Certain versus uncertain control (was Understanding control of behavior)

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.30.1640)]

RM: I’ve changed the subject head because I think I may have found what seems like a very satisfying compromise position on the “control of behavior” debate.

···

On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 8:08 AM, “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

RM: But there is a lesson here. And that is that, because we are control systems, we can’t help trying to be in control and among the most important things that we try to control is the behavior of other people.

HB : I can agree. Emphases is on »try« to control«, but you can’t control behavior of other people.

RM: You can, but certainly not as reliably as you can control the behavior of non-living systems. Maybe that’s where the sticking point is in this discussion. It’s not that you can’t control the behavior of a living control system; it’s just that you can’t control that behavior as reliably as you can control the behavior of a non-living system, such as the temperature of the water in your morning shower.

Control of a variable, X, requires that the controller’s output have a reliable effect on X. This is the feedback connection in a control loop. When the feedback connection from output to controlled variable, X, is causal, then control of X can be certain. This is the case when we control the behavior of a non-living system. For example, such a connection exists between your handle turns (outputs) and the temperature of the shower water (X). Unless there is a problem with the plumbing, turning the handles one way will reliably increase and turning them the other way will reliably decrease the temperature of the water. This reliable, causal connection between your outputs and the state of the controlled variable means that you can control the water temperature with certainty as long as you know in which direction to turn each handle to increase and decrease the water temperature.

RM: When the feedback connection from output to controlled variable is not causal then control will be uncertain. This is the case when we control the behavior of a living control system. The feedback connection between the controller’s output and the behavior that is controlled, X, is not a causal connection! Rather, it depends on the controllee controlling a particular variable. For example, in the rubber band demo, E’s (the controller’s) connection to the controlled variable, X (the position of S’s finger) depends on S controlling a variable (distance between knot and coin) to which E’s output is a disturbance. This makes the connection between E’s output (pulls on E’s end of the rubber bands) and X (S’s finger movements) non-causal because S can, for whatever reason, stop controlling the variable to which E’s outputs are a disturbance. When this happens E losses control of S’s finger movement. This was not the case with the shower water, since the handles can’t autonomously decide all on their own to stop increasing or decreasing the flow of water when you turn them appropriately (although they can break, so even control of the behavior of a non-living system isn’t completely certain).

RM: So if you are arguing that it is not possible to control the behavior of a living control system with certainly, then I agree. Control of the behavior of a living control system is uncertain, unlike the way it is (almost always) certain when you are controlling the behavior of a non-living system. And this is because the feedback connection from the controller’s output to the controlled variable (behavior) is causal in non-living control systems but not in living control systems. How about that as a compromise? We can control the behavior of living organisms. But because we are not causally connected to the behavior of these systems we can’t control their behavior with certainty, in the way that we can control the behavior of non-living systems, where our outputs can be causally connected to the variables we want to control.

RM : I think we are unaware of how often we are involved in controlling other people’s behavior because the behavior of the people we want to control is usually what we would like it to be.

HB: I really don’t understand how can we be involved often in »controlling other people’s behavior« if most constantly people »control their perception« which can be disturbed in different ways. Remember you corrected *barb :

RM: People are always controlling and among the the perceptions they control (or try to contro) is the behavior of other people. I agree that our efforts to control others are often unsuccessful – indeed, as I mention above, control of the behavior of a living control system is not deterministic in the way that control of the behavior of a non-living system can be. It’s still control when it works. But I can see your problem with the word “control” in this context; control of the behavior of a living organism is not the same as control of the behavior of a non-living system.

RM: But I do occasionally have students who are engaged in disruptive behavior – such as fairly loud conversations while I am lecturing – and then my controlling is revealed in the fact that I take action (usually by just stopping my lecture and looking at the offending students) aimed at stopping the behavior – controlling that is virtually always successful.

HB : You didn’t control their behavior.

RM: I gave the example to demonstrate my own controlling, not necessarily my control over others (though I did control them in this case) . I am always controlling for having an orderly class. Since my class is usually orderly – my perception of the orderliness of the class is typically close to my reference for what it should be – I rarely have to do anything to try to get the perception of orderliness back to my reference specification for it. So it can seem (to onlookers and to myself) that I am not controlling for an orderly class since I am generally not doing anything to maintain order. (It’s like what would happen if the cursor in a tracking task just stayed at the target; I would be making no movements of the mouse to keep it at the target so it might seem to an onlooker that I’m not controlling for keeping the cursor on target). But my controlling – the fact that I am controlling for a perception of an orderly class – is revealed when there is a disturbance – the disorderly students – to that perception. If I weren’t controlling for an orderly class, the students talking and making noise would not be a disturbance and I would do nothing.

RM: When I do do something and the students quiet down I have indeed controlled their behavior since my goal was to get their behavior back to “orderly”. But, as I said above, this controlling is not deterministic; the students could have said “screw you” and kept on talking. But they didn’t this time (and, actually, I’ve never had that happen) but it’s always a possibility. So in this sense my control of the students behavior is considerably less deterministic than my control of the behavior of my felt tip pen as it writes my brilliant thoughts on the white board.

Best

Rick

You disturbed their »control of perception«. Students control perceptions which you can’t even think off, during your lectures. You don’t know what they are controlling. Maybe one is thinking how to eliminate you, or do something to your car. Even if you think that you »controlled their behavior«, you don’t really know what »perceptions they are really controling« during your hours. But you have »perceptual illusion« that you »controlled« their behavior, which you are mixing with the way they stopped »disturbing« some of your important perceptions. Students control on many levels, and it’s hard to say which perception did you disturb with »just stopping my lecture and looking at the offending students«. But I hope that you don’t think that you were the »cause« of stopping them »control some perception« that disturbed yours. There is whole array of levels and references and I really wonder why they really stopped. Maybe affraid of punishment, or that Institution will inform parents after you »complaint« or maybe that you will give them bad marks. Who knows which important perceptions did you disturbed. But one thing is sure. You didn’t for a moment »controlled their behavior«. Because even they can’t do that. It’s just your perceptual illusion. Everything is in »control of perception«.

Best,

Boris


Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

Shakespeare, Twelfth Night

[From MK (2014.12.01.0715 CET)]

Thanks, Rick. Thinking about control in terms of how certain or uncertain it is depending on whether the controlled variable is related to a non-living or living thing seems useful.

M

I like it too, although I can see exceptions. For example a very poorly constructed non-living machine might be uncertain in it response because it is unreliably constructed. Or it could even have some randomness or noise built in. Conversely, when living things have very rigid control systems relative to the controller (e.g. a worm's desire for water), there can be more certainty than when trying to control a more sophisticated living system (e.g. a person's desire for water in a socially complex context). So surely there is a continuum of certainty for both living and non-living objects of control attempts?
Warren

···

On 1 Dec 2014, at 06:13, MK (perceptualposts@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu> wrote:

[From MK (2014.12.01.0715 CET)]

Thanks, Rick. Thinking about control in terms of how certain or uncertain it is depending on whether the controlled variable is related to a non-living or living thing seems useful.

M

[From Fred Nickols (2014.12.01.0825 EST)]

Thanks to Rick’s post about certainty-uncertainty I think I get it but I’ll let Rick et al be the judges of that.

It seems reasonable to say that other people’s behavior is a variable. As such I can target it for control as would be the case if I wanted them to display or not display specific behaviors.

However, they are the ones doing the behaving, not me, and if their behaviors are to match my reference they must adopt that reference as their own. If they do, and assuming there are no overwhelming disturbances, their behaviors will match my reference – and theirs.

So I am perfectly willing to say that I (and others) are often controlling for having the behavior of other people (LCSs) match my reference. I am also willing to say that, on many occasions, I (and others) are successful. But that success owes to getting other people to adopt my reference for their behavior.

I like Warren’s comment about a continuum ranging from certain to uncertain. On my part I will consider all this in terms of the probability of control and by “control� I mean “bringing some variable to a reference state and keeping it there.�

All that said, even when I succeed in getting other people to behave in ways I want they are the ones doing the behaving, not me.

Back to finger position. Achieving a specified finger position and maintaining involves behaving. The finger position itself is not behavior per se; it is an outcome or effect of behavior. I can probably get you to place your finger in a specified position – assuming you are agreeable and we have the same understandiing of what that position is. Using my own muscles I could probably place your finger in the specified position – again, assuming you aree agreeable. For now, I will continue to think of finger position as the outcome or result of behavior, not behavior per se.

Lastly, let’s contrast the ordinary definition of control with the PCT definition.

Ordinary:Â (v) to exercise restraining or directing influence over

PCT: (n) Achievement and maintenance of a preselected perceptual state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances (as a verb, I think the PCT definition of control is probably something like this: “Achieving and maintaining a preselected perceptual state in the controlling system… ?)

In both senses, we can and do attempt to control other people’s behavior. Our probability of success varies.

Fred Nickols

···

From: Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) [mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu]
Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 7:42 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Richard Marken
Subject: Certain versus uncertain control (was Understanding control of behavior)

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.30.1640)]

RM: I’ve changed the subject head because I think I may have found what seems like a very satisfying compromise position on the “control of behavior” debate.

On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 8:08 AM, “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

RM: But there is a lesson here. And that is that, because we are control systems, we can’t help trying to be in control and among the most important things that we try to control is the behavior of other people.

HB : I can agree. Emphases is on »try« to control«, but you can’t control behavior of other people.

RM: You can, but certainly not as reliably as you can control the behavior of non-living systems. Maybe that’s where the sticking point is in this discussion. It’s not that you can’t control the behavior of a living control system; it’s just that you can’t control that behavior as reliably as you can control the behavior of a non-living system, such as the temperature of the water in your morning shower.

Control of a variable, X, requires that the controller’s output have a reliable effect on X. This is the feedback connection in a control loop. When the feedback connection from output to controlled variable, X, is causal, then control of X can be certain. This is the case when we control the behavior of a non-living system. For example, such a connection exists between your handle turns (outputs) and the temperature of the shower water (X). Unless there is a problem with the plumbing, turning the handles one way will reliably increase and turning them the other way will reliably decrease the temperature of the water. This reliable, causal connection between your outputs and the state of the controlled variable means that you can control the water temperature with certainty as long as you know in which direction to turn each handle to increase and decrease the water temperature.

RM: When the feedback connection from output to controlled variable is not causal then control will be uncertain. This is the case when we control the behavior of a living control system. The feedback connection between the controller’s output and the behavior that is controlled, X, is not a causal connection! Rather, it depends on the controllee controlling a particular variable. For example, in the rubber band demo, E’s (the controller’s) connection to the controlled variable, X (the position of S’s finger) depends on S controlling a variable (distance between knot and coin) to which E’s output is a disturbance. This makes the connection between E’s output (pulls on E’s end of the rubber bands) and X (S’s finger movements) non-causal because S can, for whatever reason, stop controlling the variable to which E’s outputs are a disturbance. When this happens E losses control of S’s finger movement. This was not the case with the shower water, since the handles can’t autonomously decide all on their own to stop increasing or decreasing the flow of water when you turn them appropriately (although they can break, so even control of the behavior of a non-living system isn’t completely certain).

RM: So if you are arguing that it is not possible to control the behavior of a living control system with certainly, then I agree. Control of the behavior of a living control system is uncertain, unlike the way it is (almost always) certain when you are controlling the behavior of a non-living system. And this is because the feedback connection from the controller’s output to the controlled variable (behavior) is causal in non-living control systems but not in living control systems. How about that as a compromise? We can control the behavior of living organisms. But because we are not causally connected to the behavior of these systems we can’t control their behavior with certainty, in the way that we can control the behavior of non-living systems, where our outputs can be causally connected to the variables we want to control.

RM : I think we are unaware of how often we are involved in controlling other people’s behavior because the behavior of the people we want to control is usually what we would like it to be.

