Changing the foundations of PCT (was Testing for Control In Experiments)

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2010.08.11.14.06]

A few days ago, Bill sent a series of very strange messages to which my reaction has varied from day to day as I contemplated them. Apart from one obviously correct technical point that I will deal with in my experimental model on another thread, I was initially flabbergasted, and since then I have been by turns annoyed, puzzled, worried and generally at a loss as to how to respond. I will not respond to the main themes here. This message is only about Bill's radical redefinition of PCT, which once meant "PERCEPTUAL Control Theory", and now seems to mean something quite different, at least to Bill.

[From Bill Powers (2010.08.07.0210 MDT)]RM: I also don't agree with calling p[p[S]-A] a controlled variable.

MMT: Of course it is a controlled variable. Just as with any control system, the output signal influences the perceptual signal, and changes its value to approach its reference value. What's not a controlled variable about that?

RM: Bill addressed this in his comments earlier. A controlled variable (in PCT) has an environmental correlate, the controlled quantity, which can be detected by an experimenter.

MMT: The controlled quantity is ALWAYS a perception, never an environmental variable. That's PCT 101, first lesson.

BP: Here we go again. Rick is defining a controlled variable as something the external observer can see. If you would read his words that would be obvious.

Yes, it was blindingly obvious.

It was equally obvious that the idea violates the foundations of PCT, which is why I wrote my correction: "The controlled quantity is ALWAYS a perception, never an environmental variable. That's PCT 101, first lesson."

If for some reason you no longer think that perceptions are the only variables that can be controlled, and that environmental variables ("something the external observer can see") also can be controlled, I'm afraid I cannot agree. Your PCT has fallen into the supernatural void. Failing some clairvoyant abilities in the subject that would allow the true state of an externally observable variable to serve as the input to the comparator of a control system, the perceptual signal is the only way that the control unit can get information about the state of ANYTHING the external observer can see. I know you have considerable disdain for "conventional" science and scientists, but I think this change to the foundation of PCT goes too far beyond the bounds of normal (or quantum) physics, even for you.

If, as has seemed the case recently, you are controlling strongly for perceiving me to be wrong in just about everything I write, nevertheless it seems a bit extreme to use your authority as originator to alter the very foundations of Perceptual Control Theory as a means of controlling that perception. I don't accept it, and if this leads to a conflict (something I usually try to avoid), so be it.

For my part, I will continue to write about PCT as though only perceptions can be controlled.

Martin

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2010.08.11.1245 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2010.08.11.14.06 –

A few days ago, Bill sent a
series of very strange messages to which my reaction has varied from day
to day as I contemplated them. Apart from one obviously correct technical
point that I will deal with in my experimental model on another thread, I
was initially flabbergasted, and since then I have been by turns annoyed,
puzzled, worried and generally at a loss as to how to respond. I will not
respond to the main themes here. This message is only about Bill’s
radical redefinition of PCT, which once meant “PERCEPTUAL Control
Theory”, and now seems to mean something quite different, at least
to Bill.

That was not the intended import of my message at all. I was pointing out
that Rick was defining a controlled variable as an externally-observed or
deduced variable, whereas you were defining it as a perceptual signal
representing the value of a controlled variable. This accounted for most
of the disagreements between you. The only profitable course, it would
seem, would be for you and Rick to discuss this definitional problem and
resolve it to your mutual satisfaction. I wasn’t saying what my opinion
would have been.

I am not the PCT policeman. I have my own way of sorting out meanings and
I try to be consistent, but that is not binding on anyone but me. If
asked, I will explain why I choose my way, and I will be willing to
listen to counterproposals. But I don’t automatically assume I am
right.

The following interchange shows that you, apparently, are not willing to
have this discussion with Rick:

[RM: I also don’t agree with
calling p[p[S]-A] a controlled variable.

MMT: Of course it is a controlled variable. Just as with any control
system, the output signal influences the perceptual signal, and changes
its value to approach its reference value. What’s not a controlled
variable about that?

Your intent appears to be to bully Rick into agreeing that you are right
with no explanations or discussion and no respect for Rick’s point of
view, as well as no understanding of it. Rick’s definition also fits your
definition of a controlled variable: the controlled input quantity as the
observer sees it, is affected by the system’s output and its value is
thereby changed to approach a reference level (remembering that reference
level is defined in terms of the observer’s understanding of the
controlled quantity and its intended or preferred value).

BP: Here we go again. Rick is
defining a controlled variable as something the external observer can
see. If you would read his words that would be obvious.

MMT: Yes, it was blindingly obvious.

It was equally obvious that the idea violates the foundations of PCT,
which is why I wrote my correction: “The controlled quantity is
ALWAYS a perception, never an environmental variable. That’s PCT 101,
first lesson.”

BP: So in your opinion, it violates the foundations of PCT. In fact, your
way of saying it violates my attempt to put some order in the way we talk
about controlled variables by reserving the term “quantity” to
mean observable physical variables outside the system, and
“signal” to mean variables inside the system.
“Variable” applies equally inside and outside, so can’t be used
to distinguish the observer’s view from the organism’s view.
In fact neither the observer nor the control system can directly perceive
the nature of the controlled variable itself. Suppose the input function
is k1x1 + k2x2. The perceptual signal inside the system can’t represent
this function, because the signal is just a scalar variable with a value
like 3.6 or 135 (impulses per second as the neurologist sees it). The
observer can’t see this function, either, because all that is actually
visible from outside are x1 and x2. An infinity of different combinations
of x1 and x2 can produce any given magnitude of perceptual signal. Only
if the observer’s input device applies the same function to x1 and x2
that the observed system applies will the observer’s perceptual signal
covary with the system’s. Then both observer and system will perceive the
same magnitude of the controlled variable, but neither will know
what is actually being controlled.

To know what is being controlled, one must know the internal structure of
the perceptual input function. Evidently we can perceive, at some level,
that sort of structure. That may happen at the relationship level, if we
consider “relationship” to include the concept of
“function.” But this perception is part of a model, not a
direct perception of what goes on in the input function.

MMT: If for some reason you no
longer think that perceptions are the only variables that can be
controlled, and that environmental variables (“something the
external observer can see”) also can be controlled, I’m afraid I
cannot agree. Your PCT has fallen into the supernatural void.

The external observer can, given a set of lower-level variables and some
methodology, deduce what function of them is being controlled. Given a
target position T and a cursor position C, the observer can see that a
controlled variable can be defined as C - T. But the observer
perceives only the distance between the target and cursor, a
single scalar value, just as the person doing the tracking does.

Of course the observer can be wrong, especially if the correlations in
the data are low. It’s common for several equally defensible guesses
about the nature of a controlled variable to exist.

MMT: Failing some clairvoyant
abilities in the subject that would allow the true state of an externally
observable variable to serve as the input to the comparator of a control
system, the perceptual signal is the only way that the control unit can
get information about the state of ANYTHING the external observer can
see.

BP: Yes, and this is also the only way the observer can get information
about whatever is being controlled.

MMT: I know you have
considerable disdain for “conventional” science and scientists,
but I think this change to the foundation of PCT goes too far beyond the
bounds of normal (or quantum) physics, even for you.

BP: I have disdain for sloppy thinking that is presented as the word of
God. Sloppy thinking alone I can usually forgive or ignore. Actually,
some of my best friends are scientists, and they don’t do that very
often, as far as I know. I also have disdain for conventional science,
but “disdain” isn’t quite the right word. I’m willing to admit
that we are all doing our best and are honest about it, most of the time.
But human beings always add a lot of puffery to their own
accomplishments, so we have to discount a lot of the claims that are made
about what scientists say they know or understand. My greatest portion of
disdain is reserved for the puffery.

