Cooperation

[Dag_Forssell]

[From Dag Forssell (940414 1700)] Rick Marken (940414.1245)]

I have no idea what "unfounded accusations" I made. It would be
much easier for me to deal with this if you told me what
accusations I made that were unfounded and why they were
unfounded. Then I could see how I retracted them and why that was
a good idea.

You made it clear enough to me that both Ed and I aim to do the
bidding of oppressive teachers, jailers and bosses, by teaching
them how to oppress more effectively. I found that offensive,
given my value system. You know better, but try to disturb us into
debate. Following my protests, you have stated quite correctly, as
I see it, that we only teach PCT, and that both the opressors and
the opressed will be better off for learning it.

If you respected me as a control system, you would presume my
"tactlessness" was an accident, you would understand that I was
trying to control for standards that might be wrong from your
perspective but are legitimate, and you would deal with me by
helping me understand the error of my ways.

Ordinarily, I would and do. But I raise my voice along with others
on this net, when you argue for your inalienable right to say
anything that comes into your head about anything and anybody, and
claim that you can't help any of it one bit. How can any of us
presume your "tactlessness" to be accidental, when you are so proud
of it, advertise it, defend it, and promise to maximize it in the
future. I will certainly grant you that I have been tactless too in
the last few posts. I am not proud of it. Did you like it?
Apparently not.

All I ask (in term's of respect) is cooperation to help us find
agreement.

Fine, that is what we work on most of the time.

I can't ask you not to insult me -- there is no way you could
possibly know what an insult to me might be; I'm controlling my
perceptions, not you.

Yes, you can. I knew I insulted you, and you know it too. I
denigraded your personal experience. I have no business doing
that, and I have no business *telling* you, directly or indirectly,
what your (no good) intentions are, anymore than I accept that from
you.

All you have to do is respect the fact that I am controlling and
see if we can work out cooperative ways to control in the same
environment. In order to do that, we have to try to figure out
what we are controlling for; where the conflicts lie, etc.

Yes, indeed.

I don't want you to have to pussy foot around, trying not to
disturb every damn thing I'm controlling, most of which you could
not possibly even know about.

I am not concerned about pussy footing or insults as long as we
stick to PCT, what PCT is, how to present it and all that. I think
we both know that people control any number of other perceptions in
areas of self, religion, and many more. To discuss how these are
explained by PCT is fair game. To make fun of people because of
their systems concepts, no matter how misguided they seem to you
and me, is not, it seems to me.

How can I ask you to do that? If I said I was insulted by you and
you didn't think what you did should have insulted me, wouldn't
you be insulted by my suggestion?

I don't think so. I would wonder about it, then change my
understanding and stay clear. If it concerned PCT, I would ask for
clarification, and even argue, as we have.

The only respect I (or anyone else, for that matter) can ask for
(and get) is understanding -- for you to try to respect my
controlling as legitimate, not a personal affront to you; and, of
course, I take your controlling in the same spirit. We'll work it
out; don't worry. I do respect you -- in MY way.

If I was that worried, I would have stuck my tail between the legs
and run. This is better in the short and long run. Right or
wrong, I am becoming confident in my understanding of PCT, and am
willing to stick up for it.

I don't believe anybody can be respectful to anyone else in yours
(not to be disrespectful about it).

I can't make enough sense of this, given my imagination. I trust
it made sense to you, given yours.

Given my attention to imagination in the last several days, ever
since I addressed it in response to your comment about choosing
perceptions, I am more impressed than ever with the subjectiveness
of interpretation of most everything, posts on this net very much
included. How we interpret depends a great deal on stored
perceptions, used to de-code the words and phrases to give them
personal meaning.

Best, Dag

[R_Marken]

[From Rick Marken (980705.2200)]

Here's some off the top of my head thoughts about cooperation.
Since people probably like "cooperation" better than "coercion"
maybe we can have a friendlier interchange on this topic.

I propose the following definition of cooeration: cooperation
occurs when two or more control systems agree to independently
control perceptions that allow them to collectively control a
perception that neither system could control on its own. I would
call this "cooperative control".

