Controlled Variables

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (01.01.27.0845)]

I would appreciate it if someone on the net who was involved
with the development of the CROWD program could give me a list
of the six perceptual variables controlled by each individual in
that program. I am writing a paper that will include a description
of the CROWD model (and several others) but I don't have easy access
to the program or the documentation (being on a Mac and an old one
at that; however, you all have the choice of sending me a high
performance PC notebook for my birthday, coming up in just 1 month,
or...not).

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: marken@mindreadings.com
mindreadings.com

[Bill_Powers1]

[From Bill Powers (2001.01.27.1038 MST)]

Rick Marken (01.01.27.0845)--

I would appreciate it if someone on the net who was involved
with the development of the CROWD program could give me a list
of the six perceptual variables controlled by each individual in
that program.

There are three pairs of systems, each pair consisting of a direction
control and a speed control system. One pair is used by all active
individuals: the collision-avoidance system. Each individual also has _ONE_
other pair of control systems, either a destination-seeking system or a
person-following system (using both at once is not recommended, though it's
possible, because they would conflict).

The collision-avoiding system detects the sum of all proximities to the
left of the line of travel, and all those to the right of it. Speed control
is one-way: if the sum of left and right proximity is below an adjustable
reference level, the speed increases, and as proximity gets to the
reference level the speed becomes zero (rather, the contribution to the
speed reference signal becomes zero -- other systems can also contribute).
Direction control uses the difference between left and right proximity to
determine the sign of the direction error (reference level zero), while the
sum of proximity errors determines the rate of turning (reference level
about 2/3 of the maximum value). So the system more or less follows a
contour line around the net obstacle, either to the left or to the right
depending on which way the impending collision is off-center. To make sure
it will always be off-center, a small amount of random dither is added to
the proximity-difference perceptual signal. This also assures that the
person will almost always get out of a cul-de-sac eventually, because
closed paths never quite repeat.

The perceptual signal for this system is a bit difficult to define in
words. The speed control keeps the sum of proximities from increasing much
above some reference level -- that's the easy one. But the direction
controller keeps the difference in left and right proximities at some
reference value, with the sign of the output function reversing when the
left-right proximity difference changes sign. That probably boils down to
some simple relationship but I've never worked out exactly what it is.

The "seek" control systems are simpler. The speed control system keeps the
sum of proximities to the target at a specific (high) level, while the
direction control system maintains a specific angle between the line of
travel and the direction to the target (expressed as the difference in left
and right proximities to the specific target). Usually the direction
reference signal is zero, meaning "keep the target straight ahead." But as
in the case of the "heel" setup, this direction can be set to some other
value; in "heel" the "dog" keeps the "master" at an angle of about 45
degrees to one side, at some specific distance or proximity. The moving
"master" is the target in this case. For destination-seeking systems, the
proximity to the destination circle determines the controlled variable: the
left-right sum is controlled by varying the speed, the left-right
difference by varying the direction of travel.

Proximity is an inverse-square function with a maximum value of 255. It
would correspond to any inverse-square function involved in perception,
such as area subtended by a retinal image, brightness of light, or
concentration of an odor-bearing airborne substance. Left and right
proximity would be measured by simple sensors placed on each side of the
body in the forward quadrant. I gave the sensors a cardiod sensitivity,
being maximum at some small angle from the direction of travel and falling
off to zero in the reverse direction.

Hope that covers it.

Best,

Bill P.

[Linda_J_Westerschult]

[From Rick Marken (01.01.27.1730)]

Bill Powers (2001.01.27.1038 MST) --

Hope that covers it.

Yes, very helpful. Thanks.

Best regards

Rick

[Richard_Marken]

[From Rick Marken (960123.1300)]

Me:

Actually, it probably wants to repeat the _perception_ of striking the
key; and it probably wants to repeat it so that it can keep perceiving
the "incentive" at the desired level. But these are empirical, not
theoretical, possibilities.

Bruce:

Your statement about these being empirical, not theoretical, possibilities
needs some explanation. Until they are empirically confirmed, do they not
remain conjecture and thus theoretical? And isn't that at the heart of this
discussion -- which theory best explains the observations?

