Demonstration of control of behavior

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.08.1610)]

I finally completed a demonstration of control of behavior that was motivated by a conversation we had on the net some time ago. It’s at

http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/BehavioralControl.html

It took a while to do it because it was a bit difficult to figure out how to make a simple demonstration of control of behavior in terms of a sheepdog controlling a sheep. The route I took may not accurately represent the variable controlled by the sheep but the demonstration does show that it’s possible to control the behavior of another control system sans conflict.

I’d appreciate getting any comments/suggestions/ corrections that you might have regarding this demo.

Thanks.

Best

Rick

···

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.15.15.08]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.08.1610)]

I finally completed a demonstration of control of behavior that was motivated by a conversation we had on the net some time ago. It's at

Behavioral Control

It took a while to do it because it was a bit difficult to figure out how to make a simple demonstration of control of behavior in terms of a sheepdog controlling a sheep. The route I took may not accurately represent the variable controlled by the sheep but the demonstration does show that it's possible to control the behavior of another control system sans conflict.

I'd appreciate getting any comments/suggestions/ corrections that you might have regarding this demo.

Rick,

How does this differ from the knotted rubber band demo, other than being computerized? In the live rubber-band demo, the subject is aware of controlling, but that isn't obvious to the onlookers who just see the subject being controlled. Your sheep, likewise, doesn't look as though it is controlling. You have to explain in the text that it is, which doesn't make this into a very convincing demo of controlling a controller by disturbing its controlled perception.

Martin

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.15.1355)]

···

MT: I’d appreciate getting any comments/suggestions/ corrections that you might have regarding this demo.

Martin Taylor (2014.11.15.15.08)–

Rick,

MT: How does this differ from the knotted rubber band demo, other than being computerized?

RM: It is pretty much a computer analog of the rubber band demo, with the subject in the demo (the dog) as E and the sheep as S.

MT: In the live rubber-band demo, the subject is aware of controlling, but that isn’t obvious to the onlookers who just see the subject being controlled. Your sheep, likewise, doesn’t look as though it is controlling. You have to explain in the text that it is, which doesn’t make this into a very convincing demo of controlling a controller by disturbing its controlled perception.

RM: I think I see what you mean; It would be nice if it were somehow made more obvious to an observer (and to the person in the role of sheepdog) that the sheep is indeed controlling a perception. I do explain this in the text. Here’s the relevant section:

For the stray sheep, the controlled variable is the actual visual distance (from the sheep’s perspective) between the sheepdog and the grass shoot (“grass/dog actual” – large red squares) and the reference position for this variable is the desired distance between grass and dog (“grass/dog reference” – small red squares). The sheep’s reference for the distance between the grass shoot and the dog is assumed to be varied secularly by the sheep – sometime the sheep wants the dog right behind the grass shoot and sometimes it will tolerate the dog being slightly to one side of the other of the shoot.

But I agree that it would be nice if the controlling being done by the sheep were more obvious while the dog was controlling the sheep. I think I can do this by putting lines from the sheep’s eye to the distance between dog and grass shoot. I was going to do it before “releasing” the demo but it turns out to be non-trivial (for me, anyway) to draw lines between to points on the screen. But I bet I can get Adam to help! Then the subject could see how the movements of the dog affect this distance (between dog and grass shoot – the sheep’s controlled variable) and how the sheep moves to correct it. Do you think that would help?

Thanks for taking a look at it.

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.16.10.54]

Here's a different kind of suggestion. Let's start by asking what

the sheep would do if the dog were not there, and then set up a
situation in which the dog and sheep sometimes can’t see each other.
That way, the sheep’s behaviour would be observably changed when it
can see the dog as compared to when it can’t.
One possible idea: have the dog control for perceiving the sheep to
be near the herd. Set up the field so that it has varying “lushness”
of the grass and the sheep can perceive the direction of the
lushness gradient in its neighbourhood and controls for a perception
of going toward lusher grass (like e-coli in a nutrient gradient).
The sheep also controls for being far from the dog, so there could
be conflict if getting away from the dog means going to a less lush
area. You can ensure that the dog always wins that conflict, so the
sheep passes the most barren patch and runs to the next lush area
away from the dog. Meanwhile the herd moves randomly, so the dog’s
reference for where the sheep should be keeps changing.
That might be enough by itself, but I think it would be improved if
you had some kind of moving visual obstruction between sheep and dog
(such as a succession of lowly moving wagons), so that when they
can’t see each other the dog (i.e. the human dog-controller) moves
to regain sight of the sheep while the sheep just grazes its slow
way up the lushness slope in its immediate neighbourhood. I haven’t thought this through, but giving the sheep something to do
besides keeping an eye on the dog, and having times or places where
the sheep can’t see the dog might make the demo more convincing to
the onlooker.
Martin

···

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.15.1355)]

              MT:

I’d appreciate getting any comments/suggestions/
corrections that you might have regarding this demo.

          Martin

Taylor (2014.11.15.15.08)–

          Rick,



          MT: How does this differ from the knotted rubber band

demo, other than being computerized?

          RM: It is pretty much a computer analog of the rubber

band demo, with the subject in the demo (the dog) as E and
the sheep as S.

          MT:

In the live rubber-band demo, the subject is aware of
controlling, but that isn’t obvious to the onlookers who
just see the subject being controlled. Your sheep,
likewise, doesn’t look as though it is controlling. You
have to explain in the text that it is, which doesn’t make
this into a very convincing demo of controlling a
controller by disturbing its controlled perception.

          RM: I think I see what you mean; It would be nice if it

were somehow made more obvious to an observer (and to the
person in the role of sheepdog) that the sheep is indeed
controlling a perception. I do explain this in the text.
Here’s the relevant section:

            For the stray sheep, the

controlled variable is the actual visual distance (from
the sheep’s perspective) between the sheepdog and the
grass shoot (“grass/dog actual” – large red squares)
and the reference position for this variable is the
desired distance between grass and dog (“grass/dog
reference” – small red squares). The sheep’s reference
for the distance between the grass shoot and the dog is
assumed to be varied secularly by the sheep – sometime
the sheep wants the dog right behind the grass shoot and
sometimes it will tolerate the dog being slightly to one
side of the other of the shoot.

              But I agree that it would be

nice if the controlling being done by the sheep were
more obvious while the dog was controlling the sheep.
I think I can do this by putting lines from the
sheep’s eye to the distance between dog and grass
shoot.

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.16.1225)]

···

Martin Taylor (2014.11.16.10.54)

MT: Here's a different kind of suggestion. Let's start by asking what

the sheep would do if the dog were not there, and then set up a
situation in which the dog and sheep sometimes can’t see each other.
That way, the sheep’s behaviour would be observably changed when it
can see the dog as compared to when it can’t.

RM: Actually, you can see what the sheep would do if the dog were not there by just not moving the dog. Then the sheep just moves around a bit relative to the grass.

MT: One possible idea: have the dog control for perceiving the sheep to

be near the herd. Set up the field so that it has varying “lushness”
of the grass and the sheep can perceive the direction of the
lushness gradient in its neighbourhood and controls for a perception
of going toward lusher grass (like e-coli in a nutrient gradient).
The sheep also controls for being far from the dog, so there could
be conflict if getting away from the dog means going to a less lush
area. You can ensure that the dog always wins that conflict, so the
sheep passes the most barren patch and runs to the next lush area
away from the dog. Meanwhile the herd moves randomly, so the dog’s
reference for where the sheep should be keeps changing.

RM: Actually my first efforts at building the demo were based on creating a conflict in the sheep, between wanting to graze and avoid the dog. That’s probably closed to what’s going on in the actual situation. But it was hard to program it and it really didn’t illustrate the point I wanted to make – that a control system can control the outputs of another control system by disturbing a controlled variable–in a nice simple way (in the way the rubber band demo does). So I just decided to create a plausible interaction between sheep and dog that was analogous to the rubber band demo.

MT: That might be enough by itself, but I think it would be improved if

you had some kind of moving visual obstruction between sheep and dog
(such as a succession of lowly moving wagons), so that when they
can’t see each other the dog (i.e. the human dog-controller) moves
to regain sight of the sheep while the sheep just grazes its slow
way up the lushness slope in its immediate neighbourhood.

RM: I think I’ll work on trying to show the sheep’s controlled variable first.

MT: I haven't thought this through, but giving the sheep something to do

besides keeping an eye on the dog, and having times or places where
the sheep can’t see the dog might make the demo more convincing to
the onlooker.

RM: You never know.

Thanks, again for taking the time to try the demo and for the suggestions, Martin!

Best

Rick

Martin

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[Kent]

[From Kent McClelland (2014.11.17.1140)

Erling Jorgensen (2014.11.17 1040EST)

In my view, Erling's post hits the nail on the head. The controversy between Boris and Rick seems to be more a matter of semantics than real disagreements about theory, with the ambiguous term "behavior" causing the problem. If the language used were more precise, many of the disagreements between you two (except perhaps the personal animus) might disappear.

Person A can _manipulate_ person B by using the side-effects of B's focus on controlling some perception to control some perception A wants to have about B's physical actions. (The rubber-band experiment can show how this works, when the experimenter makes hand motions that the subject must mirror in order to keep the knot of the rubber band on the target.)

Person A can _coerce_ person B by threatening to disturb some perception B strongly wants to control unless person B stops controlling some other perception. (This is the tactic used by the dog with the sheep: "Stop munching on that nice grass and get with the rest of the flock, or I'll tear your throat out.")

Person A can _confine_ person B by removing the environmental feedback paths necessary for controlling certain perceptions that involve physical actions by B that A does not want to perceive (e.g, by putting B in prison).

Person A can _trick_ person B by interfering with the feedback paths B is using for the control of perceptions, so that B perceives something else than would happen without A's interference.

Person A can _influence_ person B by suggesting perceptions to control and references to use in controlling those perceptions, which B then adopts. (Most communication between people aims at this kind of mutual influence.)

In each of these cases, person A may have the perception of having controlled B's behavior, but none of these tactics works unless B remains in control of B's own perceptions. Coercion, for instance, fails if B ignores, discounts, or fails to perceive A's threat (as in the stupid game of "chicken").

My 1994 paper "Perceptual Control and Social Power" discusses manipulation, coercion, and influence in some detail from a PCT perspective. Martin Taylor's chapter for LCS IV (which I've been lucky enough to see in draft form) has a fascinating discussion of "protocols" by which people cooperatively use each other's physical actions to control their own separate perceptions.

Best regards to all,

Kent

···

On Nov 17, 2014, at 11:06 AM, Erling Jorgensen wrote:

[From Erling Jorgensen (2014.11.17 1040EST)]

Rick Marken (2014.11.16.2230)

RM: I think it would be great if people who saw my mistake in thinking would

point it out to me.

EJ: The mistake I see is one of language. "Behavior" is such an ill-defined
word. Its referent seems to slide all over the place, according to where the
speaker happens to be looking at the moment.

EJ: In general, behavior in PCT refers to the output of a control system.
But the only place this actually translates into environmental action is the
outermost layer of control, where forces in the environment are generated.
All other outputs of other layers of control are specifications for the goal
that the next-lower level is to track toward.

EJ: I assume, when you claim "the dog controls the behavior of the sheep,"
that you are not claiming the dog controls the forces produced by each leg of
the sheep. What you are trying to get at is that the dog controls a certain
perceived outcome of the sheep's leg forces. When we state it with this level
of stiff precision, it becomes clear that we have to specify who is doing the
perceiving, and toward what outcome.

