[From Bruce Nevin (2003.03.31 13:18 EST)]
A lot going on, and that delays responding.
Bill Powers (2003.03.29.0938 MST)–
When an
infant is
born, the patterns of the language that it will learn already exist,
immanent in the speech of those around it, and likewise other
culture
patterns. These patterns are part of the world the way it is, just like
the
sunrise and water running downhill.
OK, I agree with that. You seem to be saying that there are
pre-existing
patterns of speech
and other behavior
that are instrumental in making language
and other aspects of culture
possible, but
which people do not learn to control. In that case, how do they prevent
the
patterns from changing?
Rather, how do they slow the rate of change and maintain consistency with
one another through change? Because they don’t prevent change. The
patterns do change, slowly, over time, but always in such a way that the
pattern is consistent for individuals in an intercommunicating society.
If the pattern itself is not controlled, then the control of CVs of which
the pattern is an epiphenomenon must have the effects, also as an
epiphenomenon, of maintaining mutual consistency and of slowing change to
the pattern. Contrast with type 2 rings and arcs which do not change or
vary in this systematic way.
There is also synchronic variation of detail within the pattern. If the
variation is too great you lose mutual intelligibility. But even the
variation is consistent, e.g. speakers shift from formal to informal
register in consistent ways.
Diachronic change originates in this variation. A variant of some aspect
of the pattern that is restricted to a certain group of speakers over
time becomes the preferred standard common to all, for example, because
that group is esteemed. (I’ve given references to Labov’s work on the
social motivation of language change.)
All this is consistent with maintaining consistency with one another, and
is not consistent with controlling with respect to reference values
retained from childhood for some established variables that everyone
happens to control.
If consistency with one another is a controlled variable, perhaps that is
why a settled culture (such as that described for Bali prior to WWII) has
a kind of thematic unity. If different aspects of the culture
(child-rearing, music, warfare, storytelling, conflict resolution, visual
arts, etc.) are consistent with one another in an overall pattern
(climaxless plateau), then it is easier to control for consistency with
one another.
This does not mean that the pattern is itself a controlled variable.
Suppose perception of the pattern in the behavior of others (perhaps in
terms of themes or features) sets references for the way many things are
done (music, warfare, etc.), and out of the doing of those many things
emerges an epiphenomenon which, being perceived, sets the references for
controlling the pattern. I’ll return to this loop at the end.
… a
self-organizing structure that
arises in use, in the process of maintaining consistency between
individuals in a communicating community
that is, maintaining mutual intelligibility, ability to communicate.
If consistency between
individuals arises in a communicating community, that must be an
emergent
result of their interactions, just as the arc and rings are an
emergent
result of interactions among system that avoid collisions and follow a
leader.
Yes indeed, I believe that is true, and that is what I said. There is a
difference, however, between type 1 and type 2. You can model navigation
of individuals among obstacles in pursuit of a goal, and when you have a
bunch of them with a common goal the epiphenomenon of rings and arcs
appears. The epiphenomenon need not pre-exist. The individuals do need
the example of rings and arcs being formed (nor the example even of
individuals in pursuit of a goal) in order to form rings and arcs (or in
order to pursue a goal). But, by contrast, you cannot model cultural
patterns such as the patterns in language without the pattern
pre-existing to be learned,and you must provide for the fact of variation
and change in language and culture, is that cultural patterns differ from
one community to another; rings and arcs do not.
You say:
Enabling control: The patterning enables greater efficiency of
memory,
production, and recognition, supports error correction in transmission
of
information, and enables mapping of equivalent utterances across
variable
pronunciations, among other things.
Greater than what? Do you have examples of communities in which
these
patterns did not appear, and which therefore were observed to have
lower
efficiency of memory and production, etc.?
No. No human communities are on record in which people lack a
common language, or in which more generally they lack mutually
predictable ways of behaving that are characteristic of that community
and that enable communication and cooperation.
But this answer (and your question) is sidestepping the issue. Without
phonological patterning, a large vocabulary is simply not possible. This
is because without discrete distinctions as fine-grained as syllables,
segments, and concurrent features a large vocabulary cannot exist. The
number of utterances that can reliably and repeatably be differentiated
from another without a phonemic system is rather small, such as is
observed in animal calls.
This says nothing about how such patterning arises, only that, having
arisen, it is part of the perceptual universe within which a new infant
in the community learns to control. The infant also learns to perceive
and control a stone, a door, fire, sunrise, shovel, mama, father’s
brother, etc. How you speak and act must exemplify the patterns of
language and culture in order for you to be a person who is a member of
that community, so they are means of controlling identity. They are far
and away the best means for controlling communication and cooperation
with other members of the community.
I have no doubt that patterns
are observed – what you call phonemic contrasts, for example – but
why
are they not simply emergent from the process of communicating and
correcting errors of communication? If one person does not
understand
another, the other can correct the error by altering pronunciation
until
understanding is more reliably produced. The particular kinds of
alterations that will accomplish this depends on how human beings
recognize
and produce speech, and I expect on the particular kind of speech that
is
in use (Chinese versus Spanish, for example). What more do we need? Or
have
I simply succeeded, finally, in paraphrasing what you’re
saying?
Sounds like a paraphrase as far as it goes, and paraphrase is the only
reliable test of understanding that I know. But there is a bit more. To
repeat what I said above, suppose there is feedback in social space.
Suppose control of cultural themes and phonological features etc. sets
references for the way things are done, and out of the doing of those
many things with one another emerges an epiphenomenon which, being
perceived, sets the references for controlling the themes and features of
language and culture. A slowly changing homeostasis in the systemic
interactions of autonomous control systems. No superordinate “social
control” system setting references is being proposed or suggested.
The fact that the epiphenomenon constitutes a structured system is a
consequence of the interactions of individuals that a mathematical
(information theoretic) analysis might account for - those ways of
interacting that work well are perceived and remembered and establish
reference values for control, and those that don’t work cannot be
perceived as how things are done for the very reason that they are not
means of successful control.
This is brought about in part through the reorganizing that each
individual does to reduce error in communication or cooperation
<http://www.ucomics.com/forbetterorforworse/2003/03/27/>
But that is not the whole story. We also set references by observing
others (hence my interest in a PCT account of imitation, repetition,
etc.) and to do so we observe what (apparently) “everybody
does” and what “this kind of person does” and how it
contrasts with what “that kind of person does”. Identifying as
“this kind of person” I of course avoid doing what “that
kind of person does”. Unless I find myself among them; and then my
control of “doing it the way everybody here does” comes in
conflict with “doing it the way my kind of people do”. This is
a simplistic beginning at issues of identity and social perceptions.
/Bruce
Nevin
···
At 11:57 AM 3/29/2003, Bill Powers wrote: