Cognitive dissonance vs The PCT Police

CSGnet Archive CSG1997
1

[From Rick Marken (971203.1300)]

Dan Miller (971203.1300) --

Dissonance theories are a types of balance theories - as is PCT.
I suppose one could associate reducing dissonance with reducing
error, but the stretch would upset the PCT Police (and rightfully so).

Actually, I think dissonance reduction is precisely error reduction.
Cognitive dissonance theory (as I understand it) _is_ control theory.
What are controlled are "cognitions" (high order perceptions in
PCT speak). One cognition functions as a reference, the other is
a perception. The theory predicts what an individual will do to
make a cognition (like "how much I'm being paid") match a reference
("how much I should be paid").

My problem with theories like cognitive dissonance is not that they
are "bad" theories (though cognitive dissonance could be stated far
more clearly and quantitatively). My problem with such theories (and
this includes _all_ non-PCT applications of control theory to behavior,
not just cognitive dissonance) is that the theorists don't understand
how their theories work. Control systems control perceptions; that's
true of all control systems, living and artificial. If cognitive
dissonance theory is a control theory (and I believe it is) then
the way to test it is to determine whether people actually control
the cognitions that the theory says they control. So you can't
test cognitive dissonance theory using group data the way cognitive
dissonance theoriests did. And you can't test it using the conventional
IV-DV approach the way cognitive dissonance theorists did. You have
to test cognitive dissonance theory by specifying what cognition(s)
you think a person is controlling and testing to see if the person is
actually controlling them; you have to test for controlled variables.

I have always thought that the essense of PCT was in the methodology.
Perhaps this is a bias that comes from the fact that I was trained
as an experimentalist. But the fact is that PCT, as theory, is
just plain vanilla control theory, and as Hans was fond of pointing
out, there are ways to make basic PCT a hell of a lot more complex
than it is (theorists always seem interested in making theories more
complex since that's really all they have to play with; we researchers
are happy when theories are simple, not only because we're not as smart
as theorists but also because we have reality -- perceptual reality --
to play with). What's been missing from the behavioral sciences is
not control theories but research aimed at testing to determine whether
people control what these theories say they control.

Best

Rick

ยทยทยท

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

2

[From Bruce Gregory (971203.1740 EST)]

Rick Marken (971203.1300)

Actually, I think dissonance reduction is precisely error reduction.
Cognitive dissonance theory (as I understand it) _is_ control theory.
What are controlled are "cognitions" (high order perceptions in
PCT speak). One cognition functions as a reference, the other is
a perception. The theory predicts what an individual will do to
make a cognition (like "how much I'm being paid") match a reference
("how much I should be paid").

One problem seems to me to be that by simply calling for
dissonance reduction the theory is ambiguous as to which
cognition serves as a reference and which as a perception. This
could be sorted out, as you say, only by the Test. Nice post.

Bruce

3

[From Bruce Abbott (971203.1955 EST)]

Rick Marken (971203.1300) --

Dan Miller (971203.1300)

Dissonance theories are a types of balance theories - as is PCT.
I suppose one could associate reducing dissonance with reducing
error, but the stretch would upset the PCT Police (and rightfully so).

Actually, I think dissonance reduction is precisely error reduction.
Cognitive dissonance theory (as I understand it) _is_ control theory.
What are controlled are "cognitions" (high order perceptions in
PCT speak). One cognition functions as a reference, the other is
a perception. The theory predicts what an individual will do to
make a cognition (like "how much I'm being paid") match a reference
("how much I should be paid").

I think cognitive dissonance theory is somewhat different than that, at
least for the examples Festinger supplied. According to Festinger,
dissonance is a _perception_ (not an error signal) that two beliefs, or a
belief (e.g. that one should not lie without sufficient justification) and
the perception of what one has done (that one has lied with insufficient
justification) are contradictory, and that this dissonance is experienced as
discomfort. The reference is not to experience this discomfort, and action
is taken (if possible) to eliminate it by removing the dissonance. In the
Festinger experiment I described, those who had been paid only $1 for lying
would have experienced greater dissonance (according to Festinger) than
those who had been paid $20. Those paid little thus experienced stronger
discomfort. This discomfort could be eliminated by remembering the tedious
task as being more interesting and fun than it really had been, so that the
lie was not really a lie.

Under PCT, neither reference signals nor error signals are perceived. Thus
the perception "how much I should be paid" could not be a reference, nor
could the perception "I'm not being paid enough" (the difference between
"how much I should be paid" and "how much I'm being paid") be an error
signal. Or have I misunderstood Bill's position on this?

By the way, when I noted that cognitive dissonance was a type of control
theory about a week ago, no one seemed to find that interesting.

Regards,

Bruce

4

[From Bill Powers (971203.1847 MST)]

Bruce Abbott (971203.1955 EST)]

I think cognitive dissonance theory is somewhat different than that, at
least for the examples Festinger supplied.

etc. (just using this post as a jumping-off point).

One interpretation that doesn't seem to have been mentioned is that a
cognitive dissonance is a conflict. It was proposed that there was one goal
of being honest and another of getting money, with the experiment pitting
these two goals against each other. Perhaps another story could be told
starting with that premise.