The empirical question in my statement above was "what perception is
controlled by the pigeon". I was guessing that one controlled perception is
"a struck key". This empirical question can only be answered by doing The
test for the controlled variable. Until this test is done, the notion that
the the pigeon is controlling for "a struck key" is not a theoretical
conjecture; it is idle speculation. Since there have been no systematic
experimental tests done to determine the variables controlled in operant
experiments, the comparison of PCT to Killeen's (or anyone else's) model of
behavior in such experiments qualifies (in my mind) as idle (not theoretical)
speculation.

Bruce Abbott (960123.1305 EST) --

I thought that the preferred descriptor for behavioral output was _action_,
not act. In my definition, an _act_ is the (usually intended) perceptual
consequence of behavior.

In PCT we use the term "result" or "consequence" rather than "act" to refer
to a perceptual consequence of action. But I can see that "act" is defined
in the dictionary as "a result of action" so your usage was quite
appropriate. I would prefer to stick with the term "result" when we are
talking about the result of actions. But I also like going with the
dictionary; so I'm sorry about the misunderstanding.

Why is it that, having pecked the key and perceived that grain becomes
immediately available thereafter, the pigeon, after eating from the hopper
until the hopper drops out of reach, returns to the key and pecks it again?
Assume that, prior to the conjunction of these perceptual events, the pigeon
did not "know" how to control the hopper, and thus the incentive.

Here's my (well, Bill's) theory: The rat learns to control the perception of
"a struck key" because ingestion and digestion of the grain that results from
controlling this variable _slows or stops_ the process of reorganization. The
"incentive" (the grain) doesn't "lead to the establishment of a reference"
for striking the key; rather, it allows the _cessation_ of reorganization;
the organism stops trying to control other variables; it keeps controlling
for "a struck key" because doing so keeps the organism in control of an
intrinsic variable (like blood suger level). It is the error in the system
controlling this intrinsic variable that drives reorganization. As intrinsic
error decreases (because whatever the organism is currently controlling
produces, as a side effect, the desired intrinsic perception) the (possibly
random) changes in the variables being controlled ("a struck dot on floor",
"a struck dot on ceiling", "a movement of wings", etc) stops; the
pigeon keeps controlling for "a struck key".

In PCT, "incentives" don't start something (a behavior like pecking a key),
they _stop_ something (the process of reorganization). Indeed, there are no
such things as "incentives"; there are only controlled variables.

Best

Rick

[R_Marken]

[From Rick Marken (990603.1220)]

i.kurtzer (990603.1430)

The alleged limits of the Test are not what stops people from
using the Test. It the limits of their own imaginations or an
unwillingness to try something different.

Well said!

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[Marken_Richard_S1]

[From Rick Marken (930830.1030)]

Michael Fehling in post from Tom Bourbon (930830.1007) --

I cannot think of any organization for
which no controlled variables can be found. It is trivial to find them.

Could you describe one of these controlled variables and the means by
which you determined that it was, indeed, a controlled variable. Also,
how did you establish that it was controlled by "the organization".
Even though it is "trivial" to find controlled variables, they are rarely
reported in the behavioral science literature; neither are the means by
which they were discovered. So many of us doing PCT research are under
the impression that behavioral scientists wouldn't know a controlled
variable if it were standing in front of them waving a red flag. Do you
describe controlled variables and the means you used to test for their
existence in your research papers? It would be wonderful to find that
someone was doing this.

Finding the plausible controlled variables for any organization is a no
brainer.

Plausible and actual are two VERY different things. Finding ACTUAL controlled
variables is (I think) a "brainer".

Defining the exact nature of the control functions and their effects
on the environment is what I hope PCT gives better than other approaches to
control.

PCT is the ONLY approach to control that I know of. What other approaches
to control are you thinking of?

Finally, as to whether Bill is right or wrong on the similarities between
organisms and organizations as control systems, I was urging that both you
PCT'ers and others such as I would be better off putting our efforts into
converting this type of assertion into testable hypotheses rather than
spinning our wheels defending vague opinions.

