Circular Causation

[From Bruce Abbott (960912.2025 EST)]

Rick Marken (960912.1600) --

I know that the same word ("cause") is part of the description of lineal
and circular causality. But even though the same word is involved in
labelling these phenomena, they are quite different. The causality assumed in
the search for the lineal causes of behavior is not the same as the causality
involved in closed loop control. I have already mentioned the main
difference: lineal causality assumes that responses (r) are caused by
internal or external stimuli (s) and that the causal path goes through the
organism; so r = f(s) where f() is the organism. Circular causality assumes
that responses control input and resist disturbances (s) to that input in the
process: so r = g(s) where g() is the environment.

You keep saying that you understand this fact. But you don't seem to think it
is very important. I think it is.

I think it is very important, too; what mystifies me is how you are drawing
the conclusion that I don't think it is very important. Is is your
hypothesis that, where we disagree on an issue, it must be because I don't
really understand circular causation, or must not think it's important?

I find it difficult to believe that a person who knows that they are dealing
with a closed loop system would be interested in studying the "causes of
behavior" (however that is construed).

If the "causes of behavior" reside in the organism's purposes, and one
wishes to identify what those purposes are, then I don't know of any other
way to do so than to apply disturbances and observe how the organism
responds to them. Do you? I would call that "studying the causes of behavior."

I think you are leaping at the word "cause" in linear and circular causality
because it lets you think that it's all just "causality"; that recognition of
the fact that organisms are closed loop control systems really requires no
change in the way we conceptualize the nature of the science of psychology.

I think I am leaping at the word "cause" in lineal and circular causality
because you said that behavior is not caused -- a demonstrable fallacy. Now
you're trying to weasle out of it by suggesting that I'm somehow to blame
for this error.

The fact that the cause-effect relationships that are found tell us nothing
about the organism seems to be of no consequence to you as long as you don't
have to change any fundamental notions about how to study behavior.

Oh Rick, what nonsense. I think there's some serious distortion in your
perceptual input filter; perhaps you might get it looked at. It seems to
translate things I say from the lovely, logical things they are (:-> into
gobbledy gook that even I don't recognize (when I get them reflected back at
me via your descriptions).

Think
what you like but it seems to me (based on what I'm reading here on CSGNet)
that cause- effect thinking can seriouslu get in the way of a clear
understanding of the nature of control.

I agree that it can, but you'll have to be a little more specific about
which reading you're talking about before I can agree (or disagree) with you
on whether those readings indicate a problem with cause-effect thinking or,
indeed, the lack of a clear understanding of the nature of control.

All I meant to say is
that lineal causal thinking doesn't work when you're dealing with closed loop
control. What is important in the study of closed loop behavior is "what is
controlled", not "what is caused". Of course behavior (output) in a closed
loop is caused; but it also _causes_. The result is that variables are
kept under _control_. That's what is important about purposeful behavior. The
nature of the causal relationship between s and r is an irrelevant side
effect of the process of control.

Well, I can certainly agree with that! Why didn't you say so in the first
place?

Regards,

Bruce

[From Bruce Gregory (960913.1015 EDT)]

(Bruce Abbott 960912.2025 EST)

>Rick Marken (960912.1600) --

>All I meant to say is
>that lineal causal thinking doesn't work when you're dealing with closed loop
>control. What is important in the study of closed loop behavior is "what is
>controlled", not "what is caused". Of course behavior (output) in a closed
>loop is caused; but it also _causes_. The result is that variables are
>kept under _control_. That's what is important about purposeful behavior. The
>nature of the causal relationship between s and r is an irrelevant side
>effect of the process of control.

Well, I can certainly agree with that! Why didn't you say so in the first
place?

Here I am trying, as usual, to curry favor with Rick ;-).
Despite your warning, I picked up the book by Simon and tried to
read it. As with his other writings I have tried to read, I
found it murky and less than illuminating. (It did not however
threaten to undermine my status as a "true believer".) Whatever
Rick's faults may be (I am sure he has them, I am just unable to
uncover them. :wink: ), he is clear and to the point. You always
know exactly what he is saying and why. That is why I appreciate
his efforts so much.

You are more of an enigma. You claim to agree with Rick about
fundamentals, but it sure doesn't look that way much of the
time. (There I go, fawning again. :wink: ). This is not something
you need respond to. I just wanted you to know that Rick isn't
the only one who often finds it difficult to understand why you
are taking some stand or another.