HB: I really don’t understand how can we be involved often in »controlling other people’s behavior« if most constantly people »control their perception« which can be disturbed in different ways. Remember you corrected *barb :

RM: People are always controlling and among the the perceptions they control (or try to contro) is the behavior of other people. I agree that our efforts to control others are often unsuccessful – indeed, as I mention above, control of the behavior of a living control system is not deterministic in the way that control of the behavior of a non-living system can be. It’s still control when it works. But I can see your problem with the word “control” in this context; control of the behavior of a living organism is not the same as control of the behavior of a non-living system.

RM: But I do occasionally have students who are engaged in disruptive behavior – such as fairly loud conversations while I am lecturing – and then my controlling is revealed in the fact that I take action (usually by just stopping my lecture and looking at the offending students) aimed at stopping the behavior – controlling that is virtually always successful.

HB : You didn’t control their behavior.

RM: I gave the example to demonstrate my own controlling, not necessarily my control over others (though I did control them in this case) . I am always controlling for having an orderly class. Since my class is usually orderly – my perception of the orderliness of the class is typically close to my reference for what it should be – I rarely have to do anything to try to get the perception of orderliness back to my reference specification for it. So it can seem (to onlookers and to myself) that I am not controlling for an orderly class since I am generally not doing anything to maintain order. (It’s like what would happen if the cursor in a tracking task just stayed at the target; I would be making no movements of the mouse to keep it at the target so it might seem to an onlooker that I’m not controlling for keeping the cursor on target). But my controlling – the fact that I am controlling for a perception of an orderly class – is revealed when there is a disturbance – the disorderly students – to that perception. If I weren’t controlling for an orderly class, the students talking and making noise would not be a disturbance and I would do nothing.

RM: When I do do something and the students quiet down I have indeed controlled their behavior since my goal was to get their behavior back to “orderly”. But, as I said above, this controlling is not deterministic; the students could have said “screw you” and kept on talking. But they didn’t this time (and, actually, I’ve never had that happen) but it’s always a possibility. So in this sense my control of the students behavior is considerably less deterministic than my control of the behavior of my felt tip pen as it writes my brilliant thoughts on the white board.

Best

Rick

You disturbed their »control of perception«. Students control perceptions which you can’t even think off, during your lectures. You don’t know what they are controlling. Maybe one is thinking how to eliminate you, or do something to your car. Even if you think that you »controlled their behavior«, you don’t really know what »perceptions they are really controling« during your hours. But you have »perceptual illusion« that you »controlled« their behavior, which you are mixing with the way they stopped »disturbing« some of your important perceptions. Students control on many levels, and it’s hard to say which perception did you disturb with »just stopping my lecture and looking at the offending students«. But I hope that you don’t think that you were the »cause« of stopping them »control some perception« that disturbed yours. There is whole array of levels and references and I really wonder why they really stopped. Maybe affraid of punishment, or that Institution will inform parents after you »complaint« or maybe that you will give them bad marks. Who knows which important perceptions did you disturbed. But one thing is sure. You didn’t for a moment »controlled their behavior«. Because even they can’t do that. It’s just your perceptual illusion. Everything is in »control of perception«.

Best,

Boris

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

Shakespeare, Twelfth Night

  1. why replace the distinction between circular (FB) and linear (SR) causality with the notion of living/non-living systems and certain or uncertain causality? I doubt you’re talking about actual physics (continuum mechanics/field theory) when you refer to either living or non-living system (beware countering this statement - I’m writing a book on it ;-).Â

  2. at which level on Bill’s perceptual hierarchy is the “behavior” referred to here as "finger position" perceived/controlled. is it the intensity of the finger, or the intensity of the position of the finger, or the intensity of the reference match; is it a frequency, configuration, transition, relation, etc. perhaps you may control a finger point. but that is such a small amount of information, it only barely counts as a level one perception. Â

···

On Monday, December 1, 2014, “Fred Nickols” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2014.12.01.0825 EST)]

Â

Thanks to Rick’s post about certainty-uncertainty I think I get it but I’ll let Rick et al be the judges of that.

