[From Bruce Nevin (2000.05.15 1705 EDT)]
The following essay was written by Clark McPhail for a book by David
Miller. Chuck Tucker sent it to me last January. He tells me that much of
it is a summary of a piece they wrote in an issue of _Behavioral Science_,
which I don't have, but I assume one could go there for a more detailed
consideration.
I send it because it addresses in a general way the different kinds of
references that might be set for what we have been rather vaguely referring
to as "cooperation". As Clark says: "My extension of Powers' perception
control theory of purposive individual action to purposive collective
action turns on one fundamental assumption. For two or more individuals to
engage in collective action - either parallel actions at the same time or
different actions taken simultaneously or sequentially-they must adjust
their respective individual actions to realize similar or related reference
perceptions." He talks about ways in which people come to have "similar or
related reference perceptions."
This essay doesn't talk about animals. A disadvantage of working with
animals is that they can't tell us about what they are doing. (But verbal
reports are not necessarily reliable.) We assume that with lower orders at
least, it was Darwin's hammer that tuned the reference perceptions. This
means that we could find a way to "fool" an animal in ways that we cannot
fool humans -- for example beavers building a dam over the sounds of
running water coming from a loudspeaker. But the advertising industry is
built largely on fooling people in just this way.
End of digression. Here's Clark:
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Collective action and perception control theory
Scattered throughout Miller's text are several references to perception
control theory, a perspective unfamiliar to most readers. Since my
application of this perspective to collective action is one effort to
address the shortcomings of both collective behavior and collective action
explanations of collective phenomena, the author and editors have
graciously invited me to offer the following synopsis,
The decade of the brain.
About the same time that students of collective action were becoming
disillusioned with the rational calculus model of purposive action, the
U.S. Congress and President George Bush proclaimed the 1990s "the decade of
the brain." While physical anthropologists tell us the structure of the
human brain and the central nervous system has not changed over the past
30,000 years, more has been learned about the brain's structure and
processes in the last two decades than in all previous history. The
trillions of connections between the billions of neurons in our brain form
a complex neural network. The neural net processes the primitive
information received from our various sensory receptors (e.g., eyes, ears,
nose, tongue, and skin). It makes possible both the storage of that
processed information in and its retrieval from multiple memory sites
distributed throughout neural net. It conveys the electrical and chemical
signals through the central nervous system and the spinal chord to the
several hundred voluntary muscle control systems distributed throughout the
body which are responsible for almost every verbal and nonverbal action in
which we engage. Revolutionary new brain scanning and other research
techniques document these general structures and processes. The scanning
technologies provide dramatic representations of the brain areas where and
while those processes take place. These also provide evidence for what I
refer to as the images or "pictures in the mind's eye" of purposive actors.
Because human beings have always lived in constantly changing environments,
their survival has depended on continuous interplay between the sensory
receptors providing information about that environment, the brain that
processes that information and the voluntary muscle systems that adjust the
actions necessary to deal with those changes. This was no less true for our
ancestors' survival in savannas filled with carnivorous wild beasts than it
is for contemporary confrontations between public order police armed with
shields and truncheons who face anarchist protesters armed with paving
stones and Molotov cocktails. Every perception, thought, feeling or
recollection of any one of those individuals, every action they take or
adjust, is a product of the connections and interactions, the
"feed-forward" and feedback loops, in their respective neural nets.
Perception control theory.
The theory I have found most useful for making sense of the ongoing
relationships between sensory experiences, cognitive processing and
purposive adjustments of action in volatile environments is William T.
Powers' (1973; 1998) perception control theory. There is considerable
support for this theory in the contemporary neuroscience literature (e.g.,
The work of Antonio Damasio), as well as much compatibility with the
earlier theoretical writings of John Dewey, G. H. Mead, and Erving Goffman,
and the contemporary work of sociologists Peter Burke, Kent McClelland and
Charles Tilly.
The basic premise of perception control theory is that individuals act, or
adjust their actions, in order to make their current perceptions correspond
to or approximate their reference perceptions. By reference perceptions, I
mean the image(s) or picture(s) "in the mind's eye" that the individual has
retrieved from memory to serve as the goal, target or intended outcome to
be accomplished by the adjustment of his or her actions.
Perception control is not about others controlling the perceptions of the
individual by propaganda or "spin." Rather, it is about the individual
adding layers of clothing in the wintertime and peeling them off in the
summertime in order to keep his or her body temperature around 98.6
degrees. It is about adding just enough salt or pepper to one's food to
make it taste "just right" according to the standard in the mind's
"palette." It is about raising one's voice loud enough (in the mind's
"ear") to be heard by oneself and one's companion over the ambient noise on
the subway, at the concert, the rally or the cocktail party. It is about
organizing - about planning, preparing and pulling off - the party, formal
dinner, wedding, funeral or protest event that corresponds to the picture
in the organizer's head. While some reference perceptions are innate or
hard wired (e.g., body temperature), most are acquired and modified in the
course of the individual's interaction with others and his or her environment.
It is the disparity between the reference perception and one's current
perception of the situation under consideration that ordinarily leads to
immediate or eventual adjustments in actions. Those purposive adjustments
almost always enter a dynamic environment containing random disturbances or
deliberate obstacles. These bumps and blockades take their toll on the
intended results of purposive actions. Consequently, the current
perceptions of outcome frequently don't initially match the reference
perceptions. Continuing disturbances yielding continuing disparities
require continuing adjustments to realize and maintain the desired
correspondence or approximation between current perception and reference
perception. Any driver can appreciate the difficulty of maintaining the
intended direction and path of his or her vehicle's movement on a bumpy or
slippery roadway surface when there are strong and gusting crosswinds not
to mention rain, sleet or snowfall. Continuous vigilance and adjustment are
essential to survival. The causal relationships between reference
perception, purposive action, dynamic environment, and current perception
are not linear, they are continuous and recursive. Thus, perception control
theory is often labeled a "closed-loop, negative feedback" model of
purposive action.
Insert closed loop figure here
Every individual brings to any point in space and time, an accumulated and
unique history of personal experiences stored in memories. Those memories
provide the basis for the individual's definition or framing of new as well
as familiar situations. Memories also constitute the repertoire from which
the individual draws reference perceptions for purposive actions in the
immediate or more distant future. The individual then adjusts his or her
actions in order to reproduce or approximate once again what was recalled
from his or her past experiences.
Alternating individual and collective actions.
Why must a theory of collective action in temporary gatherings include a
theory of individual action? It is because the most characteristic feature
of any temporary gathering is the ongoing alternation between individual
and collective actions! Individuals interact with their companions and then
act alone, they may then act collectively with a larger numbers of others
in the gathering, then interact with their companions, and again act alone.
An adequate theory of purposive action should explain both individual and
collective action with the same set of principles.
Sources of collective action.
How are two or more individuals, each with unique personal histories stored
in memory, able to interact with one another let alone engage in more
inclusive collective action? There are at least two compatible answers
although one is a bit more complicated. First, most all of us have had
headaches and stomach aches. From experience we know that all the headaches
are not alike but they have sufficient similarities among them, and
sufficient distinctions from stomachaches, that we place the former in a
distinctive category labeled "headaches." We do the same with our
experiences of stomach aches, toothaches, backaches and even heartaches.
While no one can experience another's aches, we can "share" the symbols or
names given those different categories of experiences, those symbols make
up the language that makes communication possible about aches as well as
assembling processes, actors, actions, and other objects and events.
Second, Charles Tilly has researched and written extensively about
"repertoires" of political collective action, an idea similar to what some
earlier scholars called "collective memory." Tilly compares repertoires of
political collective action to the repertoires of melodies, chords and keys
familiar to jazz musicians. Musicians who are total strangers, but familiar
with those repertoires, can "sit in" during jam sessions and make music
together. The contemporary repertoire of political collective action
includes vigils, picket lines, rallies, processions and a slightly
different form of "sit-in."
My extension of Powers' perception control theory of purposive individual
action to purposive collective action turns on one fundamental assumption.
For two or more individuals to engage in collective action - either
parallel actions at the same time or different actions taken simultaneously
or sequentially-they must adjust their respective individual actions to
realize similar or related reference perceptions. There are three or more
ways in which such similar or related reference perceptions can be
established.