A simple example of cooperative control happens when you help a
friend move a heavy couch. Neither you nor your freind can move
the couch (control its position) alone. But you can move it together
if each of you lifts (controls the elevation of) each end of the
couch in concert.

One interesting thing about cooperative control is that there
is nothing to enforce it; the controlling done by each of the
cooperating control systems is completly independent of that done
by the other. If one system decides to stop cooperating (holding
up his end, _literally_, in the couch lifting example) there is
nothing that can stop him (short of coerion;-)) So cooperative
control is a pretty precarious process.

The benefits of cooperative control are rather remarkable; there is
hardly any artifact in my view right now that is not the result of the
cooperative efforts of many control systems; radios, computers, my
house, the road, the entire infra-structure of the society is built
and maintained by the _cooperative_ efforts of many individuals. But
any or all of these individuals could just stop cooperating any time
they wanted; I think this is why rules -- and the coercive threat of
force (or roasting in hell) -- came into being. I don't think people
wanted to leave this cooperative control to chance.

Anyway, to have cooperation, I believe that people have to be able
to perceive the benefits of the cooperation and they have to be
able to perceive themselves as an element of a cooperative "team".
That is, I think people have to be able to perceive "cooperativeness"
so that they can control for being highly cooperative (try to
coordinate their efforts with those of other control systems to
produce the desired result -- like moving the couch) or not
cooperative at all.

I think what had to evolve for people to be as cooperative as they
are was the ability to perceive cooperation (the word "cooperation"
probably describes several types of perceptual variable--
relationships, programs and principles). I think other primates
have some ability to do cooperative control; but I don't think we
see real cooperation in other species (I think ants are just
controlling variables that make them appear to be cooperating;
but this would have to be tested). I think cooperation also requires
some ability to communicate; so I think our ability to communicate
actual and intended perceptual states to each other using language
is an important evolutionary contributor to out ability to control
cooperatively.

In order to understand cooperative control I think we have to
get a better idea of the kinds of perceptions people control
when they are cooperating.

Best

Rick

···

--

Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

[Cyvchoate]

i.kurtzer (980706.0100)

[From Rick Marken (980705.2200)]

very nice post! did you take my advice and get drunk before you wrote it?

9 days and counting
i.

[Bruce_Gregory]

[From Bruce Gregory (980706.0700 EDT)]

Rick Marken (980705.2200)]

In order to understand cooperative control I think we have to
get a better idea of the kinds of perceptions people control
when they are cooperating.

Very insightful. Looking at RTP is certainly one good place to start. You
might also look at Axelrod's work. You'll be appalled to learn that he
agrees with what you say in this post and has focussed on program level
perceptions in his models. I say appalled because you and Bill carry the NIH
(Not Invented Here) syndrome to absolutely breathtaking heights (or depths).

Bruce Gregory

[Marc_Abrams5]

From [Marc Abrams (980706.0736)]

Hi Bruce,

In your reply to Rick

Bruce Gregory (980706.0700 EDT)]

<snip>

I say appalled because you and Bill carry the NIH (Not Invented Here)
syndrome to absolutely breathtaking heights (or depths).

Bruce I have a different take on this. In my post last night I talked
about the fact that PCT _is_ everywhere. _Everyone_ "sees" aspects of
control in just about everything we do. The problem is most people
_only_ understand it from a descriptive and _not_ a _functional_ point
of view and with that, they're observations are generally both
incomplete and "wrong" from the stand point of understanding PCT. I
think it becomes much more fruitful from a PCT perspective to look at
a pnenomenon ( like coercion, cooperation, etc) _fresh_. Utilizing our
knowledge of PCT, rather then hauling all the _extra_ baggage
_usually_ associated with non PCT analysis. Again, these "bridges"
seem soooo close

What do you think Bruce? Plausible or not?

