[Martin Taylor 2000.06.28 22.18.17]
[From Rick Marken (2000.05.07.1720)]
> Don't all LCSs act to control their own perceptions?
Yes. Of course. I was trying to say that cooperation --
real cooperative controlling, as in the "carrying the
couch" example -- requires that people intentionally
agree to control certain perceptions (like "lift couch on
signal") in order to produce a particular result. That
is, cooperation requires that people control "cooperative
perceptions", like "sharing", "helping", etc.> How could bees show other bees where to find pollen
> without controlling their own perceptions?My point was that bees can _appear_ to be cooperating without
actually _intending_ to cooperate.
In the original discussion, the term "cooperation" was used to talk
about the interactions between _elementary_ control systems.
Elementary control systems perceive only what they are trying to
control, not the actions or intentions of other control systems that
they are not trying to control.
The "Lifting a couch" kind of "cooperation" requires _hierarchic_
control systems. In previous writings (around 1993, reproduced in
<http://www.mmtaylor.net/PCT/Helping/helping.html>\) I called this
kind of thing "Helping" rather than "cooperation." In "helping" at
least one elementary control system in the hierarchy perceives that
another control system wants something to happen, and sets references
within its own hierarchy to help that to happen. This is _not_ what I
called "cooperation" in the stuff Mike Acree found problematic when
considering its relationship with "competition."
Martin