Causes

[From Bill Powers (961003.0700 MDT)]

Bob Franza (961003) --

Works of Aristotle, W.D.Ross [editor of translation], Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 2nd edition, 1928.

There's a radical notion -- cite the source. Thanks!

It's good to see the source because, among other things, one sees how much
room for ambiguity there is as people try to untangle the language structure
(I suppose that in the original Greek it's all clearer, not that the
original Greek would do me any good).

The Fourth Cause is the clearest: that for the sake of which we act. No
mistaking the reference condition and control system lurking behind the
scenes. The Third is also clear: "the source of the movement", or as we
would say now, the input of which the result is the output. Number Two is
pretty fuzzy, but I think we could translate it into "the form of the
function connecting input to output." Number One is beyond me: the materials
of which something is made don't seem to me to cause anything in particular
to be made.

Of course as the citation shows us, Artistotle wasn't trying to tell us what
"cause" really is: "These, then, are practically all the senses in which
causes are spoken of" is what he says. By laying out these quite different
senses of the term, Artistotle shows that "cause" doesn't have a single
meaning, but four distinct meanings with nothing in common.

Got any comments on "control systems in the DNA", Bob?

Best,

Bill P.

It's nice to see discussions of Aristotle (and I've enjoyed
reading the commentaries on Dewey and James).

I've always thought of Aristotle's Causes in terms of
modes of explanation, different means of explaining
why things are the way that they are.

As such, they are independent ways of looking
at the world, of answering fundamentally different
kinds of questions. Some of the modes of explanation
may not apply to a particular object or event.

See D.W. Graham's excellent book Aristotle's Two Systems
Oxford U. Press, 1987. In it he gives (p. 73) several
examples:

Q1: Why is the statue heavy?
Q2: Why is this a triangle?
Q3: Why did the rock fall?
Q4: Why did Socrates go for a walk?

to which there are answers [brackets are mine, pc].

A1: Because it is made of bronze. [material cause]
A2: Because it has three angles. [formal cause]
A3: Because someone pushed it. [efficient cause]
A4: Because he wanted to digest his food. [final cause]

The statue is heavy by virtue of its material
composition and properties.

The figure is a triangle by virtue of its form
(formal) properties.

The rock moved because some other agent acted on it.

Socrates walked because he is a perceptual control
system with particular reference states that were
being controlled for (i.e. by virtue of his functional
organization as a purposive, control system and the
particular purposes that are being acted on).

It would be meaningless to explain why a figure is a
triangle in terms of its material properties, as
it would be meaningless to answer the question of
why the statue is heavy in terms of its form
(i.e. Michelangelo's "David"). The behavior of a
rock is not explanable in terms of a control
system, because the rock does not have a
functional organization that would make the terms
of such an explanation appropriate.

I think this interpretation makes Aristotle's arguments
much more coherent (and powerful) than they otherwise
would appear.

I'm sure someone out there could map these modes of
explanation onto current PCT categories/concepts: e.g.
when the behavior of an object is describable in terms
of a control system and when it is describable in some
other terms (composition, form, external perturbations).

Peter Cariani
peter@epl.meei.harvard.edu

[From Bill Powers (961003.1235 MDT)]

Peter Cariani (961003) --

The statue is heavy by virtue of its material
composition and properties.

The figure is a triangle by virtue of its form
(formal) properties.

The rock moved because some other agent acted on it.

Socrates walked because he is a perceptual control
system with particular reference states that were
being controlled for (i.e. by virtue of his functional
organization as a purposive, control system and the
particular purposes that are being acted on).

Very nice and clear, Peter. You don't happen to have this fellow Aristotle's
email address, do you? I think he'd enjoy the discussion.

Bill P.