Marc

[Bruce_Gregory]

[From Bruce Gregory (980706.0938 EDT)]

Marc Abrams (980706.0736)

Bruce I have a different take on this. In my post last night I talked
about the fact that PCT _is_ everywhere. _Everyone_ "sees" aspects of
control in just about everything we do. The problem is most people
_only_ understand it from a descriptive and _not_ a _functional_ point
of view and with that, they're observations are generally both
incomplete and "wrong" from the stand point of understanding PCT. I
think it becomes much more fruitful from a PCT perspective to look at
a phenomenon ( like coercion, cooperation, etc) _fresh_. Utilizing our
knowledge of PCT, rather then hauling all the _extra_ baggage
_usually_ associated with non PCT analysis. Again, these "bridges"
seem soooo close

What do you think Bruce? Plausible or not?

Completely plausible. The only danger arises when you deny the existence of
a phenomenon because you cannot figure out how to model it using PCT and are
unwilling to even try to understand how someone else has modeled the
phenomenon.

PCT, however, it not everywhere. Control is everywhere. It's a good idea to
keep separated the phenomenon (control) from our efforts to model the
phenomenon using negative feedback principles (PCT).

Bruce Gregory

[Marc_Abrams5]

From [Marc Abrams (980706.0955)]

[From Bruce Gregory (980706.0938 EDT)]

Completely plausible. The only danger arises when you deny the
existence of a phenomenon because you cannot figure out how to model
it using PCT and are unwilling to even try to understand how someone
else has modeled the phenomenon.

Are you sure there is _denial_ of the _existence_ of the phenomenon or
just a lack of interest. I agree that both Bill and Rick can be
_extremely_ focused ( i.e. to the point of being _real_ annoying )
but i think the only alternative would be to be overwhelmed.

PCT, however, it not everywhere. Control is everywhere. It's a good

idea >to keep separated the phenomenon (control) from our efforts to
model the

phenomenon using negative feedback principles (PCT).

Excellent point, thanks.

Marc

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (980706.1433)]

Rick Marken (980705.2200) --

I think this is a great start, Rick. I can't think about it much just yet,
but I want to say at least that I appreciate it, and look forward to our
(all of us) moving ahead with it.

  Bruce Nevin

[Marc_Abrams5]

From [Marc Abrams (980706.1836)]

[From Bruce Nevin (980706.1433)]

Rick Marken (980705.2200) --

I think this is a great start, Rick. I can't think about it much just

yet,

but I want to say at least that I appreciate it, and look forward to

our

(all of us) moving ahead with it.

Me too Can we get some of Tom's work ( I, have you done anything
with cooperation ) ? Is Kent McCllend's work (models) available. I am
sure he will be at the conference with his work. ( Damn :-), can't
believe I can't go to the conference mumble, mumble, mumble :-). Does
this classify as having a conversation with myself :-))

Dr. Marken, _How_ would you like begin?

Marc

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (980706.2243 EDT)]

Rick Marken (980705.2200) --

I propose the following definition of cooeration: cooperation
occurs when two or more control systems agree to independently
control perceptions that allow them to collectively control a
perception that neither system could control on its own. I would
call this "cooperative control".

An agreement to cooperate is where the cooperation is itself a controlled
perception at the outset. Cooperation can also become a controlled
perception of its participants after it has accidentally begun. In that
case there is no explicit agreement ahead of time, but we could say there
is a tacit agreement evinced by the cooperation itself and its continuation
beyond what chance would account for. Perhaps there can be such a thing as
entirely accidental cooperation. Certainly people have talked about
unconscious cooperation, but that could involve unconscious agreements, and
of course the whole issue of awareness is bedevilled.

So two things: Prior agreement to cooperate may not be an essential
feature. And something about the coordination of efforts is itself a
controlled perception: that's the "in concert" part of your example of
lifting the couch--

A simple example of cooperative control happens when you help a
friend move a heavy couch. Neither you nor your freind can move
the couch (control its position) alone. But you can move it together
if each of you lifts (controls the elevation of) each end of the
couch in concert.

In concert: e.g. one can't walk off ahead too fast and leave the other
behind, it's easier to hold on if the couch is fairly level, etc. Not to
mention negotiating corners etc.

