Declaration of Independence

[From Fred Nickols (2015.09.21.0722)]

We act to control what we perceive.

What we control are our perceptions. When it comes to purposeful, intentional acts, what we want to control is the object of our perceptions, some variable “out there.” Let’s call it X.

For some practical purposes we can treat X and perceptions of X as though they are one and the same. For other, equally practical purposes, we dare not treat those two impostors the same.

I want X to be in a certain state. I act. My perceptions inform me if I succeeded. As a control system, all I can do is control my perceptual input, my perceptions. As a purposeful human being, my perceptions serve to inform me whether or not I succeeded, that I did or didn’t control X.

What seems to be missing from PCT is me. Those are my goals. Those are my actions. Those are my perceptions. That is my world.

What, then, is the difference between X and my perception of X? Very little as far as I can see. And, for practical purposes, next to none.

I hereby declare my independence of and lack of interest in discussions regarding the control of X or the control of perceptions of X.

Regards,

Fred Nickols, CPT

DISTANCE CONSULTING

“Assistance at a Distance”

The Knowledge Workers’ Tool Room

Be sure you measure what you want.

Be sure you want what you measure.

FN: What, then, is the difference between X and my perception of X?

PY: Think of X as an object and a perception of X as a pointer to the object. If the pointer changes location, the object remains stationary.

[From Fred Nickols (2015.09.21.1430)]

Thanks, Philip. I understand the difference. What I’m driving at is that for the practical purposes to which I’ve put PCT (as I understand it) the distinction between a perception of X and X hasn’t proved to be particularly important.

Fred Nickols

···

From: PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN [mailto:pyeranos@ucla.edu]
Sent: Monday, September 21, 2015 1:48 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Declaration of Independence

FN: What, then, is the difference between X and my perception of X?

PY: Think of X as an object and a perception of X as a pointer to the object. If the pointer changes location, the object remains stationary.

These are theoretical issues which may apply to reality when they will. As I mentioned, the difference between X (variable) and X* (pointer) is the issue. The applications are for implementing programming languages.

···

On Monday, September 21, 2015, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2015.09.21.1430)]

Thanks, Philip. I understand the difference. What I’m driving at is that for the practical purposes to which I’ve put PCT (as I understand it) the distinction between a perception of X and X hasn’t proved to be particularly important.

Fred Nickols

From: PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN [mailto:pyeranos@ucla.edu]
Sent: Monday, September 21, 2015 1:48 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Declaration of Independence

FN: What, then, is the difference between X and my perception of X?

PY: Think of X as an object and a perception of X as a pointer to the object. If the pointer changes location, the object remains stationary.

[Bruce Nevin 2015.09.23.11:33 PT]

Fred Nickols: What, then, is the difference between X and my perception of X? Very little as far as I can see. And, for practical purposes, next to none.

Fred,

You might want to control X as I perceive it.

Yes, that means controlling your perception of my perception of X. We do that all the time. In the methodology of PCT, you do it by experimentally disturbing what you perceive to be my controlled variable. So your perception of my perception of X can be based on sensory input from the environment; it need not be entirely imagined. (Though of course imagination has a much larger role when you don’t Test for the CV.)

This is the basis of intersubjective agreement. Intersubjective agreement is the definition of objectivity in science. In other words, this provides a definition of X as distinct from one’s perception of X. A provisional definition, of course. But we already knew that about science.

Collective control is related to this.

···

On Mon, Sep 21, 2015 at 4:29 AM, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2015.09.21.0722)]

Â

We act to control what we perceive.

Â

What we control are our perceptions. When it comes to purposeful, intentional acts, what we want to control is the object of our perceptions, some variable “out there.â€? Let’s call it X.Â

Â

For some practical purposes we can treat X and perceptions of X as though they are one and the same. For other, equally practical purposes, we dare not treat those two impostors the same.

Â

I want X to be in a certain state. I act. My perceptions inform me if I succeeded. As a control system, all I can do is control my perceptual input, my perceptions. As a purposeful human being, my perceptions serve to inform me whether or not I succeeded, that I did or didn’t control X.

Â

What seems to be missing from PCT is me. Those are my goals. Those are my actions. Those are my perceptions. That is my world.

Â

What, then, is the difference between X and my perception of X? Very little as far as I can see. And, for practical purposes, next to none.

Â

I hereby declare my independence of and lack of interest in discussions regarding the control of X or the control of perceptions of X.

Â

Regards,

Â

Fred Nickols, CPT

DISTANCE CONSULTING

“Assistance at a Distance�

The Knowledge Workers’ Tool Room

Be sure you measure what you want.

Be sure you want what you measure.

Â

Â

Fred Nickols: What, then, is the difference between X and my perception of X? Very little as far as I can see. And, for practical purposes, next to none.

PY: I see this question hasn’t yielded an intuitive answer. What is the difference between X and your P(X)? I suppose it may depend on how large X is. If you cannot perceive X in its entirety, there is a difference.

BN: Fred, You might want to control X as I perceive it…you do it by experimentally disturbing what you perceive to be my controlled variable…This is the basis of intersubjective agreement. Intersubjective agreement is the definition of objectivity in science. In other words, this provides a definition of X as distinct from one’s perception of X.

PY: I don’t believe this argument is valid. How far would people get if they constantly disturb each others’ perception just to gain one bit of information? I don’t think inter subjective agreement is the definition of objectivity. Science could theoretically be a one man show. Nor is the goal to provide a definition of X distinct from ones perception. This is the aim of a purely mathematical description of phenomena.

[From Rick Marken (2015.09.24.1215)]

···

Bruce Nevin 2015.09.23.11:33 PT]

Fred Nickols: What, then, is the difference between X and my perception of X? Very little as far as I can see. And, for practical purposes, next to none.

Fred, You might want to control X as I perceive it.

BN: Yes, that means controlling your perception of my perception of X. We do that all the time. In the methodology of PCT, you do it by experimentally disturbing what you perceive to be my controlled variable. So your perception of my perception of X can be based on sensory input from the environment; it need not be entirely imagined. (Though of course imagination has a much larger role when you don’t Test for the CV.)

RM: The problem here is the idea that there is an X out there that can be perceived in different ways.Â

What would it mean to perceive X in different ways? It means that your perception, p, is a function of X, p = f(X), and the different ways of perceiving X represent different functions of X. But if X is just a scalar physical variable (as it appears to be when it is symbolized as X) then whatever different forms f() might take in different people, the difference between perceptions of X will only be in terns of the perceived magnitude of X. So a 60 dB tone might sound louder (or softer) to me than it does to you. But clearly there are other ways that perceptions of the same reality can differ. So something is missing here.

RM: What’s missing is this. In PCT, what you call “X”, the reality that is “out there”, is actually set of physical variables, v.i, that is best represented as X = [v.1, v.2…v.n] as it is in Fig. 1, p. 66 of LCS I. Your perception of X is then represented as p = f(v.1, v.2…v.n). Different ways of perceiving X are again represented by different forms of the perceptual function, f(). But now, when p is a function of more than one physical variable, the different ways of perceiving X can differ in other ways besides magnitude. For example, if p = f(v.1, v.2), the perception of X could be p = v.1+v.2 or p = v.1*v.2.Â

RM: In the Test for the Controlled Variable, we determine the perception that another person is controlling by computing various possible perceptions of the same situation (either using our own perceptual systems, as in the coin game, or actually computing them using a computer, as in the “What is Size” and “Mind Reading” demos) and see whether those perceptions are protected from disturbances. The perceptions that the researcher “computes” are called q.i – a perceptual aspect of X as perceived by the experimenter. So, in the “What is size” demo, if S is controlling p = w * h and E is observing the behavior of q.i = w * h, then E will be able to see that S is controlling a perception of X that is equivalent to w * h rather than w+h.Â

RM: An example of doing this where q.i is computed using E’s own perceptual functions (and where function f() is a a lot more complex than w * h or w+h) is given in a description of the coin game in B:CP. Here, if S is perceiving and controlling a “zig zag pattern of coins” and E is perceiving the zig zag pattern of coins and sees that this perception is protected from disturbances (such as E moving the coins out of a zig zag pattern) then E knows that he/she is perceiving what S is perceiving and controlling.

