[Martin Taylor 2014.01.02.23.00]
[From Fred Nickols (2014.01.02.1556 EST)]
Uh-oh. I think I'm about to commit heresy here.
No heresy unless our loose canon decides it is.
I agree that PCT explains "observed actions of animals" (and other life
forms as well). Where I might be a wee bit heretical is with regard to the
PCT canon that "behavior is the control of perception." I appreciate the
sentiment behind that statement but I would argue that it isn't technically
correct or particularly useful. I do agree that behavior serves to control
perception. No quarrel there. However, I also happen to believe (along
with millions of others) that behavior is a term that, in general, refers to
the activity of organisms (or, as Ted says, the "observed actions of
animals").
So, PCT is a theory. That theory explains behavior. PCT is not behavior.
The control of perception is not behavior, although behavior does indeed
serve to control perception.
PCT is based on an assumption that is both intuitively reasonable (that one acts to make one's world seem good and stay that way), and that is thermodynamically required (that the maintenance of structure requires avoidance of an compensation for the influences of the environment). The PCT mantra is "All behaviour is the control of perception", where "perception" means the value of some variable internal to the organism. The word "All" is crucial here, but the difficult word is "behaviour". What does it mean, operationally? Is it "behaviour" to canvass for a political party? To tense a muscle? To try to win an argument? To take a holiday in a foreign land? In casual speech, the answer is "yes" to all of these. But that's not good enough for a precise theory.
One aspect of control that is usually ignored on CSGnet is the side-effect. When you talk about "the observed activities of animals" you always mean "the effects of the outputs of the animals on the part of the environment you observe". You don't mean their actual outputs, which you can't observe, and you don't mean the intended effects of their outputs on their environment. The actual effects of someone's output on their environment may well be quite different from what they intended. When one skis, for example, one does not intend to break a leg, but that may be the result of an intention to have an exhilarating slide down a mountainside.
Is "breaking a leg" while skiing "behaviour"? Is the perfect glide while enjoying the mountain scenery? Are the various muscle tensings and relaxings that happen during either of those events?" What IS "behaviour"? Is it the intended effects on the environment, meaning the influence that counters disturbances and brings perceptions to and maintains them near their reference levels? Those effects may not happen, as when a novice tightrope walker falls into the safety net. Which is the behaviour, the walk or the fall, or both? It's not an easy question.
If we focus on the intention behind the action -- the reference value for a perception in an active control loop--, "behaviour" must consist of all the results of the output of that control loop, including the side-effects. In that case, only outputs that are independent of any control loop can be considered "uncontrolled behaviour". The glass unintentionally knocked over when reaching for something else is not "uncontrolled behaviour" but "unintended consequences of behaviour used in control of some other perception". It's a side-effect. All observable behaviour has side-effects. The fact that the behaviour can be observed is proof of that.
Can there be "uncontrolled behaviour" within the HPCT construct? Yes, there can. It can happen at least when the brain or a motor nerve is externally stimulated. At some level, the external stimulation generates an output in some system independently of the levels of the reference and the perception in that system. At lower levels, the behaviour (outputs) are part of functioning control loops, but at the level of the stimulation the output is independent of control. It is a pure input->effect on the environment lineal causal system.
Side-effects of control may be seen as lineal causal effects of output
···
on the environment. In that sense they are "uncontrolled", but then the thesis of PCT is not that we control behaviour, is it? The side-effect of action is neither more not less controlled than any other aspect of action. Perception is what is controlled, not output. Output may be said to be "commanded", but it isn't "controlled", at least not within any flavour of PCT. Any side-effects are just among the changes in the environment that occur as consequences of the outputs that influence the perception.
No observer can tell which effects on the environment are side-effects and which are necessary to influence the controlled perceptions. When the glass is knocked over, you can't use the TCV to test whether the spill was intended. It happened, the social and physical circumstances have changed irrevocably, and the Test cannot be performed. The TCV can be used sometimes, but in real life it often is impossible. The effect on the environment occurred, the situation and opportunities to influence perceptions have changed, and no observer can distinguish side-effect from intentional effect other than by emulating the TCV imperfectly in imagination, using analogous remembered situations.
Fred says: "The control of perception is not behavior, although behavior does indeed serve to control perception." So we close the circle and ask again " what could be meant by 'controlled' and 'uncontrolled' behaviour"? My answer now is that all behaviour is uncontrolled. The distinction intended by using the words is between intended and side effects on the environment. Would it not be better to use those terms instead of implying that some behaviour is controlled?
Martin