One interesting thing about cooperative control is that there
is nothing to enforce it; the controlling done by each of the
cooperating control systems is completly independent of that done
by the other. If one system decides to stop cooperating (holding
up his end, _literally_, in the couch lifting example) there is
nothing that can stop him (short of coerion;-)) So cooperative
control is a pretty precarious process.

Social arrangements are not compulsory, they are voluntary.

(Even with coercion, the weaker system can stop volunteering to control the
contested variable. It can treat the other as though inanimate, just as the
coercer is doing. True, I don't *like* being coerced. On the other hand, I
don't like being unable to slide my house with its poured cement basement 3
feet to the south to provide more yard next to the driveway. Tough, that's
the way it is (both cases). Unless the coercer stops volunteering to coerce.)

The benefits of cooperative control are rather remarkable; there is
hardly any artifact in my view right now that is not the result of the
cooperative efforts of many control systems; radios, computers, my
house, the road, the entire infra-structure of the society is built
and maintained by the _cooperative_ efforts of many individuals. But
any or all of these individuals could just stop cooperating any time
they wanted; I think this is why rules -- and the coercive threat of
force (or roasting in hell) -- came into being. I don't think people
wanted to leave this cooperative control to chance.

People have to have a reason to cooperate. That doesn't necessarily require
coercion. We could get into long speculative riffs about wage slaves, etc.

Anyway, to have cooperation, I believe that people have to be able
to perceive the benefits of the cooperation and they have to be
able to perceive themselves as an element of a cooperative "team".
That is, I think people have to be able to perceive "cooperativeness"
so that they can control for being highly cooperative (try to
coordinate their efforts with those of other control systems to
produce the desired result -- like moving the couch) or not
cooperative at all.

Yes, somehow the cooperation itself is a controlled perception.

I think what had to evolve for people to be as cooperative as they
are was the ability to perceive cooperation (the word "cooperation"
probably describes several types of perceptual variable--
relationships, programs and principles). I think other primates
have some ability to do cooperative control; but I don't think we
see real cooperation in other species (I think ants are just
controlling variables that make them appear to be cooperating;
but this would have to be tested).

I'm not sure the distinction is defensible. What I was suggesting about
accidental cooperation may apply. I think there is good evidence that ants
communicate, but I haven't looked at entymology in a long time. Wilson's
magnum opus would be the place to start. That's where he got his
sociobiology ideas from. (He was the one writing about the biological bases
of morality.)

Also, cooperation is easy to disrupt. It would be difficult to devise
non-disruptive tests.

I think cooperation also requires
some ability to communicate; so I think our ability to communicate
actual and intended perceptual states to each other using language
is an important evolutionary contributor to out ability to control
cooperatively.

In order to understand cooperative control I think we have to
get a better idea of the kinds of perceptions people control
when they are cooperating.

Well, there are the perceptions they control to hold up their end, which
they would be controlling if there were just their end to hold up. That
would vary from one situation to another.

Then there would be the requirements for coordination imposed by the
physical characteristics of the task. Also situation specific.

Then there's the perception of -- I'm not sure if this will do at all -- of
how close one is to losing control, or at least being able to know when the
other is close to losing control, and how what one is doing is a
disturbance to the other and cutting some slack. I think this awareness of
disturbing the other's control applies both to one's own control and the
other's.

That's all for now. Past due for bed. I'm still catching up.

  Bruce Nevin

[Bob_Christensen]

[From Bob Christensen (980706.2230)]

I have been thinking more lately about how to model cooperation especially
since Rick's questioning of what cooperation is in terms of PCT, and I'm glad
to see Rick start us along a hopefully more cooperative thread.

Rick Marken (980705.2200)

I propose the following definition of cooeration: cooperation
occurs when two or more control systems agree to independently
control perceptions that allow them to collectively control a
perception that neither system could control on its own. I would
call this "cooperative control".