MMT: If, as has seemed the case
recently, you are controlling strongly for perceiving me to be wrong in
just about everything I write, nevertheless it seems a bit extreme to use
your authority as originator to alter the very foundations of Perceptual
Control Theory as a means of controlling that perception. I don’t accept
it, and if this leads to a conflict (something I usually try to avoid),
so be it.

BP: My objectives are strictly a matter of your interpretation in this
case. I was not favoring Rick’s view, only pointing out that it exists
and deserves to be dealt with. I didn’t say what the
“authoritative” view would be.

MMT: For my part, I will
continue to write about PCT as though only perceptions can be
controlled.

I sympathize with your frustration, even if it’s mostly your own doing.
Reorganizing is uncomfortable. Most of your misinterpretations, of which
there have been many lately, have brought out hidden assumptions that
have now become the subject of discussion. That’s where the heat has been
coming from, not from any outside source.

Best,

Bill P.

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2010.08.18. 14.48]

I'm still out of town, but I have just read the following:

[From Bill Powers (2010.08.11.1245 MDT)]

  Martin Taylor 2010.08.11.14.06 --

    A few days ago, Bill

sent a
series of very strange messages to which my reaction has varied
from day
to day as I contemplated them. Apart from one obviously correct
technical
point that I will deal with in my experimental model on another
thread, I
was initially flabbergasted, and since then I have been by turns
annoyed,
puzzled, worried and generally at a loss as to how to respond. I
will not
respond to the main themes here. This message is only about
Bill’s
radical redefinition of PCT, which once meant “PERCEPTUAL
Control
Theory”, and now seems to mean something quite different, at
least
to Bill.

  That was not the intended import of my message at all. I was

pointing out
that Rick was defining a controlled variable as an
externally-observed or
deduced variable, whereas you were defining it as a perceptual
signal
representing the value of a controlled variable.

When you say "A perceptual signal representing the value of a

controlled variable", it sounds very much to me as though you are
saying that “the controlled variable” is NOT the value of the
perceptual signal.

For nearly two decades, I have been under a misapprehension, then,

that the ONLY controlled variable in PCT was the value of the
perceptual signal. My understanding of basic physics, however, leads
me to believe that whatever the Powers-Marken version of PCT may
from time to time redetermine, the science of control argues that my
twenty-year understanding is the correct one. I see no possibility
for controlling anything other than the value of a perceptual
signal, an implication carried even by the very title: “Behaviour,
the control of perception”.

I had expected that rather than jumping down my throat for

(correctly) calling Rick out when he “defined” a controlled variable
as something detectable by an external observer, you would remind
him that “Perceptual Control Theory” demands that the controlled
variable is and is only a perception.

  This accounted for most

of the disagreements between you.

Indeed. You aren't the only person who noted that fact.

  The following interchange shows that you, apparently, are not

willing to
have this discussion with Rick:

      [RM: I also don't

agree with
calling p[p[S]-A] a controlled variable.

        MMT: Of course it is a controlled variable. Just as with any

control
system, the output signal influences the perceptual signal,
and changes
its value to approach its reference value. What’s not a
controlled
variable about that?

  Your intent appears to be to bully Rick into agreeing that you are

right
with no explanations or discussion and no respect for Rick’s point
of
view, as well as no understanding of it.

I think I included a complete explanation, didn't I. You even quoted

it: “the output signal influences the perceptual signal, and changes
its value to approach its reference value.” What more explanation is
needed?

I understand Rick's point of view very well (so far as I am able to

determine). His point of view is that there is no control if the
input to the perceptual function of a control system is not
observable by an external observer. I “bullied” Rick by referring to
a foundational principle of PCT, one you expound at some length
later in the message to which I am responding, that the perceptual
function has no way of knowing where its signals come from, and
still less does the controlled variable (the perceptual signal)
convey any such information.

I rather suspect that if the roles were reversed, and it was Rick

reminding me rather than me reminding Rick, that all behaviour is
the control of perception and not of environmental variables, it
would not be Rick you would be correcting.

  Rick's definition also fits your

definition of a controlled variable: the controlled input quantity
as the
observer sees it, is affected by the system’s output and its value
is
thereby changed to approach a reference level (remembering that
reference
level is defined in terms of the observer’s understanding
of the
controlled quantity and its intended or preferred value).

All you say here is that perceptual variables are influenced by

feedback pathways from the control system’s output, without
reference to how those signals get from the output to the perceptual
input function. By implication, it is possible that on some
occasions those feedback pathways may go through the external
environment and create effects observable by an external observer.
Nobody has disputed any of that, except possibly Rick. (Or, maybe
that’s not what you meant, given your later distinction between
“quantity” and “variable”.) Rick’s “definition” says that ALL
control is of the environmental variables (or, giving an extremely
charitable interpretation of preceding statements by Rick, of
perceptual variables whose values are determined by externally
observable variables).

I'm puzzled by "reference

level is defined in terms of the observer’s understanding of
the
controlled quantity and its intended or preferred value". What does
an observer have to do with the reference level of a control unit?
To bring an observer into the definition of “reference level” seems
very odd. Hitherto, it has just been a value input to the comparator
of a control unit, for comparison with the perceptual signal value.
No observer needed or implied. Where did this “observer” in the
definition spring from?

      BP: Here we go

again. Rick is
defining a controlled variable as something the external
observer can
see. If you would read his words that would be obvious.

    MMT: Yes, it was blindingly obvious.



    It was equally obvious that the idea violates the foundations of

PCT,
which is why I wrote my correction: “The controlled quantity is
ALWAYS a perception, never an environmental variable. That’s PCT
101,
first lesson.”

  BP: So in your opinion, it violates the foundations of PCT.

But it doesn't violate yours? My understanding that this was the

case was the reason I changed the subject line to “Changing the
foundations of PCT”.

Here's how I bullied Rick in my continuation of "The controlled

quantity is ALWAYS a perception, never an environmental variable.
That’s PCT 101, first lesson." The bullying commences thus:“as Bill
corrected me in the partner thread, the output of a control unit
knows or cares nothing about where its signal goes. Control exists
if the output influences the perception. If the influence of the
output reaches the perception through the external environment, so
be it. If the influence of the output reaches the perception by way
of an internal connection we call imagination, so be it. If the
influence of the output reaches the perception both through the
external environment and through internal pathways, so be it. Any
which way, it’s irrelevant to the control unit.”

But of course, that bullying comment contradicts Rick's definition,

for which I suppose I should apologise.

  In fact, your

way of saying it violates my attempt to put some order in the way
we talk
about controlled variables by reserving the term “quantity” to
mean observable physical variables outside the system, and
“signal” to mean variables inside the system.
“Variable” applies equally inside and outside, so can’t be used
to distinguish the observer’s view from the organism’s view.

??? Who cares about the observer's view unless the observer is part

of the object of study? When you are dealing with the
observer-observed system, of course the observer matters. But why
bring the observer into a discussion of which variable is controlled
in a single control system?

Is using the technically correct "variable" in place of your

idiosyncratically chosen “quantity” justification for your disputing
that “defining a controlled variable as something the observer can
see is a violation of the foundations of PCT?” Is that definition a
violation of the foundations of PCT, or is it not?

In what follows you begin to support my assertion that it is...