EJ: You rightly notice that if the sheep did not care about some perceptual
outcomes of its own, such as distance from dog, etc., it would not be
generating behavior (i.e., leg forces) to counteract the dog's disturbances to
those preferred outcomes. Because it does care about such things, perceptual
side effects that it does not care about -- e.g., the size of a clump of white
that the dog perceives as a flock -- become avenues for the dog achieving its
own perceptual results.

EJ: I realize this becomes a very stiff way of talking. But I think it is
preferable to the slippery scientific slope of claiming "behavior" is
controlled. And I think most of your own language demonstrates the same
inclination. It is there in the online description of your simulation, but
I'll take it from an earlier reply within this thread --

Rick Marken (2014.11.15.1340):
...If the sheep were not controlling for keeping the image of the dog near

the grass shoot, the movement of the dog would have no effect on the movements
of the sheep; the dog would then not be able to control the sheep's position
(keeping it near the herd). ...

...the demonstration explains what I believe is the essential observation in

the video: how the sheepdog can control the location of a sheep by moving
around. ...

...As I said, the variations in the sheep's position is the

"variability" ...

...The dog is controlling the position of the sheep relative to the

herd. ...

...another control system (you, in the role of a sheepdog) use variations in

a stimulus (the dog's position) to control the sheep's position. ...

EJ: In all these instances, you state the matter correctly. The sheep's
position gets controlled by the dog. "Position" is not a behavior.
"Location" is not a behavior. Either one is the _result_ of a set of
behaviors. Even a word like "movement" is technically not a behavior. It is
a rate of change in a perceived figure relative to a perceived background.
PCT keeps asserting that only perceptions get controlled. (And I add my sense
that "behavior" is not a particularly helpful word.)

EJ: I'm not sure about this final portion, but perhaps we could say that the
sheep's actions are part of the Environmental Feedback Function for the dog
controlling for its own perceptual results, that of having all the sheep in
approximately the same positional clump. I don't know if that mixes things up
too much analytically, because clearly the dog alters its actions to
compensate for the Disturbance provided by the sheep's actions, when its
perceived visual rate of change is not in the right perceived direction.

EJ: So you are right that the presence of control systems on each end of the
interaction might change the way we analyze the situation. But I would
definitely use different language than "controlling behavior." That's the
very direction we want to get away from, in my view.

All the best,
Erling

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.17.1730)]

···

Kent McClelland (2014.11.17.1140)

Erling Jorgensen (2014.11.17 1040EST)

In my view, Erling’s post hits the nail on the head. The controversy between Boris and Rick seems to be more a matter of semantics than real disagreements about theory, with the ambiguous term “behavior” causing the problem. If the language used were more precise, many of the disagreements between you two (except perhaps the personal animus) might disappear.

RM: As you will see from my reply to Erling I don’t think this is true at all. This is not a language problem; it is a disagreement about facts. The distance of the sheep from the herd is controlled by the sheepdog just as surely as temperature is controlled by a thermostat. Whether you want to call these variables “behavior” or “output” or “controlled results of action” or “just a bunch of stuff that happens” doesn’t matter, though I think it’s odd not to call them behavior. They are variables that are controlled.

KM: Person A can manipulate person B by using the side-effects of B’s focus on controlling some perception to control some perception A wants to have about B’s physical actions. (The rubber-band experiment can show how this works, when the experimenter makes hand motions that the subject must mirror in order to keep the knot of the rubber band on the target.)

RM: Yes, a person can “manipulate” what that convoluted phrase ends up saying: physical actions.“Manipulation” is just another word for control, no?

KM: Person A can coerce person B

RM: Coercion is also a form of control, isn’t it? Coercing a person to do something is controlling their behavior: making a person perform a particular behavior that you want to see, like paying their taxes,and not some other, like not paying them.

Person A can confine person B by removing the environmental feedback paths necessary for controlling certain perceptions that involve physical actions by B that A does not want to perceive (e.g, by putting B in prison).

RM: Confining a person to locked cell is controlling their behavior using coercion; you are getting a person to perform a particular desired behavior – being in the cell – and not any other, like being outside in the park.

Person A can trick person B by interfering with the feedback paths B is using for the control of perceptions, so that B perceives something else than would happen without A’s interference.

RM: Yes, this is called control by deception. This is how politicians (via Fox News) get people to vote against their best interests. You say things like “Obama is doing a terrible job” because you know that people are controlling for having a president who is doing a good job. So you get people to vote for people who don’t support Obama but, when elected, will take away their health insurance, social security and keep them working for slave wages at minimum wage jobs. Kids learn how to control behavior using deception at a very young age. When she was 3 or so my darling daughter was able to get a swing from her 6 year old brother by saying “Mommy is calling you”.

KM: Person A can influence person B by suggesting perceptions to control and references to use in controlling those perceptions, which B then adopts. (Most communication between people aims at this kind of mutual influence.)

RM: This is a version of control by deception.

KM: In each of these cases, person A may have the perception of having controlled B’s behavior, but none of these tactics works unless B remains in control of B’s own perceptions.

RM: That’s absolutely true. And that’s what I show in my demo (I will show it better with a version that has lines in it showing the state of the variable controlled by the sheep). The dog can control the location of the sheep relative to the herd because the sheep remains in control of its perception of the position of the dog relative to the grass shoot. But this just explains how the dog is able to control the behavior of the sheep. It certainly doesn’t show that the behavior of the sheep (measured as the distance of the sheep from the herd) is not controlled.

KM:Coercion, for instance, fails if B ignores, discounts, or fails to perceive A’s threat (as in the stupid game of “chicken”).

RM: Right, and the dog could not control the behavior of the sheep if the sheep were not controlling for its perception of the dog relative to the grass shoot. But in the demo the sheep is controlling for its perception of the position of the grass shoot, so the dog can control the behavior of the sheep.

KM: My 1994 paper “Perceptual Control and Social Power” discusses manipulation, coercion, and influence in some detail from a PCT perspective. Martin Taylor’s chapter for LCS IV (which I’ve been lucky enough to see in draft form) has a fascinating discussion of “protocols” by which people cooperatively use each other’s physical actions to control their own separate perceptions.

RM: Great. Manipulation, coercion and influence are (as I mention above) certainly ways of controlling behavior. And cooperation does often involve people people mutually agreeing to “use” (control) each other’s behavior to control perceptions. So let’s keep studying control of behavior instead of denying that it occurs.

Best

Rick

Best regards to all,

Kent

On Nov 17, 2014, at 11:06 AM, Erling Jorgensen wrote:

[From Erling Jorgensen (2014.11.17 1040EST)]

Rick Marken (2014.11.16.2230)

RM: I think it would be great if people who saw my mistake in thinking would

point it out to me.

EJ: The mistake I see is one of language. “Behavior” is such an ill-defined

word. Its referent seems to slide all over the place, according to where the

speaker happens to be looking at the moment.

EJ: In general, behavior in PCT refers to the output of a control system.

But the only place this actually translates into environmental action is the

outermost layer of control, where forces in the environment are generated.

All other outputs of other layers of control are specifications for the goal

that the next-lower level is to track toward.

EJ: I assume, when you claim “the dog controls the behavior of the sheep,”

that you are not claiming the dog controls the forces produced by each leg of

the sheep. What you are trying to get at is that the dog controls a certain

perceived outcome of the sheep’s leg forces. When we state it with this level

of stiff precision, it becomes clear that we have to specify who is doing the

perceiving, and toward what outcome.

EJ: You rightly notice that if the sheep did not care about some perceptual

outcomes of its own, such as distance from dog, etc., it would not be

generating behavior (i.e., leg forces) to counteract the dog’s disturbances to

those preferred outcomes. Because it does care about such things, perceptual

side effects that it does not care about – e.g., the size of a clump of white

that the dog perceives as a flock – become avenues for the dog achieving its

own perceptual results.

EJ: I realize this becomes a very stiff way of talking. But I think it is

preferable to the slippery scientific slope of claiming “behavior” is

controlled. And I think most of your own language demonstrates the same

inclination. It is there in the online description of your simulation, but

I’ll take it from an earlier reply within this thread –

Rick Marken (2014.11.15.1340):

…If the sheep were not controlling for keeping the image of the dog near

the grass shoot, the movement of the dog would have no effect on the movements

of the sheep; the dog would then not be able to control the sheep’s position

(keeping it near the herd). …

…the demonstration explains what I believe is the essential observation in

the video: how the sheepdog can control the location of a sheep by moving

around. …

…As I said, the variations in the sheep’s position is the

“variability” …

…The dog is controlling the position of the sheep relative to the

herd. …

…another control system (you, in the role of a sheepdog) use variations in

a stimulus (the dog’s position) to control the sheep’s position. …

EJ: In all these instances, you state the matter correctly. The sheep’s

position gets controlled by the dog. “Position” is not a behavior.

“Location” is not a behavior. Either one is the result of a set of

behaviors. Even a word like “movement” is technically not a behavior. It is

a rate of change in a perceived figure relative to a perceived background.

PCT keeps asserting that only perceptions get controlled. (And I add my sense

that “behavior” is not a particularly helpful word.)

EJ: I’m not sure about this final portion, but perhaps we could say that the

sheep’s actions are part of the Environmental Feedback Function for the dog

controlling for its own perceptual results, that of having all the sheep in

approximately the same positional clump. I don’t know if that mixes things up

too much analytically, because clearly the dog alters its actions to

compensate for the Disturbance provided by the sheep’s actions, when its

perceived visual rate of change is not in the right perceived direction.

EJ: So you are right that the presence of control systems on each end of the

interaction might change the way we analyze the situation. But I would

definitely use different language than “controlling behavior.” That’s the

very direction we want to get away from, in my view.

All the best,

Erling

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.17.1840)]

RM: One more thought regarding control of behavior. Perhaps part of the difficulty here comes from the fact hat PCT does show that the environment -- the physical, non-living environment -- does not control behavior. This is where PCT contradicts those, like Skinner, who believe that the environment does control behavior. Based on his experiments, for example. Skinner concluded that the behavior of organisms is controlled by "contingencies of reinforcement". That is, behavior is controlled by the rewards and punishments (out there in the environment) that follow particular behaviors.
RM: PCT shows that this is not the case at all; the environment -- in the form of stimuli, rewards and punishments -- doesn't control behavior. But Skinner was able to control behavior with rewards and punishments -- mainly rewards -- so what's going on here? Why would PCT deny that rewards and punishments control behavior? The answer is that PCT let's us see the wizard that, in this case, isn't even behind the curtain; the wizard who is doing the actual controlling is in full view but, somehow, never noticed . It's Skinner who is controlling the behavior using rewards and punishments, not the rewards and punishments themselves.
Rewards and punishments are not control systems; they have no goals for what an organism should do. But Skinner did. Skinner wanted to see a rat press a lever to get food, for example, and he found that he could get the rat to do that using a process called "shaping", which involves rewarding the animal for making successive approximations to the desired behavior (bar pressing). Skinner was clearly controlling the behavior of the rat, and he did it by varying his actions (giving or withholding rewards) with the aim of getting his perception of the rat's behavior to be what he wanted it to be.
He could also build machines that could stand in for his controlling; so once the rat had been "shaped" into pressing the bar the machine could take over and give a reward only after a press (or several presses) were made. Of course, the machine is not really controlling the rat either since it would deliver a reward even if the bar were pressed by someone other than the rat. And if the pellet delivery system were jammed the rat would eventually stop pressing the bar and the machine would do nothing to get it back to the bar. The machine can't perceive the rat's behavior and act appropriately if it's not doing what is "wanted", becuase the machine also has no wants (references).
The point is that PCT shows that the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system. It's not "the environment" consisting of stimuli ,rewards, or punishments that controls behavior; it is the other control systems in that environment -- generally other people -- that use stimuli, rewards or punishments to control behavior. And if the controlling is not consensual or if it requires the controllee to do things that conflict with other goals (including the goal of not being controlled) then the controllee might decide to resist the controlling; and then things get ugly.
Best
Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of <http://www.amazon.com/Doing-Research-Purpose-Experimental-Psychology/dp/0944337554/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1407342866&sr=8-1&keywords=doing+research+on+purpose>Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[FredNickols]

[From Fred Nickols (2014.11.18.0730 EST)]

First, let me say that I agree with Kent. Erling nailed it. Second, let me
say that I have found this thread to be very instructive, useful and
helpful.

