Re: CHOICE THEORY
[Martin Taylor [2005.01.28.12.45]
It’s hard to be certain whether an difference we have is simply a
difference of wording. I rather thank that we see the issue of
“survival” pretty much the same way. However, I don’t think
that’s all there is to issues of evolution.
[From Bill Powers (2005.01.28.1007
MST)]
Martin Taylor 2005.01.28.11.16–
Survival is not an intrinsic
reference level. I think Martin really agrees with that.
Yes, I do.
However, I must add a caveat there, based on what I conceive to be
the relationship between the Perceptual Control system and the
intrinsic variables. Survival is not an intrinsic reference level,
but may become a perceptual reference level.
Yes, that is true. But what people conceive of as surviving has little
to do with the actual conditions that must be met in order to survive.
What we know of survival is always in terms of the learned world we
are conscious of.
A statement that would be equally true of many high-level
controlled perceptions.
“Survival” would then become a
“task” of the organism.
Always a way to make a statement come out true, eh? But it’s not a
basic task; it’s a learned task.
The mechanisms are learned, as they are for most controlled
perceptions. The only question about whether “survival” is a
controlled perception is whether the person in question sees it as
such. Perhaps one might ask “Why did you stop then” and get
the answer “Because I didn’t want to die.” That might
suggest the possibility that surviving was a controlled perception for
that person at that time, mightn’t it?
The problem with using reproduction
as the criterion of fitness is that it’s too open-ended – it seems to
imply that the more reproductive a species is, the fitter it
is.
Actually, I don’t think any evolutionary theory asserts that.
Retrospectively, fitness is assessed by whether a gene has surivived.
Prospectively and theoretically, it addresses the probability that the
gene will survive into the indefinite future, given its probable
future environments.
But if you think of fitness in a
PCT way, as a species’ capacity to control what happens to
it,
I don’t consider a species as having ANY perceptual control. I
may be wrong, but I think of perceptual control as happeining within
individual organisms.
it becomes clear that there are
both lower and upper limits to the rate of reproduction that
optimizes fitness. Bacteria multiply to the point where they are all
starving and barely alive (in a confined space). That certainly does
not optimize any bacterium’s capacity to control what happens to
it.
Very true, and I would add that much of the human species is in
just that condition.
Most of the evolutionary arguments
concerning altruism are based on the premise that it’s rate of
reproduction that’s the ultimate measure of fitness.
Not true. See above. There are several different possibilities, but
they all add up to the question of whether the relevant genes (or
memes) surivive.
My own take on altruism is a bit different anyway. Probably this
isn’t the best place to get into it, but basically it’s like my take
on reorganization: side effects of one’s actions can affect the
environment of others in such a way that their actions enhance my
ability to control, and thereby the stability of my intrinsic
variables. It doesn’t have anything to do with my controlling for
perceptions of the well-being of others.
Obviously, if one does control a perception of the well being of
others (e.g. of the survival of relatives), and it conflicts with
control of perceiving one’s own well being or survival, that’s
altruism in the classical sense. Certainly it can happen, but it isn’t
necessary in order for the evolution of behaviour that has the effect
of preserving the life of relatives at the cost of one’s own. Think
ant colonies, or bees.
It’s the reorganization process over
evolutionary time or within an
individual that could, for some individuals or for some species,
turn
“survival” or “protection
of relatives” into “tasks” within the
perceptual control structure.
What we call “survival.” What we mean by a survival
task in birds is certainly not the pursuit of a goal labeled
“survival” or “protection of relatives.” It’s
something like feeding the young, your own or your sibling’s. That is
no more a “survival task” than breathing is. Only someone
who can symbolize and conceptualize survival can specifically learn to
carry out what he or she believes is a survival task, like the fellow
who carries a loaded AK-47 in order to survive.
Yes. That’s why I said “for some individuals or for some
species” and used the word “could.” I was trying to be
as non-directive as possible while pointing out a possibility.
Survival, I still maintain, is neither a
goal nor a task: it’s an outcome.
I agree that it’s an outcome. But I would replace “is”
with “need be”.
Martin