  In fact neither the observer nor the control system can directly

perceive
the nature of the controlled variable itself. …

  To know what is being controlled, one must know the internal

structure of
the perceptual input function.

You are now taking the "analyst's viewpoint", which you derided in a

message on which I still intend to comment.

  Evidently we can perceive, at some level,

that sort of structure. That may happen at the relationship level,
if we
consider “relationship” to include the concept of
“function.” But this perception is part of a model, not a
direct perception of what goes on in the input function.

Yes, indeed! That's the analyst's viewpoint all right!

    MMT: If for some

reason you no
longer think that perceptions are the only variables that can be
controlled, and that environmental variables (“something the
external observer can see”) also can be controlled, I’m afraid I
cannot agree. Your PCT has fallen into the supernatural void.

  The external observer can, given a set of lower-level variables

and some
methodology, deduce what function of them is being controlled.
Given a
target position T and a cursor position C, the observer can see
that a
controlled variable can be defined as C - T. But the observer
perceives only the distance between the target and cursor,
a
single scalar value, just as the person doing the tracking does.

  Of course the observer can be wrong, especially if the

correlations in
the data are low. It’s common for several equally defensible
guesses
about the nature of a controlled variable to exist.

Now we are going into the process whereby an observer becomes an

analyst. What you say is true, so far as I can see, but isn’t it a
bit off the track? The point is, as you seem to concede, that the
perceptual variable is what is controlled.

    MMT: Failing some

clairvoyant
abilities in the subject that would allow the true state of an
externally
observable variable to serve as the input to the comparator of a
control
system, the perceptual signal is the only way that the control
unit can
get information about the state of ANYTHING the external
observer can
see.

  BP: Yes, and this is also the only way the observer can get

information
about whatever is being controlled.

Yes, indeed. But why concern yourself with a hypothetical observer?

Is it a phiosophical question like “If a tree falls in a forest with
nobody near, does it make any sound?” If a person acts without an
observer to see, is the person controlling?

    MMT: For my part, I

will
continue to write about PCT as though only perceptions can be
controlled.

  I sympathize with your frustration, even if it's mostly your own

doing.
Reorganizing is uncomfortable. Most of your misinterpretations, of
which
there have been many lately, have brought out hidden assumptions
that
have now become the subject of discussion.

Would you mind describing a few of these "many" misinterpretations?

Is it a misinterpretation that Rick has said (whether he believes it

or not) and that you have agreed (whether you believe it or not)
that for control to exist, some variable observable by an external
observer must be influenced by the control system’s output, and if
no such variable is influenced by the output, control does not
exist?

Here's what Rick said [From Rick Marken (2010.08.06.1630)] that

leads me to the foregoing misinterpretation: " A controlled variable
(in PCT) has an environmental correlate, the controlled quantity,
which can be detected by an experimenter. There is no environmental
correlate of p[pS]-A] (because A exists only in the subject’s
imagination) so it’s really not a controlled variable."

My misinterpretation unfortunately led me to believe that Rick was

claiming that if the inputs to a perceptual function did not come
from some particular class of sources (variables whose variation was
perceptible to an outside observer), the corresponding perception
was not controlled, regardless of the fact that it was brought to a
reference value by variation of the output of the control unit. I
hope you can explain that Rick did not mean that, because I am
unable to figure out an alternative interpretation.

In [From Bill Powers (2010.08.07.0210 MDT)] you seemed to use my

interpretation of Rick’s words, as you said: “Rick is defining a
controlled variable as something
the external observer can see. If you would read his words that
would be
obvious.” So am I misinterpreting you as agreeing that a controlled
variable CAN be something the external observer can see, and that I
am therefore wrong to say: “For my part, I will
continue to write about PCT as though only perceptions can be
controlled.”? In your view, is it the case that PCT does now allow
for control of external variables (sorry “quantities”)?

However, this is only one of my many recent misinterpretations,

which you say are all my own doing. I’d like to be made aware of the
most important of the others.

Martin

[BUSINESS_GAVIN_HERMA]

(Gavin Ritz 2010.08.19.15.41NZT)

Hi there Martin

I understand your concern
about the perceptual signals. This baffled me to until I realised the actual relationship
with physics, chem and PCT.

perceptual signal is a transduced signal (it has to be), of all incoming energy
forms and processes. There is no “matter” external variable that isn’t
transduced. Pressure, sounds, light, temperature, chemical. This relates to all
the human (and animal) modalities.

And this has repercussions
for physics and chemistry too. As then all our science is the reflection and
abstraction of the transduced signals only and that’s TRUE of science. (Perceptual signals).

The big question in my
mind is what about those signals that cannot be transduced. (Dark matter, dark
energy-most of the universe) We have no answers for non-matter concepts. No
wonder we run into immediate problems at the high levels of HPCT.

Regards

Gavin

···

From my understanding the

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2010.08.19.0748 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2010.08.18. 14.48 –

MMT: When you say “A
perceptual signal representing the value of a controlled variable”,
it sounds very much to me as though you are saying that “the
controlled variable” is NOT the value of the perceptual signal.

For nearly two decades, I have been under a misapprehension, then, that
the ONLY controlled variable in PCT was the value of the perceptual
signal. My understanding of basic physics, however, leads me to believe
that whatever the Powers-Marken version of PCT may from time to time
redetermine, the science of control argues that my twenty-year
understanding is the correct one. I see no possibility for controlling
anything other than the value of a perceptual signal, an implication
carried even by the very title: “Behaviour, the control of
perception”.

I had expected that rather than
jumping down my throat for (correctly) calling Rick out when he
“defined” a controlled variable as something detectable by an
external observer, you would remind him that “Perceptual Control
Theory” demands that the controlled variable is and is only a
perception.

BP: Sorry, but that’s not how I do things. PCT is a THEORY. It’s not a
fact. Not yet. Every demonstration is a test of the THEORY. The way we
test a theory, in my view, is to see what experimental results it
predicts, then do the experiments and compare the results with the
predictions. This means that the final criterion is observation, not
theory. Observation is the reality; theory is a guess as to what might
exist behind the observations. If (competent) observation disagrees with
theory, it is theory that is wrong.
Rick defines a controlled variable as something he can observe. Theory
says it is a perception of his own that he is observing, and that if he
sees it being controlled (resisting disturbances, etc.), that is because
the behaving system being observed also is controlling the same
perception. That is a tremendously important concept, but it still rests
on a theory that remains to be proven. Not believed in, not taken as a
matter of settled and agreed faith, not accepted because it is logical
and makes sense. There will never be a time when we can stop challenging
the theory; it is and will always remain a picture of an imagined
reality. That is true of all theories with which we try to make sense of
our experiences. It is true of the theory of electricity, of
thermodynamics, of God, of quantum mechanics, of basic physics.

BP earlier:This accounted for
most of the disagreements between you.

MMT: Indeed. You aren’t the only person who noted that
fact.

BP: Perhaps, but for the moment I seem to be the only one here who
doesn’t automatically think that his opinion counts for more than Rick’s.
If I disagree with Rick, I feel called upon to explain why, and from my
own understanding, not by citing Scripture.

…

BP earlier: Your intent appears
to be to bully Rick into agreeing that you are right with no explanations
or discussion and no respect for Rick’s point of view, as well as no
understanding of it.

MMT: I think I included a complete explanation, didn’t I. You even quoted
it: “the output signal influences the perceptual signal, and changes
its value to approach its reference value.” What more explanation is
needed?