My kudos to all for staying involved and working hard toward clarity.

Fred Nickols

From: "McClelland, Kent" (MCCLEL@Grinnell.EDU via csgnet Mailing List)
[mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu]
Sent: Monday, November 17, 2014 1:07 PM
To: Erling Jorgensen
Cc: Erling Jorgensen
Subject: Re: Demonstration of control of behavior

[From Kent McClelland (2014.11.17.1140)

Erling Jorgensen (2014.11.17 1040EST)

In my view, Erling's post hits the nail on the head. The controversy

between

Boris and Rick seems to be more a matter of semantics than real
disagreements about theory, with the ambiguous term "behavior" causing
the problem. If the language used were more precise, many of the
disagreements between you two (except perhaps the personal animus)
might disappear.

Person A can _manipulate_ person B by using the side-effects of B's focus

on

controlling some perception to control some perception A wants to have
about B's physical actions. (The rubber-band experiment can show how this
works, when the experimenter makes hand motions that the subject must
mirror in order to keep the knot of the rubber band on the target.)

Person A can _coerce_ person B by threatening to disturb some perception B
strongly wants to control unless person B stops controlling some other
perception. (This is the tactic used by the dog with the sheep: "Stop
munching on that nice grass and get with the rest of the flock, or I'll

tear your

throat out.")

Person A can _confine_ person B by removing the environmental feedback
paths necessary for controlling certain perceptions that involve physical
actions by B that A does not want to perceive (e.g, by putting B in

prison).

Person A can _trick_ person B by interfering with the feedback paths B is
using for the control of perceptions, so that B perceives something else

than

would happen without A's interference.

Person A can _influence_ person B by suggesting perceptions to control and
references to use in controlling those perceptions, which B then adopts.
(Most communication between people aims at this kind of mutual influence.)

In each of these cases, person A may have the perception of having
controlled B's behavior, but none of these tactics works unless B remains

in

control of B's own perceptions. Coercion, for instance, fails if B

ignores,

discounts, or fails to perceive A's threat (as in the stupid game of

"chicken").

My 1994 paper "Perceptual Control and Social Power" discusses
manipulation, coercion, and influence in some detail from a PCT

perspective.

Martin Taylor's chapter for LCS IV (which I've been lucky enough to see in
draft form) has a fascinating discussion of "protocols" by which people
cooperatively use each other's physical actions to control their own

separate

perceptions.

Best regards to all,

Kent

> [From Erling Jorgensen (2014.11.17 1040EST)]
>> Rick Marken (2014.11.16.2230)
>
>> RM: I think it would be great if people who saw my mistake in
>> thinking would
> point it out to me.
>
> EJ: The mistake I see is one of language. "Behavior" is such an
> ill-defined word. Its referent seems to slide all over the place,
> according to where the speaker happens to be looking at the moment.
>
> EJ: In general, behavior in PCT refers to the output of a control

system.

> But the only place this actually translates into environmental action
> is the outermost layer of control, where forces in the environment are
generated.
> All other outputs of other layers of control are specifications for
> the goal that the next-lower level is to track toward.
>
> EJ: I assume, when you claim "the dog controls the behavior of the

sheep,"

> that you are not claiming the dog controls the forces produced by each
> leg of the sheep. What you are trying to get at is that the dog
> controls a certain perceived outcome of the sheep's leg forces. When
> we state it with this level of stiff precision, it becomes clear that
> we have to specify who is doing the perceiving, and toward what outcome.
>
> EJ: You rightly notice that if the sheep did not care about some
> perceptual outcomes of its own, such as distance from dog, etc., it
> would not be generating behavior (i.e., leg forces) to counteract the
> dog's disturbances to those preferred outcomes. Because it does care
> about such things, perceptual side effects that it does not care about
> -- e.g., the size of a clump of white that the dog perceives as a
> flock -- become avenues for the dog achieving its own perceptual

results.

>
> EJ: I realize this becomes a very stiff way of talking. But I think
> it is preferable to the slippery scientific slope of claiming
> "behavior" is controlled. And I think most of your own language
> demonstrates the same inclination. It is there in the online
> description of your simulation, but I'll take it from an earlier reply
> within this thread --
>
>>> Rick Marken (2014.11.15.1340):
>>> ...If the sheep were not controlling for keeping the image of the
>>> dog near
> the grass shoot, the movement of the dog would have no effect on the
> movements of the sheep; the dog would then not be able to control the
> sheep's position (keeping it near the herd). ...
>>> ...the demonstration explains what I believe is the essential
>>> observation in
> the video: how the sheepdog can control the location of a sheep by
> moving around. ...
>>> ...As I said, the variations in the sheep's position is the
> "variability" ...
>>> ...The dog is controlling the position of the sheep relative to the
> herd. ...
>>> ...another control system (you, in the role of a sheepdog) use
>>> variations in
> a stimulus (the dog's position) to control the sheep's position. ...
>
> EJ: In all these instances, you state the matter correctly. The
> sheep's position gets controlled by the dog. "Position" is not a

behavior.

> "Location" is not a behavior. Either one is the _result_ of a set of
> behaviors. Even a word like "movement" is technically not a behavior.
> It is a rate of change in a perceived figure relative to a perceived
background.
> PCT keeps asserting that only perceptions get controlled. (And I add
> my sense that "behavior" is not a particularly helpful word.)
>
> EJ: I'm not sure about this final portion, but perhaps we could say
> that the sheep's actions are part of the Environmental Feedback
> Function for the dog controlling for its own perceptual results, that
> of having all the sheep in approximately the same positional clump. I
> don't know if that mixes things up too much analytically, because
> clearly the dog alters its actions to compensate for the Disturbance
> provided by the sheep's actions, when its perceived visual rate of

change is

···

-----Original Message-----
On Nov 17, 2014, at 11:06 AM, Erling Jorgensen wrote:
not in the right perceived direction.
>
> EJ: So you are right that the presence of control systems on each end
> of the interaction might change the way we analyze the situation. But
> I would definitely use different language than "controlling behavior."
> That's the very direction we want to get away from, in my view.
>
> All the best,
> Erling
>

[rsmarken]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.18.0850)]

···

Fred Nickols (2014.11.18.0730 EST)

FN: First, let me say that I agree with Kent. Erling nailed it. Second, let me

say that I have found this thread to be very instructive, useful and

helpful.

RM: Well I am amazed and dumbfounded. Apparently the consensus is that there is no such thing as control of behavior of a control system. Indeed, there’s no such thing as behavior. guess I’ll get my lamp out and go looking for an honest control theorist;-)

FN: My kudos to all for staying involved and working hard toward clarity.

RM: I think we’ve gotten to very different states of “clarity”

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.18.12.53]

I am reminded of two things. (1) In one of my first classes in Psychology (as a Ph.D.student) the

teacher gave his opinion that when two schools of thought disagree
violently, historically it has usually been true that both are right
but look at the problem from different angles.
(2) (From The Mikado" – in reference to a decree that someone
should be beheaded)
The trouble is that I agree with Rick, Kent, Erling, and Fred, who
are not all in complete agreement. To me, behaviour is output, but not only at the level of muscle
movements. It is output at ANY level of the hierarchy. so I agree
with Rick. You can and often do control the behaviour of others. You
say “pass the salt” and your dinner partner does pass the salt. Is
that not a behaviour? You may be controlling at one level for
perceiving the salt to be in hand, but at another level are you not
controlling for perceiving the partner to perform the behaviour of
passing it? Control isn’t always successful, and if the partner
doesn’t want to pass you the salt, that doesn’t mean you aren’t
controlling for perceiving the partner to perform that behaviour.
Kent lists several different ways of influencing the behaviour of
others, which have different everyday English labels, and some of
those control by disturbing perceptions the “other” controls (I
discount those that alter the ability of the other to perceive or to
act). All serve to help YOU perceive the other to execute the
behaviour you want to perceive, no matter how they interact with the
other’s control of controlled perceptions, by using, altering, or
preventing that control by the other.
I don’t see the contradiction that you all seem to see. Rick’s sheep
has only one possible behaviour, to move left or right across the
screen. It is an action to control its perception of the relation
between the visual location of the dog and the tuft of grass. The
dog’s movement disturbs that perception so the sheep moves to
correct the error, just as the “subject” in the knotted elastic band
demo moves to keep the knot at its reference location when the
“experimenter” moves the other end of the band. Almost everyone
(Boris excluded) seem to agree that the experimenter does control
the subject’s behaviour, and is able to do so only because the
subject continues to control for having the knot where s/he wants
it. Why not for the sheep? My criticism of the demo is that to the uninitiated whom Rick wants
to convince, it looks like a demo of an S-R process.
Martin

···

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.18.0850)]

          Fred

Nickols (2014.11.18.0730 EST)

          FN: First, let me say that I agree with Kent.  Erling

nailed it. Second, let me

          say that I have found this thread to be very instructive,

useful and

          helpful.

          RM: Well I am amazed and dumbfounded. Apparently the

consensus is that there is no such thing as control of
behavior of a control system. Indeed, there’s no such
thing as behavior. guess I’ll get my lamp out and go
looking for an honest control theorist;-)

          FN: My

kudos to all for staying involved and working hard toward
clarity.

          RM: I think we've gotten to very different states of

“clarity”

And I expect you'll all agree That he was right to so decree. And I am right, And you are right, And all is right as right can be!

</details>

[_Boris_Hartman]

Martin,

MT :

To me, behaviour is output, but not only at the level of muscle movements. It is output at ANY level of the hierarchy. so I agree with Rick. You can and often do control the behaviour of others.

HB :

I don’t see the connection ? What outputs on different levels of hierarchy has to do with »control of behavior« ? What does it mean to »control behavior« in HPCT and what does it mean to you to »control behavior« of the others HPCT ? I’m really not used to such a thinking from you You didin’t seem to me that you were inclined to self-regulation and behavioristic terminology ? I’m used to quite precise PCT thinking from you.

MT :

Almost everyone (Boris excluded) seem to agree that the experimenter does control the subject’s behaviour, and is able to do so only because the subject continues to control for having the knot where s/he wants it. Why not for the sheep?

HB:

I’m not agreeing, not only because Bill and Rick wrote that LCS environment can’t control »HPCT« or LCS control and can not be controlled, but because I think that nobody can’t »control behavior (output)«. Only »perception can be controlled« in the sense Kent used terminology for »possible perceptual collective control«.