RM: Hope this clears things up. I think the main thing to understand is that p and q.i are the same variable. p is not a function of q.i; both p and q.i are the same function of physical variables, where p is what is seen from the perspective of the control system and q.i is the same thing seen from the perspective of an observer of the control system.Â

BestÂ

Rick

Â

This is the basis of intersubjective agreement. Intersubjective agreement is the definition of objectivity in science. In other words, this provides a definition of X as distinct from one’s perception of X. A provisional definition, of course. But we already knew that about science.

Collective control is related to this.

/B


Richard S. MarkenÂ

www.mindreadings.com
Author of  Doing Research on Purpose
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

On Mon, Sep 21, 2015 at 4:29 AM, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2015.09.21.0722)]

Â

We act to control what we perceive.

Â

What we control are our perceptions. When it comes to purposeful, intentional acts, what we want to control is the object of our perceptions, some variable “out there.â€? Let’s call it X.Â

Â

For some practical purposes we can treat X and perceptions of X as though they are one and the same. For other, equally practical purposes, we dare not treat those two impostors the same.

Â

I want X to be in a certain state. I act. My perceptions inform me if I succeeded. As a control system, all I can do is control my perceptual input, my perceptions. As a purposeful human being, my perceptions serve to inform me whether or not I succeeded, that I did or didn’t control X.

Â

What seems to be missing from PCT is me. Those are my goals. Those are my actions. Those are my perceptions. That is my world.

Â

What, then, is the difference between X and my perception of X? Very little as far as I can see. And, for practical purposes, next to none.

Â

I hereby declare my independence of and lack of interest in discussions regarding the control of X or the control of perceptions of X.

Â

Regards,

Â

Fred Nickols, CPT

DISTANCE CONSULTING

“Assistance at a Distance�

The Knowledge Workers’ Tool Room

Be sure you measure what you want.

Be sure you want what you measure.

Â

Â

[Martin Taylor 2015.09.24]

I have 279 unread messages on CSGnet, so forgive me if I am jumping to repeat something that has been said already.

[From Rick Marken (2015.09.24.1215)]

RM: Hope this clears things up. I think the main thing to understand is that p and q.i are the same variable. p is not a function of q.i; both p and q.i are the same function of physical variables, where p is what is seen from the perspective of the control system and q.i is the same thing seen from the perspective of an observer of the control system.

That's more or less right, but it sometimes is important than one recognized that p and qi are functions of time, and that p is an integrative function of qi, not exactly the same thing. Most often, the distinction doesn't matter, but sometimes it does. By "integrative function" I mean that the value of p at time t0 depends on the values of qi over some time period from t0-epsilon to t0-delta. You can see this simply by noticing that when you look at a movie, you don't see a whole series of still pictures, or by "seeing" the continuous movement and deformation of a form that has one shape in one location and is replaced after a few milliseconds gap by a different form in a new place.

But as I say, usually this doesn't matter, since most control experiments run quite slowly compared to the time it takes to build the perception. The time lag from detecting the error to its effect on qi is usually much longer, though this may not be true at higher perceptual levels, as when it slowly dawns on you that someone may have been cheating you, but you can act quickly to correct the error in that perception.

So for practical purposes, it is often OK to say that p and qi are essentially the same variable, despite one being in the environment and the other in the brain, but if you are being careful, you should always be sure to note that it is not actually true. Physical causality works, and causes precede effects, even in a control loop.

Martin

···

On 2015/09/24 3:15 PM, Richard Marken wrote:

MT: I have 279 unread messages on CSGnet
PY: Wow…I’m responsible for half of them. No wonder I never saw your responses.

MT: it sometimes is important than one recognized that p and qi are functions of time, and that p is an integrative function of qi…by “integrative function” I mean that the value of p at time t0 depends on the values of qi over some time period from t0-epsilon to t0-delta…But as I say, usually this doesn’t matter, since most control experiments run quite slowly compared to the time it takes to build the perception.

PY: Look at the demo of RM concerning hierarchical control: http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Hierarchy.html

PY: Do you think that the perceptions above configuration (transition and sequence) are properly implemented as “integrative functions”? An integrative function would map all values between t0 epsilon to t0 delta as one constant-valued interval. To show the raw data of the transition and sequence at each instant of time is not the same, I am thinking.

RM: The problem here is the idea that there is an X out there that can be perceived in different ways.

What would it mean to perceive X in different ways? It means that your perception, p, is a function of X, p = f(X), and the different ways of perceiving X represent different functions of X.

PY: That’s not a very good way to put it. A better way is this: your perception, p, is a particular “moment” of state-space, X, and the different ways of perceiving X represent different moments of X(t). It seems you’re in need of a primer on Markov processes…don’t worry, we’ll get there; until then…

PY: Let’s look again at a definition of an object class or abstract data type:

abstract data type: square

{

DATA

int: height

int: width

METHODS

int: get_height ()

{return height}

void: change_height (int: arg_1)

{height = arg_1}

int: get_width ()

{return width}

void: change_width (int: arg_1)

{width = arg_1}

}

PY: What we are seeing here is the use of methods to access and manipulate data belonging to the object. These are known as “accessor” and “mutator” functions, and they are implemented inside the definition of the object itself. An accessor function, such as int: get_height (), returns a value of a specified type. In this case, it returns an int corresponding to the value of the height variable which belongs to the object. Mutator functions, such as void: change_height (int: arg_1), accept an argument which is used to alter the object data accordingly. These functions may or may not return a value; if not, they are of type “void”.

PY: A program which uses this object would look like this:

main()

{

square X // instantiate a square-class object named X

X.change_height (5) // mutator function

if (X.get_height () != 5) // accessor function inside conditional; “!=” means “not equal”

print “the method didn’t work!”

}

PY: You don’t need to code this way (i.e. using accessor and mutator functions), but it’s standard professional protocol. Getting back to what RM said…different ways of perceiving X represent different accessor functions of the object X. In the square object, we have two such accessor (get_) functions.

RM: X is just a scalar physical variable (as it appears to be when it is symbolized as X)…

PY: Let’s call X an instance of an object. For instance, the square X in the program above.

RM: In PCT, what you call “X”, the reality that is “out there”, is actually set of physical variables, v.i, that is best represented as X = [v.1, v.2…v.n] as it is in Fig. 1, p. 66 of LCS I.

PY: All is well. We can imagine X as an object “out there, inside the computer”. It is is a set of physical variables occupying a contiguous array of memory bytes.

image273.png

RM: Your perception of X is then represented as p = f(v.1, v.2…v.n). Different ways of perceiving X are again represented by different forms of the perceptual function, f().

PY: Indeed, your perception is the returned value of an accessor function. These values can be combined into different variables. For example, int: area = X.get_height() * X.get_width().

RM: But now, when p is a function of more than one physical variable, the different ways of perceiving X can differ in other ways besides magnitude. For example, if p = f(v.1, v.2), the perception of X could be p = v.1+v.2 or p = v.1*v.2.

PY: ERROR! This is wrong! The different ways of perceiving X has nothing to do with combining various data variables into different expressions. It only has to do with the types of values returned by its accessor functions. In this case, we can access the height or width of the square. We can combine these however we like, but what matters is the type of variable we assign the value to. The function just above, int: area = X.get_height() * X.get_width(), stores the value as an integer (although the type can be anything, including an abstract data type).

PY: Do we understand each other?.

···

On Thu, Sep 24, 2015 at 1:29 PM, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2015.09.24]

I have 279 unread messages on CSGnet, so forgive me if I am jumping to repeat something that has been said already.

On 2015/09/24 3:15 PM, Richard Marken wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2015.09.24.1215)]

RM: Hope this clears things up. I think the main thing to understand is that p and q.i are the same variable. p is not a function of q.i; both p and q.i are the same function of physical variables, where p is what is seen from the perspective of the control system and q.i is the same thing seen from the perspective of an observer of the control system.

That’s more or less right, but it sometimes is important than one recognized that p and qi are functions of time, and that p is an integrative function of qi, not exactly the same thing. Most often, the distinction doesn’t matter, but sometimes it does. By “integrative function” I mean that the value of p at time t0 depends on the values of qi over some time period from t0-epsilon to t0-delta. You can see this simply by noticing that when you look at a movie, you don’t see a whole series of still pictures, or by “seeing” the continuous movement and deformation of a form that has one shape in one location and is replaced after a few milliseconds gap by a different form in a new place.