I understand Rick’s point of view very well (so far as I am able to
determine). His point of view is that there is no control if the input to
the perceptual function of a control system is not observable by an
external observer.

BP: That is nothing like what I think his view is. I think he believes
that IF the behaving system is organized as PCT claims it is, then the
control that an external observer can see is explained by imagining a
system hidden inside the other person, acting to control its own
perceptions. If the external observer (i.e., any observer but the
behaving system itself) does not see any control going on, there is no
way to find out if covert control is happening. It could be happening,
but it can only be imagined, not observed. It’s not a testable part of
the theory.

MMT: I “bullied” Rick
by referring to a foundational principle of PCT, one you expound at some
length later in the message to which I am responding, that the perceptual
function has no way of knowing where its signals come from, and still
less does the controlled variable (the perceptual signal) convey any such
information.

BP: Yes, that is what I call bullying. A bully knows what the
foundational principles are, and berates anyone who fails to treat them
with the awe and respect they deserve, implying that the transgressor is
ignorant, stupid, or perverse for not seeing the obvious truth. But I say
that all such “foundational principles” can be challenged by
anyone at any time, and the only defense is to demonstrate that they
correctly predict what we observe. To do nothing more than point to the
principles we are all supposed to believe in is to turn science into
faith-based guessing.

So now I am bullying you. How does it feel?

MMT: I’m puzzled by
“reference level is defined in terms of the observer’s
understanding of the controlled quantity and its intended or preferred
value”. What does an observer have to do with the reference level of
a control unit? To bring an observer into the definition of
“reference level” seems very odd.

BP: “Reference level” is the state of the controlled quantity
that an observer sees as the goal-state being produced and maintained by
the behavior. “Reference signal” or “reference
perception” is part of the theory that explains how an observable
reference level can exist. In the standard PCT diagram, everything below
the system-environment boundary line is observable by an external
observer, though the observer must learn how to combine the physical
variables in the right way to see with some degree of approximation what
the controlled quantity is.

MMT: Hitherto, it has just been
a value input to the comparator of a control unit, for comparison with
the perceptual signal value. No observer needed or implied. Where did
this “observer” in the definition spring
from?

BP: You and I are the observers. There may be others. The reference
signal is an entity of the model referring to an invisible,
imagined variable which we (meaning you and I) infer from finding the
reference level of the observable controlled quantity.
Observing means perception by a system other than the behaving
system.

BP: So in your opinion, it
violates the foundations of PCT.

MMT: But it doesn’t violate yours? My understanding that this was the
case was the reason I changed the subject line to “Changing the
foundations of PCT”.

BP: It doesn’t violate mine at all. I agree that an observed controlled
variable or quantity probably corresponds to a controlled perception
inside the behaving system (as well as the observing system, if the
observer guesses right). I agree that a hypothetical controlled quantity
inside the behaving system can’t be observed from outside, and thus has
to be imagined by the observer, which means by you and me.

MMT: Here’s how I bullied Rick
in my continuation of “The controlled quantity is ALWAYS a
perception, never an environmental variable. That’s PCT 101, first
lesson.” The bullying commences thus:“as Bill corrected me in
the partner thread, the output of a control unit knows or cares nothing
about where its signal goes. Control exists if the output influences the
perception. If the influence of the output reaches the perception through
the external environment, so be it. If the influence of the output
reaches the perception by way of an internal connection we call
imagination, so be it. If the influence of the output reaches the
perception both through the external environment and through internal
pathways, so be it. Any which way, it’s irrelevant to the control
unit.”

BP: You’re speaking as if the theory is gospel truth and brooks no
contradiction. You’re hammering on the pulpit and preaching down to the
sinners, showing them the right way to think without any attempt at
persuasion, without questions like “what do you mean by …?”
You’re threatening to expel them into the outer darkness, away from those
who have been saved and think correctly. I do call this bullying, though
the threat of force is not directly from you – it’s from the community
of Right Thinkers.

MMT: But of course, that
bullying comment contradicts Rick’s definition, for which I suppose I
should apologise.

BP: Contradiction is always permissible, even with respect to fundamental
principles. But by my rules, you have to explain why you are rejecting
what is said, not just substitute something you believe is better and say
it at more length, and louder.

BP earlier: In fact, your way of
saying it violates my attempt to put some order in the way we talk about
controlled variables by reserving the term “quantity” to mean
observable physical variables outside the system, and “signal”
to mean variables inside the system. “Variable” applies equally
inside and outside, so can’t be used to distinguish the observer’s view
from the organism’s view.

MMT: ??? Who cares about the observer’s view unless the observer is part
of the object of study?

BP: How can there be an object of study without an observer?

MMT: When you are dealing with
the observer-observed system, of course the observer matters. But why
bring the observer into a discussion of which variable is controlled in a
single control system?

BP: Because there is still an observer, or several: the parties to the
discussion.

MMT: Is using the technically
correct “variable” in place of your idiosyncratically chosen
“quantity” justification for your disputing that “defining
a controlled variable as something the observer can see is a violation of
the foundations of PCT?” Is that definition a violation of the
foundations of PCT, or is it not?

BP: It’s a claim, not a definition. My attempt was to separate an entity
in a brain model (signal) from an entity in the physics model (quantity),
to distinguish the general term (variable) according to context.

BP earlier: Evidently we can
perceive, at some level, that sort of structure. That may happen at the
relationship level, if we consider “relationship” to include
the concept of “function.” But this perception is part of a
model, not a direct perception of what goes on in the input function.

MMT: Yes, indeed! That’s the analyst’s viewpoint all
right!

BP: Then the analyst’s point of view is the one from which we all must
begin. The analyst is constructing a model that might explain the rest of
experienced reality. The model, clearly, is part of experienced reality,
but it is not the rest of reality that is to be explained, and it comes
after, not before, that which requires explanation.

…

MMT: Now we are going into the
process whereby an observer becomes an analyst. What you say is true, so
far as I can see, but isn’t it a bit off the track? The point is, as you
seem to concede, that the perceptual variable is what is
controlled.

BP: Sorry for sounding like President Clinton, but the answer depends on
what you mean by “is.” Do you mean the perceptual variable
actually is, in objective reality and independent of human
interpretation, what is controlled, or do you mean that according
to PCT (in which T stands for Theory) the perceptual variable is proposed
to be what is controlled?

…

BP earlier: Yes, and this is
also the only way the observer can get information about whatever is
being controlled.

MMT: Yes, indeed. But why concern yourself with a hypothetical observer?
Is it a philosophical question like “If a tree falls in a forest
with nobody near, does it make any sound?” If a person acts without
an observer to see, is the person controlling?

BP: I am a quite real observer and I trust you see yourself that way,
too. I’m talking about how you and I get information, not some vague
hypothetical observer. Admittedly, I am generalizing from myself to
others, but so far all the evidence supports the idea that they, too, can
observe.

MMT: For my part, I will
continue to write about PCT as though only perceptions can be
controlled.

BP: Fine, but I hope you include disclaimers such as
“theoretically,” or “according to PCT” or “as
far as we know today,” or sometimes “as has been demonstrated
in many cases,” and so on.

MMT: Would you mind describing a
few of these “many” misinterpretations?

BP: I have been doing so here.

MMT: Is it a misinterpretation
that Rick has said (whether he believes it or not) and that you have
agreed (whether you believe it or not) that for control to exist, some
variable observable by an external observer must be influenced by the
control system’s output, and if no such variable is influenced by the
output, control does not exist?

BP: Yes, that is a misinterpretation.