Independently.
People who have interacted a great deal with one another, who are part of
the same daily rounds, social networks, groups and cultures, are more
likely to have similar named categories of experiences stored in memory
from which they can independently draw similar reference perceptions, for
example, in many cultures applause is one appropriate way of showing
approval or enjoyment of what one has seen or heard. In such cultures a
gathering of individuals does not have to be asked or told, nor does anyone
have to consult their neighbor about when to applaud when their team scores
the game winning point, when a speaker finishes a compelling speech or when
a musician concludes a thrilling performance. Two or more members of a
gathering can and do independently call up that reference perception as the
appropriate outcome to achieve by slapping their open palms together and
doing so at more or less the same time. Hence the collective action of
applause.
Interdependently.
We all have experienced something we did not initially understand clearly.
We all have been confronted with a task we could not complete by our
actions alone. Thus we frequently require the assistance or cooperation of
one or more additional individuals. This problem can be as simple as not
hearing or fully understanding what a speaker has just said to the
gathering of which we are a part. Thus we may ask the person next to us to
repeat what the speaker said or even what it meant. Or it could be the more
complex problem of moving a sofa or other piece of large furniture up or
down a stairwell or into an adjoining room. When one person requires the
assistance of another, or when two or more people are confronted with a
mutual problem to be solved, they can interact by signifying in words and
gestures what needs to be done, and who will do what, when, where and how.
Thereby they interdependently establish the similar or related reference
perceptions in relation to which, simultaneously or sequentially, they will
adjust their respective actions to solve the problem.
Adoption from a third party.
The more complex the problem to be solved, and the more people required for
that solution, the more important it becomes to have a single source of
reference perceptions. I refer to that single source as a "third party" who
addresses similar or different but related reference perceptions for
adoption by two or more other individuals. The third party cannot stick
those reference perceptions into the brains of the other individuals in
question. They must adopt them as their own and then adjust their similar
or different but related actions in order to realize the intended outcome
established by the reference perceptions. Familiar examples of third
parties include the principal organizer for large events (protests,
weddings, funerals, reunions), the coach of an athletic team, the director
of a church choir, the commanding officer of a military or police unit, the
chief of a construction crew, etc.
It is often the case that the third party has devised a solution for a
complex problem but requires the coordinated participation and cooperation
of many others in order to realize that solution. When a large number of
others are involved, all will not be able to see or hear the collective
outcome of the individual actions they have contributed. Only the third
party can perceive that outcome, compare it to the reference perception in
his or her head, and then ask others to make the adjustments in their
actions that will yield the collective outcome that approximates or
corresponds to that reference perception. Whether the third party is an
organizer, coach, choir director, commanding officer, or construction crew
chief, his or her feedback and proposals to (and the adjustments by) the
individual demonstrators, singers, rank and file officers, or construction
workers, respectively, are essential to bring the envisioned collective
outcome to fruition.
Third party sources of reference perceptions are often necessarily
supplemented by interaction between some individuals who do not hear or
understand or perhaps are reluctant to do what the third party asks. And it
is frequently the case that the actual implementation of what the third
party asks other individuals to do assumes that they can and will
independently draw upon their individual memories for additional bits and
pieces of cultural knowledge to supplement what the third party has
requested or proposed. Thus, the three sources of similar or related
reference perceptions-independent, interdependent, or third party can
operate separately or in various combinations.
My application of Powers' perception control theory to individual and
collective action is an unfinished work in progress, a product of the
individual and collaborative contributions of my students, colleagues and
myself. Perhaps this synopsis will encourage others to undertake their own
applications of perception control theory to the purposive individual and
collective phenomena in which they are interested and to which David
Miller's text provides an excellent introduction.
Contributed by Clark McPhail
Clark McPhail, Ph.D.
Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Visiting Professor of Politics, University of Reading, UK, 1999-2000
Fulbright Senior Research Scholar, UK, 1999-2000
website: www.uiuc.edu/~cmcphail
Childs Hall, Flat #11
Upper Redland Road
Reading, Berkshire, RG1 5JW
United Kingdom (tel: 0118 931 8809)
(from the USA, tel: 011 44 118 931 8809)
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Bruce Nevin