Bill P.'s CROWD program and Tom B.'s models (and data) on social interactions
are very clear, testable hypotheses about what is happening when variables
are "controlled" by groups of individuals. These are not vague opinions;
they are working models. Tom's work, for example, shows clearly how social
control of a variable (by two or more people) results from the operation of
independent control systems. Bill's program shows how the appearance of
"organizational control" (like the formation of a perfect circle of
individuals
around a "leader") also results from the operation of independent control
systems, no one of which has the goal of forming a circle around the leader.

PCT is more about getting the basics right than it is about how to do fancy
modelling that has nothing to do with reality. The things that you might
think
of as trivial or obvious are what PCT is about. That's why very few people
are interested in PCT; they think they're already on the right track; they
just want to head down that track more efficiently. PCT is almost certain
to be perceived as a spoil sport by these people -- it's major contribution
to most work in the behavioral sciences is to yell "you're heading down the
wrong track"; not exactly music to most people's ears.

It sounds possible to me that you are, indeed, heading down the "right"
track (from a PCT perspective) with your research on organizations. I can
get a better idea of whether or not this is the case if you describe in more
detail 1) how you determine the variables that are being controlled by an
organization 2) how you determine that it is the "organization" (and not the
individuals in it) that is controlling these variables and 3) how you model
the
perceptual functions that turn environmental variables into the perceptual
variables that are actually controlled by the control system (organization
or individual).

Best

Rick

[Michael_Fehling]

[Michael Fehling 930830 12:42 PM PDT]

In re Rick Marken 930830.1030 --

Rick,

In response to my claim that it's a "no brainer" to find variables controlled
by organizations I've been studying, you asked me to "describe...these
controlled variables and the means by which you determined that it was,
indeed, a controlled variable...[how you]...established that it was controlled
by 'the organization' (and not the individuals in it), and...how you model the
perceptual functions that turn environmental variables into the perceptual
variables that are actually controlled...'"

  I see. You're calling my bluff, huh?

  In fact, I think this is an excellent suggestion. However, I want to be
challenged to do this _in_(H)PCT_terms_ and not in the terms that I have been
using to date. So, please provide me with the most precise description you
can of (a) what will count as a controlled variable in theoretical terms, (b)
the corresponding operational test for such, and (c) any other factors that
PCT requires. (I think I've learned enough PCT from you folks to go ahead on
my own, but I'd rather minimize terminological quibbles and other incidental
miscommunications. Besides, that way I learn more from this exercise, too.)

  If you'll do this I'll try to carefully describe at least one case that
supports my claim in your terms. This is the most immediate way I can think
of to show my willingness to try incorporating PCT into my own work.

  (BTW, if you think that the information that I've requested would bore the
"regular (sic) contributors to this list" , as one message put it, then email
me privately.)

- michael -

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2002.09.27.0940)]

Bill Williams (27 September 2002 1:00 AM CST)

I've come to the conclusion that: I since I choose my reference levels, and I
also choose my experience ( a la William JAmes Principles of Psychology p. 402)
then I am in a position to choose the magnitude of the errors I percieve. This
can be expressed in a variation on an old and familiar theme: "I see you have
choosen to hurt."

I agree that we choose our reference levels (within the constraints of all our
existing references, so we can't choose arbitrarily or freely) but I don't think
we can choose the magnitude of error in our control loops in the same way. The
magnitude of error in a control loop depends on how well designed the control
system is (how skillful it is at controlling the perceptual variable) _and_ on the
prevailing magnitude of disturbances. When disturbances exceed the output
capabilities of the control system, the system experiences error that is
unquestionably _not_ of its choosing.

It was after coming to this understanding that I reached the conclusion that
the people who think Rick is so terrible and don't come to the CSG meetings
because they don't like Rick were making a mistake. They were claiming, in
effect, that Rick hurt them. Rick they've said is a "bully." But, all Rick
has ever done is talk. There's not the slightest hint that Rick's talk has
ever contained anything remotely suggesting a physical threat to anyone. So, if
Rick poses a threat, it is a question of people's self-regard rather than their
bodily well being that is involved. That's when I reached the conclusion that
the reason they were experiencing pain was the result of a choice they had
made.