MMT: Here’s what Rick said [From
Rick Marken (2010.08.06.1630)] that leads me to the foregoing
misinterpretation: " A controlled variable (in PCT) has an
environmental correlate, the controlled quantity, which can be detected
by an experimenter. There is no environmental correlate of p[pS]-A]
(because A exists only in the subject’s imagination) so it’s really not a
controlled variable."

“A controlled variable has an environmental correlate” means,
to me, that according to PCT there is an internal perception being
controlled, and that there is some corresponding external state of a set
of variables that an experimenter can detect. I might point out some
exceptions to that (the taste of lemonade) to see if he would modify that
statement, but I wouldn’t just say he’s wrong. From the second quoted
sentence I would say he’s defining a controlled variable as something
observable, so I would try to see if he would agree that in PCT an
imagined perception is a variable, too, though an observer can’t know
about it. He might modify that statement a bit, too, or adopt the usage
that an observable controlled variable should be called a controlled
quantity, thus making it clear that the observer (Rick, you, I) is seeing
it as something under control.

MMT: My misinterpretation
unfortunately led me to believe that Rick was claiming that if the inputs
to a perceptual function did not come from some particular class of
sources (variables whose variation was perceptible to an outside
observer), the corresponding perception was not controlled, regardless of
the fact that it was brought to a reference value by variation of the
output of the control unit. I hope you can explain that Rick did not mean
that, because I am unable to figure out an alternative
interpretation.

BP: I have given it to you. To understand Rick’s point of view, and I
assume he will correct this if it is wrong, you have to begin with what
the observer can observe: a controlled quantity in the common (-seeming)
environment. If the observer succeeds in seeing it as under control, the
observer will perceive something that is maintained near some some state
we call its reference level or reference condition. According to PCT, the
controlling system will also be perceiving that variable or something
close to it, with a reference signal specifying the state of the
perception that corresponds to what we observe as its reference level or
condition. The theory provides for imagined perceptions and their
control, but those are observable only from within the controlling
system. The observer can imagine them, but there is no way to test the
correctness of that hypothesis, and for that reason, one guess as to what
is imagined is as good as any other (except when the behaving system is
doing the guessing).

MMT: In [From Bill Powers
(2010.08.07.0210 MDT)] you seemed to use my interpretation of Rick’s
words, as you said: “Rick is defining a controlled variable as
something the external observer can see. If you would read his words that
would be obvious.” So am I misinterpreting you as agreeing that a
controlled variable CAN be something the external observer can see, and
that I am therefore wrong to say: “For my part, I will continue to
write about PCT as though only perceptions can be controlled.”? In
your view, is it the case that PCT does now allow for control of external
variables (sorry “quantities”)?

However, this is only one of my many recent misinterpretations, which you
say are all my own doing. I’d like to be made aware of the most important
of the others.

BP: The basic misinterpretation that I see is taking theory as the
reality and the observer as an unnecessary part of the theory. My
position is that the observed world is the reality, and that theories are
attempts by observers to make sense of it. They go astray when they start
thinking that the figments of their imaginations, the models they are
constructing as explanations, are more real than the experiences they are
trying to explain.

In your comments about Rick, you appear to be assuming that PCT is
primary and real observations are secondary, so that if there is a clash,
PCT wins. I think Rick takes the oppositive view. I should leave the rest
of this to Rick.

Best,

Bill P.

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2010.08.19.1020)]

Bill Powers (2010.08.19.0748 MDT) to Martin Taylor 2010.08.18. 14.48 --

In your comments about Rick, you appear to be assuming that PCT is primary
and real observations are secondary, so that if there is a clash, PCT wins.
I think Rick takes the oppositive view. I should leave the rest of this to
Rick.

Thanks, Bill. You got it all right. My reply to Martin would have been
much shorter than yours. I was just going to say that, from my
perspective, PCT is a theoretical account of the _fact_ of control.
So, as you say, I see observation (of control phenomena) as primary;
theory as secondary, in the sense that the theory must constantly be
tested against observation, and revised if the observations demand it.

You are right that I was unclear about the "environmental correlate"
of a controlled variable. I guess it would be more correct to say
that, per PCT, there is a _function_ of environmental variables that
correlates with the controlled perceptual variable. So the perception
of the taste of lemonade is some function of what physics and
chemistry tells us are the physical variables (chemicals) that make up
lemonade.

But I was actually reluctant to reply to Martin at all because I find
these verbal disagreements pretty uninteresting. I would rather talk
about actual working models and how they relate to relevant data. I've
now got a working version of my model of the behavior in a yes/not
detection task; it's not very complicated and still needs work but it
does produce results like those seen in yes/no detection tasks. Once
I've produced a version of Martin's model I will distribute the code
for both and we can go from there.

I assume that both Martin's and my model will behave in exactly the
same way in the yes/no detection task. So once we get acceptable
versions of both models we can start figuring how to develop
experiments that distinguish the models and then start collecting data
(rather than sitting around arguing about what the theory "really"
says). I think a discussion of how well the theory accounts for the
facts will be much more satisfying than a discussion how well I
account for the theory;-)

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2010.08.19.1325 MDT)]

I would rather talk
about actual working models and how they relate to relevant data. I've
now got a working version of my model of the behavior in a yes/not
detection task; it's not very complicated and still needs work but it
does produce results like those seen in yes/no detection tasks. Once
I've produced a version of Martin's model I will distribute the code
for both and we can go from there.

Great. That's what we need to do. I'll be interested to see how you handle the digital control system: As I see it, when the error goes to zero, the output should go to the zero-output state, which should make the error nonzero on the next iteration, which should make the output go to maximum, and so on forever.

Best,

Bill P.

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2010.08.22.00.58

OK. I give up.

Martin

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2010.08.22.17.35

 [Martin Taylor 2010.08.22.00.58

  OK. I give up.




  Martin

I suppose I owe you an explanation as to why I give up.

Fundamentally, it is because I am unpracticed in conducting a
discussion in which the premises can be arbitrarily changed by one
participant without explanation or notice that they are being
changed.

Examples:

1. We are discussing implications of a theory known as Perceptual

Control Theory. Hitherto, this theory has been that the only
variable that can be controlled is the output of a function known as
the perceptual input function, that this value is compared to a
reference value supplied from outside, and that the difference
affects an output function whose output influences an input to the
perceptual input function to complete a feedback loop. Nothing is
stated about how the output influences the input, since there are
many possibilities. What has always mattered has been that ONLY the
perceptual signal value, labelled “P” in the figure, can be
controlled, and that the control occurs because in some undefined
way O influences S.

![ctrl_unit2.logo.png|120x80](upload://rQ6aDpDdn73lmbT4kFPFmyaSNu4.png)

In the course of the discussion, I have been told, first by Rick and

then by Bill, that there are now new conditions imposed on what
happens between “O” and “S” in the figure, namely that “O” must
influence something observable by an independent entity. When I
question where this new condition comes from, and that my
understanding of PCT has been only that O influences S, I am told I
am “bullying”.

2. Over the many years in which I have been aware of PCT, the effect

of perceptual control by and within an organism has been considered
(in the theory) independent of whether anyone else observed the
control happening. Although it seems that the potential existence of
an observer does matter in quantum physics (a finding questioned by
Bill P.), until now it has never been a part of Perceptual Control
Theory, but suddenly it has become an essential factor. As Rick said
[From Rick Marken (2010.08.06.1630)]: “There is no environmental
correlate of p[pS]-A] (because A exists only in the subject’s
imagination) so it’s really not a controlled variable.” Nothing has
been argued as to how the potential existence of an observer
modifies the process of control, but it is suddenly asserted that
the potential presence of an observer is essential for a variable to
be controlled, and Bill P. has supported this assertion without
providing any supporting reasons for such a fundamental change in
PCT.