But as I say, usually this doesn’t matter, since most control experiments run quite slowly compared to the time it takes to build the perception. The time lag from detecting the error to its effect on qi is usually much longer, though this may not be true at higher perceptual levels, as when it slowly dawns on you that someone may have been cheating you, but you can act quickly to correct the error in that perception.

So for practical purposes, it is often OK to say that p and qi are essentially the same variable, despite one being in the environment and the other in the brain, but if you are being careful, you should always be sure to note that it is not actually true. Physical causality works, and causes precede effects, even in a control loop.

Martin

[From Fred Nickols (2015.09.25.0624)]

Let me add a bit more to this.

I understand the distinction between X (out there) and my perception of X (in here). I also appreciate the challenging scientific work that goes along with that. However, my interest in PCT is in a much more applied way, using it to tackle human performance problems in the workplace. So allow me to relate an example.

A division director at the testing company where I worked asked me to look into a problem in one of his division’s processing operations. The operation in question processed registration forms submitted by people who wanted to register for and take a certification test in the health aide field. He said the reject rate was much too high and he wanted me to see what I could do to get it down.

The reject rate was about 75 percent. The operations staff could fix about half of those but the other half had to be returned to the registrants. The errors on the forms were about evenly divided between invalid institutional codes and just plain sloppiness (e.g., missing zip code).

Obviously, the “performers� in this case were the registrants. They were the ones who filled out the form and who were doing so in ways that left the registration forms riddled with errors. It was their “form filling out behavior� that produced errors and it was their behavior that had to be changed in ways that would reduce errors.

So, from a PCT perspective, it seemed to me that if the registrants were to stop making errors, they would have to have the same reference signal for a completed form that the testing company used. That led to some basic questions (e.g., Where and how would they learn what constituted a “clean and complete� registration form? What would make them want to produce such a form? Why would they adopt the testing company’s standards? What kinds of “disturbances� might be preventing them from filling out the form correctly?)

After looking into the matter I discovered some important facts. The registrants obtained the registration form from a testing bulletin, which also contained the instructions for filling out the form. Those instructions were very skimpy (to save on printing costs) and contained no examples. Nor did the instructions spell out the consequences to the registrants for failure to fill it out properly. A rejected registration form meant the registrants would be delayed in taking the test, delayed in obtaining the certification, delayed in obtaining employment and delayed in obtaining a paycheck.

I was also curious about the invalid institution codes. Where, I wondered, did the registrants get those? It turns out the various institutions were provided with an institutional code list used by registrants.  It was the same code list used by the testing company and it was very much a disturbance. The code list was organized numerically because the testing company staff had the number and wanted to know the name of the institution. However, the registrants had the name and wanted to know the number. They required a code list that was organized alphabetically.

The instructions were revised to include examples and a bold print section advising the registrants of the consequences of them of failure to properly fill out the registration form. An alphabetical code list was also prepared and distributed. Subsequently, the reject rate dropped to less than 10 percent. Later on, the test and registration were moved on-line and the reject rate problem completely disappeared.

Where in this example does any distinction between X and my perception of X come into play? I viewed the registrants as living control systems and was thus led to look into how they would be able to exercise control over filling out the registration form in ways that would lead to far fewer errors. I also uncovered and took care of a disturbance.

Unless I’m mistaken, I think this is a pretty good example of one way in which PCT can be applied to practical problems of human behavior and performance in the workplace. Frankly, I wasn’t interested in doing “the test� to see what the registrants might be controlling for and I certainly didn’t care about the distinction between X and anyone’s perception of X. Instead, I wanted to shape what registrants were controlling for with respect to the registration form. I wanted to get them to adopt a set of standards (reference signals) for the form. The impact on the reject rate suggests I succeeded.

Fred Nickols

bob hintz - 2015.9.25

bh - I would just like to note that you also changed the output of the folks who hired you to solve a problem that was in part created by their own behavior. Had they been unwilling to reorganize, the registrants would not have been able to reorganize and produce better applications. You looked at the output of the registrants as resource to imagine how various inputs which were someone else’s outputs were part of a process of interaction. Neither of the participants were doing this apparently. Both were experiencing disturbances created by the other, but not communicating very accurately.

bobÂ

···

On Fri, Sep 25, 2015 at 5:26 AM, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2015.09.25.0624)]

Â

Let me add a bit more to this.

Â

I understand the distinction between X (out there) and my perception of X (in here). I also appreciate the challenging scientific work that goes along with that. However, my interest in PCT is in a much more applied way, using it to tackle human performance problems in the workplace. So allow me to relate an example.

Â

A division director at the testing company where I worked asked me to look into a problem in one of his division’s processing operations. The operation in question processed registration forms submitted by people who wanted to register for and take a certification test in the health aide field. He said the reject rate was much too high and he wanted me to see what I could do to get it down.

Â

The reject rate was about 75 percent. The operations staff could fix about half of those but the other half had to be returned to the registrants. The errors on the forms were about evenly divided between invalid institutional codes and just plain sloppiness (e.g., missing zip code).

Â

Obviously, the “performers� in this case were the registrants. They were the ones who filled out the form and who were doing so in ways that left the registration forms riddled with errors. It was their “form filling out behavior� that produced errors and it was their behavior that had to be changed in ways that would reduce errors.

Â

So, from a PCT perspective, it seemed to me that if the registrants were to stop making errors, they would have to have the same reference signal for a completed form that the testing company used. That led to some basic questions (e.g., Where and how would they learn what constituted a “clean and complete� registration form? What would make them want to produce such a form? Why would they adopt the testing company’s standards? What kinds of “disturbances� might be preventing them from filling out the form correctly?)

Â

After looking into the matter I discovered some important facts. The registrants obtained the registration form from a testing bulletin, which also contained the instructions for filling out the form. Those instructions were very skimpy (to save on printing costs) and contained no examples. Nor did the instructions spell out the consequences to the registrants for failure to fill it out properly. A rejected registration form meant the registrants would be delayed in taking the test, delayed in obtaining the certification, delayed in obtaining employment and delayed in obtaining a paycheck.

Â

I was also curious about the invalid institution codes. Where, I wondered, did the registrants get those? It turns out the various institutions were provided with an institutional code list used by registrants. It was the same code list used by the testing company and it was very much a disturbance. The code list was organized numerically because the testing company staff had the number and wanted to know the name of the institution. However, the registrants had the name and wanted to know the number. They required a code list that was organized alphabetically.

Â

The instructions were revised to include examples and a bold print section advising the registrants of the consequences of them of failure to properly fill out the registration form. An alphabetical code list was also prepared and distributed. Subsequently, the reject rate dropped to less than 10 percent. Later on, the test and registration were moved on-line and the reject rate problem completely disappeared.

Â

Where in this example does any distinction between X and my perception of X come into play? I viewed the registrants as living control systems and was thus led to look into how they would be able to exercise control over filling out the registration form in ways that would lead to far fewer errors. I also uncovered and took care of a disturbance.

Â

Unless I’m mistaken, I think this is a pretty good example of one way in which PCT can be applied to practical problems of human behavior and performance in the workplace. Frankly, I wasn’t interested in doing “the test� to see what the registrants might be controlling for and I certainly didn’t care about the distinction between X and anyone’s perception of X. Instead, I wanted to shape what registrants were controlling for with respect to the registration form. I wanted to get them to adopt a set of standards (reference signals) for the form. The impact on the reject rate suggests I succeeded.

Â

Fred Nickols

Â

Â

Â

***Â ***

[From Fred Nickols (2015.09.26.0650)]

Actually, the guy who hired me was in Operations. Testing Program Management later became a target when it became obvious that the bulletin and the code list needed to be modified. You are correct that the test taker output (i.e., the form) was input to the testing company’s process (although at the time no one looked at it that way). I suppose you could say that program management underwent some reorganization. Initially, they were very resistant to modifying the bulletin but when they compared the costs of doing that with the inflated costs of processing error-laden registration forms as well as numerous complaints from registrants and user institutions, they agreed.

Fred Nickols

···

From: Bob Hintz [mailto:bob.hintz@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, September 25, 2015 8:54 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Declaration of Independence

bob hintz - 2015.9.25

bh - I would just like to note that you also changed the output of the folks who hired you to solve a problem that was in part created by their own behavior. Had they been unwilling to reorganize, the registrants would not have been able to reorganize and produce better applications. You looked at the output of the registrants as resource to imagine how various inputs which were someone else’s outputs were part of a process of interaction. Neither of the participants were doing this apparently. Both were experiencing disturbances created by the other, but not communicating very accurately.

bob

On Fri, Sep 25, 2015 at 5:26 AM, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2015.09.25.0624)]

Let me add a bit more to this.

I understand the distinction between X (out there) and my perception of X (in here). I also appreciate the challenging scientific work that goes along with that. However, my interest in PCT is in a much more applied way, using it to tackle human performance problems in the workplace. So allow me to relate an example.

A division director at the testing company where I worked asked me to look into a problem in one of his division’s processing operations. The operation in question processed registration forms submitted by people who wanted to register for and take a certification test in the health aide field. He said the reject rate was much too high and he wanted me to see what I could do to get it down.

The reject rate was about 75 percent. The operations staff could fix about half of those but the other half had to be returned to the registrants. The errors on the forms were about evenly divided between invalid institutional codes and just plain sloppiness (e.g., missing zip code).

Obviously, the “performers� in this case were the registrants. They were the ones who filled out the form and who were doing so in ways that left the registration forms riddled with errors. It was their “form filling out behavior� that produced errors and it was their behavior that had to be changed in ways that would reduce errors.

So, from a PCT perspective, it seemed to me that if the registrants were to stop making errors, they would have to have the same reference signal for a completed form that the testing company used. That led to some basic questions (e.g., Where and how would they learn what constituted a “clean and complete� registration form? What would make them want to produce such a form? Why would they adopt the testing company’s standards? What kinds of “disturbances� might be preventing them from filling out the form correctly?)

After looking into the matter I discovered some important facts. The registrants obtained the registration form from a testing bulletin, which also contained the instructions for filling out the form. Those instructions were very skimpy (to save on printing costs) and contained no examples. Nor did the instructions spell out the consequences to the registrants for failure to fill it out properly. A rejected registration form meant the registrants would be delayed in taking the test, delayed in obtaining the certification, delayed in obtaining employment and delayed in obtaining a paycheck.

I was also curious about the invalid institution codes. Where, I wondered, did the registrants get those? It turns out the various institutions were provided with an institutional code list used by registrants. It was the same code list used by the testing company and it was very much a disturbance. The code list was organized numerically because the testing company staff had the number and wanted to know the name of the institution. However, the registrants had the name and wanted to know the number. They required a code list that was organized alphabetically.

The instructions were revised to include examples and a bold print section advising the registrants of the consequences of them of failure to properly fill out the registration form. An alphabetical code list was also prepared and distributed. Subsequently, the reject rate dropped to less than 10 percent. Later on, the test and registration were moved on-line and the reject rate problem completely disappeared.

Where in this example does any distinction between X and my perception of X come into play? I viewed the registrants as living control systems and was thus led to look into how they would be able to exercise control over filling out the registration form in ways that would lead to far fewer errors. I also uncovered and took care of a disturbance.

Unless I’m mistaken, I think this is a pretty good example of one way in which PCT can be applied to practical problems of human behavior and performance in the workplace. Frankly, I wasn’t interested in doing “the test� to see what the registrants might be controlling for and I certainly didn’t care about the distinction between X and anyone’s perception of X. Instead, I wanted to shape what registrants were controlling for with respect to the registration form. I wanted to get them to adopt a set of standards (reference signals) for the form. The impact on the reject rate suggests I succeeded.

Fred Nickols


bob hintz 2015.9.26

bh - Would it be fair to say that your output was directed at helping someone in the organization to examine how the output of the of the organization contributed to input that the organization was receiving. I imagine that several people in the organization blamed the registrants for the problem and wanted you to fix them. How does one control system influence another control system to examine itself, i.e., begin reorganizing its internal operation to increase its external control of external variables.

···

On Sat, Sep 26, 2015 at 5:55 AM, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2015.09.26.0650)]

Â

Actually, the guy who hired me was in Operations. Testing Program Management later became a target when it became obvious that the bulletin and the code list needed to be modified. You are correct that the test taker output (i.e., the form) was input to the testing company’s process (although at the time no one looked at it that way). I suppose you could say that program management underwent some reorganization. Initially, they were very resistant to modifying the bulletin but when they compared the costs of doing that with the inflated costs of processing error-laden registration forms as well as numerous complaints from registrants and user institutions, they agreed.

Â

Fred Nickols

Â

From: Bob Hintz [mailto:bob.hintz@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, September 25, 2015 8:54 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Declaration of Independence

Â

bob hintz - 2015.9.25

Â

bh - I would just like to note that you also changed the output of the folks who hired you to solve a problem that was in part created by their own behavior. Had they been unwilling to reorganize, the registrants would not have been able to reorganize and produce better applications. You looked at the output of the registrants as resource to imagine how various inputs which were someone else’s outputs were part of a process of interaction. Neither of the participants were doing this apparently. Both were experiencing disturbances created by the other, but not communicating very accurately.

Â

bobÂ

Â

On Fri, Sep 25, 2015 at 5:26 AM, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2015.09.25.0624)]

Â

Let me add a bit more to this.

Â

I understand the distinction between X (out there) and my perception of X (in here). I also appreciate the challenging scientific work that goes along with that. However, my interest in PCT is in a much more applied way, using it to tackle human performance problems in the workplace. So allow me to relate an example.

Â

A division director at the testing company where I worked asked me to look into a problem in one of his division’s processing operations. The operation in question processed registration forms submitted by people who wanted to register for and take a certification test in the health aide field. He said the reject rate was much too high and he wanted me to see what I could do to get it down.

Â

The reject rate was about 75 percent. The operations staff could fix about half of those but the other half had to be returned to the registrants. The errors on the forms were about evenly divided between invalid institutional codes and just plain sloppiness (e.g., missing zip code).

Â

Obviously, the “performers� in this case were the registrants. They were the ones who filled out the form and who were doing so in ways that left the registration forms riddled with errors. It was their “form filling out behavior� that produced errors and it was their behavior that had to be changed in ways that would reduce errors.

Â

So, from a PCT perspective, it seemed to me that if the registrants were to stop making errors, they would have to have the same reference signal for a completed form that the testing company used. That led to some basic questions (e.g., Where and how would they learn what constituted a “clean and complete� registration form? What would make them want to produce such a form? Why would they adopt the testing company’s standards? What kinds of “disturbances� might be preventing them from filling out the form correctly?)

Â

After looking into the matter I discovered some important facts. The registrants obtained the registration form from a testing bulletin, which also contained the instructions for filling out the form. Those instructions were very skimpy (to save on printing costs) and contained no examples. Nor did the instructions spell out the consequences to the registrants for failure to fill it out properly. A rejected registration form meant the registrants would be delayed in taking the test, delayed in obtaining the certification, delayed in obtaining employment and delayed in obtaining a paycheck.

Â

I was also curious about the invalid institution codes. Where, I wondered, did the registrants get those? It turns out the various institutions were provided with an institutional code list used by registrants. It was the same code list used by the testing company and it was very much a disturbance. The code list was organized numerically because the testing company staff had the number and wanted to know the name of the institution. However, the registrants had the name and wanted to know the number. They required a code list that was organized alphabetically.

Â

The instructions were revised to include examples and a bold print section advising the registrants of the consequences of them of failure to properly fill out the registration form. An alphabetical code list was also prepared and distributed. Subsequently, the reject rate dropped to less than 10 percent. Later on, the test and registration were moved on-line and the reject rate problem completely disappeared.

Â

Where in this example does any distinction between X and my perception of X come into play? I viewed the registrants as living control systems and was thus led to look into how they would be able to exercise control over filling out the registration form in ways that would lead to far fewer errors. I also uncovered and took care of a disturbance.

Â

Unless I’m mistaken, I think this is a pretty good example of one way in which PCT can be applied to practical problems of human behavior and performance in the workplace. Frankly, I wasn’t interested in doing “the test� to see what the registrants might be controlling for and I certainly didn’t care about the distinction between X and anyone’s perception of X. Instead, I wanted to shape what registrants were controlling for with respect to the registration form. I wanted to get them to adopt a set of standards (reference signals) for the form. The impact on the reject rate suggests I succeeded.