I don't quite agree with this. I don't think it's fair to say that these folks
have chosen to be hurt by me. They have simply chosen to control for ideas that
matter to them and what I say has been a disturbance to these ideas. My
disturbances have produced error for them and, hence, pain. They can see that I am
the source of this pain so they hate me. Actually, neither they nor I has chosen
for them to experience hurt; their hurt is a side effect of a debate about ideas.

What I think those who hate me are wrong about is not that I am the cause of their
pain -- I am. What they are wrong about is that it is my intent to hurt them. I
don't intend to hurt them but it is hard to argue against people's ideas without
hurting the people who hold those ideas dear. So I suppose I am _ knowingly_
hurting them but it's not really intentional -- in the sense that my goal is to
hurt the idea, not the person who cherishes it. But I certainly don't blame these
people for hating me. It's quite understandable. If I were more effective at
presenting the case for PCT I might have more cognitive and S-R psychologists
hating me too.

This "hatred" thing is a problem in all intellectual (including political)
debates. When you argue against an idea (S-R, cognitive, conventional economics,
postmodernism, etc.) you are hurting the person who holds that idea dear. The more
effective and persuasive your argument the less able your opponent is to resist
your disturbance and, thus, the greater the hurt you are causing. And people often
end up disliking people who cause them pain. The only solutions to this problem
that I can see are to stop arguing against the idea or to argue less effectively.

But, it appears to me that one, and by far the most prominent
comlaint about Rick is based upon reasoning that I now belive is fallacious.
Despite what many people think, I regard the belief that conversational level
soundwaves and facial expressions can hurt people without their consent as
magical.

I disagree. I think words can hurt people (by causing error) and that the people
who hate me have every reason to hate me because my words have probably created
some very large errors (and, thus, hurt) for them. What I object to is people
acting on their hatred by attacking the source of the disturbance personally. I
think intellectual debates should focus on the ideas under discussion, not the
source of those ideas. I know this is hard to do but I think working toward this
ideal is the only way to keep things civil in debates such as those on CSGNet.
For example, when we debate reinforcement vs control of input the focus should be
on the relative merits of those two ideas, not on the real or imagined personal
failings of the advocates of those ideas.

The "hate Rick club" mistake has a counterpart in the mistake that Rick makes.

Rick once claimed that the glee of those who supported the World Trade
Center attack was a crime worse than the murders of innocent people.

If I ever said such a thing then that was a ridiculous thing to say. I certainly
don't think that, though I do think showing glee at murder is a pretty ugly
behavior.

But, it is clear that Rick is still thinks that an absurd
expression of opinion in a remote Arab village "causes" him pain-- maybe not
worse than the attack itself, but never-the-less severe pain.

Yes. This kind of thing does cause me pain. It is a disturbance to perceptions I
control. But I can control the pain in this case; I just switch off the news.

So, if we believe
Rick, he is under the control of those ragged fiends somewhere on the West
Bank.

I am not under control of them; but my feelings are certainly influenced by their
behavior.

His emotional state is, he is convinced, one of the variables that they
control.

No. Control implies the production of intended results. My emotional state is not
an intended result of their actions. It is an unintended side effect of their
actions.

Based on the
participation one might be justified in thinking that only Bill Powers and I
adhere to a position that excludes all environmental control of behavior.

I also "adhere to the position" that there is no environmental control of behavior
-- as long as we are talking about the inanimate environment. The animate
environment -- living control systems -- can certainly control behavior. They can
control behavior as output by disturbing controlled variables. And they can
control behavior as controlled perceptions by coercion. They _can_ do it but they
usually don't or, when they try, they don't do it very well. But they do try, as
when those who hate me for causing disturbances to their cherished ideas try to
prevent these disturbances through actions such as personal attacks that are aimed
at preventing me from producing more disturbances. I would prefer that they not
do this but I have no control over it. I wish the "hate Rick club" could become
the "hate Rick's ideas" club instead. Then I think we could all get along much
better personally.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2002.09.27.1120)]

Me:

>I agree that we choose our reference levels (within the constraints of all
> our existing references, so we can't choose arbitrarily or freely) but I
don't think

>we can choose the magnitude of error in our control loops in the same way.