I like this definition of cooperation, but I think there could be a more
general definition of when two or more control systems interact in a manner in
which both benefit, but which does not necessarily involve controlling a
single perception that neither system could control on its own. An example
could be if two neighbors exchange services or goods. If one is skilled at
fixing cars, and the other at doing taxes, then neighbor 1 could fix neighbor
2's car, while neighbor 2 does neighbor 1's taxes. Both neighbors can benefit
here because, if each did his own work it would take more time and effort
because of a lack of skill. The question for me would be to either have a
second definition for the more general term and leave your definition of
cooperation, or to have cooperation stand for the more general case and your
definition be a frequent case. Other terms might be "mutually beneficial
exchange" (MBE), or "win, win exchange" (WWE).

The definition I'm thinking of would be something like.

X occurs when two or more LCS's agree to independently control variables which
can be perceived by other LCS's involved, when each LCS benefits (achieves
better control of an important variable), and when the benefit to each LCS
comes at least in part from the output of other LCS's.

Key parts of the definition are:
1. agreement - I also debated using the word contract here, either implicit
or explicit. An explicit contract spells out what the output of each LCS will
bring about. I think agreement also imply's each side chosing to be part of
the interaction and not being coerced.

2. It is important that at least one other LCS can perceive the agreed state
of a variable which another LCS has agreed to control to be able to benefit
from it and to monitor if it is in the agreed state.

3. Each LCS's benefit must come at least in part to other LCS's output,
otherwise there could just be LCS's acting independently to control their own
perceptions while not overly disturbing others (not a bad feat in itself).

Best,

Bob C.

[KENNETH_J_KITZKE1]

[From Kenny Kitzke (980707.0900 EDT)]

<Bruce Nevin (980706.2243 EDT)>

<Social arrangements are not compulsory, they are voluntary.>

Is this true in all cases? Do you more accurately mean that cooperative
social arrangements are voluntary, not compulsory.

Involuntary (against a person's will) behavior forced by a stronger person
on a weaker person fits my definition of coercion.

Examples of a coercive system, the controlled variable and actual coercion:
Public Education - Cumpulsory attendance - Punishment for playing hooky
RTP - No disruption in class - Stop disrupting or go to the RTP room
Kidnapping - Physical restraint - Stop screaming for "help" or have a rag
stuffed down your throat.

All these systems involve social interactions between a coercer and the
coercee but they *are not* voluntary. That helps show that coercion cannot
be usefully defined by only the coercer's will or behavior but must be
active in obtaining the behavior of the coercee that is perceived as wanted
by the coercer but not wanted by the coercee.

I hope you will find the time to add to the "cooperation" dialogue the way
you did on coercion.

best regards,

Kenny

[KENNETH_J_KITZKE1]

[From Kenny Kitzke (980707.1030EDT)]

<Bob Christensen (980706.2230)>

<I like this definition of cooperation, but I think there could be a more
general definition of when two or more control systems interact in a manner
in which both benefit, but which does not necessarily involve controlling a
single perception that neither system could control on its own. An example
could be if two neighbors exchange services or goods. If one is skilled at
fixing cars, and the other at doing taxes, then neighbor 1 could fix
neighbor
2's car, while neighbor 2 does neighbor 1's taxes.>

I see your point. I also think Rick's definition is a particular but
important sub set. Rick's couch example entails simultaneous, joint,
interactive and mutually beneficial behavior.

Your example seems to entail cooperation but the behavior is independent.
I'll control for fixing your car if you control for doing my taxes. Vice
versa for the other. There is no joint interaction we can describe as
cooperation. It is just two control systems who behave independently to
achieve perceptions that are mutually desired.

best regards,

Kenny

I

[bnhpct]

[From Bruce Nevin (980707.1341 EDT)]

Kenny Kitzke (980707.0900 EDT) --

<Bruce Nevin (980706.2243 EDT)>

<Social arrangements are not compulsory, they are voluntary.>

Is this true in all cases? Do you more accurately mean that cooperative
social arrangements are voluntary, not compulsory.

Did you disagree with the very next paragraph after the one you quoted? If
so, can you make your disagreements explicit? Or did you just overlook it?
Here it is again:

(Even with coercion, the weaker system can stop volunteering to control the
contested variable. It can treat the other as though inanimate, just as the
coercer is doing. True, I don't *like* being coerced. On the other hand, I
don't like being unable to slide my house with its poured cement basement 3
feet to the south to provide more yard next to the driveway. Tough, that's
the way it is (both cases). Unless the coercer stops volunteering to coerce.)

The one who is coerced can either resist, or relate to the coercer as
though he were an inanimate source of irresistible disturbance, and choose
to work around the disturbance as one would accommodate an inanimate
obstruction in the environment. This gets into the nature of freedom. For
that, I refer you to Victor Frankl's writings on what he called
logotherapy, coming out of his experience in the Nazi camps.

I'm not saying that's good or bad. What I'm saying is this: it shows that
the social interactions that we label coercion are voluntary on both sides.
The word "voluntary" refers to control of a perception. As soon as one
party in the conflict ceases to control a perception of the contested
variable, the actions of the other party cease to be a disturbance, and the
INTERaction as such ceases. If as soon as the stronger one stops
controlling the variable the weaker one starts again, then the weaker one
never stopped controlling it.

Remember, I define an interaction as behavior of two or more control
systems such that the actions of each either disturb or are the source of
some of the perceptions that the other is or others are controlling. The
above follows from this definition. I could be wrong. If you disagree,
please provide a different definition of interaction that accounts for your
disagreement.

  Bruce Nevin

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.12.05.1800)]

OK, let’s change the topic to cooperation.

I think it has been agreed that cooperation occurs when two or more control systems want the same thing, ie. have the same reference for the same perceptual variable. But I think it’s more complicated than that. But in order to see that I think it might help if we tried to to a PCT analysis of what I think is a very basic, cooperative interaction that you all may be familiar with: helping a friend move a couch. It takes two people to lift teh couch to you and the friend have to do it together – you have to cooperate in order to produce the desired result: the couch moved from here to there.

So how is this cooperation result achieved, according to PCT?

This is an open book (and open internet) test;-)

Best regards

Rick

···

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

Shakespeare, Twelfth Night

[_Mike_Mermel]

I’m sure this is adding complexity when you seem to be looking for simplicity, but my way of controlling my own perception of getting my friend’s couch moved might be to kick in twenty bucks to hire some movers. Are we (the friend and I) controlling the “same” perceptions? Are we/I getting confused thinking about different levels of control? Can two people (control systems) really share a perception in the way you have described? Would I be controlling the perception of “having a friend” or “helping my friend” or “seeing a couch in a specified position”, or all of the above, all at the same time?

Mike

···

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

&n
bsp; Shakespeare, Twelfth Night

[FredNickols]

[From Fred Nickols (2014.12.06.0840 EST)]

Hmm. I’ve done this a time or two but never looked at it in light of PCT. Anyway, here goes.

First, the from here to there bit. It’s always been the case that the two of us knew where the couch was going. Whether our references were exactly the same or not I think they were close enough for government work.

Second, actually moving the darn thing always seemed to involve lots and lots of adjustments on both our parts (e.g., shifting weight, balancing, lifting, lowering, etc, etc.). Talk about varying behavior to achieve an outcome!

Third, once “there,� there was typically some jockeying around to get the darn thing positioned properly. That usually took place as a result of some verbal instructions (e.g., “Move your end your way a little bit. A little bit more. That’s fine. Now let’s push it back against the wall.�

I think we both adjusted and adapted as the move proceeded with some of the same kinds of things (reference signals) in mind: Don’t drop it; don’t damage it; don’t scuff the walls; etc., etc.).

In short, I think we were able to cooperate because (a) we had very similar understandings of what was or would be involved and (2) we were willing to undertake the task.

Don’t know if this is what you were looking for or not.

Fred Nickols

···

From: Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) [mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu]
Sent: Friday, December 05, 2014 9:03 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Richard Marken
Subject: Cooperation

[From Rick Marken (2014.12.05.1800)]

OK, let’s change the topic to cooperation.