Respectfully,

Bruce

[From Bruce Abbott (960913.0935 EST)]

Rick Marken (960912.2200) --

The idea that "ANY control system that controls accurately will provide a
good fit to the human data" seems to be based on the notion that good
control is simple and that poor control is complex; good control can be
simulated with ANY high gain controller (controlling the same perceptual
variable as the human, of course) but poor control really separates the men
from the boys. The output of a good controller (human and model) matches
the disturbance; big deal. The output of a poor controller is all over the
place; it's a good model, indeed, that can explain all the human
controller's apparently random output variations.

Wow, you really DO need to hear what Simon has to say about this! But I'm
going to wait until I've had a chance to establish the context (if I ever
_get_ that chance). But Martin will probably 'splain it to you before then
anyway.

One problem with this idea is this: suppose you see a person who is
apprently controlling poorly; the controlled variable is moving all over
the place and outputs are only roughly (negatively) correlated with the
disturbance. The problem is that you have no idea whether the variance in
output (and input) is a result of poor control or good control relative to
a changing reference for the controlled variable.

I agree that these would be difficult (perhaps impossible) to discriminate.
But that's not the situation Martin is talking about. What he says holds
true when the reference is known and even when it is constant. We're
talking about the situation that occurs when the model does an excellent job
of matching the data; in that case there are probably a begillion different
controllers one could invent that would do the job equally well. How do you
tell which is the _right_ model. But what does Simon know -- he's a
"conventional" psychologist, right?

I suggest that the way to compare control models is not to make behavior
noisy but to create situations where the models make different predictions.

Certainly, but creating certain kinds of situations in which the behavior
becomes noisy is one way to do that.

Bruce Abbott (960912.2025 EST)

Is is your hypothesis that, where we disagree on an issue, it
must be because I don't really understand circular causation, or >must not
think it's important?

No. My hypothesis is that you are controlling for the idea that PCT can
exist comfortably in the context of conventional psychology. So far,
everything I have said that would be a disturbance to that idea -- eg.
"Simon has nothing to contribute to our understanding of purposeful
behavior", "psychologists who study the causes of behavior are on the wrong
track" -- has met with strong resistance.

I don't know whether Simon has anything to contribute to our understanding
of purposeful behavior (that's your re-interpretation of my words; what I
said is that Simon has some ideas that I think PCTers would find
interesting), but I do think he has something to contribute to our
understanding of the task of discovering the properties of the underlying
systems that serve particular functions in the life of the organism. As
Simon's analysis is neutral with respect to any particular model of behavior
(control, S-R, astrology, what have you), holding a control-system view does
not require one to reject what Simon has to say on this matter.

If the "causes of behavior" reside in the organism's purposes, and >one
wishes to identify what those purposes are, then I don't know >of any
other way to do so than to apply disturbances and observe >how the
organism responds to them. Do you?

You bet. Applying disturbance and observing how the organism responds tells
you nothing about an organism's purposes. This is just standard IV-DV
methodology. What is missing -- the essential step -- is applying these
disturbances to a _hypothetical controlled variable_. The important thing
to watch for is _lack_ of effect of the disturbance.

I had the Test for the controlled variable in mind when I wrote this.
That's how it works -- you disturb some possible controlled variable and
observe what happens, and what doesn't. So you don't really know any other
way to determine the causes of behavior than to disturb and observe.

>I would call that "studying the causes of behavior."

If you used The Test properly then I suppose you could say that you are
looking for the "causes of behavior".

Yep, glad you agree.

Behavior -- controlled perceptual variables -- is not caused: it is
controlled. There's a difference.

Behavior is not a perceptual variable. Behavior controls perception,
remember? Behavior is the controlling, not the end result of that control
-- a controlled perceptual variable. And behavior IS caused, although not
in the way imagined by open-loop theories. To state otherwise is to assert
that behavior is something like the ancient notion that the mind has free
will, acting but not being acted upon.

I'll say it
again if you like (though I don't recall saying it the first time).
Behavior is _not_ caused. Behavior (controlled perceptions) is controlled.

You're starting to sound like Big Brother in George Orwell's _1984_:
ignorance is strength, freedom is slavery, behavior is perception.