Peter J. Burke (UCR 9/27/2002 10:15AM PDT)--

I would have to disagree that we can choose our reference levels. To do so
would be to disturb the output of the higher level control system which is
determining the reference level in question.

I agree with this, too. But I do think we can willfully choose our references,
at least for a while. I can choose to point at the screen (as I just did) and
then choose to point at the window (just did that). I willfully selecting
arbitrary settings of the reference for the direction of my finger. So I am
choosing reference levels. But obviously I can't do this irrespective of other
references. I did the demonstration of selecting pointing reference when I was
not typing, which involves setting references for my finger than are
incompatible with pointing at the screen and the window. So I think this is one
of those "it depends" kind of things; whether ot not we can choose (willfully)
reference levels _depends_ on the current settings of other reference levels.
Sometimes we can and sometimes we can't choose references (willfully).

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[Peter_J_Burke2]

[From Peter J. Burke UCR 9/27/2002 10:15AM PDT]

Rick Marken (2002.09.27.0940

I've come to the conclusion that: I since I choose my reference levels,

and I

also choose my experience ( a la William JAmes Principles of Psychology

p. 402)

then I am in a position to choose the magnitude of the errors I percieve.

This

can be expressed in a variation on an old and familiar theme: "I see you

have

choosen to hurt."

I agree that we choose our reference levels (within the constraints of all

our

existing references, so we can't choose arbitrarily or freely) but I don't

think

we can choose the magnitude of error in our control loops in the same way.

The

magnitude of error in a control loop depends on how well designed the

control

system is (how skillful it is at controlling the perceptual variable) _and_

on the

prevailing magnitude of disturbances. When disturbances exceed the output
capabilities of the control system, the system experiences error that is
unquestionably _not_ of its choosing.

I would have to disagree that we can choose our reference levels. To do so
would be to disturb the output of the higher level control system which is
determining the reference level in question.

Peter

Peter J. Burke
Professor
Department of Sociology
University of California
Riverside, CA 92521-0419
Phone: 909/787-3401
Fax: 909/787-0333
peter.burke@ucr.edu

[Bill_Williams_UMKC]

[From Bill Williams 27 September 2002 14:30 CST]

Peter,

Maybe the question to ask at this point is where do the higher level reference
signals come from? I'm assuming that they can be changed by reorganization.

best

Bill Williams

···

______________________________________________________________________
Do you want a free e-mail for life ? Get it at http://www.email.ro/

[Peter_J_Burke2]

[From Peter J. Burke UCR 9/27/2002 12:47PM PDT]

Bill Williams 27 September 2002 14:30

Peter,

Maybe the question to ask at this point is where do the higher level

reference

signals come from? I'm assuming that they can be changed by

reorganization.

Reminds me of the poem by Ogden Nash:
Big fleas have little fleas
Upon their back to bite 'em
And little fleas have lesser fleas
And so ad infinitum.

Lower references have higher references
Upon their back to guide 'em
And higher references have still higher ones
And so ad infinitum.

I think Bill has addressed this in the past, and somewhere I guess we have
to come to genetics for the individual.

Peter

[Bill_Williams_UMKC]

[From Peter J. Burke UCR 9/27/2002 12:47PM PDT]

Bill Williams 27 September 2002 17:17

>Peter,

>Maybe the question to ask at this point is where do the higher level
reference levels come from.

I think Bill has addressed this in the past, and somewhere I guess we have
to come to genetics for the individual.

  I don't object to bringing genetics into the consideration. I was assuming
that the higher level reference levels could be modified by reorganization.
However, I don't object if you wish to think of higher level reference levels
as being changed by modification of genetic specification. For the time being
I'm attempting to clarify the issue concerning enviornmentalism. Whether how I
attempt to think about environmentalism is consistent with the rest of what I
think-- that might be open to question. I have some ideas about how the
structure of goals might be organized, which I think is roughly consistent with
the discussion in BCP. But, I consider my thinking to be open to proposals,
but I haven't myself encountered such thinking in CSG.