Â

It seems reasonable to say that other people’s behavior is a variable. As such I can target it for control as would be the case if I wanted them to display or not display specific behaviors.

Â

However, they are the ones doing the behaving, not me, and if their behaviors are to match my reference they must adopt that reference as their own. If they do, and assuming there are no overwhelming disturbances, their behaviors will match my reference – and theirs.<

Â

So I am perfectly willing to say that I (and others) are often controlling for having the behavior of other people (LCSs) match my reference. I am also willing to say that, on many occasions, I (and others) are successful. But that success owes to getting other people to adopt my reference for their behavior.

Â

I like Warren’s comment about a continuum ranging from certain to uncertain. On my part I will consider all this in terms of the probability of control and by “control� I mean “bringing some variable to a reference state and keeping it there.�

Â

All that said, even when I succeed in getting other people to behave in ways I want they are the ones doing the behaving, not me.

Â

Back to finger position. Achieving a specified finger position and maintaining involves behaving. The finger position itself is not behavior per se; it is an outcome or effect of behavior. I can probably get you to place your finger in a specified position –“ assuming you are agreeable and we have the same understanding of what that position is. Using my own muscles I could probably place your finger in the specified position – again, assuming you are agreeable. For now, I will continue to think of finger position as the outcome or result of behavior, not behavior per se.

Â

Lastly, let’s contrast the ordinary definition of control with the PCT definition.

Â

Ordinary:Â (v) to exercise restraining or directing influence over

Â

PCT: (n) Achievement and maintenance of a preselected perceptual state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances (as a verb, I think the PCT definition of control is probably something like this: “Achieving and maintaining a preselected perceptual state in the controlling system…â€?)/u>

Â

In both senses, we can and do attempt to control other people’s behavior. Our probability of success varies.

Â

Fred Nickols

Â

Â

From: Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) [mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu]
Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 7:42 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Richard Marken
Subject: Certain versus uncertain control (was Understanding control of behavior)

Â

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.30.1640)]

Â

RM: I’ve changed the subject head because I think I may have found what seems like a very satisfying compromise position on the “control of behavior” debate.Â

Â

On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 8:08 AM, “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

Â

 RM: But there is a lesson here. And that is that, because we are control systems,  we can’t help trying to be in control and among the most important things that we try to control is the behavior of other people.

Â

HB : I can agree. Emphases is on »try« to control«, but you can’t control behavior of other people.

Â

RM: You can, but certainly not as reliably as you can control the behavior of non-living systems. Maybe that’s where the sticking point is in this discussion. It’s not that you can’t control the behavior of a living control system; it’s just that you can’t control that behavior as reliably as you can control the behavior of a non-living system, such as the temperature of the water in your morning shower.Â

Â

Control of a variable, X, requires that the controller’s output have a reliable effect on X. This is the feedback connection in a control loop. When the feedback connection from output to controlled variable, X, is causal, then control of X can be certain. This is the case when we control the behavior of a non-living system. For example, such a connection exists between your handle turns (outputs) and the temperature of the shower water (X). Unless there is a problem with the plumbing, turning the handles one way will reliably increase and turning them the other way will reliably decrease the temperature of the water. This reliable, causal connection between your outputs and the state of the controlled variable means that you can control the water temperature with certainty as long as you know in which direction to turn each handle to increase and decrease the water temperature.Â

Â

RM: When the feedback connection from output to controlled variable is not causal then control will be uncertain. This is the case when we control the behavior of a living control system. The feedback connection between the controller’s output and the behavior that is controlled, X, is not a causal connection! Rather, it depends on the controllee controlling a particular variable. For example, in the rubber band demo, E’s (the controller’s) connection to the controlled variable, Â X (the position of S’s finger) depends on S controlling a variable (distance between knot and coin) to which E’s output is a disturbance. This makes the connection between E’s output (pulls on E’s end of the rubber bands) and X (S’s finger movements) non-causal because S can, for whatever reason, stop controlling the variable to which E’s outputs are a disturbance. When this happens E losses control of S’s finger movement. This was not the case with the shower water, since the handles can’t autonomously decide all on their own to stop increasing or decreasing the flow of water when you turn them appropriately (although they can break, so even control of the behavior of a non-living system isn’t completely certain).

Â

RM: So if you are arguing that it is not possible to control the behavior of a living control system with certainly, then I agree. Control of the behavior of a living control system is uncertain, unlike the way it is (almost always) certain when you are controlling the behavior of a non-living system. And this is because the feedback connection from the controller’s output to the controlled variable (behavior) is causal in non-living control systems but not in living control systems. How about that as a compromise? We can control the behavior of living organisms. But because we are not causally connected to the behavior of these systems we can’t control their behavior with certainty, in the way that we can control the behavior of non-living systems, where our outputs can be causally connected to the variables we want to control.

Â

 RM : I think we are unaware of how often we are involved in controlling other people’s behavior because the behavior of the people we want to control is usually what we would like it to be.

Â

HB: I really don’t understand how can we be involved often in »controlling other people’s behavior« if most constantly people »control their perception« which can be disturbed in different ways. Remember you corrected *barb :

Â

RM: People are always controlling and among the the perceptions they control (or try to contro) is the behavior of other people. I agree that our efforts to control others are often unsuccessful – indeed, as I mention above, control of the behavior of a living control system is not deterministic in the way that control of the behavior of a non-living system can be. It’s still control when it works. But I can see your problem with the word “control” in this context; control of the behavior of a living organism is not the same as control of the behavior of a non-living system.

Â

RM:Â But I do occasionally have students who are engaged in disruptive behavior – such as fairly loud conversations while I am lecturing – and then my controlling is revealed in the fact that I take action (usually by just stopping my lecture and looking at the offending students) aimed at stopping the behavior – controlling that is virtually always successful.

Â

HB :Â You didn’t control their behavior.

Â

RM: I gave the example to demonstrate my own controlling, not necessarily my control over others (though I did control them in this case) . I am always controlling for having an orderly class. Since my class is usually orderly – my perception of the orderliness of the class is typically close to my reference for what it should be – I rarely have to do anything to try to get the perception of orderliness back to my reference specification for it. So it can seem (to onlookers and to myself) that I am not controlling for an orderly class since I am generally not doing anything to maintain order. (It’s like what would happen if the cursor in a tracking task just stayed at the target; I would be making no movements of the mouse to keep it at the target so it might seem to an onlooker that I’m not controlling for keeping the cursor on target). But my controlling – the fact that I am controlling for a perception of an orderly class  –  is revealed when there is a disturbance – the disorderly students –  to that perception. If I weren’t controlling for an orderly class, the students talking and making noise would not be a disturbance and I would do nothing.Â

Â

RM: When I do do something and the students quiet down I have indeed controlled their behavior since my goal was to get their behavior back to “orderly”. But, as I said above, this controlling is not deterministic; the students could have said “screw you” and kept on talking. But they didn’t this time (and, actually, I’ve never had that happen) but it’s always a possibility. So in this sense my control of the students behavior is considerably less deterministic than my control of the behavior of my felt tip pen as it writes my brilliant thoughts on the white board.Â

Â

BestÂ

Â

Rick

Â

You disturbed their »control of perception«. Students control perceptions which you can’t even think off, during your lectures. You don’t know what they are controlling. Maybe one is thinking how to eliminate you, or do something to your car. Even if you think that you »controlled their behavior«, you don’t really know what »perceptions they are really controling« during your hours. But you have »perceptual illusion« that you »controlled« their behavior, which you are mixing with the way they  stopped »disturbing« some of your important perceptions. Students control on many levels, and it’s hard to say which perception did you disturb with »just stopping my lecture and looking at the offending students«. But I hope that you don’t think that you were the »cause« of stopping them »control some perception« that disturbed yours. There is whole array of levels and references and I really wonder why they really stopped. Maybe affraid of punishment, or that Institution will inform parents after you »complaint« or maybe that you will give them bad marks. Who knows which important perceptions did you disturbed. But one thing is sure. You didn’t for a moment »controlled their behavior«. Because even they can’t do that. It’s just your perceptual illusion. Everything is in »control of perception«.

