[From Rick Marken (2015.08.20.0920)]
···
Rupert Young (2015.08.19 20.30)–
RY: Though what you actually controlling is a perception of the
amount of electromagnetic energy, such as the number of cells that
are stimulated, rather than an environmental variable?
RM: Yes!! What is controlled is an aspect of the environment as sensed. But in order to sense the desired aspect of the environment sensed you have to have an effect on the environment (as when you sense that you have lifted a book) or your relationship to it (as when you move to catch a fly ball). Control of perception always involves having an effect on the environment and/or your relationship to it.
RY: What I mean is that for the TCV to be used is that an experimentermust be able to measure certain environmental variables, which are
hypothesised to be correlates of the perception under control; that
is, they must be able to measured objectively.
RM: Actually I think that when it comes to testing for higher level controlled variables, like principles such as honesty, we won’t need to measure the environmental variables that are the basis of these perceptions because I suspect that for some time the only device capable of constructing such perceptions from sensory data will be the human brain. So the test will be done by having the experimenter determine whether the person is controlling a perception that corresponds to the experimenter’s own perception. This is the way the test is carried out in Bill’s example of “the coin game” by the way (B:CP 2nd edition, p. 236-238).
RY: I only brought that up as I though you'd said (in Rick Marken(2015.08.06.1000)) that we control the amount of sugar, for
sweetness of lemonade.
RM: The problem is that control is a hierarchical process. In the case of lemonade, variations in the amount of sugar added is a means (output) of controlling taste; but the amount of sugar added is itself a controlled variable; you are controlling for seeing a certain amount of sugar go into the liquid; if some falls off the spoon as you are carrying it to the liquid, for example, you will compensate for this disturbance by adding some extra sugar later to get to the reference amount sugar added that you want to add.
RY: So perhaps we shouldn't use it in the informal sense, to avoidconfusion.
RM: Again, I think it’s more of a problem because of the hierarchical nature of control. The trajectory of the bat is controlled as the means of controlling for making contact with the ball. The position of the mouse is controlled as the means of controlling for keeping the cursor on target. Most of what we think of as outputs are at the same time controlled perceptual inputs. The only actual “outputs” of a living control system are the results of efferent neural activity, such as changes in the length of muscle fibers.
RY: I was including imaginations, so no wonder we were seeing thingsslightly different. I didn’t see any reason to exclude them. I
assume that there are still control systems going on controlling
their perceptions, but with internal behaviour rather than overt
externally observed behaviour.
RM: Yes, this is the way control of imagination works in the PCT model.
RY: This seems to be a significant partof the control of perception, particularly with humans. I assume
that perceptions can be controlled merely through the process of
thinking. Perhaps by changing (varying) one’s perspective of the
meaning of thoughts, “I can’t get a job, it’s not my fault, there
are immigrants from other countries, they are working, it’s their
fault I don’t have job, send them back home”. Feedback is internal
and not through the environment, so environmental variables are not
involved. This sort of positive or negative thinking can consolidate
(control) thoughts and beliefs (perceptions) entirely with internal
processes. I can image Donald Trump looking in the mirror every
morning saying to himself “I will be in the Oval office, I will be
in the Oval office; this is a sexy hairstyle, this is a sexy
hairstyle”. People can create and control perceptions (imaginations)
without recourse to, or even in opposition to (e.g. religion),
environmental reality (evidence). But these perceptions may,
subsequently, have consequences in the real world.
RM: Yes, this may be the source of all of our problems. All my work is focused on understanding purposeful behavior – the stuff we can see other people doing. But we know (since we are living control systems ourselves) that a lot (possibly most) of what we do is done in our heads: we plan, imagine future experiences, remember, try different approaches to solving problems, etc. All this is control of imagined perception. I agree that controlling imagined perception can be a very important influence on the way we control in the real world, as your examples show. I think it’s also the reason for a lot of our own personal problems; nothing creates anxiety (error signals) like replaying in one’s head imagined perceptions of worst case scenarios. Also, imagination can be used to manipulate us. Advertisers and politicians do this all the time by evoking imagined disturbances to variables they know we are likely to be controlling.
RM: I think what many people think of when they hear “behavior is the control of perception” is that “behavior is the control of imagination”. And they like PCT for that reason because they know (like you say) that much of what we do is based on imaginations that lead us to do certain (often stupid) things. Its the things we do (as per the title of Gary Cziko’s wonderful book on PCT) – the actual behavior – that involves control of perception. That’s really all I’ve been talking about on this net when I talk about the PCT model of behavior. Control of perception is about actual behavior – behavior that produces controlled results in the the behaving system’s environment – and not about imagined behavior – controlled results that are produced only in the mind.
RM: Actual behavior – the things we do – is also the main focus of B:CP. Bill’s work was all about understanding behavior, not imagination. But he included imagination in the model for the sake of building a complete model of human nature because he knew that people do control in imagination: they think. But there is little more than a brief section on imagination in B:CP, perhaps because Bill felt that you have to understand actual behavior before you can start trying to understand imagined behavior (control of imagined perceptions).