If you have a structure in mind maybe you could supply an abstruct or
references to material ? Maybe if their are implications for the environmental
question could say what they are?

cordially yours
\
  bill Wlliams

···

______________________________________________________________________
Do you want a free e-mail for life ? Get it at http://www.email.ro/

[Tom_BOURBON3]

From Tom Bourbon [930831.1622]

[Michael Fehling 930831 12:03 PM]

In re Tom Bourbon [930831.1144 --

You did not form the wrong impression. I have indeed identified variables
that are controlled by organizations. However, I have now learned (a lot)
about the subtleties of PCT's concepts and terms. I felt it would be far
more constructive if I were to expend the effort to re-express my analyses
in PCT terms, if possible.

My recent impression that my earlier impressions were wrong stands
corrected.
..

Thanks for the additional sources. Now, you, too, have called my bluff

A bunch of sly devils, aren't we all?

I am eager to see the variables you select, now that you are suitably armed
with material about "The Test." When you post your ideas concerning
particular variables controlled by an organization, it might be informative
for those of us who are not familiar with your earlier work if you were to
summarize your original interpretion and compare them with your
reinterpretation using PCT -- assuming of course that to do so would not
require excessive time.

Until later,

Tom

[Tom_BOURBON3]

From Tom Bourbon [930831.1144]

[Michael Fehling 930830 12:42 PM PDT]

In re Rick Marken 930830.1030 --

Rick,

In response to my claim that it's a "no brainer" to find variables controlled
by organizations I've been studying, you asked me to "describe...these
controlled variables and the means by which you determined that it was,
indeed, a controlled variable...[how you]...established that it was controlled
by 'the organization' (and not the individuals in it), and...how you model the
perceptual functions that turn environmental variables into the perceptual
variables that are actually controlled...'"

I see. You're calling my bluff, huh?

Michael, I must have formed the wrong impression from some of your earlier
posts. I thought you had already identified variables that are controlled
by organizations, consequently, Rick's questions did not strike me as
instances of "bluff calling." Whatever is the best way to characterize his
questions, I was pleased by your next remarks:

In fact, I think this is an excellent suggestion. However, I want to be
challenged to do this _in_(H)PCT_terms_ and not in the terms that I have been
using to date. So, please provide me with the most precise description you
can of (a) what will count as a controlled variable in theoretical terms, (b)
the corresponding operational test for such, and (c) any other factors that
PCT requires. (I think I've learned enough PCT from you folks to go ahead on
my own, but I'd rather minimize terminological quibbles and other incidental
miscommunications. Besides, that way I learn more from this exercise, too.)

I will not assume to speak for Rick, who will post his own reply, but I can
suggest a few good sources for information on "the test for the controlled
variable," which is one of the prime experimental methods for perceptual
control scientists. In addition to the sources I describe here, there have
been several good descriptions of "the test" in recent posts on the net,
some of them in earlier replies to questions from you. You might want to
look back over some of that mail.

In the past, several "newcomers" to the net have left, saying they were
offended or insulted when some of us described good published resources on
topics in which they had expressed interest. Or perhaps the problem was
that we suggested, in good faith, that they might benefit from reading those
sources. But you impress me as someone who is earnestly trying to explore
and understand PCT. It is under that impression that I offer this short
list of references concerning "the test."

The sources:

Powers, William T. (1973). Behavior: The control of perception. Chicago:
Aldine. Chapter 16, pages 231-249, is titled, "Experimental Methods" and is
a lengthy discussion of "the test," with informative examples.

Marken, R. (1982). Intentional and accidental behavior: A control theory
analysis. Psychological Reports, 50, 647-650. (Reprinted in the book, Mind
Readings, edited by Marken and available from CSG Publishing, Gravel Switch,
KY.)

Marken, R. S. (1989). Behavior in the first degree. In W. A. Hershberger
(Ed.), Volitional action. Amsterdam: North-Holland. pages 299-314. (Also
reprinted in Mind Readings.)

Runkel, Philip J. (1990). Casting nets and testing specimens: Two grand
methods of psychology. New York: Praeger. See, in particular, pages
117-118 and 151-152.