Regards,

Bruce

[From Rick Marken (960913.1050)]

Bruce Abbott (960913.0935 EST)--

We're talking about the situation that occurs when the model does an
excellent job of matching the data; in that case there are probably a
begillion different controllers one could invent that would do the job
equally well. How do you tell which is the _right_ model.

For me, it would be the model that is the simplest.

I do think he [Simon] has something to contribute to our understanding of
the task of discovering the properties of the underlying systems that serve
particular functions in the life of the organism.

What does he have to contribute?

As Simon's analysis is neutral with respect to any particular model of
behavior (control, S-R, astrology, what have you), holding a control-system
view does not require one to reject what Simon has to say on this matter.

In what sense is Simon's "analysis" (of behavior?) neutral. Everything of his
that I'm reading here is clearly based on a cause-effect view of behavior.

I don't believe that _any_ analysis of behavior is "theory neutral", by the
way. I think many scientific psychologists would say that they are "theory
neutral"; that they don't believe in any particular theory of behavior --
S-R, reinforcement, cognitive, dynamic, whatever -- but I think they are
wrong. There is really only one theory (besides PCT) in psychology today --
cause-effect theory -- and all psychologists believe in it (whether they know
it or not) because it is the basis of all the research that is done in
psychology. Psychologists who say "I don't believe in any particular theory
of behavior" still believe in the results of psychological reseach. They
believe that achievement instructions cause people to stand closer to the
target, that a small number of bystanders causes people to help in an
emergency, that solving the same kind of problem over and over causes people
to take a long time solving a new problem, etc. They believe in the cause-
effect theory of behavior.

Behavior is not a perceptual variable. Behavior controls perception,
remember? Behavior is the controlling, not the end result of that control
-- a controlled perceptual variable.

Bill called his book "Behavior: The control of perception" because the word
"behavior" is ambiguous; it refers to many aspects of the process of control.
So the title of the book referred to behavior as a process: control of
perception.

Psychologists have used the word "behavior" to refer to the actions that
influence a controlled perception (like the variations in retinal size that
influence the amount of light falling on the retina) to controlled
perceptions themselves (like the intensity of a tone in the psychophysical
method of adjustment) and to irrelevant side effects of the control process
(like the "kick" that occurs in the patellar "reflex"). From the point of
view of the behaving system, however, behavior _is_ a perceptual variable.
When I type, I am controlling (among other things) my perception of the words
that appear on the screen -- a perceptual variable. One of my behaviors is
the stream of letters appearing in front of me. Another is the kinesthetic
and visual perceptions that are my "postural" behaviors.

I can make a fist with my hand (not while I'm typing;-)). This behavior is,
configuration. From my point of view, my behavior is the behavior of my
perceptions. For a more thorough discussion of this point of view, please see
my paper "The hierarchical behavior of perception" which is available on the
WWW at:

http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/csg/documents/behave_p.erc.html

It is true that the behavior of my perceptions is caused by me; but it is
also caused by environmental influences that are indendent of me. When I lift
my hand to point at the screen, the final position of my hand is caused by
forces I exert _and_ by forces independent of me -- like gravity. The
reference signal in me specifies where the perception of hand position is to
be; but the actual state of that perception is caused by me _and_ the
environment.

Because the environmental causes of a percpetion are always different, the
causes I exert to produce the same perception will also always be different;
the same perception is always caused differently. So the fact that a behavior
(like the position of my hand) is _caused_ really doesn't tell us much about
that behavior. What is important about behavior (as perceptual result) is
that a perceeption is _controlled_; the same behavior (perception) can be
produced consistently despite the fact that it is always produced by
different causes.

And behavior IS caused, although not in the way imagined by open-loop
theories.

I agree with you big time on this one.

You're starting to sound like Big Brother in George Orwell's _1984_:
ignorance is strength, freedom is slavery, behavior is perception.

Starting? I think I've been sounding like this for a long time. Sometimes
when I talk about the nature of perceptual control even _I_ think I'm nuts;-)

PCT is a VERY different way of looking at behavior. William James got close
but I've never seen anything from Herb Simon that seemed close -- or
particularly helpful. But if you like his stuff, mazel tov.

Best

Rick

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from my point of view, a particular state of a kinesthetic perceptual