I agree with both of you.
···
From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of “McClelland, Kent” (MCCLEL@Grinnell.EDU via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2014 6:38 PM
To: bara0361@gmail.com
Subject: Re: Demonstration of control of behavior
Hi Barb,
I’m with you, Barb, especially your conclusion:
The dog perceives that it is causing the sheep to move. The sheep perceives a threat, and moves itself away from the threat and back to the herd. The farmer perceives his well-trained dog (whom he influences with food) keeping his herd together. Goals have been met in each of their minds, tiny though some of those may be, but in no case here are any of them controlling one another.
Exactly. They’re controlling their perceptions of the other organism’s actions, but they aren’t controlling the other organisms or the other organisms’ behavior (whatever that word has come to be defined as in this thread).
I would say that the other organism’s behavior is the control of its own perceptions, and those who perceive themselves to be in control in this simulation aren’t reaching into the other organisms’ perceptual hierarchies and controlling the other organisms’ perceptions.
Rick in several of his excellent publications has made the point that the phenomenon we should really be talking about is control, not behavior as it has been defined by conventional psychologists, and control is always control of perceptions.
Best,
Kent
On Nov 19, 2014, at 9:37 AM, bara0361@gmail.com wrote:
At the end of the second paragraph, I should have said, “…or change our goal or behavior to accommodate that disturbance.”
*barb
On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 7:16 AM, bara0361@gmail.com bara0361@gmail.com wrote:
Forgive me, but I’m struggling to see what is truly at issue. Some of the argument here sounds as if the theory itself is in question. Some of it sounds as if the specific words being used are in question. I’m also curious to see Warren’s quote from Dad in a larger context. Please tolerate my jumping in for a moment and let me know if I’m clear…
Outside disturbances may influence behavior in another control system, but not actually control the behavior of that system. Goals and priorities constantly shift in order to maintain a certain level of accomplishment, satisfaction, etc., conscious or unconscious. When a conflict becomes apparent, something on one side or another of that conflict must change in order to move on. We can either reach our goal despite the disturbance or change our goal to accommodate that disturbance.
I liked Rick’s sheep demo, and admittedly played with it for awhile during a lull at work. The dog has been trained that the sheep should be kept together so it has learned on some level that it can bark and nip from certain angles and the sheep will move away from it. Sheep are wild animals, and generally will move away from what looks like a threat. If the dog is not in the way, it will try to get back to the herd. It looks as if the dog is “controlling” the sheep, and the farmer (me) and the dog appear satisfied that this is what is happening. The sheep didn’t return to the herd because the dog controlled it. To the sheep, the dog was behaving in a threatening manner, and the goal of the sheep was to return to the safety of the herd.
The sheep could have turned rogue and decided it wasn’t afraid of the dog, and kept running away, contrary to what the dog was trying to accomplish. Had the dog remained between the sheep and the herd, the sheep likely would have moved further off.
The dog perceives that it is causing the sheep to move. The sheep perceives a threat, and moves itself away from the threat and back to the herd. The farmer perceives his well-trained dog (whom he influences with food) keeping his herd together. Goals have been met in each of their minds, tiny though some of those may be, but in no case here are any of them controlling one another.
*barb
On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 3:37 AM, Warren Mansell csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:
In B:CP where Bill explains arbitrary control, he states explicitly that other people’s behaviour can be controlled, and that this is a major source of conflict:
'… the attempt to make behaviour conform to one set of goals without regard to other goals…that may already be controlling that behaviour–that must already exist, since the behaviour exists…’
Warren
On 19 Nov 2014, at 09:39, Boris Hartman (boris.hartman@masicom.net via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:
What a construct.
Where Bill divided environment into physical and social environment with different effects of disturbances and different perceptual signals for living and non-living environment. Show me in any of his diagrams ?
There are just physical variables (distal stimuli) outside which are turned into perceptual signals and which are than all compared in comparator (neurons) inside LCS. What LCS experience is just perception (disturbances), no mater what is causing disturbances in environment and later perception. I also didn’t see in any of his defintions or books divission on physical and social environment. The question is whether environment »controls behavior of LCS or not« ? As I see your writings you say once yes and once no. It’s total confussion.
If you are phylosophing in your name under Bill’s »flag« than you should find a citation that could support your statement in the name of PCT. If you don’t give that proof, I can just conclude that it’s your imagination.
LCS perceive disturbances (turned into perception), no matter who is producing them. And there is no protection against them. There is just conter-action.
Here are some Bill’s defitions just not to forget about which theroy we are talking about. And as far as I can see he is also not talking about »observable facts«. It’s subjective impression, so not something that is »definitelly or objectivelly outside« but something that is subject to human feelings and so on. See how we differently see the same »theme«. So what is here »obervable fact«.