Runkel, Philip J. (1990). Research method for control theory. American
Behavioral Scientist, 34, 14-23.

I hope some of these sources prove useful to you and I look forward to
seeing the results of your applications of the test when you search for
variables controlled by organizations. For my part, I do not think of that
as an easy task. Perhaps it is only that I am slow, but I spent several
hours, distributed across three days, trying to identify good candidates as
the controlled environmental variables for Figure 4 in my recent post [Tom
Bourbon (930830.0830)], in which I illustrated three individuals who had
assumed the roles of three PCT functions in "an organization trying to keep a
cursor aligned with a target."

Good hunting!

Until later,

  Tom

[Michael_Fehling]

[Michael Fehling 930831 12:03 PM]

In re Tom Bourbon [930831.1144 --

Tom,

You did not form the wrong impression. I have indeed identified variables
that are controlled by organizations. However, I have now learned (a lot)
about the subtleties of PCT's concepts and terms. I felt it would be far
more constructive if I were to expend the effort to re-express my analyses
in PCT terms, if possible.

  My remark about Rick "calling my bluff" was just a joke. I have raising
issues that come from my own prior perspective. I have implied, but not
proved in PCT terms, that there are valuable compatibilities between PCT and
the distinctions in terms of which my own theories are now expressed. That's
the "bluff."

  Thanks for the additional sources. Now, you, too, have called my bluff

- michael -

[R_Marken]

[From Rick Marken (981014.0920)]

Me:

1. Do you agree that controlled variables (PCT sense) are real
phenomena?

Dennis J. Delprato (981014) --

if by 'real,' you mean as opposed to 'unreal' (i.e., inexistent),
I opt for the former.

Great!

Me:

2. If so, then what are these variables called in conventional
psychology?

Dennis:

Mainstream psychologists struggle with events and relations that
might be better handled by CVs with such constructs as needs,
reinforcers, goals, ideals, internal templates, set points,
and perceptual reinforcers, among others.

What does "handled by CVs" mean. CVs are a kind of variable; the
kind that is _controlled_. CVs are _not_ a theoretical construct
that explains ("handles") some other phenomena. Controlled variables
are no more theoretical than independent and dependent variables.
So you haven't answered my question; what are controlled variables
called by conventional psychologists?

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

[Bruce_Gregory]

[From Bruce Gregory 9981014.1510 EDT)]

Rick Marken (981014.0920)

CVs are a kind of variable; the
kind that is _controlled_. CVs are _not_ a theoretical construct
that explains ("handles") some other phenomena. Controlled variables
are no more theoretical than independent and dependent variables.

I would say that they are no _less_ theoretical than independent and
dependent variables. Heisenberg liked to recall Einstein's statement to him,
"The theory tells us what we can observe."

Bruce Gregory

[R_Marken]

[From Rick Marken (981014.1340)]

Bruce Gregory (981014.1510 EDT) --

I would say that they [controlled variables] are no _less_
theoretical than independent and dependent variables. Heisenberg
liked to recall Einstein's statement to him, "The theory tells
us what we can observe."

Yes, theory can tell us what we _can_ observe if we know what
to look for. PCT tells us that we _can_ observe controlled
variables. But the theory didn't put those perceptions (of
controlled variables) there; perceptions of controlled variables
are there to be had even by people who don't know control theory.

Theories predict and explain observations that were there before
the theory. Controlled variables can be observed whether control
theory is there or not; but control theory does call their
existence to our attention.

The point I am making is that controlled variables do not seem
to have been noticed by conventional psychologists. Conventional
psychologists _could have_ noticed their existence even without
control theory -- but they apparently did _not_ notice their
existence and psychology has gone on (since it's birth in the late
1800s) with no obvious awareness of the existence of a phenomenon
(controlled variables) that is of central importance to understanding
behavior.

Bruce Abbott seems to disagree. He seems to think that conventional
psychologists are aware of the existence of controlled variables
(though under another name) and that they deal with this phenomenon
regularly in their research. I would just like Bruce A. to point me
to the places in the psychological literature -- preferably the
behavioral research literature -- that deal with controlled variables
(by whatever name they are known).

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken