Conflict in conversation

[From Rick Marken (2007.01.28.1340)]

Martin Taylor (2007.01.28.12.18)

Why is a discussion a "metaphorical entity" when other perceptions are not?

I think what is metaphorical is the idea that that the discussion is an entity on which all parties to a conflict can mutually opposing effects. The metaphor is that a discussion is like the flag tied to the rope in a tug of war game. The position of the flag is not only perceived by both parties to the conflict; it's state is simultaneously affected in mutually exclusive ways by both parties. I was trying to imagine the discussion to be like that kind of tug of war, but it's not. What I do to move my perception of the discussion closer to my reference has no effect on the other party's ability to control their perception of the discussion, and vice versa. Quite different than a tug of war.

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[From Bill Powers (2007.01.28.1628 MST)]

Rick Marken (2007.01.28.1340) --

What I do to move my perception of the discussion closer to my reference has no effect on the other party's ability to control their perception of the discussion, and vice versa. Quite different than a tug of war.

That's what I had in mind when I called it a metaphor.

Best,

Bill P.

[Martin Taylor 2007.01.30.10.08]

[From Bill Powers (2007.01.28.1628 MST)]

Rick Marken (2007.01.28.1340) --

What I do to move my perception of the discussion closer to my reference has no effect on the other party's ability to control their perception of the discussion, and vice versa. Quite different than a tug of war.

That's what I had in mind when I called it a metaphor.

I'm sorry to seem (or be) obtuse, but you both seem to accept that you can have a perception of "the discussion", and this perception is one that each party to "the discussion" can control. How, then, is "the discussion" more of a metaphor than any other controllable perception?

An alternate question that might bypass the need to answer the first is: What do you conceive as being "the discussion" that each party perceives? Is it the perception that the parties are attempting to communicate? Is it the topic? Is it the approach to the topic? Is it the degree of agreement by the other party as to some issue relating to the topic?

Or do you call it a metaphor because you want to refer to all of the above at one fell swoop (a nice metaphor itself)?

Are you talking about each participant controlling in imagination, without acting in the "real" world perceptible to the other party? That doesn't seem right, either, given that each party perceives the other as participating in the "discussion", the perception of which is being controlled by each.

Whatever it is, I'm finding it hard to imagine a set-up within the PCT framework in which two people's perceptions of an entity can be independently controlled without either influencing the other's ability to control.

Underlying my worrying at this tag-end is a question of whether you conceive PCT as admitting controlled perceptions of entities perceptible by more than one person, but that nevertheless are controllable independently by all that perceive them. It seems that you do, and that these mutually perceptible but independently controllable entities are called "metaphors". I can't, at the moment, see how such a situation is possible. If that's not it, then what, in the context of PCT, do you label a "metaphor"?

Martin

[From Rick Marken (2007.01.30.0925)]

Martin Taylor (2007.01.30.10.08) --

I'm sorry to seem (or be) obtuse, but you both seem to accept that you can have a perception of "the discussion", and this perception is one that each party to "the discussion" can control. How, then, is "the discussion" more of a metaphor than any other controllable perception?

Again, what is (possibly) metaphorical is the idea that the state of a discussion is like the position of a flag in a tug of war. It's the idea that what each party does affects the state of this variable in a mutually exclusive way.

An alternate question that might bypass the need to answer the first is: What do you conceive as being "the discussion" that each party perceives?

I think it's the sound waves produced by A and B. I guess A and B can affect this variable in mutually exclusive ways by shouting each other down, trying to mask the sound produced by the other. So at the lower levels -- at the level of sound amplitude -- there can be a non-metaphorical conflict over the signal/noise ratio of the sound produced by each party.

Is it the perception that the parties are attempting to communicate? Is it the topic? Is it the approach to the topic? Is it the degree of agreement by the other party as to some issue relating to the topic?

I think the conflict is metaphorical at all perceptual levels above sound amplitude.

Or do you call it a metaphor because you want to refer to all of the above at one fell swoop (a nice metaphor itself)?

Are you talking about each participant controlling in imagination, without acting in the "real" world perceptible to the other party? That doesn't seem right, either, given that each party perceives the other as participating in the "discussion", the perception of which is being controlled by each.

Whatever it is, I'm finding it hard to imagine a set-up within the PCT framework in which two people's perceptions of an entity can be independently controlled without either influencing the other's ability to control.

I think there is real conflict at the lower (sound amplitude) level that affects the how the discussion goes at the higher ones.

Underlying my worrying at this tag-end is a question of whether you conceive PCT as admitting controlled perceptions of entities perceptible by more than one person, but that nevertheless are controllable independently by all that perceive them. It seems that you do, and that these mutually perceptible but independently controllable entities are called "metaphors". I can't, at the moment, see how such a situation is possible. If that's not it, then what, in the context of PCT, do you label a "metaphor"?

I think the goal is to model things correctly. If what I say about Bush has no real influence on what someone else says about Bush, other than the acoustic interference that results when we say it in the same room, then I would say that the discussion about Bush (at the level of a discussion about Bush's competence, say) is not really a conflict and the perception that is the subject of the discussion (Bush's competence) is only metaphorically in conflict, unlike other variables (the position of the flag in tug of war) that are really in conflict.

Best

Rick

Martin

Richard S. Marken Consulting
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[From Bill Powers (2007.01.30.1125 MST)]

Martin Taylor 2007.01.30.10.08 –

I’m sorry to seem (or be)
obtuse, but you both seem to accept that you can have a perception of
“the discussion”, and this perception is one that each party to
“the discussion” can control. How, then, is “the
discussion” more of a metaphor than any other controllable
perception?

Each party’s perception of “the discussion” resides in that
individual’s head. There is no interaction in the outside world at that
level of perception. It is perfectly possible for those two perceptions
to be in different states (as each is judged by its owner) at the same
time, which would not be possible if “the discussion” were part
of the environment being affected simultaneously by both parties. So the
conflict is metaphorical – we speak as if there were really a
conflict at the level of the discussion.

An alternate question that might
bypass the need to answer the first is: What do you conceive as being
“the discussion” that each party perceives? Is it the
perception that the parties are attempting to communicate? Is it the
topic? Is it the approach to the topic? Is it the degree of agreement by
the other party as to some issue relating to the topic?

Or do you call it a metaphor because you want to refer to all of the
above at one fell swoop (a nice metaphor itself)?

All of the above could be what either party means by “the
discussion.” Each of these questions addresses a perception in one
party’s head, or both. There is no way to compare one party’s perception
with a supposedly similar perception in the other party’s head. Any of
the perceptions you mention could be in two different states at the same
time, because they are in physically distinct places. To get a true
conflict there must be a single variable being affected by outputs
from both systems so only the algebraic sum of the outputs is having an
effect on the single variable. Furthermore, there must be a significant
loss of control for this situation to be called a conflict.

Those seem to be the rules that follow from my mental model of
conflict.

Whatever it is, I’m finding it
hard to imagine a set-up within the PCT framework in which two people’s
perceptions of an entity can be independently controlled without either
influencing the other’s ability to control.

The catch is the term “an entity.” You’re assuming (or maybe
assuming that I’m assuming) that there is a single entity called
“the discussion” (or whatever), and both people are
experiencing different representations “of it.” If that were in
fact the case, then it would be impossible for both parties to influence
the objective entity so as to put it in two different states at the same
time. A true conflict would exist, if the other conditions were met. But
if the perceptions are defining the entity for each person, the
definitions can be different and no conflict will ensue. One person can
be experiencing one state of a discussion while the other person is
simultaneously experiencing a different state of a discussion. That will
not create conflict unless the actions one person uses to control the
perception of the discussion prevent the other person from perceiving his
version of the discussion in the desired state. The conflict would then
be manifested at a lower level than than perception of the
discussion.