Â

Fred Nickols

Â

Â

Â

***Â ***

Â

[From Fred Nickols (2015.09.26.1145)]

You’re not far off. The operations staff were convinced that the registrants couldn’t fill out the form if their lives depended on it (which they couldn’t but that owed to the testing company, not the registrants). Program management was a different story. They understood the situation right away but were reluctant to spend the money on revising (expanding) the bulletin. However, a cost comparison did the trick on that score. Expanding the bulletin would actually reduce total charges to the program, not to mention removing the bulk of the complaints tied to rejected registration forms. In this regard, the institutions were complainants, too, and they were the program’s clients.

Interestingly, when the data came in and the reject rate was down under 10 percent, I asked the division director if he wanted to take it lower. He said no, that he had bigger fish to fry. The operations staff we freed up were reassigned to other areas needing support. Not long after, the division director was promoted to VP in another area and I was assigned to take his place as the new division director. To state the obvious: I was an employee at the time, not an outside consultant.

Fred Nickols

···

From: Bob Hintz [mailto:bob.hintz@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, September 26, 2015 11:34 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Declaration of Independence

bob hintz 2015.9.26

bh - Would it be fair to say that your output was directed at helping someone in the organization to examine how the output of the of the organization contributed to input that the organization was receiving. I imagine that several people in the organization blamed the registrants for the problem and wanted you to fix them. How does one control system influence another control system to examine itself, i.e., begin reorganizing its internal operation to increase its external control of external variables.

On Sat, Sep 26, 2015 at 5:55 AM, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2015.09.26.0650)]

Actually, the guy who hired me was in Operations. Testing Program Management later became a target when it became obvious that the bulletin and the code list needed to be modified. You are correct that the test taker output (i.e., the form) was input to the testing company’s process (although at the time no one looked at it that way). I suppose you could say that program management underwent some reorganization. Initially, they were very resistant to modifying the bulletin but when they compared the costs of doing that with the inflated costs of processing error-laden registration forms as well as numerous complaints from registrants and user institutions, they agreed.

Fred Nickols

From: Bob Hintz [mailto:bob.hintz@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, September 25, 2015 8:54 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Declaration of Independence

bob hintz - 2015.9.25

bh - I would just like to note that you also changed the output of the folks who hired you to solve a problem that was in part created by their own behavior. Had they been unwilling to reorganize, the registrants would not have been able to reorganize and produce better applications. You looked at the output of the registrants as resource to imagine how various inputs which were someone else’s outputs were part of a process of interaction. Neither of the participants were doing this apparently. Both were experiencing disturbances created by the other, but not communicating very accurately.

bob

On Fri, Sep 25, 2015 at 5:26 AM, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2015.09.25.0624)]

Let me add a bit more to this.

I understand the distinction between X (out there) and my perception of X (in here). I also appreciate the challenging scientific work that goes along with that. However, my interest in PCT is in a much more applied way, using it to tackle human performance problems in the workplace. So allow me to relate an example.

A division director at the testing company where I worked asked me to look into a problem in one of his division’s processing operations. The operation in question processed registration forms submitted by people who wanted to register for and take a certification test in the health aide field. He said the reject rate was much too high and he wanted me to see what I could do to get it down.

The reject rate was about 75 percent. The operations staff could fix about half of those but the other half had to be returned to the registrants. The errors on the forms were about evenly divided between invalid institutional codes and just plain sloppiness (e.g., missing zip code).

Obviously, the “performers� in this case were the registrants. They were the ones who filled out the form and who were doing so in ways that left the registration forms riddled with errors. It was their “form filling out behavior� that produced errors and it was their behavior that had to be changed in ways that would reduce errors.

So, from a PCT perspective, it seemed to me that if the registrants were to stop making errors, they would have to have the same reference signal for a completed form that the testing company used. That led to some basic questions (e.g., Where and how would they learn what constituted a “clean and complete� registration form? What would make them want to produce such a form? Why would they adopt the testing company’s standards? What kinds of “disturbances� might be preventing them from filling out the form correctly?)

After looking into the matter I discovered some important facts. The registrants obtained the registration form from a testing bulletin, which also contained the instructions for filling out the form. Those instructions were very skimpy (to save on printing costs) and contained no examples. Nor did the instructions spell out the consequences to the registrants for failure to fill it out properly. A rejected registration form meant the registrants would be delayed in taking the test, delayed in obtaining the certification, delayed in obtaining employment and delayed in obtaining a paycheck.

I was also curious about the invalid institution codes. Where, I wondered, did the registrants get those? It turns out the various institutions were provided with an institutional code list used by registrants. It was the same code list used by the testing company and it was very much a disturbance. The code list was organized numerically because the testing company staff had the number and wanted to know the name of the institution. However, the registrants had the name and wanted to know the number. They required a code list that was organized alphabetically.

The instructions were revised to include examples and a bold print section advising the registrants of the consequences of them of failure to properly fill out the registration form. An alphabetical code list was also prepared and distributed. Subsequently, the reject rate dropped to less than 10 percent. Later on, the test and registration were moved on-line and the reject rate problem completely disappeared.

Where in this example does any distinction between X and my perception of X come into play? I viewed the registrants as living control systems and was thus led to look into how they would be able to exercise control over filling out the registration form in ways that would lead to far fewer errors. I also uncovered and took care of a disturbance.

Unless I’m mistaken, I think this is a pretty good example of one way in which PCT can be applied to practical problems of human behavior and performance in the workplace. Frankly, I wasn’t interested in doing “the test� to see what the registrants might be controlling for and I certainly didn’t care about the distinction between X and anyone’s perception of X. Instead, I wanted to shape what registrants were controlling for with respect to the registration form. I wanted to get them to adopt a set of standards (reference signals) for the form. The impact on the reject rate suggests I succeeded.

Fred Nickols


This time I’ll not comment, but I’ll invite all members to participate in deciding whether Rick’s interpretation of Bill’s text is right or wrong. He mostly wrote about »Coin game« (B:CP, 2005, p. 236).

I think that Rick made similary to Philip his own »construction« based on his »behavioristic« psychological knowledge. So simply I think that he read Bill’s thoughts as he wanted to read them not »as they are«. Although also »as they are« can be critical, when there are many obsevers of the same »X« - external events.

But I’m inviting Rick to precisely define symbols he is using in his explanation of »Coin game« and in answer to Bruce and Fred, because I think that using symbols without understanidng their precise meaning can be misleading and manipulative.Â

Of course, also Powers ladies are kindly invited to participate in discussion about Rick’s interpretation of Bill’s work or they will just beleive Rick »on word«.

Best,

Boris

···

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, September 24, 2015 9:15 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Declaration of Independence

[From Rick Marken (2015.09.24.1215)]

Bruce Nevin 2015.09.23.11:33 PT]

Fred Nickols: What, then, is the difference between X and my perception of X? Very little as far as I can see. And, for practical purposes, next to none.

Fred, You might want to control X as I perceive it.

BN: Yes, that means controlling your perception of my perception of X. We do that all the time. In the methodology of PCT, you do it by experimentally disturbing what you perceive to be my controlled variable. So your perception of my perception of X can be based on sensory input from the environment; it need not be entirely imagined. (Though of course imagination has a much larger role when you don’t Test for the CV.)

RM: The problem here is the idea that there is an X out there that can be perceived in different ways.

What would it mean to perceive X in different ways? It means that your perception, p, is a function of X, p = f(X), and the different ways of perceiving X represent different functions of X. But if X is just a scalar physical variable (as it appears to be when it is symbolized as X) then whatever different forms f() might take in different people, the difference between perceptions of X will only be in terns of the perceived magnitude of X. So a 60 dB tone might sound louder (or softer) to me than it does to you. But clearly there are other ways that perceptions of the same reality can differ. So something is missing here.

RM: What’s missing is this. In PCT, what you call “X”, the reality that is “out there”, is actually set of physical variables, v.i, that is best represented as X = [v.1, v.2…v.n] as it is in Fig. 1, p. 66 of LCS I. Your perception of X is then represented as p = f(v.1, v.2…v.n). Different ways of perceiving X are again represented by different forms of the perceptual function, f(). But now, when p is a function of more than one physical variable, the different ways of perceiving X can differ in other ways besides magnitude. For example, if p = f(v.1, v.2), the perception of X could be p = v.1+v.2 or p = v.1*v.2.

