CSGNET Digest - 1 Apr 2008 to 2 Apr 2008 (#2008-74)

Does discussion on this list ever cover actual control system modeling such as PID control, etc.?

···

On Wed, Apr 2, 2008 at 8:00 AM, CSGNET automatic digest system LISTSERV@listserv.uiuc.edu wrote:

There are 3 messages totalling 132 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Uncertainty (was second-order and third-order beliefs) (3)

Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2008 13:43:04 -0700

From: Richard Marken rsmarken@GMAIL.COM

Subject: Re: Uncertainty (was second-order and third-order beliefs)

[From Rick Marken (2008.04.01.1345)]

Bill Powers (2008.03.31.2013 MDT)–

I conclude that we mean different things by “uncertainty.”.

Maybe. Could someone remind me why this “uncertainty” thing came up in

the first place.

I see several candidates for definitions of uncertainty about a perception:

  1. The perception itself seems to vary randomly so there is no way to

predict its next value.

  1. The perception is itself relatively constant, but is masked by random

noise which makes it hard to perceive at all, or to perceive in a consistent

way.

  1. The perception is ambiguous, in that parts of its lower-level components

are missing so they could be filled in by imagination in different ways,

each leading to a different familiar perception.

I see all of these as being consistent with what I mean by

uncertainty, which is a state that can exist only when a person has

the purpose of making an inference, prediction or decision about a

possible state of affairs based on a perception that is assumed to be

evidence regarding that state of affairs. In your example 1 there is

uncertainty if a person has the purpose of predicting the next value

of the perception based on the present value, where the present value

is taken to be evidence of what might happen next. In your example 2

there is uncertainty if a person has the purpose of perceiving the

perception that is masked based on a perception of the masked

perception, where the masked perception is taken to be evidence of

what perception is masked. Same for example 3, where there is

uncertainty if the person has the purpose of perceiving the complete

perception that about which the ambiguous perception is assumed to be

evidence.

I guess I’m saying that I don’t think it makes sense to talk about

perceptions themselves as being uncertain. Perceptions are just

perceptions. They become “unpredictable”, “masked” or “ambiguous” only

when there is the purpose to use those perceptions as evidence of

something else (the thing to be predicted, detected or identified).

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken PhD

rsmarken@gmail.com


Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2008 19:44:38 -0600

From: Bill Powers powers_w@FRONTIER.NET

Subject: Re: Uncertainty (was second-order and third-order beliefs)

[From Bill Powers (2008.03.31.1932 MDT)]

Rick Marken (2008.04.01.1345) –

I guess I’m saying that I don’t think it makes sense to talk about

perceptions themselves as being uncertain. Perceptions are just

perceptions. They become “unpredictable”, “masked” or “ambiguous” only

when there is the purpose to use those perceptions as evidence of

something else (the thing to be predicted, detected or identified).

I basically agree with you, but I’m trying to make the whole

discussion depend less on “how we think of it” and more on stateable

principles. You can define uncertainty as an objective state of

affairs if that’s what you want to do, like Heisenberg saying that

position and momentum themselves are uncertain, independently of the

observer. That’s a proposition, and it can be discussed and argued

about, but not by saying we don’t like it or believe it. You propose

another definition of uncertainty. Is it a better one? Of course you

think it is, but why should anyone else think it is?

I think we’re trying to define a term, not really look at a

phenomenon. Either we’ll agree on a definition or we won’t. At the

moment it doesn’t matter to me, because I don’t use the idea of

uncertainty in my work very much, except when talking about things

like prediction errors, which fits in with your proposed definition.

I don’t think Martin will accept it, but we’ll see. I’m not inclined

to shut Martin off by dismissing his interests, but if they’re too

far from mine, I’m willing for us to go our separate ways on this

subject. It would be nice to get some kind of convergence, though.

Best,

Bill P.


Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2008 00:21:31 -0400

From: Martin Taylor mmt-csg@MMTAYLOR.NET

Subject: Re: Uncertainty (was second-order and third-order beliefs)

[Martin Taylor 2008.04.02]

[From Bill Powers (2008.03.31.1932 MDT)]

Rick Marken (2008.04.01.1345) –

I guess I’m saying that I don’t think it makes sense to talk about

perceptions themselves as being uncertain. Perceptions are just

perceptions. They become “unpredictable”, “masked” or “ambiguous” only

when there is the purpose to use those perceptions as evidence of

something else (the thing to be predicted, detected or identified).

I basically agree with you, but I’m trying to make the whole

discussion depend less on “how we think of it” and more on stateable

principles.

I sent out a long message on this on Monday, but it hasn’t shown up.

I’m going to send it again, despite the likelihood that you will see

it twice.

Martin


End of CSGNET Digest - 1 Apr 2008 to 2 Apr 2008 (#2008-74)


[From Bill Powers (2008.04.02.1849 MDT)]

Does discussion on this list
ever cover actual control system modeling such as PID control,
etc.?

Yes and no. “PID” is a somewhat restrictive term for a
particular kind of control system design in which the output function
combines proportional, integral and derivative responses to the error
signal. Of course the designs we consider include such things – the most
common design is a combination of integral and proportional control, with
some derivative terms thrown in (they don’t make much difference in
models of real performance like tracking behavior). We also include
transport lags (usually just in the input function) which do make models
fit actual performance significantly better.

But beyond that, the modelers among us have been exploring hierarchies of
control systems with many systems operating in parallel at each level and
many levels (in principle – I don’t want to imply that we have made a
lot of progress with that in constructing computer models). Also the
concept of reorganization based on random-walk hill-climbing plays a role
and is in some of our models. The most ambitious version of that involves
an arm and hand with 14 degrees of freedom, which reorganizes the weights
in the output functions to achieve control of 14 joint angles, starting
with all the weights at zero and with continuous smoothed random
disturbances of all the joint angles plus continuous variations in the
reference signals. Each output starts with the potential of affecting all
14 joint angles, and reorganization then prunes out the cross-connections
that don’t help the control processes.

I’m in the final throes of publishing a new book which is a collection of
models and simulations that I’ve developed since the 1970s, which
discusses all the basic principles of Perceptual Control Theory and
includes a disk of computer demos (written with Delphi) that illustrate
what each chapter is about. The book should appear early this summer – I
hope.

We are primarily concerned with laying the foundations for a general
model of human behavior. Not many of us are actual programmers or
modelers, and what programs and models we generate are mainly
demonstrations or proofs of principle rather than sophisticated things
like stabilizing helicopter autopilots. Technical discussions tend to
occur offline, though we try to maintain communication between technical
types and applications people.

So – ask an innocent question and get a drink from a firehose.

Best regards,

Bill Powers

···

On Wed, Apr 2, 2008 at 8:00 AM, > CSGNET automatic digest system > < > LISTSERV@listserv.uiuc.edu> wrote:
There are 3 messages totalling 132 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Uncertainty (was second-order and third-order beliefs)
    (3)

Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2008 13:43:04 -0700
From: Richard Marken
rsmarken@GMAIL.COM
Subject: Re: Uncertainty (was second-order and third-order
beliefs)

[From Rick Marken (2008.04.01.1345)]

Bill Powers (2008.03.31.2013 MDT)–

I conclude that we mean different things by
“uncertainty.”.

Maybe. Could someone remind me why this “uncertainty” thing
came up in
the first place.

I see several candidates for definitions of uncertainty
about a perception:

  1. The perception itself seems to vary randomly so there
    is no way to
    predict its next value.

  2. The perception is itself relatively constant, but is
    masked by random
    noise which makes it hard to perceive at all, or to perceive in
    a consistent
    way.

  3. The perception is ambiguous, in that parts of its
    lower-level components
    are missing so they could be filled in by imagination in
    different ways,
    each leading to a different familiar perception.

I see all of these as being consistent with what I mean by
uncertainty, which is a state that can exist only when a person
has
the purpose of making an inference, prediction or decision about
a
possible state of affairs based on a perception that is assumed to
be
evidence regarding that state of affairs. In your example 1 there
is
uncertainty if a person has the purpose of predicting the next
value
of the perception based on the present value, where the present
value
is taken to be evidence of what might happen next. In your example
2
there is uncertainty if a person has the purpose of perceiving
the
perception that is masked based on a perception of the masked
perception, where the masked perception is taken to be evidence
of
what perception is masked. Same for example 3, where there is
uncertainty if the person has the purpose of perceiving the
complete
perception that about which the ambiguous perception is assumed to
be
evidence.

I guess I’m saying that I don’t think it makes sense to talk
about
perceptions themselves as being uncertain. Perceptions are just
perceptions. They become “unpredictable”,
“masked” or “ambiguous” only
when there is the purpose to use those perceptions as evidence
of
something else (the thing to be predicted, detected or
identified).

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com


Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2008 19:44:38 -0600
From: Bill Powers
<powers_w@FRONTIER.NET

Subject: Re: Uncertainty (was second-order and third-order
beliefs)

[From Bill Powers (2008.03.31.1932 MDT)]

Rick Marken (2008.04.01.1345) –

I guess I’m saying that I don’t think it makes sense to talk
about
perceptions themselves as being uncertain. Perceptions are
just
perceptions. They become “unpredictable”,
“masked” or “ambiguous” only
when there is the purpose to use those perceptions as evidence
of
something else (the thing to be predicted, detected or
identified).

I basically agree with you, but I’m trying to make the whole
discussion depend less on “how we think of it” and more on
stateable
principles. You can define uncertainty as an objective state of
affairs if that’s what you want to do, like Heisenberg saying
that
position and momentum themselves are uncertain, independently of
the
observer. That’s a proposition, and it can be discussed and
argued
about, but not by saying we don’t like it or believe it. You
propose
another definition of uncertainty. Is it a better one? Of course
you
think it is, but why should anyone else think it is?

I think we’re trying to define a term, not really look at a
phenomenon. Either we’ll agree on a definition or we won’t. At
the
moment it doesn’t matter to me, because I don’t use the idea of
uncertainty in my work very much, except when talking about
things
like prediction errors, which fits in with your proposed
definition.
I don’t think Martin will accept it, but we’ll see. I’m not
inclined
to shut Martin off by dismissing his interests, but if they’re
too
far from mine, I’m willing for us to go our separate ways on
this
subject. It would be nice to get some kind of convergence,
though.

Best,

Bill P.


Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2008 00:21:31 -0400
From: Martin Taylor
mmt-csg@MMTAYLOR.NET
Subject: Re: Uncertainty (was second-order and third-order
beliefs)

[Martin Taylor 2008.04.02]

[From Bill Powers (2008.03.31.1932 MDT)]

Rick Marken (2008.04.01.1345) –

I guess I’m saying that I don’t think it makes sense to talk
about
perceptions themselves as being uncertain. Perceptions are
just
perceptions. They become “unpredictable”,
“masked” or “ambiguous” only
when there is the purpose to use those perceptions as
evidence of
something else (the thing to be predicted, detected or
identified).

I basically agree with you, but I’m trying to make the whole
discussion depend less on “how we think of it” and more
on stateable
principles.

I sent out a long message on this on Monday, but it hasn’t shown
up.
I’m going to send it again, despite the likelihood that you will
see
it twice.

Martin


End of CSGNET Digest - 1 Apr 2008 to 2 Apr 2008 (#2008-74)


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