Best,

Bill P.

5

[Dan Miller (971214.1315)]

Bruce Abbott (971203.1955 EST)

I think cognitive dissonance theory is somewhat different than that, at
least for the examples Festinger supplied. According to Festinger,
dissonance is a _perception_ (not an error signal) that two beliefs, or a
belief (e.g. that one should not lie without sufficient justification) and
the perception of what one has done (that one has lied with insufficient
justification) are contradictory, and that this dissonance is experienced as
discomfort. The reference is not to experience this discomfort, and action
is taken (if possible) to eliminate it by removing the dissonance. In the
Festinger experiment I described, those who had been paid only $1 for lying
would have experienced greater dissonance (according to Festinger) than
those who had been paid $20. Those paid little thus experienced stronger
discomfort. This discomfort could be eliminated by remembering the tedious
task as being more interesting and fun than it really had been, so that the
lie was not really a lie.

Under PCT, neither reference signals nor error signals are perceived. Thus
the perception "how much I should be paid" could not be a reference, nor
could the perception "I'm not being paid enough" (the difference between
"how much I should be paid" and "how much I'm being paid") be an error
signal. Or have I misunderstood Bill's position on this?

I think you have it right. A very nice description and analysis of
cognitive dissonance.

By the way, when I noted that cognitive dissonance was a type of control
theory about a week ago, no one seemed to find that interesting.

Well, it points to a very narrow problem within PCT, but I do not
recall it dealing much with actual acting control systems. And, it
isn't very interesting, but, then, I'm easily entertained. It was
fun to think about ideas I hadn't considered for twenty some years.

Keep the faith,
Dan

Dan Miller
miller@riker.stjoe.udayton.edu

6

[Dan Miller (971204.1330)]

From Rick Marken (971203.1300)

My problem with theories like cognitive dissonance is not that they
are "bad" theories (though cognitive dissonance could be stated far
more clearly and quantitatively). My problem with such theories (and
this includes _all_ non-PCT applications of control theory to behavior,
not just cognitive dissonance) is that the theorists don't understand
how their theories work.

I'm not sure what a "bad" theory is. Some are pretty loony, but
whether or not they are useful in solving problems (reducing error?)
may be a better way of judging them. In this sense I feel that
cognitive dissonance theory, though intuitive, is not particularly
useful for just the reason you state. Festinger and his comrades did
not try to understand how the phenomenon he was purporting to explain
actually worked. It was a black box. Also, I do not recall much in
the way of behavior happening in Festinger's world. Though this is
not what PCT tries to explain, it is an essential ingredient in the
model.

Control systems control perceptions; that's
true of all control systems, living and artificial. If cognitive
dissonance theory is a control theory (and I believe it is) then
the way to test it is to determine whether people actually control
the cognitions that the theory says they control. So you can't
test cognitive dissonance theory using group data the way cognitive
dissonance theoriests did.

No, I agree that they did not adequately "test" cognitive dissonance
in the sense that Perceptual Control Theorists test. Rather, they
demonstrated cognitive dissonance. The aggregated individual data
(remember in sociology group has a more precise meaning that does not
fit the constraints of your definition) employed by Festinger was an
attempt to be scientific, that is, action intended to bring
about a perception that others thought he was one hell of a
scientist. Also, he wanted to demonstrate that this dissonance stuff
was more general than ideosyncratic. He was successful on both
accounts.

I have always thought that the essense of PCT was in the methodology.
Perhaps this is a bias that comes from the fact that I was trained
as an experimentalist.
. . .
we researchers
are happy when theories are simple, not only because we're not as smart
as theorists but also because we have reality -- perceptual reality --
to play with). What's been missing from the behavioral sciences is
not control theories but research aimed at testing to determine whether
people control what these theories say they control.

I agree with you only so far (so what's new). You are a theorist - a
scientific theorist. I once read how social philosophy became social
theory sometime in the early 20th Century. However, I've never
bought it. Theories must be grounded in observation, and they must
be tested. Otherwise, what is their utility (beyond a demonstration
of one's intellectual prowess)? I'm not knocking perceptions of
one's own intellectual prowess, but I prefer a tight relationship
between theory and research in my science.

On the other hand, the methodology employed - our actions taken in
order to generate data - does have profound effects on our
perceptions of those data. I don't think we can make a hard case for
particular methods if all we are getting are intensities and
sensations. More to the point, the requirements for specific
research actions defeats the central axiom of Perceptual Control
Theory.

Keep the faith,
Dan

Dan Miller
miller@riker.stjoe.udayton.edu

7

i.kurtzer (971207)

[From Bruce Abbott (971203.1955 EST)]

Under PCT, neither reference signals nor error signals are perceived.

that not PCT, that's some philosophy to associate experience with a class of
signals. The rest of the argument falls.

By the way, when I noted that cognitive dissonance was a type of control
theory about a week ago, no one seemed to find that interesting.

was it the type of control theory that makes predictions of r= .98, or was it
the type of talk such that we can do business as usual?

i.