RM: In the Test for the Controlled Variable, we determine the perception that another person is controlling by computing various possible perceptions of the same situation (either using our own perceptual systems, as in the coin game, or actually computing them using a computer, as in the “What is Size” and “Mind Reading” demos) and see whether those perceptions are protected from disturbances. The perceptions that the researcher “computes” are called q.i – a perceptual aspect of X as perceived by the experimenter. So, in the “What is size” demo, if S is controlling p = w * h and E is observing the behavior of q.i = w * h, then E will be able to see that S is controlling a perception of X that is equivalent to w * h rather than w+h.

RM: An example of doing this where q.i is computed using E’s own perceptual functions (and where function f() is a a lot more complex than w * h or w+h) is given in a description of the coin game in B:CP. Here, if S is perceiving and controlling a “zig zag pattern of coins” and E is perceiving the zig zag pattern of coins and sees that this perception is protected from disturbances (such as E moving the coins out of a zig zag pattern) then E knows that he/she is perceiving what S is perceiving and controlling.

RM: Hope this clears things up. I think the main thing to understand is that p and q.i are the same variable. p is not a function of q.i; both p and q.i are the same function of physical variables, where p is what is seen from the perspective of the control system and q.i is the same thing seen from the perspective of an observer of the control system.

Best

Rick

This is the basis of intersubjective agreement. Intersubjective agreement is the definition of objectivity in science. In other words, this provides a definition of X as distinct from one’s perception of X. A provisional definition, of course. But we already knew that about science.

Collective control is related to this.

/B

On Mon, Sep 21, 2015 at 4:29 AM, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2015.09.21.0722)]

We act to control what we perceive.

What we control are our perceptions. When it comes to purposeful, intentional acts, what we want to control is the object of our perceptions, some variable “out there.� Let’s call it X.

For some practical purposes we can treat X and perceptions of X as though they are one and the same. For other, equally practical purposes, we dare not treat those two impostors the same.

I want X to be in a certain state. I act. My perceptions inform me if I succeeded. As a control system, all I can do is control my perceptual input, my perceptions. As a purposeful human being, my perceptions serve to inform me whether or not I succeeded, that I did or didn’t control X.

What seems to be missing from PCT is me. Those are my goals. Those are my actions. Those are my perceptions. That is my world.

What, then, is the difference between X and my perception of X? Very little as far as I can see. And, for practical purposes, next to none.

I hereby declare my independence of and lack of interest in discussions regarding the control of X or the control of perceptions of X.

Regards,

Fred Nickols, CPT

DISTANCE ** CONSULTING**

“Assistance at a Distance�

The Knowledge Workers’ Tool Room

Be sure you measure what you want.

Be sure you want what you measure.

Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

I’m certainly not the expert, and am not picking sides. I am confident in the extent of knowledge of PCT shown by our moderator, and by the core group with whom I’m most familiar, and by whom most of the contributions here are made.

Â

While teaching, there is always more to learn. As you all know, this is one purpose of this forum. A close examination of one’s knowledge by colleagues, and by one’s students, is how one tests and re-examines understanding.

Â

Hard work can become quite personal. It involves a huge investment in time. I appreciate the very deep well of knowledge from which each of you are dipping. This is complicated, and it can be difficult at times to put one’s understanding in black and white, to “make” others see what one is seeing.Â

Â

When there is a sticking point, it’s time to come to task and pick through it together. This is not a competition, it’s a challenge to see how best these different areas can be clarified by a body of highly knowledgeable scientists. In the end, that is what will make all of this more accessible to others.

Â

Respectfully,

 *barb

Â

Â

Â

Â

Â

···

On Sun, Sep 27, 2015 at 8:09 AM, Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net wrote:

BH wrote:Â

Â

This time I’ll not comment, but I’ll invite all members to participate in deciding whether Rick’s interpretation of Bill’s text is right or wrong. He mostly wrote about »Coin game« (B:CP, 2005, p. 236).

Â

I think that Rick made similary to Philip his own »construction« based on his »behavioristic« psychological knowledge. So simply I think that he read Bill’s thoughts as he wanted to read them not »as they are«. Although also »as they are« can be critical, when there are many obsevers of the same »X« - external events.

Â

But I’m inviting Rick to precisely define symbols he is using in his explanation of »Coin game« and in answer to Bruce and Fred, because I think that using symbols without understanidng their precise meaning can be misleading and manipulative.Â

Â

Of course, also Powers ladies are kindly invited to participate in discussion about Rick’s interpretation of Bill’s work or they will just beleive Rick »on word«.

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

From: Richard Marken [mailto:rsmarken@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, September 24, 2015 9:15 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Declaration of Independence

Â

[From Rick Marken (2015.09.24.1215)]

Â

Bruce Nevin 2015.09.23.11:33 PT]

Â

Fred Nickols: What, then, is the difference between X and my perception of X? Very little as far as I can see. And, for practical purposes, next to none.

Â

Fred, You might want to control X as I perceive it.

Â

BN: Yes, that means controlling your perception of my perception of X. We do that all the time. In the methodology of PCT, you do it by experimentally disturbing what you perceive to be my controlled variable. So your perception of my perception of X can be based on sensory input from the environment; it need not be entirely imagined. (Though of course imagination has a much larger role when you don’t Test for the CV.)

Â

RM: The problem here is the idea that there is an X out there that can be perceived in different ways.Â

What would it mean to perceive X in different ways? It means that your perception, p, is a function of X, p = f(X), and the different ways of perceiving X represent different functions of X. But if X is just a scalar physical variable (as it appears to be when it is symbolized as X) then whatever different forms f() might take in different people, the difference between perceptions of X will only be in terns of the perceived magnitude of X. So a 60 dB tone might sound louder (or softer) to me than it does to you. But clearly there are other ways that perceptions of the same reality can differ. So something is missing here.

Â

RM: What’s missing is this. In PCT, what you call “X”, the reality that is “out there”, is actually set of physical variables, v.i, that is best represented as X = [v.1, v.2…v.n] as it is in Fig. 1, p. 66 of LCS I. Your perception of X is then represented as p = f(v.1, v.2…v.n). Different ways of perceiving X are again represented by different forms of the perceptual function, f(). But now, when p is a function of more than one physical variable, the different ways of perceiving X can differ in other ways besides magnitude. For example, if p = f(v.1, v.2), the perception of X could be p = v.1+v.2 or p = v.1*v.2.Â

Â

RM: In the Test for the Controlled Variable, we determine the perception that another person is controlling by computing various possible perceptions of the same situation (either using our own perceptual systems, as in the coin game, or actually computing them using a computer, as in the “What is Size” and “Mind Reading” demos) and see whether those perceptions are protected from disturbances. The perceptions that the researcher “computes” are called q.i – a perceptual aspect of X as perceived by the experimenter. So, in the “What is size” demo, if S is controlling p = w * h and E is observing the behavior of q.i = w * h, then E will be able to see that S is controlling a perception of X that is equivalent to w * h rather than w+h.Â

Â

RM: An example of doing this where q.i is computed using E’s own perceptual functions (and where function f() is a a lot more complex than w * h or w+h) is given in a description of the coin game in B:CP. Here, if S is perceiving and controlling a “zig zag pattern of coins” and E is perceiving the zig zag pattern of coins and sees that this perception is protected from disturbances (such as E moving the coins out of a zig zag pattern) then E knows that he/she is perceiving what S is perceiving and controlling.

Â

RM: Hope this clears things up. I think the main thing to understand is that p and q.i are the same variable. p is not a function of q.i; both p and q.i are the same function of physical variables, where p is what is seen from the perspective of the control system and q.i is the same thing seen from the perspective of an observer of the control system.Â

Â

BestÂ

Â

Rick

Â

Â

Â

This is the basis of intersubjective agreement. Intersubjective agreement is the definition of objectivity in science. In other words, this provides a definition of X as distinct from one’s perception of X. A provisional definition, of course. But we already knew that about science.

Â

Collective control is related to this.