Underlying my worrying at this
tag-end is a question of whether you conceive PCT as admitting controlled
perceptions of entities perceptible by more than one person, but that
nevertheless are controllable independently by all that perceive
them.

Well, this is the basic hard question, isn’t it? What is the relationship
between the worlds of perception that we experience and whatever it is
that exists (according to the models we accept) on the other side of the
sensory endings? Is there, in fact, any entity outside our input
boundaries that two people can knowingly perceive at the same
time?

It seems that you do, and
that these mutually perceptible but independently controllable entities
are called “metaphors”. I can’t, at the moment, see how such a
situation is possible. If that’s not it, then what, in the context of
PCT, do you label a “metaphor”?

The metaphor to which I refer is the outside world. We act as if
our perceptions were identical to reality in the critical regards. We
communicate with others as if we had identical experiences of the
world, including the communication itself at all the protocol layers. Of
course our acceptance of this apparent reality is conditional – when
there is a sufficient degree of actual conflict, we start reorganizing,
changing the details that seem to be causing the problem.

This metaphor exists within a larger one, of course: the PCT
model.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Erling Jorgensen (2007.01.31 8:45 EST)]

Philip Runkel (2007.01.30 20:22:28 -0800)

I sat at one
table, and after a short time, a man came in and sat opposite me. I
told him a little about myself and my professional interests, and he
made encouraging replies.

After perhaps fifteen minutes, I began to feel there was something
odd about the conversation. It turned out that the fellow was not
the person I had invited to coffee. He said he, too, had been
finding the conversation odd. Considering all the remarks that might
have raised suspicion but didn't, I thought it remarkable that the
discussion went that long (instead of one or two minutes) before
collapsing.

It is situations like these that lead me to believe we do often control
for perceptions such as "Episodes." His episode was something like
"a polite conversation in a restaurant with a stranger." Your episode
was something like "a beginning discussion with a potential colleague."
Each of those was in the service of higher level desired perceptions,
perhaps a principle of "cordiality" on his part, & perhaps a systems
concept(?) on yours of "settling in to a new career."

It seems you were both using varying discursive means to bring about
such perceptions. For instance, the back & forth of turn-taking,
non-verbal gestures of interest ['Is that encouragement I see, or mere
politeness?'], degree of self-disclosure, etc., as well as the actual
content of the discussion & all the auditory & musculature perceptions
to bring it about.

Some of these appeared to be in conflict, leading to the "oddness" that
you both eventually sensed. One candidate for the conflict is that
perception of "episode." For each of you, things were not progressing
the way they 'should' to bring about your respective episodes -- perhaps,
not winding down quickly enough for him, versus not being reciprocated
by corresponding self-disclosure in your perceptions of him.

I am not sure I agree with Bill & Rick's contention that the conflict
is "metaphorical" by virtue of the perceptions being in two different
places, i.e., the heads of the respective parties. That is true of
all perceptions. If exact overlap of perceptions -- such that there can
be a direct opposition of reference signals -- is a litmus test for
conflict to exist, then we start to have a concept that doesn't do us
much practical good.

It seems to me that we can have "the perception that we are perceiving
the same thing," and "the perception that the other person is moving
that in a direction different from what I want." Weren't both of these
present in your situation, Phil? The oddness arose from the low-key
conflict around the latter. It was resolved by realizing the former
perception was in error. When you both acknowledged that your
perceptions of the episodic interaction were different, instead of
jointly coordinating the same episode, you regained enough degrees of
freedom to get out of the conflict. But I think it arose because of
an untested _perception_ that 'we're on the same page', or some such
thing. And that perception did not have to actually exist "out there"
in the environment -- (what perceptions do?)-- for the conflict to
manifest itself.