Bill P (BC:P,2005):
DISTURBANCE : Any variable in the environment of a control system that (a) contributes to changes in the controlled quantty (b) is not controlled by the same control system.
ENVIRONMENT (of a control sytem) : All that directly affects the input function of a system and is affected by the output function of the system. See REALITY…
REALITY [Directly perceived] : The world as subjectively experienced, including mental activities, feelings, concepts, as wel as the subjective impression of three-dimensional outside universe. [External] : A directly-perceived set of hypotheses, beleifs, deducations, and organized models purporting to explain directly perceived reality in terms of underlying phenomena and laws. See PHYSICAL QUANTITY.
PHYSICAL QUANTTITY, PHENOMENON : A perception identifyed as part of a physical model of external reality.
I think it’s time that we see some real PCT wording, not just RCT wording. If you will talk what is PCT or what is not you should use PCT wording not self-regulation or behavioristic. As you can see Bill is not mentioning any different meaning for different »stimuli« or »observable facts« that is as it is because you said so…
At least I see it this way. But I don’t see everything as »observable fact«
Best,
Boris
From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2014 3:39 AM
To:
Subject: Re: Demonstration of control of behavior
[From Rick Marken (2014.11.17.1840)]
RM: One more thought regarding control of behavior. Perhaps part of the difficulty here comes from the fact hat PCT does show that the environment – the physical, non-living environment – does not control behavior. This is where PCT contradicts those, like Skinner, who believe that the environment does control behavior. Based on his experiments, for example. Skinner concluded that the behavior of organisms is controlled by “contingencies of reinforcement”. That is, behavior is controlled by the rewards and punishments (out there in the environment) that follow particular behaviors.
RM: PCT shows that this is not the case at all; the environment – in the form of stimuli, rewards and punishments – doesn’t control behavior.
HB :
According to upper Bill’s definitions this is all what we need to know.
How could rats knew what is »reward and punishment from Skinner«. Rats just perceive stimuli and control these perceived stimuli as any other stimuli from environment. There is no difference between stimuli from social and physical environment. They are all turned into perception which doesn’t distinguish between stimuli from social or physical environment. Perceptual signal is the same for all stimuli that affect input function. They just distinguish in intensity (frequency) and space code (.
But Skinner was able to control behavior with rewards and punishments – mainly rewards – so what’s going on here? Why would PCT deny that rewards and punishments control behavior? The answer is that PCT let’s us see the wizard that, in this case, isn’t even behind the curtain; the wizard who is doing the actual controlling is in full view but, somehow, never noticed . It’s Skinner who is controlling the behavior using rewards and punishments, not the rewards and punishments themselves.
Rewards and punishments are not control systems; they have no goals for what an organism should do. But Skinner did. Skinner wanted to see a rat press a lever to get food, for example, and he found that he could get the rat to do that using a process called “shaping”, which involves rewarding the animal for making successive approximations to the desired behavior (bar pressing). Skinner was clearly controlling the behavior of the rat, and he did it by varying his actions (giving or withholding rewards) with the aim of getting his perception of the rat’s behavior to be what he wanted it to be.
He could also build machines that could stand in for his controlling; so once the rat had been “shaped” into pressing the bar the machine could take over and give a reward only after a press (or several presses) were made. Of course, the machine is not really controlling the rat either since it would deliver a reward even if the bar were pressed by someone other than the rat. And if the pellet delivery system were jammed the rat would eventually stop pressing the bar and the machine would do nothing to get it back to the bar. The machine can’t perceive the rat’s behavior and act appropriately if it’s not doing what is “wanted”, becuase the machine also has no wants (references).
The point is that PCT shows that the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system. It’s not “the environment” consisting of stimuli ,rewards, or punishments that controls behavior; it is the other control systems in that environment – generally other people – that use stimuli, rewards or punishments to control behavior. And if the controlling is not consensual or if it requires the controllee to do things that conflict with other goals (including the goal of not being controlled) then the controllee might decide to resist the controlling; and then things get ugly.
HB : I never saw in PCT (Bill’s theory) to be pointing to anything you say and I didn’t see anything you wrote. Where did you see him saying »the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system«. It looks like your construct of PCT, which can be called RCT. If you are talking in the name of PCT I think you should prove it wilh some Bill’s defintion or Bill’s writings, as that is now only reference for what is true about PCT or not. You are using PCT as cover for your behavioristic and self-regulation theory. You are almost duplicate of Carver & Scheier. Why don’t you join them ?
Best,
Boris
Best
Rick
–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
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