Â

/B

Â

On Mon, Sep 21, 2015 at 4:29 AM, Fred Nickols fred@nickols.us wrote:

[From Fred Nickols (2015.09.21.0722)]

Â

We act to control what we perceive.

Â

What we control are our perceptions. When it comes to purposeful, intentional acts, what we want to control is the object of our perceptions, some variable “out there.â€? Let’s call it X.Â

Â

For some practical purposes we can treat X and perceptions of X as though they are one and the same. For other, equally practical purposes, we dare not treat those two impostors the same.

Â

I want X to be in a certain state. I act. My perceptions inform me if I succeeded. As a control system, all I can do is control my perceptual input, my perceptions. As a purposeful human being, my perceptions serve to inform me whether or not I succeeded, that I did or didn’t control X.

Â

What seems to be missing from PCT is me. Those are my goals. Those are my actions. Those are my perceptions. That is my world.

Â

What, then, is the difference between X and my perception of X? Very little as far as I can see. And, for practical purposes, next to none.

Â

I hereby declare my independence of and lack of interest in discussions regarding the control of X or the control of perceptions of X.

Â

Regards,

Â

Fred Nickols, CPT

DISTANCE ** CONSULTING**

“Assistance at a Distance�

The Knowledge Workers’ Tool Room

Be sure you measure what you want.

Be sure you want what you measure.

Â

Â

Â

Â

Richard S. MarkenÂ

www.mindreadings.com
Author of  Doing Research on Purpose

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[From Rick Marken (2015.09.27.1330)]

···

[Martin Taylor 2015.09.24]

RM: Hope this clears things up. I think the main thing to understand is that p and q.i are the same variable. p is not a function of q.i; both p and q.i are the same function of physical variables, where p is what is seen from the perspective of the control system and q.i is the same thing seen from the perspective of an observer of the control system.

MT: That’s more or less right, but it sometimes is important than one recognized that p and qi are functions of time, and that p is an integrative function of qi, not exactly the same thing.

RM: Good point, though p is is not a function, integrative or otherwise, of q.i. Both p and q.i are (hopefully, when you’ve guessed right) the same function of the same set of physical variables: p = f(v.1,v.2,…v.n) and q.i = f(v.1,v.2,…v.n). So in this sense p and q.i are the same. But, as you point out, p is what is actually controlled and so there are going to be dynamic factors involved in the control of p by a control system that are not involved in measuring q.i by the observer of the control system. For example, in the “What is size” demo (http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Size.html), a subject who is controlling, say, the area of the rectangle is presumably controlling p = w * h while the observer of this control, the computer, is measuring q.i = w * h.

RM: What I think Martin is correctly pointing out is that temporal variations in what the observer measures,q.i, do not necessarily correspond to temporal variations in what the control system controls, p. This could result from dynamic properties of the control loop, such as integration and differentiation. But it could also result from variations in the control system’s secular variation of the reference for p. I actually discussed this problem in a paper I did for the PCT conference in Wales back in 1994. A WORD version is here if anyone is interested. (https://www.dropbox.com/s/8nppop9ariz55ft/ThermoPeople.doc?dl=0)

RM: Anyway, the likely difference in the dynamics of the (unobservable) p and the observed q.i creates a methodological problem if we are testing to determine what variable the control system is controlling. The problem is that it is difficult to tell whether variation in q.i means 1) that q.i is not a good representation of p (q.i is a different function of v.1,v2…vn than the one we guess, which in this case was h *w) and, therefore, is not actually the correct guess at the controlled variable (p) or 2) that q.i is indeed a good representation of p but the observed variance in q.i is caused by dynamics of the loop and/or variations in the reference for p.

RM: In the “What is size” demo this problem is solved, to some extent, by simply seeing which of two different hypotheses about the controlled variable, area or perimeter, is the better guess. We can tell by seeing whether q.i =wh or q.i = 2(w+h) is more stable in the face of disturbance. That’s what the error and perimeter stability measures measure. So in this case we are doing the TCV to see which hypothesis about the function that produces the controlled perception, f(), is best, not which one is right. We do it by seeing which function of w and h (which value of q.i) is most stable in the face of disturbance.

RM: To determine which hypothesis about the controlled variable is right we have to use modeling rather than just observation. This involves putting our hypothesis about the controlled variable – our observed variable q.i – into a control model as p. Then we see whether we can adjust the parameters of this model (variations in things like gain, integration factor, transport lag and reference variations) to see if we can get the model to fit the data perfectly (RMS deviation = 0). If we get a perfect fit of model to data we can consider our guess at the controlled variable, q.i, as being exactly the same as the actual variable controlled by the control system, p.

RM: One last note, particularly to Fred Nichols, who I believe asked about whether the distinction between q.i (X) and p matter to him. My answer is “no”, it could only possibly matter to people doing research on PCT (meaning it could only possibly matter to 3 or 4 people in the world;-) Applied people can go about their business just like normal human beings and treat their perceptions as what they seem to be: reality. The world you see (and hear) out there; the world of computers and people and houses and cars and so on; that’s perception!

Best

Rick

Most often, the distinction doesn’t matter, but sometimes it does. By “integrative function” I mean that the value of p at time t0 depends on the values of qi over some time period from t0-epsilon to t0-delta. You can see this simply by noticing that when you look at a movie, you don’t see a whole series of still pictures, or by “seeing” the continuous movement and deformation of a form that has one shape in one location and is replaced after a few milliseconds gap by a different form in a new place.

But as I say, usually this doesn’t matter, since most control experiments run quite slowly compared to the time it takes to build the perception. The time lag from detecting the error to its effect on qi is usually much longer, though this may not be true at higher perceptual levels, as when it slowly dawns on you that someone may have been cheating you, but you can act quickly to correct the error in that perception.

So for practical purposes, it is often OK to say that p and qi are essentially the same variable, despite one being in the environment and the other in the brain, but if you are being careful, you should always be sure to note that it is not actually true. Physical causality works, and causes precede effects, even in a control loop.

Martin


Richard S. Marken

www.mindreadings.com
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[Martin Taylor 2015.09.29.17.30]

Now there are 302!

Not true, at least as I intended the words. In what follows I will
use “x” instead of the cumbersome “qi” to represent the physical
input vector. Here’s a trivial example, which I don’t intend to
represent any real-life system (though it does look rather like the
response of many biological sensors). P(.) is the perceptual input
function that determines how the physical inputs combine to create
the perception. Each of the physical inputs might be represented by
its value “eps” seconds ago, by its derivative at that time, and by
a history of its values up to that time, but by no values later than
“eps” seconds ago.
Let p(t+eps) = P(k1x(t) + k2(dx(t)/dt) +
k3integral_from_t-infinity_to_t((exp(-k4tau))*x(tau)d_tau)).
That’s an integrative function as I meant the words. To determine
p(t) you need values of x(tau) other than at tau=t. (The “+eps” in
the argument to p acknowledges that there must be a transport lag
between the arrival of, say, a photon, and its effect on the
perceptual value).
Now if you define qi as that function of x(t), then of course p =
qi, tautologically. But qi is usually treated as the physical input
at a moment, not the value of the perception at that moment.
Incidentally, that function can look rather like what you perceive
when you have been in the dark for a while and then turn on a light.
Initially, the light is blindingly bright, but after a while it
settles down to a steady state.
Transition and sequence are almost by definition integrative in this
sense, since neither exists at a moment in time, but depend entirely
on a historical evolution. Sequence, for example, has an intuitive
implementation as a function of the current state of all the stages
of a shift register. Noting that X is a vector.
Not different moments, but different functions, at least in what
Rick was describing. His rectangle example has X(t) = {w(t), h(t)},
and his question, addressed by the TCV is whether the perception the
subject controls is more like w(t)+h(t) or w(t)h(t).
Why bring Markov processes into this? The trajectories in the state
space can be continuous, can they not? Of course, if you restrict
the variables to belonging or not belonging to specific categories,
then you can use Markov chains, as indeed we used to do when I was
involved in automatic speech recognition. Maybe ASR systems still
do. I wouldn’t know, as I have not been involved for a couple of
decades. However, even if you are dealing with categorical
variables, you still have to be concerned with the fact that
category membership is fuzzy, at least when you are not dealing with
mathematically described or linguistically defined categories. What
I mean by that is that analytically, a penguin and an ostrich are
categorically birds, but the strongest perceptual feature of
“birdiness” is flight, and neither of those fly. They are less
“birdy” than a sparrow or an eagle.
Maybe I missed something in the 302 unread messages, but you seem to
be bringing it in to argue against Rick Marken’s use of the TCV to
test whether, given exactly and only the two choices “w+h” and
"w
h", which is closer to the perceptual function that defines the
perception the subject is controlling. Rick isn’t asking what the
rectangle is able to do when instructed, which is what you describe.
I certainly understand that you believe, with Wolfram, that the
Universe is constructed by program, but I doubt that he would go so
far as to assert that the programming technique of the architect of
the Universe is what we puny humans currently use to work with
sequential von Neumann machines. What I don’t understand is why you
believe this, and even if it happened to be true, why it would be
relevant to what Rick said.
My objection to Rick’s equating p with qi is that while it is
presumably true of a steady-state (equilibrium) solution of the
control equations, it is not true of a perception in which context
(time and/or space) affects the value of the perception if qi is
taken to be some well-defined state of the environment at some
moment in time. Of course, one could define qi to include all that
context, but that is not how qi is usually understood.
Martin