All the best,
Erling

[From Bill Powers (2007.01.31.1020 MST)]

Erling Jorgensen (2007.01.31 8:45 EST) –

I am not sure I agree with Bill
& Rick’s contention that the conflict

is “metaphorical” by virtue of the perceptions being in two
different

places, i.e., the heads of the respective parties. That is true of

all perceptions. If exact overlap of perceptions – such that there
can

be a direct opposition of reference signals – is a litmus test for

conflict to exist, then we start to have a concept that doesn’t do us

much practical good.

Conflicts, as I think of them, arise when two different control systems
controlling different (even if similar) variables act on the same
lower-order variable in opposing directions – or, alternatively, require
the same lower-order variable to be in two different states at the same
time, which is impossible. This doesn’t mean just that they perceive the
same environment in different ways or have different reference levels for
the perceptions. They can do that without conflict, because two different
perceptual variables are involved and there is nothing to say they have
to be in the same state. The real requirement for conflict is that ONE
variable is required to have different values at the same time. This
never happens at the level of perceptual signals in different people.
Those are not the same variable. A conflict involves a literal
impossibility.
You and I may have different reference levels for temperature (assume we
perceive temperature similarly), so what we consider to be a comfortable
temperature is not the same air temperature. However, I can set the
temperature of my house to keep it comfortable without keeping you from
setting the temperature of your house to keep it comfortable. No
conflict. Similarly, I may perceive the “neatness” of a room
differently from the way you perceive it (assume we both want high levels
of neatness): I want to see the books lined up neatly but don’t include
coats draped over the backs of chairs in my definition. You’re the
opposite. But you can keep your living-room neat and I can keep mine neat
without conflict, because they’re different living rooms. We’re
controlling physically different variables even if we call them by the
same name: neatness.
If we become housemates, conflict is just about inevitable, because now
it’s the same house and the same living room that we both use to control
our own perceptions. Now we are trying to keep the same house at two
different temperatures, and the same living room with books both orderly
and disorderly, and coats both put away and draped over chairs. That’s
where the conflict shows up, not in the way we perceive or in our
reference signals but in our attempt to change the same physical
variables in contradictory ways.
Conflict between control systems arises because they share the use of
lower-order systems, so different systems at one level can require
different states of the same controlled variable at a lower level, or the
same environmental variable outside the organism. The direct conflict
appears in the form of two output signals or actions that cancel each
other’s effect on a common variable such as a lower-order reference
signal or a physical variable in the environment. In MSOB I called that
the “expression” of the conflict, and later the
“manifestation” of the conflict. Without that direct opposition
there would be differences, but no conflict
Differences in opinions, goals, tastes, beliefs, and perceptions do not
constitute conflicts. These differences lead to conflict only when the
actions used to control (for) them operate on a common variable and
require that variable to be in mutually-exclusive states.
In Phil Runkel’s lovely example, there was no conflict as long as each
party managed to satisfy his own reference conditions without causing
errors in the other party. But because of the differences in perception,
some actions would satisfy one person but cause error in the other. For
example, the man talking to Phil might have said “Isn’t it great
that a totally accidental meeting like this could lead to an interesting
conversation?” Phil would have perceived that as an error, because
the meeting he perceived was planned, not accidental. Or the Phil might
have addressed the other person by name, and of course that would alert
the other person that something was wrong.
In Durango, I used to receive phone calls asking if “Bill” was
speaking. Of course I said yes. The first time, it took a while before I
could convince the other person that I could not replace his windshield
today, that we had no appointment (though the first time I did
have an appointment with someone else, and apologized at first for
getting the day wrong), and so on. “The Importance of Being
Earnest” was all about that sort of mistaken identity type of
conflict (though it was deliberate on one side). If you analyze any
competent novel or play, you will find that the heart of the work that
sustains interest in it is a conflict, either consciously known or
dangerously unrecognized. And the conflict, when manifested, always
requires two contradictory states of the same (literally the same)
variable.

Best,

Bill P.