Beside that subject can left experiment whenever he/she wants. So he/she decides which perception to control in any moment ? The only who can set the references is HPCT himself. Nobody others can. Any other HPCT is just disturbance to other HPCT as any other disturbance in physical environment. And I don’t see how anything in environment could control any HPCT through perceptual input, although there is ambiguos »arrow« on eleven level of control hierarchy, showing that maybe reference could come from outside ? But as far I remember Bill never allowed that possibilty. So in PCT there is no reference in control hierarchy that can be set from outside. So the main problem is : how perceptual input can control behavior without setting also the reference signal, which is by PCT logic always formed inside organism ? Could you use instead of »behavioristic« logic, your precise mathematical PCT logic and clarify how »perception can directly control behavior«, output ?

Also Rick wrote, that subject has to agree to cooperate in experiment. So whether subject will cooperate in experiment or not is always by his will not by the will of experimenter. The same is with the salt. If you ask somebody to pass you salt and he doesn’t want to do it, it’s obvious that you request doesn’t imply behavior of the person that you asked for salt. Even if he does agree that he will do what you want, the references are always set inside control system. It can’t be set from outside, so to say that environment »control behavior« of HPCT. So I think that you can’t say in any case that environment »control behavior of HPCT«. As Kent wrote once, control stays at controllee. The decission which perception will be controlled stays always at controlee. If this is not so, than there are two control mechanisms for »controlling behavior« :

1.  one when person agree to pass you salt, and
   

2.  one when person disagree to pass you salt.
   

But then the same two control mechanisms exist in the case of »knot experiment«. So if I understand right »double possibility« for »controling the person« there is one control mechanism called »control of behavior« when person agree to pass you salt and the other mechanism called »control of perception« when person disagree to pass you salt… The same problem I see when dog »sit« when you say so, and dog doesn’t »sit« when you say so. And sheep ran to the herd when dog come closser and sheep get into »defending« position when dog come closer or even attack the dog and dog ran to a master. Can we say in this case that »dog control the behavior of the sheep« or sheep »control behavior of a dog«. Or can we say that both controlled their perceptions, and all events can be analyzed with »collective control process«. The videos clearly show many possibilties. And videos are part of scientific methods.                                                                                                                                                    Â

But I think there is only one control mechanism in organism in both cases which works the same with different results. But I’ll be interested to see how you explain working both control mechanisms inside the LCS or any control mechanism when the human, dog, sheep »behavior is being controlled«.

People probably looked for milions of years (let us say 10 milion years) at the stimulus they produce when they ask somebody to do something for them, and they saw behavior of other people doing what they want. Maybe they didn’t give a name to this process, but they observed it functioning. For them it was »observable fact« as for Rick is. He is doing the same what people 10 milion years are doing. They beleived their eyes, what they perceive although they maybe didn’t call this process perception. They were sure that what they see is what it is outside. Now we know that it’s old fashion thinking, maybe we could say also »fossil«.

So some century ago some wise guy decided on the bases of observations, that what is seen outside can be measured. So effects of stimulus and behavior starts to be measured and we got »behaviorism« and statistical interpretations, as everything is concluded from observed behaviors (by Rick interpretation facts). So many followed these beleives. But they neglected control process inside LCS which produce actions. Bill briliantly concluded that control process in organism is not »control of behavior« but »control of perception«. (where reference and perception are included). And he briliantly described this process, where the refernces are formed inside organism and so he made the »highway« for further explorations. It’s not perfect yet, but it’s pioneer work. So why don’t we just stay at what he said about these processes if we talk about PCT. If we are talking about some other control process inside organism we could for example go on ECACS and talk about »control of behavior« of any kind there.

RM : My criticism of the demo is that to the uninitiated whom Rick wants to convince, it looks like a demo of an S-R process.

HB : At least one thing that we agree upon…J

Boris

···

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Taylor (mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2014 7:40 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Demonstration of control of behavior

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.18.12.53]

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.18.0850)]

Fred Nickols (2014.11.18.0730 EST)

FN: First, let me say that I agree with Kent. Erling nailed it. Second, let me
say that I have found this thread to be very instructive, useful and
helpful.

RM: Well I am amazed and dumbfounded. Apparently the consensus is that there is no such thing as control of behavior of a control system. Indeed, there’s no such thing as behavior. guess I’ll get my lamp out and go looking for an honest control theorist;-)

FN: My kudos to all for staying involved and working hard toward clarity.

RM: I think we’ve gotten to very different states of “clarity”

I am reminded of two things.

(1) In one of my first classes in Psychology (as a Ph.D.student) the teacher gave his opinion that when two schools of thought disagree violently, historically it has usually been true that both are right but look at the problem from different angles.

(2) (From The Mikado" – in reference to a decree that someone should be beheaded)

And I expect you'll all agree

That he was right to so decree.

And I am right,

And you are right,

And all is right as right can be!

The trouble is that I agree with Rick, Kent, Erling, and Fred, who are not all in complete agreement.

To me, behaviour is output, but not only at the level of muscle movements. It is output at ANY level of the hierarchy. so I agree with Rick. You can and often do control the behaviour of others. You say “pass the salt” and your dinner partner does pass the salt. Is that not a behaviour? You may be controlling at one level for perceiving the salt to be in hand, but at another level are you not controlling for perceiving the partner to perform the behaviour of passing it? Control isn’t always successful, and if the partner doesn’t want to pass you the salt, that doesn’t mean you aren’t controlling for perceiving the partner to perform that behaviour.

Kent lists several different ways of influencing the behaviour of others, which have different everyday English labels, and some of those control by disturbing perceptions the “other” controls (I discount those that alter the ability of the other to perceive or to act). All serve to help YOU perceive the other to execute the behaviour you want to perceive, no matter how they interact with the other’s control of controlled perceptions, by using, altering, or preventing that control by the other.

I don’t see the contradiction that you all seem to see. Rick’s sheep has only one possible behaviour, to move left or right across the screen. It is an action to control its perception of the relation between the visual location of the dog and the tuft of grass. The dog’s movement disturbs that perception so the sheep moves to correct the error, just as the “subject” in the knotted elastic band demo moves to keep the knot at its reference location when the “experimenter” moves the other end of the band. Almost everyone (Boris excluded) seem to agree that the experimenter does control the subject’s behaviour, and is able to do so only because the subject continues to control for having the knot where s/he wants it. Why not for the sheep?

My criticism of the demo is that to the uninitiated whom Rick wants to convince, it looks like a demo of an S-R process.

Martin

[_Boris_Hartman]

Nice work Fred…J

···

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2014 5:54 PM
To: Fred Nickols
Cc: mcclel@grinnell.edu; Erling Jorgensen; csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Demonstration of control of behavior

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.18.0850)]

Fred Nickols (2014.11.18.0730 EST)

FN: First, let me say that I agree with Kent. Erling nailed it. Second, let me
say that I have found this thread to be very instructive, useful and
helpful.

RM: Well I am amazed and dumbfounded. Apparently the consensus is that there is no such thing as control of behavior of a control system. Indeed, there’s no such thing as behavior. guess I’ll get my lamp out and go looking for an honest control theorist;-)

HB : Well I think that Carver and Scheier are waiting for your call J

FN: My kudos to all for staying involved and working hard toward clarity.

RM: I think we’ve gotten to very different states of “clarity”

HB :

See there is no »observable facts«. Just perception of different people, which has to be somehow harmonized, adjusted….

Best, Boris

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[_Boris_Hartman]

What a construct.

Where Bill divided environment into physical and social environment with different effects of disturbances and different perceptual signals for living and non-living environment. Show me in any of his diagrams ?

There are just physical variables (distal stimuli) outside which are turned into perceptual signals and which are than all compared in comparator (neurons) inside LCS. What LCS experience is just perception (disturbances), no mater what is causing disturbances in environment and later perception. I also didn’t see in any of his defintions or books divission on physical and social environment. The question is whether environment »controls behavior of LCS or not« ? As I see your writings you say once yes and once no. It’s total confussion.

If you are phylosophing in your name under Bill’s »flag« than you should find a citation that could support your statement in the name of PCT. If you don’t give that proof, I can just conclude that it’s your imagination.

LCS perceive disturbances (turned into perception), no matter who is producing them. And there is no protection against them. There is just conter-action.

Here are some Bill’s defitions just not to forget about which theroy we are talking about. And as far as I can see he is also not talking about »observable facts«. It’s subjective impression, so not something that is »definitelly or objectivelly outside« but something that is subject to human feelings and so on. See how we differently see the same »theme«. So what is here »obervable fact«.

Bill P (BC:P,2005):

DISTURBANCE : Any variable in the environment of a control system that (a) contributes to changes in the controlled quantty (b) is not controlled by the same control system.

ENVIRONMENTÂ (of a control sytem) : All that directly affects the input function of a system and is affected by the output function of the system. See REALITY…

REALITY [Directly perceived] : The world as subjectively experienced, including mental activities, feelings, concepts, as wel as the subjective impression of three-dimensional outside universe. [External] : A directly-perceived set of hypotheses, beleifs, deducations, and organized models purporting to explain directly perceived reality in terms of underlying phenomena and laws. See PHYSICAL QUANTITY.

PHYSICAL QUANTTITY, PHENOMENON : A perception identifyed as part of a physical model of external reality.

I think it’s time that we see some real PCT wording, not just RCT wording. If you will talk what is PCT or what is not you should use PCT wording not self-regulation or behavioristic. As you can see Bill is not mentioning any different meaning for different »stimuli« or »observable facts« that is as it is because you said so…

At least I see it this way. But I don’t see everything as »observable fact«

Best,

Boris

···

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2014 3:39 AM
To:
Subject: Re: Demonstration of control of behavior

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.17.1840)]

RM: One more thought regarding control of behavior. Perhaps part of the difficulty here comes from the fact hat PCT does show that the environment – the physical, non-living environment – does not control behavior. This is where PCT contradicts those, like Skinner, who believe that the environment does control behavior. Based on his experiments, for example. Skinner concluded that the behavior of organisms is controlled by “contingencies of reinforcement”. That is, behavior is controlled by the rewards and punishments (out there in the environment) that follow particular behaviors.

RM: PCT shows that this is not the case at all; the environment – in the form of stimuli, rewards and punishments – doesn’t control behavior.

HB :

According to upper Bill’s definitions this is all what we need to know.Â

How could rats knew what is »reward and punishment from Skinner«. Rats just perceive stimuli and control these perceived stimuli as any other stimuli from environment. There is no difference between stimuli from social and physical environment. They are all turned into perception which doesn’t distinguish between stimuli from social or physical environment. Perceptual signal is the same for all stimuli that affect input function. They just distinguish in intensity (frequency) and space code (.

But Skinner was able to control behavior with rewards and punishments – mainly rewards – so what’s going on here? Why would PCT deny that rewards and punishments control behavior? The answer is that PCT let’s us see the wizard that, in this case, isn’t even behind the curtain; the wizard who is doing the actual controlling is in full view but, somehow, never noticed . It’s Skinner who is controlling the behavior using rewards and punishments, not the rewards and punishments themselves.

Rewards and punishments are not control systems; they have no goals for what an organism should do. But Skinner did. Skinner wanted to see a rat press a lever to get food, for example, and he found that he could get the rat to do that using a process called “shaping”, which involves rewarding the animal for making successive approximations to the desired behavior (bar pressing). Skinner was clearly controlling the behavior of the rat, and he did it by varying his actions (giving or withholding rewards) with the aim of getting his perception of the rat’s behavior to be what he wanted it to be.

He could also build machines that could stand in for his controlling; so once the rat had been “shaped” into pressing the bar the machine could take over and give a reward only after a press (or several presses) were made. Of course, the machine is not really controlling the rat either since it would deliver a reward even if the bar were pressed by someone other than the rat. And if the pellet delivery system were jammed the rat would eventually stop pressing the bar and the machine would do nothing to get it back to the bar. The machine can’t perceive the rat’s behavior and act appropriately if it’s not doing what is “wanted”, becuase the machine also has no wants (references).