···

On 2015/09/24 5:59 PM, PHILIP JERAIR
YERANOSIAN wrote:

MT: I
have 279 unread messages on CSGnet
PY: Wow…I’m
responsible for half of them. No wonder I never saw your
responses.

        MT: it sometimes

is important than one recognized that p and qi are functions
of time, and that p is an integrative function of qi…by
“integrative function” I mean that the value of p at time t0
depends on the values of qi over some time period from
t0-epsilon to t0-delta… But as I say, usually
this doesn’t matter, since most control experiments run
quite slowly compared to the time it takes to build the
perception.

        PY: Look at the

demo of RM concerning hierarchical control:

        PY: Do you think

that the perceptions above configuration (transition and
sequence) are properly implemented as “integrative
functions”? An integrative function would map all values
between t0 epsilon to t0 delta as one constant-valued
interval.

        To show the raw

data of the transition and sequence at each instant of time
is not the same, I am thinking.

        RM: The problem here

is the idea that there is an X out there that can be
perceived in different ways.

        What would it mean

to perceive X in different ways? It means that your
perception, p, is a function of X, p = f(X), and the
different ways of perceiving X represent different functions
of X.

      PY:  That's not a very

good way to put it. A better way is this: your perception, p,
is a particular “moment” of state-space, X, and the different
ways of perceiving X represent different moments of X(t).

      It seems you're in

need of a primer on Markov processes…don’t worry, we’ll get
there; until then…

      PY: Let's look again

at a definition of an object class or abstract data type:

          RM:  But now,

when p is a function of more than one physical variable,
the different ways of perceiving X can differ in other
ways besides magnitude. For example, if p =
f(v.1, v.2), the perception of X could be p = v.1+v.2 or p
= v.1*v.2.

        PY:  ERROR! This

is wrong! The different ways of perceiving X has nothing to
do with combining various data variables into different
expressions. It only has to do with the types of values returned by
its accessor functions. In this case, we can access the
height or width of the square. We can combine these however
we like, but what matters is the type of variable
we assign the value to. The function just above, int: area = X.get_height()

  • X.get_width(), stores the value as
    an integer
    (although the type can be anything, including an abstract data type).
        PY: Do we

understand each other?.

      On Thu, Sep 24, 2015 at 1:29 PM, Martin

Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
wrote:

        [Martin

Taylor 2015.09.24]

        I have 279 unread messages on CSGnet, so forgive me if I am

jumping to repeat something that has been said already.

        On 2015/09/24 3:15 PM, Richard Marken wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2015.09.24.1215)]

            RM: Hope this clears things up. I think the main thing

to understand is that p and q.i are the same variable. p
is not a function of q.i; both p and q.i are the same
function of physical variables, where p is what is seen
from the perspective of the control system and q.i is
the same thing seen from the perspective of an observer
of the control system.

        That's more or less right, but it sometimes is important

than one recognized that p and qi are functions of time, and
that p is an integrative function of qi, not exactly the
same thing. Most often, the distinction doesn’t matter, but
sometimes it does. By “integrative function” I mean that the
value of p at time t0 depends on the values of qi over some
time period from t0-epsilon to t0-delta. You can see this
simply by noticing that when you look at a movie, you don’t
see a whole series of still pictures, or by “seeing” the
continuous movement and deformation of a form that has one
shape in one location and is replaced after a few
milliseconds gap by a different form in a new place.

        But as I say, usually this doesn't matter, since most

control experiments run quite slowly compared to the time it
takes to build the perception. The time lag from detecting
the error to its effect on qi is usually much longer, though
this may not be true at higher perceptual levels, as when it
slowly dawns on you that someone may have been cheating you,
but you can act quickly to correct the error in that
perception.

        So for practical purposes, it is often OK to say that p and

qi are essentially the same variable, despite one being in
the environment and the other in the brain, but if you are
being careful, you should always be sure to note that it is
not actually true. Physical causality works, and causes
precede effects, even in a control loop.

            Martin

http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Hierarchy.html

MT: I certainly understand that you believe, with Wolfram, that the Universe is constructed by program, but I doubt that he would go so far as to assert that the programming technique of the architect of the Universe is what we puny humans currently use to work with sequential von Neumann machines. What I don’t understand is why you believe this, and even if it happened to be true, why it would be relevant to what Rick said.

PY: I didn’t say the universe is constructed by program…the universe is constructed from hydrogen, obviously. What I did say is that the theory of “types” is relevant to understanding what a perception is in the context of a computer program. And I would add that the detailed exposition of what goes on behind the scenes in the computer is very important. For instance, virtual memory is very relevant to consciousness. If that’s not understandable to you or to Rick or to anyone else here, I will have to switch venues. The "puny"ness of humanity is too much for me to bear.

[Bruce Nevin 2015.09.29.21:20 PT]
PY:
I'm sorry to report that there is no significant difference between PCT programs and ordinary control theory programs. The programs that you guys write, and the robots that you guys build, they're so much simpler than what everybody else is doing with ordinary control theory. [...] the form of the diagram itself needs to evolve, not the way it's discussed.
BN:
The heart of PCT methodology is the building of generative models (or simulations) that very closely replicate the behavior of individual organisms resisting unpredictable disturbances to identified controlled variables. (There are more persnickety precise statements, but that should do.)
You are advocating more sophisticated mathematical tools than are typical in PCT research. Perhaps your motivation is that the more sophisticated mathematical tools that you advocate make it possible to model kinds of behavior that we cannot model with our simple tools. That would be very exciting. Can you identify for us the kinds of behavior that these more sophisticated tools enable us to model, and help us to understand why our simple tools are inadequate for that purpose? Are there aspects of the behavior of living things that can only be modeled with the more complex kinds of control theory that "everybody else is doing"?
Or maybe your motivation is that these more sophisticated mathematical tools will enable us to undertake a more sophisticated methodology of analyzing and modeling the phenomenon of control. That would be exciting too. Can you lead us to a more sophisticated methodology, or to an addition to our methodology that is more sophisticated than what we are now familiar with? And then help us to understand why our simple methodology is inadequate for modeling behavior? Are there aspects of the behavior of living things that can only be analyzed and modeled with a more sophisticated methodology?
An analogy might be drawn to the relationship between the mathematics of Newtonian physics and the more complex and sophisticated mathematics of relativistic physics and quantum physics. The results of the former are contained within those of the latter, in a manner of speaking. For practically all human purposes, Newtonian physics suffices, but not for corner cases and for deeper research questions. What are the deeper research questions that require your more sophisticated mathematical tools? What are the aspects of behavior which are 'corner cases' from the point of view of conventional PCT, but which yield to your more sophisticated methodology and tools in a comprehensive view that includes all the 'normal' ('Newtonian') cases as well?
But you also did say that "there's no significant difference between PCT programs and ordinary control theory programs", which leaves me puzzled what the motivation is for advocating greater complexity.
Now, if your motivation derives from pleasure in controlling the perceptions that constitute mathematics, that's a very good thing. But it's not the same thing. And it certainly does not justify scorn in this venue.
/BN