I think it has been agreed that cooperation occurs when two or more control systems want the same thing, ie. have the same reference for the same perceptual variable. But I think it’s more complicated than that. But in order to see that I think it might help if we tried to to a PCT analysis of what I think is a very basic, cooperative interaction that you all may be familiar with: helping a friend move a couch. It takes two people to lift teh couch to you and the friend have to do it together – you have to cooperate in order to produce the desired result: the couch moved from here to there.

So how is this cooperation result achieved, according to PCT?

This is an open book (and open internet) test;-)

Best regards

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

Shakespeare, Twelfth Night

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2014.12.06.10.22]

As Fred said, there are two separate issues here. Firstly each of them must perceive that the other controls a

perception of where the couch is to go and that the reference values
for their perceptions corresponds to much the same place in the
environment. There are protocols for getting to this state [Martin
Taylor 2014.11.26.16.45].
Secondly, the interesting question is how they coordinate their
lifting and moving actions at the lower levels to reduce the error
in the “couch-location” relationship perceptions. Didn’t Tom Bourbon
do some modelling of this situation with four people carrying a
table, or some such, a long time ago? Do you know if the results are
anywhere accessible? Or is my memory at fault?
Martin

···

[From Rick Marken (2014.12.05.1800)]

OK, let’s change the topic to cooperation.

      I think it has been agreed that cooperation occurs when two

or more control systems want the same thing, ie. have the same
reference for the same perceptual variable. But I think it’s
more complicated than that. But in order to see that I think
it might help if we tried to to a PCT analysis of what I think
is a very basic, cooperative interaction that you all may be
familiar with: helping a friend move a couch. It takes two
people to lift teh couch to you and the friend have to do it
together – you have to cooperate in order to produce the
desired result: the couch moved from here to there.

      So how is this cooperation result achieved, according to

PCT?

This is an open book (and open internet) test;-)

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.12.06.1250)]

···

On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 8:28 PM, Mike Mermel mmermel@mikemermel.com wrote:

RM: Great to hear from you Mike!

MM: I’m sure this is adding complexity when you seem to be looking for simplicity, but my way of controlling my own perception of getting my friend’s couch moved might be to kick in twenty bucks to hire some movers.

RM: It’s not so much adding complexity as going outside the constraints of the problem. Here’s a restatement of the problem:

It takes two people to lift a couch so you and the friend have to do it together – you have to cooperate in order to produce the desired result: the couch lifted and moved from here to there. So how is this cooperative result achieved, according to PCT?

RM: What I am hoping for is a verbal description (or,better, a diagram) of a PCT model of two people lifting a couch. You don’t even have to model moving the couch; let’s just see what’s involved in cooperatively lifting it.

MM: Can two people (control systems) really share a perception in the way you have described?

RM: I think this is a very good point. Two people are looking at the situation from different locations so right there their low level perceptions have to be different. But their perception at a higher level could definitely be the same. For example, if the couch is to be moved “next to the lamp” then both of the friends can perceive the same relationship (couch beside lamp) even if the components of that perception (the lamp and couch) look different from each of their perspectives.

Fred Nickols (2014.12.06.0840 EST)–

FN: First, the from here to there bit. It’s always been the case that the two of us knew where the couch was going. Whether our references were exactly the same or not I think they were close enough for government work…

FN: In short, I think we were able to cooperate because (a) we had very similar understandings of what was or would be involved and (2) we were willing to undertake the task.

FN: Don’t know if this is what you were looking for or not.

RM: Not quite. I want to see how you would actually model the situation using a PCT model. And I would like you to do it for what seems to me the simplest possible case of cooperation: where two systems are needed to produce a result that both want: a lifted couch. That is, describe how two control systems that both want a couch lifted would get this to happen.

Martin Taylor (2014.12.06.10.22)–

MT: As Fred said, there are two separate issues here.

MT: Firstly each of them must perceive that the other controls a perception of where the couch is to go and that the reference values for their perceptions corresponds to much the same place in the environment. There are protocols for getting to this state [Martin Taylor 2014.11.26.16.45].

RM: Again, let’s simplify this by assuming that both people know what perception is to be produced – a lifted couch – and that both are willing to contribute to producing this result.