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of  Doing Research on Purpose

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

Â

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

               Shakespeare, Twelfth Night

[Martin Taylor 2014.12.01.13.05]

I'm not clear why you make this distinction between living and

non-living. Sure, S in the elastic band demo could choose to walk
away, but that’s just breaking the loop in the same way that the
loop of your thermostat would be broken if a wire came loose. S
could choose to vary her reference position for the knot, which E
could counter, at the cost of some reduction in the accuracy of
control (a lot of loss if S’s variation was fast), but that’s just
the same as controlling the temperature by way of the thermostat
when the fuel supply to the furnace is contaminated and the building
has appreciable thermal inertia.
By the way, I find that controlling the temperature of the water in
my morning shower is quite difficult. The problem is that there are
two thermostats in the loop (both non-living). Martin

···

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.30.1640)]

      RM: I've changed the subject head because I think I may

have found what seems like a very satisfying compromise
position on the “control of behavior” debate.

          On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 8:08 AM,

“Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
wrote:

                   RM:

But there is a lesson here. And that is that,
because we are control systems, we can’t help
trying to be in control and among the most
important things that we try to control is the
behavior of other people.

                    HB

: I
can agree. Emphases is on »try« to control«, but
you can’t control behavior of other people.

            RM: You can, but certainly not as reliably as you can

control the behavior of non-living systems. Maybe
that’s where the sticking point is in this discussion.
It’s not that you can’t control the behavior of a living
control system; it’s just that you can’t control that
behavior as reliably as you can control the behavior of
a non-living system, such as the temperature of the
water in your morning shower.

[From Richard Pfau (2014.12.02 10:40 Nepal Time]

Ref: [From Fred Nickols (2014.12.01.0825 EST)]

FN: So I am perfectly willing to say that I (and others) are often controlling for having the behavior of other people (LCSs) match my reference. I am also willing to say that, on many occasions, I (and others) are successful. But that success owes to getting other people to adopt my reference for their behavior. [Note: bold type added by RP]

RP: Not necessarily. Don’t forget that the same behavior may serve different references. For example, I may withdraw money from an ATM (a) to have money in my pocket (to ease my anxiety of having nothing there), (b) to go grocery shopping (to obtain food), © to pay a debt that I owe someone, (d) to save my wife’s life (by giving money to a criminal who has a gun to her head and want’s money), … In some cases the references of the two persons may be similar, but in other cases they may be quite different (as in case “d” where your reference may be to save your wife’s life, and the criminal’s reference may be to obtain money to buy drugs). And so “success” in perceiving that we have controlled the behavior of other people can occur, even though our references and theirs may be quite different.

With Regards,

Richard Pfau

[Martin Taylor 2014.12.02.00.03]

No. Matching between their reference value and yours has nothing to

do with it. Consider the elastic band experiment. E is controlling a
perception of where S’s end of the knot is, while S is controlling a
perception of the distance of the knot on the band from a reference
point.
If you want to control a perception of someone’s actions, all that
is necessary is for you to arrange that their actions match your
reference for your perception of their actions. Why they do those
actions is their business, but if you are controlling your
perception of their actions, you probably are disturbing one or more
perceptions they are controlling. (Aside: You might not be actively disturbing a perception they
control, but might just be taking advantage of something you
perceive to be in their environment that you expect them to control;
as Kent said, you might just be easing one path and making another
more difficult, having guessed well about something they would be
controlling.)
Martin

···
        [From

Fred Nickols (2014.12.01.0825 EST)]

        It

seems reasonable to say that other people’s behavior is a
variable. As such I can target it for control as would be
the case if I wanted them to display or not display specific
behaviors.

        However,

they are the ones doing the behaving, not me, and if their
behaviors are to match my reference they must adopt that
reference as their own.