The point is that PCT shows that the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system. It’s not “the environment” consisting of stimuli ,rewards, or punishments that controls behavior; it is the other control systems in that environment – generally other people – that use stimuli, rewards or punishments to control behavior. And if the controlling is not consensual or if it requires the controllee to do things that conflict with other goals (including the goal of not being controlled) then the controllee might decide to resist the controlling; and then things get ugly.

HB : I never saw in PCT (Bill’s theory) to be pointing to anything you say and I didn’t see anything you wrote. Where did you see him saying »the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system«. It looks like your construct of PCT, which can be called RCT. If you are talking in the name of PCT I think you should prove it wilh some Bill’s defintion or Bill’s writings, as that is now only reference for what is true about PCT or not. You are using PCT as cover for your behavioristic and self-regulation theory. You are almost duplicate of Carver & Scheier. Why don’t you join them ?

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[wmansell]

What a construct.

Where Bill divided environment into physical and social environment with different effects of disturbances and different perceptual signals for living and non-living environment. Show me in any of his diagrams ?

There are just physical variables (distal stimuli) outside which are turned into perceptual signals and which are than all compared in comparator (neurons) inside LCS. What LCS experience is just perception (disturbances), no mater what is causing disturbances in environment and later perception. I also didn’t see in any of his defintions or books divission on physical and social environment. The question is whether environment »controls behavior of LCS or not« ? As I see your writings you say once yes and once no. It’s total confussion.

If you are phylosophing in your name under Bill’s »flag« than you should find a citation that could support your statement in the name of PCT. If you don’t give that proof, I can just conclude that it’s your imagination.

LCS perceive disturbances (turned into perception), no matter who is producing them. And there is no protection against them. There is just conter-action.

Here are some Bill’s defitions just not to forget about which theroy we are talking about. And as far as I can see he is also not talking about »observable facts«. It’s subjective impression, so not something that is »definitelly or objectivelly outside« but something that is subject to human feelings and so on. See how we differently see the same »theme«. So what is here »obervable fact«.

Bill P (BC:P,2005):

DISTURBANCE : Any variable in the environment of a control system that (a) contributes to changes in the controlled quantty (b) is not controlled by the same control system.

ENVIRONMENT (of a control sytem) : All that directly affects the input function of a system and is affected by the output function of the system. See REALITY…

REALITY [Directly perceived] : The world as subjectively experienced, including mental activities, feelings, concepts, as wel as the subjective impression of three-dimensional outside universe. [External] : A directly-perceived set of hypotheses, beleifs, deducations, and organized models purporting to explain directly perceived reality in terms of underlying phenomena and laws. See PHYSICAL QUANTITY.

PHYSICAL QUANTTITY, PHENOMENON : A perception identifyed as part of a physical model of external reality.

I think it’s time that we see some real PCT wording, not just RCT wording. If you will talk what is PCT or what is not you should use PCT wording not self-regulation or behavioristic. As you can see Bill is not mentioning any different meaning for different »stimuli« or »observable facts« that is as it is because you said so…

At least I see it this way. But I don’t see everything as »observable fact«

Best,

Boris

To:

···

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.17.1840)]

RM: One more thought regarding control of behavior. Perhaps part of the difficulty here comes from the fact hat PCT does show that the environment – the physical, non-living environment – does not control behavior. This is where PCT contradicts those, like Skinner, who believe that the environment does control behavior. Based on his experiments, for example. Skinner concluded that the behavior of organisms is controlled by “contingencies of reinforcement”. That is, behavior is controlled by the rewards and punishments (out there in the environment) that follow particular behaviors.

RM: PCT shows that this is not the case at all; the environment – in the form of stimuli, rewards and punishments – doesn’t control behavior.

HB :

According to upper Bill’s definitions this is all what we need to know.

How could rats knew what is »reward and punishment from Skinner«. Rats just perceive stimuli and control these perceived stimuli as any other stimuli from environment. There is no difference between stimuli from social and physical environment. They are all turned into perception which doesn’t distinguish between stimuli from social or physical environment. Perceptual signal is the same for all stimuli that affect input function. They just distinguish in intensity (frequency) and space code (.

But Skinner was able to control behavior with rewards and punishments – mainly rewards – so what’s going on here? Why would PCT deny that rewards and punishments control behavior? The answer is that PCT let’s us see the wizard that, in this case, isn’t even behind the curtain; the wizard who is doing the actual controlling is in full view but, somehow, never noticed . It’s Skinner who is controlling the behavior using rewards and punishments, not the rewards and punishments themselves.

Rewards and punishments are not control systems; they have no goals for what an organism should do. But Skinner did. Skinner wanted to see a rat press a lever to get food, for example, and he found that he could get the rat to do that using a process called “shaping”, which involves rewarding the animal for making successive approximations to the desired behavior (bar pressing). Skinner was clearly controlling the behavior of the rat, and he did it by varying his actions (giving or withholding rewards) with the aim of getting his perception of the rat’s behavior to be what he wanted it to be.

He could also build machines that could stand in for his controlling; so once the rat had been “shaped” into pressing the bar the machine could take over and give a reward only after a press (or several presses) were made. Of course, the machine is not really controlling the rat either since it would deliver a reward even if the bar were pressed by someone other than the rat. And if the pellet delivery system were jammed the rat would eventually stop pressing the bar and the machine would do nothing to get it back to the bar. The machine can’t perceive the rat’s behavior and act appropriately if it’s not doing what is “wanted”, becuase the machine also has no wants (references).

The point is that PCT shows that the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system. It’s not “the environment” consisting of stimuli ,rewards, or punishments that controls behavior; it is the other control systems in that environment – generally other people – that use stimuli, rewards or punishments to control behavior. And if the controlling is not consensual or if it requires the controllee to do things that conflict with other goals (including the goal of not being controlled) then the controllee might decide to resist the controlling; and then things get ugly.

HB : I never saw in PCT (Bill’s theory) to be pointing to anything you say and I didn’t see anything you wrote. Where did you see him saying »the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system«. It looks like your construct of PCT, which can be called RCT. If you are talking in the name of PCT I think you should prove it wilh some Bill’s defintion or Bill’s writings, as that is now only reference for what is true about PCT or not. You are using PCT as cover for your behavioristic and self-regulation theory. You are almost duplicate of Carver & Scheier. Why don’t you join them ?

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[_bara0361]

Forgive me, but I’m struggling to see what is truly at issue. Some of the argument here sounds as if the theory itself is in question. Some of it sounds as if the specific words being used are in question. I’m also curious to see Warren’s quote from Dad in a larger context. Please tolerate my jumping in for a moment and let me know if I’m clear…

Â

Outside disturbances may influence behavior in another control system, but not actually control the behavior of that system. Goals and priorities constantly shift in order to maintain a certain level of accomplishment, satisfaction, etc., conscious or unconscious. When a conflict becomes apparent, something on one side or another of that conflict must change in order to move on. We can either reach our goal despite the disturbance or change our goal to accommodate that disturbance.

Â

I liked Rick’s sheep demo, and admittedly played with it for awhile during a lull at work. The dog has been trained that the sheep should be kept together so it has learned on some level that it can bark and nip from certain angles and the sheep will move away from it. Sheep are wild animals, and generally will move away from what looks like a threat. If the dog is not in the way, it will try to get back to the herd. It looks as if the dog is “controlling” the sheep, and the farmer (me) and the dog appear satisfied that this is what is happening. The sheep didn’t return to the herd because the dog controlled it. To the sheep, the dog was behaving in a threatening manner, and the goal of the sheep was to return to the safety of the herd.

Â

The sheep could have turned rogue and decided it wasn’t afraid of the dog, and kept running away, contrary to what the dog was trying to accomplish. Had the dog remained between the sheep and the herd, the sheep likely would have moved further off.

Â

The dog perceives that it is causing the sheep to move. The sheep perceives a threat, and moves itself away from the threat and back to the herd. The farmer perceives his well-trained dog (whom he influences with food) keeping his herd together.  Goals have been met in each of their minds, tiny though some of those may be, but in no case here are any of them controlling one another.Â

Â

Â

*barb

Â

Â

Â

Â

···

On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 3:37 AM, Warren Mansell csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

In B:CP where Bill explains arbitrary control, he states explicitly that other people’s behaviour can be controlled, and that this is a major source of conflict:

'… the attempt to make behaviour conform to one set of goals without regard to other goals…that may already be controlling that behaviour–that must alreadyy exist, since the behaviour exists…’Â

Warren

On 19 Nov 2014, at 09:39, Boris Hartman (boris.hartman@masicom.net via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

What a construct.

Â

Where Bill divided environment into physical and social environment with different effects of disturbances and different perceptual signals for living and non-living environment. Show me in any of his diagrams ?

Â

There are just physical variables (distal stimuli) outside which are turned into perceptual signals and which are than all compared in comparator (neurons) inside LCS. What LCS experience is just perception (disturbances), no mater what is causing disturbances in environment and later perception. I also didn’t see in any of his defintions or books divission on physical and social environment. The question is whether environment »controls behavior of LCS or not« ? As I see your writings you say once yes and once no. It’s total confussion.

Â

If you are phylosophing in your name under Bill’s »flag« than you should find a citation that could support your statement in the name of PCT. If you don’t give that proof, I can just conclude that it’s your imagination.

Â

LCS perceive disturbances (turned into perception), no matter who is producing them. And there is no protection against them. There is just conter-action.

Â

Here are some Bill’s defitions just not to forget about which theroy we are talking about. And as far as I can see he is also not talking about »observable facts«. It’s subjective impression, so not something that is »definitelly or objectivelly outside« but something that is subject to human feelings and so on. See how we differently see the same »theme«. So what is here »obervable fact«.

Â

Bill P (BC:P,2005):

DISTURBANCE : Any variable in the environment of a control system that (a) contributes to changes in the controlled quantty (b) is not controlled by the same control system.

Â

ENVIRONMENTÂ (of a control sytem) : All that directly affects the input function of a system and is affected by the output function of the system. See REALITY…

Â

REALITY [Directly perceived] : The world as subjectively experienced, including mental activities, feelings, concepts, as wel as the subjective impression of three-dimensional outside universe. [External] : A directly-perceived set of hypotheses, beleifs, deducations, and organized models purporting to explain directly perceived reality in terms of underlying phenomena and laws. See PHYSICAL QUANTITY.

Â

PHYSICAL QUANTTITY, PHENOMENON : A perception identifyed as part of a physical model of external reality.

Â

I think it’s time that we see some real PCT wording, not just RCT wording. If you will talk what is PCT or what is not you should use PCT wording not self-regulation or behavioristic. As you can see Bill is not mentioning any different meaning for different »stimuli« or »observable facts« that is as it is because you said so…

Â

At least I see it this way. But I don’t see everything as »observable fact«

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2014 3:39 AM
To:
Subject: Re: Demonstration of control of behavior

Â

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.17.1840)]

Â

RM: One more thought regarding control of behavior. Perhaps part of the difficulty here comes from the fact hat PCT does show that the environment – the physical, non-living environment – does not control behavior. This is where PCT contradicts those, like Skinner, who believe that the environment does control behavior. Based on his experiments, for example. Skinner concluded that the behavior of organisms is controlled by “contingencies of reinforcement”. That is, behavior is controlled by the rewards and punishments (out there in the environment) that follow particular behaviors. Â

Â

RM: PCT shows that this is not the case at all; the environment – in the form of stimuli, rewards and punishments – doesn’t control behavior.Â

Â

HB :

According to upper Bill’s definitions this is all what we need to know.Â

Â

How could rats knew what is »reward and punishment from Skinner«. Rats just perceive stimuli and control these perceived stimuli as any other stimuli from environment. There is no difference between stimuli from social and physical environment. They are all turned into perception which doesn’t distinguish between stimuli from social or physical environment. Perceptual signal is the same for all stimuli that affect input function. They just distinguish in intensity (frequency) and space code (.