MT: Secondly, the interesting question is how they coordinate their lifting and moving actions at the lower levels to reduce the error in the “couch-location” relationship perceptions.

RM: Yes, that’s what I want to see a model of!

MT: Didn’t Tom Bourbon do some modelling of this situation with four people carrying a table, or some such, a long time ago? Do you know if the results are anywhere accessible? Or is my memory at fault?

RM: I think you are right. I think he reported it at a meeting, though. I don’t think it’s described in any of Tom’s published papers. However, Tom’s work on two-person interaction is definitely relevant to the question of how people cooperate. I think the answer to my question could certainly be gleaned from Tom’s models of two-person interaction. And from Kent’s as well. Indeed, what I’m looking for is a model along the lines of those developed by Tom and Kent.

Best regards

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

Shakespeare, Twelfth Night

[Kent]

Yes, I’d be interested in seeing that model, too. Unfortunately, I don’t have time to work on it myself at the moment.

Kent

···

On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 8:28 PM, Mike Mermel
mmermel@mikemermel.com wrote:

RM: Great to hear from you Mike!

MM: I’m sure this is adding complexity when you seem to be looking for simplicity, but my way of controlling my own perception of getting my friend’s couch moved might be to kick in twenty bucks to hire some movers.

RM: It’s not so much adding complexity as going outside the constraints of the problem. Here’s a restatement of the problem:

It takes two people to lift a couch so you and the friend have to do it together – you have to cooperate in order to produce the desired result: the couch lifted and moved from here to there. So how is this cooperative result
achieved, according to PCT?

RM: What I am hoping for is a verbal description (or,better, a diagram) of a PCT model of two people lifting a couch. You don’t even have to model moving the couch; let’s just see what’s involved in cooperatively lifting it.

MM: Can two people (control systems) really share a perception in the way you have described?

RM: I think this is a very good point. Two people are looking at the situation from different locations so right there their low level perceptions have to be different. But their perception at a higher level could definitely be the same. For example, if
the couch is to be moved “next to the lamp” then both of the friends can perceive the same relationship (couch beside lamp) even if the components of that perception (the lamp and couch) look different from each of their perspectives.

Fred Nickols (2014.12.06.0840 EST)–

FN: First, the from here to there bit. It’s always been the case that the two of us knew where the couch was going. Whether our references
were exactly the same or not I think they were close enough for government work…

FN: In short, I think we were able to cooperate because (a) we had very similar understandings of what was or would be involved and
(2) we were willing to undertake the task.

FN: Don’t know if this is what you were looking for or not.

RM: Not quite. I want to see how you would actually model the situation using a PCT model. And I would like you to do it for what seems to me the simplest possible case of cooperation: where two
systems are needed to produce a result that both want: a lifted couch. That is, describe how two control systems that both want a couch lifted would get this to happen.

Martin Taylor (2014.12.06.10.22)–

MT: As Fred said, there are two separate issues here.

MT: Firstly each of them must perceive that the other controls a perception of where the couch is to go and that the reference values for their perceptions corresponds to much the same place in the environment. There are protocols
for getting to this state [Martin Taylor 2014.11.26.16.45].

RM: Again, let’s simplify this by assuming that both people know what perception is to be produced – a lifted couch – and that both are willing to contribute to producing this result.

MT: Secondly, the interesting question is how they coordinate their lifting and moving actions at the lower levels to reduce the error in the “couch-location” relationship perceptions.

RM: Yes, that’s what I want to see a model of!

MT: Didn’t Tom Bourbon do some modelling of this situation with four people carrying a table, or some such, a long time ago? Do you know if the results are anywhere accessible? Or is my memory at fault?

RM: I think you are right. I think he reported it at a meeting, though. I don’t think it’s described in any of Tom’s published papers. However, Tom’s work on two-person interaction is definitely relevant to the question of how people cooperate. I think
the answer to my question could certainly be gleaned from Tom’s models of two-person interaction. And from Kent’s as well. Indeed, what I’m looking for is a model along the lines of those developed by Tom and Kent.

Best regards

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.

Author of Doing
Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

Shakespeare, Twelfth Night