3. In answer to Rick's claim that a perceptual value cannot be

controlled if it is the output of a function that happens to have
one of its inputs an imagined variable value, I said [Martin Taylor
2010.08.11.14.06]
: “Of course it is a controlled variable. Just as with any control
system, the output signal influences the perceptual signal, and
changes its value to approach its reference value.” If this is not
the definition of a controlled variable, then the definition has
been changed under my nose, without warning. Nevertheless, my
stating it thus has been called “bullying” by Bill, in not one but
two messages. I have never understood that an appeal to what used to
be a basic premise of a theory could be called “bullying” when
discussing an implication of the theory, but I suppose that since
the argument is incontrovertible Rick would have no way to counter
it, so an ad hominem argument had to be produced in place of a
scientific one that doesn’'t exist.

4. I said: [MT]

  I had expected that

rather than
jumping down my throat for (correctly) calling Rick out when he
“defined” a controlled variable as something detectable by an
external observer, you would remind him that “Perceptual Control
Theory” demands that the controlled variable is and is only a
perception.

BP: Sorry, but that's not how I do things.

[MT now] It is exactly how you do things. I said ""Perceptual

Control Theory" demands …", and you said, as though contradicting
me, “PCT is a THEORY. It’s not a
fact.” It is, and you don’t contradict me in saying so. The fact
that the alternative is to accept clairvoyance, or to deny the
accepted laws of thermodynamics, is really irrelevant (other than to
say that PERCEPTUAL control is a theory with very strong support in
normal physics).

When we are dealing with the implications of a theory, it is normal

to take the basic assumptions of the theory as tentative facts and
see where they lead. It is completely improper to disclaim the basic
tenets of the theory on the grounds that it IS a theory, in order to
avoid addressing the issue. [Parenthetically: how many hundred times
have you NOT taken Rick to task when he has said that “conventional
psychologists” fail to note the FACT of control?]

The reason I give up is that I have no skill in changing the basic

premises of an argument to suit a conclusion I would like to reach;
I am accustomed to working on the basis that when the basic tenets
of a theory have been defined, and when a derivation from them has
been argued and accepted, that agreement persists until other
evidence (e.g a failure of a model to perform as expected) is
adduced or new arguments developed to change the conclusion.
Likewise, I have no skill in conducting arguments in which the other
party changes the premises at will to suit their desired conclusion.
Since it is clear your objective is to win, rather than to reach
supportable scientific results, I really have no choice but to
withdraw.

Martin

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2010.08.22.1640 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2010.08.22.17.35 –

I appreciate the expansion on your post.

MMT: 1. We are discussing
implications of a theory known as Perceptual Control Theory. Hitherto,
this theory has been that the only variable that can be controlled is the
output of a function known as the perceptual input function, that this
value is compared to a reference value supplied from outside, and that
the difference affects an output function whose output influences an
input to the perceptual input function to complete a feedback loop.
Nothing is stated about how the output influences the input, since there
are many possibilities. What has always mattered has been that ONLY the
perceptual signal value, labelled “P” in the figure, can be
controlled, and that the control occurs because in some undefined way O
influences S.

In the course of the discussion, I have been told, first by Rick and then
by Bill, that there are now new conditions imposed on what happens
between “O” and “S” in the figure, namely that
“O” must influence something observable by an independent
entity. When I question where this new condition comes from, and that my
understanding of PCT has been only that O influences S, I am told I am
“bullying”.

BP: The theory leads to exactly what you are saying. If PCT is correct,
all that can be controlled are perceptions. Therefore when we see other
people controlling aspects of what we see as their environments, the
theory tells us that they are controlling perceptual signals representing
those aspects.

However, we do not observe the perceptions that other people are
controlling. they are hypothetical. Neither do we observe that we
ourselves are controlling perceptions; it seems to us that we are
controlling real aspects of a real external world. PCT is a step toward
explaining how this can happen.

MMT: 2. Over the many years in
which I have been aware of PCT, the effect of perceptual control by and
within an organism has been considered (in the theory) independent of
whether anyone else observed the control happening. Although it seems
that the potential existence of an observer does matter in quantum
physics (a finding questioned by Bill P.), until now it has never been a
part of Perceptual Control Theory, but suddenly it has become an
essential factor.

BP: That is a misunderstanding of what Rick and I are saying. We do not
say that an observer is required by the theory to be present. If the
theory is correct, a controlling person is controlling a perception by
acting on a largely unknown external world, although that is not how it
seems to the person. Unlike quantum mechanics, PCT does not require the
presence of an observer for the theory to work properly.

MMT: As Rick said [From Rick
Marken (2010.08.06.1630)]: “There is no environmental
correlate of p[pS]-A] (because A exists only in the subject’s
imagination) so it’s really not a controlled variable.”

BP: He should have said “It’s really not an observable controlled
variable.” I asked him about that, and that is what he said he
meant. If you had checked to find out what he meant in this critical
regard, you could have discovered this just as easily.

MMT: Nothing has been argued as
to how the potential existence of an observer modifies the process of
control, but it is suddenly asserted that the potential presence of an
observer is essential for a variable to be controlled, and Bill P. has
supported this assertion without providing any supporting reasons for
such a fundamental change in PCT.

BP: You are running with the ball in a direction completely off the
playing field. In PCT, the observer has no effect on the process of
control just by observing it (the observer can do things to affect it,
but nothing mysterious).

MMT; 3. In answer to Rick’s
claim that a perceptual value cannot be controlled if it is the output of
a function that happens to have one of its inputs an imagined variable
value,

BP: That is not what Rick intended to say, as a simple question to him
about his meaning quickly verified. If you would simply change your
statement a little, it would match what Rick means: “A perceptual
value cannot be known by an external observer to be controlled if the
perceptual value depends on unobservable variables inside the
subject.” We are all external observers when it comes to explaining
the behavior of a subject other than ourselves in an experiment. We can’t
use the theory as if we could directly verify it by observing the
entities in it. We have to use indirect experimental means.

MMT: le. Just as with any
control system, the output signal influences the perceptual signal, and
changes its value to approach its reference value." If this is not
the definition of a controlled variable, then the definition has been
changed under my nose, without warning. Nevertheless, my stating it thus
has been called “bullying” by Bill, in not one but two
messages.

BP: No, I called your critical and superior attitude, the unquestioning
assumption that you are right and Rick is wrong, bullying, not what you
said.

MMT: I have never understood
that an appeal to what used to be a basic premise of a theory could be
called “bullying” when discussing an implication of the theory,
but I suppose that since the argument is incontrovertible Rick would have
no way to counter it, so an ad hominem argument had to be produced in
place of a scientific one that doesn’'t exist.

BP: An appeal to a basic premise of a theory is only that, an appeal to a
statement on which a theory rests. It’s not a proof that they theory or
the premise, is right. But I wouldn’t call that bullying – it simply
misses the point, but we all do that on occasion. What is bullying is to
speak as if from superior logic and understanding and as if the target of
your criticisms is too stupid to realise his error. Perhaps you simply
don’t grasp how your words are heard at the receiving end.