Â

Â

Â

But Skinner was able to control behavior with rewards and punishments – mainly rewards – so what’s going on here? Why would PCT deny that rewards and punishments control behavior? The answer is that PCT let’s us see the wizard that, in this case, isn’t even behind the curtain; the wizard who is doing the actual controlling is in full view but, somehow, never noticed . It’s Skinner who is controlling the behavior using rewards and punishments, not the rewards and punishments themselves.Â

Â

Rewards and punishments are not control systems; they have no goals for what an organism should do. But Skinner did. Skinner wanted to see a rat press a lever to get food, for example, and he found that he could get the rat to do that using a process called “shaping”, which involves rewarding the animal for making successive approximations to the desired behavior (bar pressing). Skinner was clearly controlling the behavior of the rat, and he did it by varying his actions (giving or withholding rewards) with the aim of getting his perception of the rat’s behavior to be what he wanted it to be.Â

Â

He could also build machines that could stand in for his controlling; so once the rat had been “shaped” into pressing the bar the machine could take over and give a reward only after a press (or several presses) were made. Of course, the machine is not really controlling the rat either since it would deliver a reward even if the bar were pressed by someone other than the rat. And if the pellet delivery system were jammed the rat would eventually stop pressing the bar and the machine would do nothing to get it back to the bar. The machine can’t perceive the rat’s behavior and act appropriately if it’s not doing what is “wanted”, becuase the machine also has no wants (references).

Â

The point is that PCT shows that the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system. It’s not “the environment” consisting of stimuli ,rewards, or punishments that controls behavior; it is the other control systems in that environment – generally other people – that use stimuli, rewards or punishments to control behavior. And if the controlling is not consensual or if it requires the controllee to do things that conflict with other goals (including the goal of not being controlled) then the controllee might decide to resist the controlling; and then things get ugly.

Â

HB : I never saw in PCT (Bill’s theory) to be pointing to anything you say and I didn’t see anything you wrote. Where did you see him saying »the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system«. It looks like your construct of PCT, which can be called RCT. If you are talking in the name of PCT I think you should prove it wilh some Bill’s defintion or Bill’s writings, as that is now only reference for what is true about PCT or not. You are using PCT as cover for your behavioristic and self-regulation theory. You are almost duplicate of Carver & Scheier. Why don’t you join them ?

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

Â

BestÂ

Â

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of  Doing Research on Purpose.Â

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[_bara0361]

At the end of the second paragraph, I should have said, “…or change our goal or behavior to accommodate that disturbance.”

Â

*barb

···

On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 7:16 AM, bara0361@gmail.com bara0361@gmail.com wrote:

Forgive me, but I’m struggling to see what is truly at issue. Some of the argument here sounds as if the theory itself is in question. Some of it sounds as if the specific words being used are in question. I’m also curious to see Warren’s quote from Dad in a larger context. Please tolerate my jumping in for a moment and let me know if I’m clear…

Â

Outside disturbances may influence behavior in another control system, but not actually control the behavior of that system. Goals and priorities constantly shift in order to maintain a certain level of accomplishment, satisfaction, etc., conscious or unconscious. When a conflict becomes apparent, something on one side or another of that conflict must change in order to move on. We can either reach our goal despite the disturbance or change our goal to accommodate that disturbance.

Â

I liked Rick’s sheep demo, and admittedly played with it for awhile during a lull at work. The dog has been trained that the sheep should be kept together so it has learned on some level that it can bark and nip from certain angles and the sheep will move away from it. Sheep are wild animals, and generally will move away from what looks like a threat. If the dog is not in the way, it will try to get back to the herd. It looks as if the dog is “controlling” the sheep, and the farmer (me) and the dog appear satisfied that this is what is happening. The sheep didn’t return to the herd because the dog controlled it. To the sheep, the dog was behaving in a threatening manner, and the goal of the sheep was to return to the safety of the herd.

Â

The sheep could have turned rogue and decided it wasn’t afraid of the dog, and kept running away, contrary to what the dog was trying to accomplish. Had the dog remained between the sheep and the herd, the sheep likely would have moved further off.

Â

The dog perceives that it is causing the sheep to move. The sheep perceives a threat, and moves itself away from the threat and back to the herd. The farmer perceives his well-trained dog (whom he influences with food) keeping his herd together.  Goals have been met in each of their minds, tiny though some of those may be, but in no case here are any of them controlling one another.Â

Â

Â

*barb

Â

Â

Â

Â

On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 3:37 AM, Warren Mansell csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

In B:CP where Bill explains arbitrary control, he states explicitly that other people’s behaviour can be controlled, and that this is a major source of conflict:

'… the attempt to make behaviour conform to one set of goals without regard to other goals…that may already be controlling that behaviour–that mmust already exist, since the behaviour exists…’Â

Warren

On 19 Nov 2014, at 09:39, Boris Hartman (boris.hartman@masicom.net via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

What a construct.

Â

Where Bill divided environment into physical and social environment with different effects of disturbances and different perceptual signals for living and non-living environment. Show me in any of his diagrams ?

Â

There are just physical variables (distal stimuli) outside which are turned into perceptual signals and which are than all compared in comparator (neurons) inside LCS. What LCS experience is just perception (disturbances), no mater what is causing disturbances in environment and later perception. I also didn’t see in any of his defintions or books divission on physical and social environment. The question is whether environment »controls behavior of LCS or not« ? As I see your writings you say once yes and once no. It’s total confussion.

Â

If you are phylosophing in your name under Bill’s »flag« than you should find a citation that could support your statement in the name of PCT. If you don’t give that proof, I can just conclude that it’s your imagination.

Â

LCS perceive disturbances (turned into perception), no matter who is producing them. And there is no protection against them. There is just conter-action.

Â

Here are some Bill’s defitions just not to forget about which theroy we are talking about. And as far as I can see he is also not talking about »observable facts«. It’s subjective impression, so not something that is »definitelly or objectivelly outside« but something that is subject to human feelings and so on. See how we differently see the same »theme«. So what is here »obervable fact«.

Â

Bill P (BC:P,2005):

DISTURBANCE : Any variable in the environment of a control system that (a) contributes to changes in the controlled quantty (b) is not controlled by the same control system.

Â

ENVIRONMENTÂ (of a control sytem) : All that directly affects the input function of a system and is affected by the output function of the system. See REALITY…

Â

REALITY [Directly perceived] : The world as subjectively experienced, including mental activities, feelings, concepts, as wel as the subjective impression of three-dimensional outside universe. [External] : A directly-perceived set of hypotheses, beleifs, deducations, and organized models purporting to explain directly perceived reality in terms of underlying phenomena and laws. See PHYSICAL QUANTITY.

Â

PHYSICAL QUANTTITY, PHENOMENON : A perception identifyed as part of a physical model of external reality.

Â

I think it’s time that we see some real PCT wording, not just RCT wording. If you will talk what is PCT or what is not you should use PCT wording not self-regulation or behavioristic. As you can see Bill is not mentioning any different meaning for different »stimuli« or »observable facts« that is as it is because you said so…

Â

At least I see it this way. But I don’t see everything as »observable fact«

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2014 3:39 AM
To:
Subject: Re: Demonstration of control of behavior

Â

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.17.1840)]

Â

RM: One more thought regarding control of behavior. Perhaps part of the difficulty here comes from the fact hat PCT does show that the environment – the physical, non-living environment – does not control behavior. This is where PCT contradicts those, like Skinner, who believe that the environment does control behavior. Based on his experiments, for example. Skinner concluded that the behavior of organisms is controlled by “contingencies of reinforcement”. That is, behavior is controlled by the rewards and punishments (out there in the environment) that follow particular behaviors. Â

Â

RM: PCT shows that this is not the case at all; the environment – in the form of stimuli, rewards and punishments – doesn’t control behavior.Â

Â

HB :

According to upper Bill’s definitions this is all what we need to know.Â

Â

How could rats knew what is »reward and punishment from Skinner«. Rats just perceive stimuli and control these perceived stimuli as any other stimuli from environment. There is no difference between stimuli from social and physical environment. They are all turned into perception which doesn’t distinguish between stimuli from social or physical environment. Perceptual signal is the same for all stimuli that affect input function. They just distinguish in intensity (frequency) and space code (.

Â

Â

Â

But Skinner was able to control behavior with rewards and punishments – mainly rewards – so what’s going on here? Why would PCT deny that rewards and punishments control behavior? The answer is that PCT let’s us see the wizard that, in this case, isn’t even behind the curtain; the wizard who is doing the actual controlling is in full view but, somehow, never noticed . It’s Skinner who is controlling the behavior using rewards and punishments, not the rewards and punishments themselves.Â

Â

Rewards and punishments are not control systems; they have no goals for what an organism should do. But Skinner did. Skinner wanted to see a rat press a lever to get food, for example, and he found that he could get the rat to do that using a process called “shaping”, which involves rewarding the animal for making successive approximations to the desired behavior (bar pressing). Skinner was clearly controlling the behavior of the rat, and he did it by varying his actions (giving or withholding rewards) with the aim of getting his perception of the rat’s behavior to be what he wanted it to be.Â

Â

He could also build machines that could stand in for his controlling; so once the rat had been “shaped” into pressing the bar the machine could take over and give a reward only after a press (or several presses) were made. Of course, the machine is not really controlling the rat either since it would deliver a reward even if the bar were pressed by someone other than the rat. And if the pellet delivery system were jammed the rat would eventually stop pressing the bar and the machine would do nothing to get it back to the bar. The machine can’t perceive the rat’s behavior and act appropriately if it’s not doing what is “wanted”, becuase the machine also has no wants (references).

Â

The point is that PCT shows that the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system. It’s not “the environment” consisting of stimuli ,rewards, or punishments that controls behavior; it is the other control systems in that environment – generally other people – that use stimuli, rewards or punishments to control behavior. And if the controlling is not consensual or if it requires the controllee to do things that conflict with other goals (including the goal of not being controlled) then the controllee might decide to resist the controlling; and then things get ugly.

Â

HB : I never saw in PCT (Bill’s theory) to be pointing to anything you say and I didn’t see anything you wrote. Where did you see him saying »the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system«. It looks like your construct of PCT, which can be called RCT. If you are talking in the name of PCT I think you should prove it wilh some Bill’s defintion or Bill’s writings, as that is now only reference for what is true about PCT or not. You are using PCT as cover for your behavioristic and self-regulation theory. You are almost duplicate of Carver & Scheier. Why don’t you join them ?

Â

Best,

Â

Boris

Â

Â

BestÂ

Â

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of  Doing Research on Purpose.Â

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[Kent]

Hi Barb,

I’m with you, Barb, especially your conclusion:

Exactly. They’re controlling their perceptions of the other organism’s actions, but they aren’t controlling the other organisms or the other organisms’ behavior (whatever that word has come to be defined as in this thread).