RM: But I think we should start talking more abut control of imagination not only because it is often what is most interesting to people (being a major source of neuroses, probably) but also because it is related to the dominant conventional psychology today – cognitive psychology. Much of cognitive psychology can be viewed as an attempt to study control of imagination. And there is probably some pretty good research in cognitive psychology on which to base a discussion of control of imagination in terms of the PCT model.
RM: So I suggest that we start a discussion of control of imagination: thinking. I think failure to distinguish between control of perception (which is based on sensory effects of environmental variables) and control of imagination (which is not) has been the source of much confusion. Overt behavior involves the control of sensory based perception; thinking involves control of imagination, which has no (present time) sensory/environmental basis.
RM: I’m changing the subject head to see if we can start a discussion of the difference between control of perception and control of imagination. Maybe we can come up with some research to finally test some aspects of the PCT model of control of imagination.
Best
Rick
Though, "Behaviour is the control of perception", is a principlegeneral to all levels, including imagination, which has been part of
my point.
Yep, I take your point, but not sure I am convinced yet. Thereseems to be a major disjunct between perceptions based on sensory
input and high level perceptions of principles and system concepts.
Requires more thought.
But these can then, as I say above, become controllable perceptions,in the real world, such as Donald’s bid for the presidency.
Rupert
–
Richard S. Marken
www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble
RM:All perceptions are ultimately a function of
environmental variables so to the extent that a tester can
compute (or experience) the same aspect of those variables
as the testee, the TCV can be used to determine what
perception the system is controlling.
RM: I don't think sugar is an environmental correlate
of the perception of tea; that perception depends on a
combination of chemicals that includes sugar as one
component. But when you add sugar, sugar could be
considered an output that affects the controlled
perception, the taste of tea.
RY: There is, itseems to me, a distinction between the use of the word
“control” in the informal and formal, technical sense.
An important distinction. Informally it might look as if
someone is controlling the heat dial when taking a
shower, when it is actually being varied to control the
perception. Likewise with some of your baseball
examples. Informally it could be said that batters were
controlling the location of their bat relative to the
pitched ball. But formally they may actually have been *
varyingthe location of their bat in order to control the *
perceived relationship between the bat and the pitched ball.
The use of this informal sense may, perhaps, lead those
new to PCT to not appreciate the difference between our
manipulation of the world and the control of
perceptions, and miss the essence of PCT.
RM: Yes, that’s a problem.
RM: Imagined perceptions are not perceptions, in the
sense that they are not a function of physical stimulation
of the senses. So I would rather just refer to them as
“imaginations”. I have no idea what to do about
perceptions that are a combination of perception and
imagination. My experience is that it’s always one or the
other. But if there are such combinations then they are
what they are. But they are currently not part of the PCT
model. What we experience is either a perception or an
imagination, per the model anyway.
RY: If these arevalid then it doesn’t seem valid to regard the
controlof variable aspects of the environment as a general
principle.
RM: True. But I don't see it as a general principle. I
just see it as the way the model works. According to the
model, we control perceptions that are functions of
environmental variables (where environmental variables are
the variables in the models of physics and chemistry).
RY: This leads on tothe question of whether all perceptions are ultimately a
function of physical variables. Regarding high-level and
abstract perceptions, such as, honesty or god, I can’t
see how it can make sense that these are functions of
physical variables.
RM: And it doesn't make sense to me that they could not
be. Perceptions have to be based on sensory input and
sensory input is assumed to be caused by physical
variables. Think about it in terms of robotics. How would
you build a robot that controlled for the level of honesty
in an interaction with another control system? To build
such a robot it would have to perceive the honesty of what
it is saying. And that perception would have to be based
on a perception of what it’s saying, who the other control
system is, etc. And these perception would depend on the
robot hearing what it is saying and seeing who the other
robot is.That is, it would have to have sensors for
acoustic and optical physical variable – ears and eyes.
As for god, I don’t know what perceptual variable would be
controlled here. Degree of belief in god, perhaps? In
order to control this perception you would have to be able
to perceive how much you believe in god. This perception
would probably depend on perceiving your professions of
belief, your attendance at church perhaps, etc. Anyway, it
would ultimately depend on your ability to sense variables
in the environment – acoustical and optical.
RY: If they're notthen I’m not sure I have a satisfactory resolution but
the answer would seem to lie in imagination. What arises
from thinking is the ability to put together different
concepts and abstractions to create new, previously
un-thought thoughts.
RM: Yes, this is true. We create perceptions in
imagination that are not derived from sensory input
(physical variables). I guess I should be clear that when
I say that perceptions are always functions of
environmental variables I am talking about controlled or
controllable perceptions. The perceptual variables that
I create for myself in imagination – like the perception
of myself jumping up and flying over buildings – are
usually only controllable in imagination.