4. I said: [MT]

I had expected that rather than
jumping down my throat for (correctly) calling Rick out when he
“defined” a controlled variable as something detectable by an
external observer, you would remind him that “Perceptual Control
Theory” demands that the controlled variable is and is only a
perception.

BP: Sorry, but that’s not how I do things.

[MT now] It is exactly how you do things. I said ““Perceptual
Control Theory” demands …”, and you said, as though
contradicting me, “PCT is a THEORY. It’s not a fact.” It is,
and you don’t contradict me in saying so.

BP: That’s right. But citing PCT as if it’s a fact, which is what you
have been doing, is not how I do things or how I think they should be
done. You are complaining about non-adherence to the claims of a theory,
whereas Rick and I have been saying that the theory can be used only to
the extent that the data in a given circumstance support it. If the data
are not there to support the idea that a variable is being controlled in
the imagination mode, then claiming that you know it is being controlled
that way is a mistake.

MMT: The fact that the
alternative is to accept clairvoyance, or to deny the accepted laws of
thermodynamics, is really irrelevant (other than to say that PERCEPTUAL
control is a theory with very strong support in normal
physics).

BP: The alternative is not to accept clairvoyance, it’s simply to say
“I don’t know.” There could be many alternative explanations
that might prove to be correct and the fact that you don’t know what they
are is irrelevant. Anyway, there is nothing in what Rick or I have said
that demands clairvoyance; on the contrary, your insistence that the
subject is imagining one variable in a relationship between two variables
can be known only by clairvoyance to everyone else but that subject. That
is the basic objection Rick and I both have to your model: there is no
way to test it.

MMT: When we are dealing with
the implications of a theory, it is normal to take the basic assumptions
of the theory as tentative facts and see where they lead.

BP: Tentative, yes. That means disclaimers, it means saying IF the
subject was imagining this or that, we should expect certain
consequences. It also means retaining a sufficient degree of awareness
thsat the assumption may not be a fact, and limiting the deductions from
it accordingly.

MMT: It is completely improper
to disclaim the basic tenets of the theory on the grounds that it IS a
theory, in order to avoid addressing the issue.

BP: What about disclaiming them on the grounds that they are untestable
and that any deductions from them might have to be retracted in
toto?

MMT:[Parenthetically: how many
hundred times have you NOT taken Rick to task when he has said that
“conventional psychologists” fail to note the FACT of
control?]

BP:I would never criticise him for saying such things. I have critized
him for being belligerant and using terms like “a**hole” to
embellish his remarks.

MMT: The reason I give up is
that I have no skill in changing the basic premises of an argument to
suit a conclusion I would like to reach; I am accustomed to working on
the basis that when the basic tenets of a theory have been defined, and
when a derivation from them has been argued and accepted, that agreement
persists until other evidence (e.g a failure of a model to perform as
expected) is adduced or new arguments developed to change the
conclusion.

BP: I think of theories as ideas that have to be tested and retested
throughout their entire lives. There is never a time when you can just
take it for granted that they are correct, which seems to be what you are
recommending. Every time PCT is used to explain an experimental finding,
I want to see it challenged and to find evidence in the experimental
results to meet the challenge. Imagining that someone else is imagining
is not a way to do that. It’s not an unreasonable guess, but it’s not the
only possible guess and no important conclusions should be drawn from it
until we find a way to test it.

As to your accusation of changing premises to suit a conclusion I would
like to reach, that is a figment of your imagination. You have shown no
evidence, even after this long interchange, of understanding my point,
which is the same as it has always been. I have never changed the
structure of the PCT model in the ways you describe. But some aspects of
the model, such as the imagination mode, are at present unobservable in
nature, and we can make up any details we wish, which greatly weakens any
conclusions we draw, making them unfalsifiable.

Control is a fact that we can observe, given the operational definitions
we have worked out over the years. It can be explained by PCT, but not
every aspect of PCT can be verified experimentally, which is a weakness
of the theory we have to keep trying to remedy. In any case, theory does
not come first: observation does. The theory exists only to explain
observations and can never be more believable than the observations.

An external observer – which includes you – can’t test to see whether
imagination is involved in an entirely hidden control process. That is
the point you have misinterpreted as a claim that control can’t happen
without an external observer. If you have misinterpreted that, then
nothing you have said that is based on the mistaken interpretation has
any relevance to the discussion.

Imagination is of importance subjectively – it’s a phenomenon that
individuals can experience, and requires explanation, but the explanation
doesn’t apply to our observations of other people simply because we can’t
observed imagination happening or even infer it from observable
evidence.

Bill P.

[BUSINESS_GAVIN_HERMA]

( Gavin
Ritz 2010.08.23.11.53NZT)

[Martin Taylor
2010.08.22.17.35
[Martin Taylor 2010.08.22.00.58

Martin

I had expected that
rather than jumping down my throat for (correctly) calling Rick
out when he “defined” a controlled variable as something detectable by
an external observer, you would remind him that “Perceptual Control
Theory” demands that the controlled variable is and is only a perception.

Welcome to the world of Illusion’s

I’m not sure that you read my other
threads, just about everything is a controlled variable. Law, science, social
conditions, knowledge, etc

You have now reached the inevitable conclusion
that something very strange is going on. Only PCT could have brought you here. Bill is battling with it
because he thinks that PCT is a science when science falls into the same nest
of illusions.

You have reached the highest human
conundrum. Don’t be hard on Bill his theory is actually very robust until we climb the levels. PCT
runs into the same problem that all social theories do, read Holism, or
Stafford Beers’ Viable System, or Peter Checkland’s Systems Thinking. You require requisitely to mirror
yourself (your model). Is this not a requirement over and above science?

Personal Honesty is a very good reward. I’m
afraid it’s outside the realms of PCT.

Kind regards

Gavin

···

[BUSINESS_GAVIN_HERMA]

(Gavin Ritz 2010.08.23.14.27NZT)

[From Bill Powers
(2010.08.22.1640 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2010.08.22.17.35 –

This is one of the most appropriate responses
I have seen on this list. Honest and too the point.

···

I appreciate the expansion on your post.

MMT: 1. We are discussing
implications of a theory known as Perceptual Control Theory. Hitherto, this
theory has been that the only variable that can be controlled is the output of
a function known as the perceptual input function, that this value is compared
to a reference value supplied from outside, and that the difference affects an
output function whose output influences an input to the perceptual input
function to complete a feedback loop. Nothing is stated about how the output
influences the input, since there are many possibilities. What has always
mattered has been that ONLY the perceptual signal value, labelled “P”
in the figure, can be controlled, and that the control occurs because in some
undefined way O influences S.

In the course of the discussion, I have been told, first by Rick and then by
Bill, that there are now new conditions imposed on what happens between
“O” and “S” in the figure, namely that “O” must
influence something observable by an independent entity. When I question where
this new condition comes from, and that my understanding of PCT has been only
that O influences S, I am told I am “bullying”.

BP: The theory leads to exactly what you are saying. If PCT is correct, all
that can be controlled are perceptions. Therefore when we see other people
controlling aspects of what we see as their environments, the theory tells us
that they are controlling perceptual signals representing those aspects.

However, we do not observe the perceptions that other people are controlling.
they are hypothetical. Neither do we observe that we ourselves are controlling
perceptions; it seems to us that we are controlling real aspects of a real
external world. PCT is a step toward explaining how this can happen.

MMT: 2. Over the many
years in which I have been aware of PCT, the effect of perceptual control by
and within an organism has been considered (in the theory) independent of
whether anyone else observed the control happening. Although it seems that the
potential existence of an observer does matter in quantum physics (a finding
questioned by Bill P.), until now it has never been a part of Perceptual
Control Theory, but suddenly it has become an essential factor.

BP: That is a misunderstanding of what Rick and I are saying. We do not say
that an observer is required by the theory to be present. If the theory is
correct, a controlling person is controlling a perception by acting on a
largely unknown external world, although that is not how it seems to the
person. Unlike quantum mechanics, PCT does not require the presence of an
observer for the theory to work properly.

MMT: As Rick said [From
Rick Marken (2010.08.06.1630)]: “There is no environmental correlate
of p[pS]-A] (because A exists only in the subject’s imagination) so it’s really
not a controlled variable.”

BP: He should have said “It’s really not an observable controlled
variable.” I asked him about that, and that is what he said he meant. If
you had checked to find out what he meant in this critical regard, you could
have discovered this just as easily.

MMT: Nothing has been
argued as to how the potential existence of an observer modifies the process of
control, but it is suddenly asserted that the potential presence of an observer
is essential for a variable to be controlled, and Bill P. has supported this
assertion without providing any supporting reasons for such a fundamental
change in PCT.

BP: You are running with the ball in a direction completely off the playing
field. In PCT, the observer has no effect on the process of control just by
observing it (the observer can do things to affect it, but nothing mysterious).

MMT; 3. In answer to
Rick’s claim that a perceptual value cannot be controlled if it is the output
of a function that happens to have one of its inputs an imagined variable
value,

BP: That is not what Rick intended to say, as a simple question to him about
his meaning quickly verified. If you would simply change your statement a
little, it would match what Rick means: “A perceptual value cannot be
known by an external observer to be controlled if the perceptual value depends
on unobservable variables inside the subject.” We are all external
observers when it comes to explaining the behavior of a subject other than
ourselves in an experiment. We can’t use the theory as if we could directly
verify it by observing the entities in it. We have to use indirect experimental
means.

MMT: le. Just as with any
control system, the output signal influences the perceptual signal, and changes
its value to approach its reference value." If this is not the definition
of a controlled variable, then the definition has been changed under my nose,
without warning. Nevertheless, my stating it thus has been called
“bullying” by Bill, in not one but two messages.

BP: No, I called your critical and superior attitude, the unquestioning
assumption that you are right and Rick is wrong, bullying, not what you said.

MMT: I have never
understood that an appeal to what used to be a basic premise of a theory could
be called “bullying” when discussing an implication of the theory,
but I suppose that since the argument is incontrovertible Rick would have no
way to counter it, so an ad hominem argument had to be produced in place of a
scientific one that doesn’'t exist.

BP: An appeal to a basic premise of a theory is only that, an appeal to a
statement on which a theory rests. It’s not a proof that they theory or the
premise, is right. But I wouldn’t call that bullying – it simply misses the
point, but we all do that on occasion. What is bullying is to speak as if from
superior logic and understanding and as if the target of your criticisms is too
stupid to realise his error. Perhaps you simply don’t grasp how your words are
heard at the receiving end.

4. I said: [MT]

I had expected that
rather than jumping down my throat for (correctly) calling Rick out when he
“defined” a controlled variable as something detectable by an
external observer, you would remind him that “Perceptual Control
Theory” demands that the controlled variable is and is only a perception.

BP: Sorry, but that’s not how I do things.

[MT now] It is exactly how you do things. I said ““Perceptual Control
Theory” demands …”, and you said, as though contradicting me,
“PCT is a THEORY. It’s not a fact.” It is, and you don’t contradict
me in saying so.

BP: That’s right. But citing PCT as if it’s a fact, which is what you have been
doing, is not how I do things or how I think they should be done. You are
complaining about non-adherence to the claims of a theory, whereas Rick and I
have been saying that the theory can be used only to the extent that the data
in a given circumstance support it. If the data are not there to support the
idea that a variable is being controlled in the imagination mode, then claiming
that you know it is being controlled that way is a mistake.

MMT: The fact that the
alternative is to accept clairvoyance, or to deny the accepted laws of
thermodynamics, is really irrelevant (other than to say that PERCEPTUAL control
is a theory with very strong support in normal physics).

BP: The alternative is not to accept clairvoyance, it’s simply to say “I
don’t know.” There could be many alternative explanations that might prove
to be correct and the fact that you don’t know what they are is irrelevant.
Anyway, there is nothing in what Rick or I have said that demands clairvoyance;
on the contrary, your insistence that the subject is imagining one variable in
a relationship between two variables can be known only by clairvoyance to
everyone else but that subject. That is the basic objection Rick and I both
have to your model: there is no way to test it.

MMT: When we are dealing
with the implications of a theory, it is normal to take the basic assumptions
of the theory as tentative facts and see where they lead.

BP: Tentative, yes. That means disclaimers, it means saying IF the subject was
imagining this or that, we should expect certain consequences. It also means
retaining a sufficient degree of awareness thsat the assumption may not be a fact,
and limiting the deductions from it accordingly.

MMT: It is completely
improper to disclaim the basic tenets of the theory on the grounds that it IS a
theory, in order to avoid addressing the issue.

BP: What about disclaiming them on the grounds that they are untestable and
that any deductions from them might have to be retracted in toto?

MMT:[Parenthetically: how
many hundred times have you NOT taken Rick to task when he has said that
“conventional psychologists” fail to note the FACT of control?]

BP:I would never criticise him for saying such things. I have critized him for
being belligerant and using terms like “a**hole” to embellish his
remarks.

MMT: The reason I give up
is that I have no skill in changing the basic premises of an argument to suit a
conclusion I would like to reach; I am accustomed to working on the basis that
when the basic tenets of a theory have been defined, and when a derivation from
them has been argued and accepted, that agreement persists until other evidence
(e.g a failure of a model to perform as expected) is adduced or new arguments
developed to change the conclusion.

BP: I think of theories as ideas that have to be tested and retested throughout
their entire lives. There is never a time when you can just take it for granted
that they are correct, which seems to be what you are recommending. Every time
PCT is used to explain an experimental finding, I want to see it challenged and
to find evidence in the experimental results to meet the challenge. Imagining
that someone else is imagining is not a way to do that. It’s not an
unreasonable guess, but it’s not the only possible guess and no important
conclusions should be drawn from it until we find a way to test it.

As to your accusation of changing premises to suit a conclusion I would like to
reach, that is a figment of your imagination. You have shown no evidence, even
after this long interchange, of understanding my point, which is the same as it
has always been. I have never changed the structure of the PCT model in the
ways you describe. But some aspects of the model, such as the imagination mode,
are at present unobservable in nature, and we can make up any details we wish,
which greatly weakens any conclusions we draw, making them unfalsifiable.

Control is a fact that we can observe, given the operational definitions we
have worked out over the years. It can be explained by PCT, but not every
aspect of PCT can be verified experimentally, which is a weakness of the theory
we have to keep trying to remedy. In any case, theory does not come first:
observation does. The theory exists only to explain observations and can never
be more believable than the observations.

An external observer – which includes you – can’t test to see whether
imagination is involved in an entirely hidden control process. That is the
point you have misinterpreted as a claim that control can’t happen without an
external observer. If you have misinterpreted that, then nothing you have said
that is based on the mistaken interpretation has any relevance to the
discussion.

Imagination is of importance subjectively – it’s a phenomenon that individuals
can experience, and requires explanation, but the explanation doesn’t apply to
our observations of other people simply because we can’t observed imagination
happening or even infer it from observable evidence.

Bill P.