I would say that the other organism’s behavior is the control of its own perceptions, and those who perceive themselves to be in control in this simulation aren’t reaching into the other organisms’ perceptual hierarchies and controlling the other organisms’
perceptions.

Rick in several of his excellent publications has made the point that the phenomenon we should really be talking about is control, not behavior as it has been defined by conventional psychologists, and control is always control of perceptions.

Best,

Kent

···

The dog perceives that it is causing the sheep to move. The sheep perceives a threat, and moves itself away from the threat and back to the herd. The farmer perceives his well-trained dog (whom he influences with food) keeping his herd together. Goals
have been met in each of their minds, tiny though some of those may be, but in no case here are any of them controlling one another.

On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 7:16 AM,
bara0361@gmail.com bara0361@gmail.com wrote:

Forgive me, but I’m struggling to see what is truly at issue. Some of the argument here sounds as if the theory itself is in question. Some of it sounds as if the specific words being used are in question. I’m also curious to see Warren’s quote from
Dad in a larger context. Please tolerate my jumping in for a moment and let me know if I’m clear…

Outside disturbances may influence behavior in another control system, but not actually
control the behavior of that system. Goals and priorities constantly shift in order to maintain a certain level of accomplishment, satisfaction, etc., conscious or unconscious. When a conflict becomes apparent, something on one side or another of
that conflict must change in order to move on. We can either reach our goal despite the disturbance or change our goal to
accommodate that disturbance.

I liked Rick’s sheep demo, and admittedly played with it for awhile during a lull at work. The dog has been trained that the sheep should be kept together so it has learned on some level that it can bark and nip from certain angles and the sheep will move
away from it. Sheep are wild animals, and generally will move away from what looks like a threat. If the dog is not in the way, it will try to get back to the herd. It looks as if the dog is “controlling” the sheep, and the farmer (me) and the dog appear
satisfied that this is what is happening. The sheep didn’t return to the herd because the dog controlled it. To the sheep, the dog was behaving in a threatening manner, and the goal of the sheep was to return to the safety of the herd.

The sheep could have turned rogue and decided it wasn’t afraid of the dog, and kept running away, contrary to what the dog was trying to accomplish. Had the dog remained between the sheep and the herd, the sheep likely would have moved further off.

The dog perceives that it is causing the sheep to move. The sheep perceives a threat, and moves itself away from the threat and back to the herd. The farmer perceives his well-trained dog (whom he influences with food) keeping his herd together. Goals
have been met in each of their minds, tiny though some of those may be, but in no case here are any of them controlling one another.

*barb

On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 3:37 AM, Warren Mansell
csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

In B:CP where Bill explains arbitrary control, he states explicitly that other people’s behaviour can be controlled, and that this is a major source of conflict:

'… the attempt to make behaviour conform to one set of goals without regard to other goals…that may already be controlling that behaviour–that must already exist, since the behaviour exists…’

Warren

On 19 Nov 2014, at 09:39, Boris Hartman (boris.hartman@masicom.net via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

What a construct.

Where Bill divided environment into physical and social environment with different effects of disturbances and different perceptual signals for living
and non-living environment. Show me in any of his diagrams ?

There are just physical variables (distal stimuli) outside which are turned into perceptual signals and which are than all compared in comparator (neurons)
inside LCS. What LCS experience is just perception (disturbances), no mater what is causing disturbances in environment and later perception. I also didn’t see in any of his defintions or books divission on physical and social environment. The question is
whether environment »controls behavior of LCS or not« ? As I see your writings you say once yes and once no. It’s total confussion.

If you are phylosophing in your name under Bill’s »flag« than you should find a citation that could support your statement in the name of PCT. If you don’t
give that proof, I can just conclude that it’s your imagination.

LCS perceive disturbances (turned into perception), no matter who is producing them. And there is no protection against them. There is just conter-action.

Here are some Bill’s defitions just not to forget about which theroy we are talking about. And as far as I can see he is also not talking about »observable
facts«. It’s subjective impression, so not something that is »definitelly or objectivelly outside« but something that is subject to human feelings and so on. See how we differently see the same »theme«. So what is here »obervable fact«.

Bill P (BC:P,2005):

DISTURBANCE : Any variable in the environment of a control system that (a) contributes to changes in the controlled quantty (b) is not controlled by the same control
system.

ENVIRONMENT (of a control sytem) : All that directly affects the input function of a system and is affected by the output function of the system. See REALITY…

REALITY [Directly perceived] : The world as subjectively experienced, including mental activities, feelings, concepts, as wel as the subjective impression of three-dimensional
outside universe. [External] : A directly-perceived set of hypotheses, beleifs, deducations, and organized models purporting to explain directly perceived reality in terms of underlying phenomena and laws. See PHYSICAL QUANTITY.

PHYSICAL QUANTTITY, PHENOMENON : A perception identifyed as part of a physical model of external reality.

I think it’s time that we see some real PCT wording, not just RCT wording. If you will talk what is PCT or what is not you should use PCT wording not self-regulation
or behavioristic. As you can see Bill is not mentioning any different meaning for different »stimuli« or »observable facts« that is as it is because you said so…

At least I see it this way. But I don’t see everything as »observable fact«

Best,

Boris

From:
csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu]
On Behalf Of Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet
Mailing List)
Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2014 3:39 AM
To:
Subject: Re: Demonstration of control of behavior

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.17.1840)]

RM: One more thought regarding control of behavior. Perhaps part of the difficulty here comes from the fact hat PCT does show that the environment – the physical, non-living environment – does not control behavior. This is where
PCT contradicts those, like Skinner, who believe that the environment does control behavior. Based on his experiments, for example. Skinner concluded that the behavior of organisms is controlled by “contingencies of reinforcement”. That is, behavior is controlled
by the rewards and punishments (out there in the environment) that follow particular behaviors.

RM: PCT shows that this is not the case at all; the environment – in the form of stimuli, rewards and punishments – doesn’t control behavior.

HB :

According to upper Bill’s definitions this is all what we need to know.

How could rats knew what is »reward and punishment from Skinner«. Rats just perceive stimuli and control these perceived stimuli as any other stimuli from
environment. There is no difference between stimuli from social and physical environment. They are all turned into perception which doesn’t distinguish between stimuli from social or physical environment. Perceptual signal is the same for all stimuli that
affect input function. They just distinguish in intensity (frequency) and space code (.

But Skinner was able to control behavior with rewards and punishments – mainly rewards – so what’s going on here? Why would PCT deny that rewards and punishments control behavior? The answer is that PCT let’s us see the wizard that, in
this case, isn’t even behind the curtain; the wizard who is doing the actual controlling is in full view but, somehow, never noticed . It’s Skinner who is controlling the behavior using rewards and punishments, not the rewards and punishments themselves.

Rewards and punishments are not control systems; they have no goals for what an organism should do. But Skinner did. Skinner wanted to see a rat press a lever to get food, for example, and he found that he could get the rat to do that using
a process called “shaping”, which involves rewarding the animal for making successive approximations to the desired behavior (bar pressing). Skinner was clearly controlling the behavior of the rat, and he did it by varying his actions (giving or withholding
rewards) with the aim of getting his perception of the rat’s behavior to be what he wanted it to be.

He could also build machines that could stand in for his controlling; so once the rat had been “shaped” into pressing the bar the machine could take over and give a reward only after a press (or several presses) were made. Of course, the
machine is not really controlling the rat either since it would deliver a reward even if the bar were pressed by someone other than the rat. And if the pellet delivery system were jammed the rat would eventually stop pressing the bar and the machine would
do nothing to get it back to the bar. The machine can’t perceive the rat’s behavior and act appropriately if it’s not doing what is “wanted”, becuase the machine also has no wants (references).

The point is that PCT shows that the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is
another control system . It’s not “the environment” consisting of stimuli ,rewards, or punishments that controls behavior; it is the other control systems in that environment – generally other people – that use stimuli, rewards or punishments to control
behavior. And if the controlling is not consensual or if it requires the controllee to do things that conflict with other goals (including the goal of not being controlled) then the controllee might decide to resist the controlling; and then things get ugly.

HB : I never saw in PCT (Bill’s theory) to be pointing to anything you say and I didn’t see anything you wrote. Where did you see him saying » the
only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system «. It looks like your construct of PCT, which can be called RCT. If you are talking
in the name of PCT I think you should prove it wilh some Bill’s defintion or Bill’s writings, as that is now only reference for what is true about PCT or not. You are using PCT as cover for your behavioristic and self-regulation theory. You are almost duplicate
of Carver & Scheier. Why don’t you join them ?

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[MartinT]

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.19.15.28]

Good. Why not imagine that maybe what I have written continues the

same?
The message I sent a couple of hours ago might have an answer to
your question. But here it is again in maybe different words. What I
mean by “control of behaviour” is just the same as what I mean by
“control of” anything else. The control unit has a perceptual signal
corresponding to the thing that is said to be controlled. It has a
reference value for that perceptual signal, and if the perceptual
signal differs from the reference value, an error value goes to an
output function that produces output. There’s no more to it than that. Of course, if control is
successful, the output has effects in the environment that alter the
perception of the thing controlled so that the perception approaches
its reference value. If control is not successful, it doesn’t. But
it is control either way, successful or not. And it doesn’t matter
whether the environmental correlate of the perception is something
you call “behaviour” or something you call “the brightness of a
light” or “the mood of my wife”.
I don’t think anyone on this list disagrees with the fact that only
perception can be controlled. But I think also that most people on
this list also recognize that if controlling perception does not
thereby control things that matter in the outer world, the
controller won’t live very long. Exactly so. One controller acts to disturb a perception the other is
controlling, so that other acts to reduce the error in that
controlled perception. Those acts are its “behaviour”. And that’s
how one controller controls the behaviour of another, as Rick’s
dog-sheep demo shows.
If I disturb a perception at level N, its output changes references
for perceptions controlled at level N-1. So, if I guess right about
some level N perception another is controlling and about how a
disturbance to that perception will affect its output, I am setting
references at level N-1.
Exactly. They aren’t S-R systems. They control as they will. All
these polite requests work only if the other is controlling for
something that is disturbed by the request in such a way that the
corrective action is to accept the request.
Except as I described above.
This is always true.
Controlling is the same, whether it is successful or not. If it is
not, then the controller might reorganize, or if there are other
environmental effordances for that particular perception to be
controlled, the controller might use them. If what I am controlling
for is getting the salt, I might ask someone else, or I might just
reach across and get it. But if I am really controlling for having
the person pass the salt and don’t care about getting the salt, I
might ask why he doesn’t want to, or try other means to get him to
do it. All of them are attempts at disturbing some perception he
controls in such a way as to get the desired perceptual result. It
doesn’t always work, but that’s true of all control.
Not at all. It’s the same both ways. What perceptions the other
person is controlling (or their reference values) may differ in the
two situations, but there’s no difference in what I am controlling,
which is a perception of their behaviour (perhaps as a means of
controlling a perception of where the salt is, reference being in my
hand).
Martin

···

On 2014/11/19 4:31 AM, “Boris Hartman”
( via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

boris.hartman@masicom.net

Martin,

Â

        MT

:

      To me, behaviour is output, but not only at

the level of muscle movements. It is output at ANY level of
the hierarchy. so I agree with Rick. You can and often do
control the behaviour of others.

Â

HB :

          I don't see the connection ? What

outputs on different levels of hierarchy has to do with
»control of behavior« ? What does it mean to »control
behavior« in HPCT and what does it mean to you to »control
behavior« of the others HPCT ? I’m really not used to
such a thinking from you You didin’t seem to me that you
were inclined to self-regulation and behavioristic
terminology ? I’m used to quite precise PCT thinking from
you.

Â

MT :

      Almost everyone (Boris excluded) seem to

agree that the experimenter does control the subject’s
behaviour, and is able to do so only because the subject
continues to control for having the knot where s/he wants it.
Why not for the sheep?

Â

HB:

          I'm not agreeing, not only

because Bill and Rick wrote that LCS environment can’t
control »HPCT« or LCS control and can not be controlled,
but because I think that nobody can’t »control behavior
(output)«. Only »perception can be controlled« in the
sense Kent used terminology for »possible perceptual
collective control«.

Â

          Beside that subject can left

experiment whenever he/she wants. So he/she decides which
perception to control in any moment ? The only who can set
the references is HPCT himself. Nobody others can. Any
other HPCT is just disturbance to other HPCT as any other
disturbance in physical environment.

          And I don't see how anything in

environment could control any HPCT through perceptual
input, although there is ambiguos »arrow« on eleven level
of control hierarchy, showing that maybe reference could
come from outside ? But as far I remember Bill never
allowed that possibilty. So in PCT there is no reference
in control hierarchy that can be set from outside. So the
main problem is : how perceptual input can control
behavior without setting also the reference signal, which
is by PCT logic always formed inside organism ? Could you
use instead of »behavioristic« logic, your precise
mathematical PCT logic and clarify how »perception can
directly control behavior«, output ?

Â

          Also Rick wrote, that subject has

to agree to cooperate in experiment. So whether subject
will cooperate in experiment or not is always by his will
not by the will of experimenter. The same is with the
salt. If you ask somebody to pass you salt and he doesn’t
want to do it, it’s obvious that you request doesn’t imply
behavior of the person that you asked for salt.

Even if he does agree that he
will do what you want, the references are always set
inside control system. It can’t be set from outside,

          so to say that environment

»control behavior« of HPCT. So I think that you can’t say
in any case that environment »control behavior of HPCT«

          . As Kent wrote once, control

stays at controllee. The decission which perception will
be controlled stays always at controlee. If this is not
so, than there are two control mechanisms for »controlling
behavior« :

1.     one when person agree to pass you
salt, and

2.     one when person disagree to pass
you salt.

Â

          But then the same two control

mechanisms exist in the case of »knot experiment«. So if I
understand right »double possibility« for »controling the
person« there is one control mechanism called »control of
behavior« when person agree to pass you salt and the other
mechanism called »control of perception« when person
disagree to pass you salt…

[_Boris_Hartman]

I agree with both of you.

Best,

Boris

···

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of “McClelland, Kent” (MCCLEL@Grinnell.EDU via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2014 6:38 PM
To: bara0361@gmail.com
Subject: Re: Demonstration of control of behavior

Hi Barb,

I’m with you, Barb, especially your conclusion:

The dog perceives that it is causing the sheep to move. The sheep perceives a threat, and moves itself away from the threat and back to the herd. The farmer perceives his well-trained dog (whom he influences with food) keeping his herd together. Goals have been met in each of their minds, tiny though some of those may be, but in no case here are any of them controlling one another.

Exactly. They’re controlling their perceptions of the other organism’s actions, but they aren’t controlling the other organisms or the other organisms’ behavior (whatever that word has come to be defined as in this thread).

I would say that the other organism’s behavior is the control of its own perceptions, and those who perceive themselves to be in control in this simulation aren’t reaching into the other organisms’ perceptual hierarchies and controlling the other organisms’ perceptions.

Rick in several of his excellent publications has made the point that the phenomenon we should really be talking about is control, not behavior as it has been defined by conventional psychologists, and control is always control of perceptions.

Best,

Kent

On Nov 19, 2014, at 9:37 AM, bara0361@gmail.com wrote:

At the end of the second paragraph, I should have said, “…or change our goal or behavior to accommodate that disturbance.”

*barb

On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 7:16 AM, bara0361@gmail.com bara0361@gmail.com wrote:

Forgive me, but I’m struggling to see what is truly at issue. Some of the argument here sounds as if the theory itself is in question. Some of it sounds as if the specific words being used are in question. I’m also curious to see Warren’s quote from Dad in a larger context. Please tolerate my jumping in for a moment and let me know if I’m clear…

Outside disturbances may influence behavior in another control system, but not actually control the behavior of that system. Goals and priorities constantly shift in order to maintain a certain level of accomplishment, satisfaction, etc., conscious or unconscious. When a conflict becomes apparent, something on one side or another of that conflict must change in order to move on. We can either reach our goal despite the disturbance or change our goal to accommodate that disturbance.

I liked Rick’s sheep demo, and admittedly played with it for awhile during a lull at work. The dog has been trained that the sheep should be kept together so it has learned on some level that it can bark and nip from certain angles and the sheep will move away from it. Sheep are wild animals, and generally will move away from what looks like a threat. If the dog is not in the way, it will try to get back to the herd. It looks as if the dog is “controlling” the sheep, and the farmer (me) and the dog appear satisfied that this is what is happening. The sheep didn’t return to the herd because the dog controlled it. To the sheep, the dog was behaving in a threatening manner, and the goal of the sheep was to return to the safety of the herd.

The sheep could have turned rogue and decided it wasn’t afraid of the dog, and kept running away, contrary to what the dog was trying to accomplish. Had the dog remained between the sheep and the herd, the sheep likely would have moved further off.

The dog perceives that it is causing the sheep to move. The sheep perceives a threat, and moves itself away from the threat and back to the herd. The farmer perceives his well-trained dog (whom he influences with food) keeping his herd together. Goals have been met in each of their minds, tiny though some of those may be, but in no case here are any of them controlling one another.

*barb

On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 3:37 AM, Warren Mansell csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

In B:CP where Bill explains arbitrary control, he states explicitly that other people’s behaviour can be controlled, and that this is a major source of conflict:

'… the attempt to make behaviour conform to one set of goals without regard to other goals…that may already be controlling that behaviour–that must already exist, since the behaviour exists…’

Warren

On 19 Nov 2014, at 09:39, Boris Hartman (boris.hartman@masicom.net via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

What a construct.

Where Bill divided environment into physical and social environment with different effects of disturbances and different perceptual signals for living and non-living environment. Show me in any of his diagrams ?

There are just physical variables (distal stimuli) outside which are turned into perceptual signals and which are than all compared in comparator (neurons) inside LCS. What LCS experience is just perception (disturbances), no mater what is causing disturbances in environment and later perception. I also didn’t see in any of his defintions or books divission on physical and social environment. The question is whether environment »controls behavior of LCS or not« ? As I see your writings you say once yes and once no. It’s total confussion.

If you are phylosophing in your name under Bill’s »flag« than you should find a citation that could support your statement in the name of PCT. If you don’t give that proof, I can just conclude that it’s your imagination.

LCS perceive disturbances (turned into perception), no matter who is producing them. And there is no protection against them. There is just conter-action.

Here are some Bill’s defitions just not to forget about which theroy we are talking about. And as far as I can see he is also not talking about »observable facts«. It’s subjective impression, so not something that is »definitelly or objectivelly outside« but something that is subject to human feelings and so on. See how we differently see the same »theme«. So what is here »obervable fact«.

Bill P (BC:P,2005):

DISTURBANCE : Any variable in the environment of a control system that (a) contributes to changes in the controlled quantty (b) is not controlled by the same control system.

ENVIRONMENT (of a control sytem) : All that directly affects the input function of a system and is affected by the output function of the system. See REALITY…

REALITY [Directly perceived] : The world as subjectively experienced, including mental activities, feelings, concepts, as wel as the subjective impression of three-dimensional outside universe. [External] : A directly-perceived set of hypotheses, beleifs, deducations, and organized models purporting to explain directly perceived reality in terms of underlying phenomena and laws. See PHYSICAL QUANTITY.

PHYSICAL QUANTTITY, PHENOMENON : A perception identifyed as part of a physical model of external reality.

I think it’s time that we see some real PCT wording, not just RCT wording. If you will talk what is PCT or what is not you should use PCT wording not self-regulation or behavioristic. As you can see Bill is not mentioning any different meaning for different »stimuli« or »observable facts« that is as it is because you said so…

At least I see it this way. But I don’t see everything as »observable fact«

Best,

Boris

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2014 3:39 AM
To:
Subject: Re: Demonstration of control of behavior

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.17.1840)]

RM: One more thought regarding control of behavior. Perhaps part of the difficulty here comes from the fact hat PCT does show that the environment – the physical, non-living environment – does not control behavior. This is where PCT contradicts those, like Skinner, who believe that the environment does control behavior. Based on his experiments, for example. Skinner concluded that the behavior of organisms is controlled by “contingencies of reinforcement”. That is, behavior is controlled by the rewards and punishments (out there in the environment) that follow particular behaviors.

RM: PCT shows that this is not the case at all; the environment – in the form of stimuli, rewards and punishments – doesn’t control behavior.

HB :

According to upper Bill’s definitions this is all what we need to know.

How could rats knew what is »reward and punishment from Skinner«. Rats just perceive stimuli and control these perceived stimuli as any other stimuli from environment. There is no difference between stimuli from social and physical environment. They are all turned into perception which doesn’t distinguish between stimuli from social or physical environment. Perceptual signal is the same for all stimuli that affect input function. They just distinguish in intensity (frequency) and space code (.

But Skinner was able to control behavior with rewards and punishments – mainly rewards – so what’s going on here? Why would PCT deny that rewards and punishments control behavior? The answer is that PCT let’s us see the wizard that, in this case, isn’t even behind the curtain; the wizard who is doing the actual controlling is in full view but, somehow, never noticed . It’s Skinner who is controlling the behavior using rewards and punishments, not the rewards and punishments themselves.

Rewards and punishments are not control systems; they have no goals for what an organism should do. But Skinner did. Skinner wanted to see a rat press a lever to get food, for example, and he found that he could get the rat to do that using a process called “shaping”, which involves rewarding the animal for making successive approximations to the desired behavior (bar pressing). Skinner was clearly controlling the behavior of the rat, and he did it by varying his actions (giving or withholding rewards) with the aim of getting his perception of the rat’s behavior to be what he wanted it to be.

He could also build machines that could stand in for his controlling; so once the rat had been “shaped” into pressing the bar the machine could take over and give a reward only after a press (or several presses) were made. Of course, the machine is not really controlling the rat either since it would deliver a reward even if the bar were pressed by someone other than the rat. And if the pellet delivery system were jammed the rat would eventually stop pressing the bar and the machine would do nothing to get it back to the bar. The machine can’t perceive the rat’s behavior and act appropriately if it’s not doing what is “wanted”, becuase the machine also has no wants (references).

The point is that PCT shows that the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system. It’s not “the environment” consisting of stimuli ,rewards, or punishments that controls behavior; it is the other control systems in that environment – generally other people – that use stimuli, rewards or punishments to control behavior. And if the controlling is not consensual or if it requires the controllee to do things that conflict with other goals (including the goal of not being controlled) then the controllee might decide to resist the controlling; and then things get ugly.

HB : I never saw in PCT (Bill’s theory) to be pointing to anything you say and I didn’t see anything you wrote. Where did you see him saying »the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system«. It looks like your construct of PCT, which can be called RCT. If you are talking in the name of PCT I think you should prove it wilh some Bill’s defintion or Bill’s writings, as that is now only reference for what is true about PCT or not. You are using PCT as cover for your behavioristic and self-regulation theory. You are almost duplicate of Carver & Scheier. Why don’t you join them ?

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble