Emotion

from [Marc Abrams (2004.01.11.1436)]

[Martin Taylor 2004.01.11.1211]

I go away fro two days and find something like 50 CSG messages!
Marc,

EVERY individual process in a control loop is an S-R process. The
perceptual input function is an S-R process. The comparator is an S-R
process. The output function is an S-R process. It's only when the
loop is completed that we have control. Controlled perception happens
only through the looped interconnection of a bunch of different S-R
processes.

There's no contradiction between controlling perception and the fact
that the perceptual signal is constructed by an S-R process.

I don't think this is quite accurate. I think you mean that each function is
connected by an s->r process and it is the collection of all the functions
in total that provide the loop. That is true, but I'm not talking about
that. I am suggesting that feedback exists _WITHIN_ the input function and
that the production of perceptions requires a _number_ of different
interrelated control processes that ultimately provide us with our
perceptions

You of course bring up a very interesting point. _If_ what you were saying
is true. At what scale would feedback become relevant? Because what you are
saying is that you can view _ANY_ part of a process, and decide it's an s->r
system and you would be right, but it would also indicate an incomplete view
of the entire system, which would also be correct. Which view is more
important? And at what scale? Since there are obviously embedded loops
within embedded loops within still other loops. And looking at any 'chain'
of variables _without_ completing a loop would be considered an 'open loop'
or s->r process. I guess it depends on what your purpose is in the
investigation.

Marc

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.12.0843 MST)]

Marc Abrams (2004.01.10.1837) --

Would you like the _Nervous System_ Word file? Again, it's a 25
page summary that is approx. a 535k zipped file.

Yes, I'd appreciate it, or a URL through which I can get it. I can
accomodate that without going over my message-size limit, which is
currently set at 3 Megs.

As it turns out Rick was correct. We are in conflict. Not because I want to
stand in your spot, but because you are demanding that I stay 100 miles away
from you metaphorically, and I can't. You have ideas and concepts that go
way beyond the "official" PCT model, and I will not 'compete' with you on
CSGnet for your time. The "offical" theory may only be 5 feet in diameter
but you have laid claim to a 100 mile circle.

I haven't laid claim to anything. There is a solid core of theory, some
less solid conjectures, and the rest is either work in progress or a class
of phenomena I still haven't touched, and may never get to. I don't,
however, confine myself to a 100 mile circle. How about everything within a
radius of 13 billion light years? What limits have you set for yourself?

You don't need or want either a physiological model or an emotional model
of PCT.

PCT is a model of human and animal organization. You say I don't need
models of that model. I don't even know what that means.

You already have existing applications in both you want others to test.
Well, I don't think it's gonna happen that way. I have my own ideas that I
like a lot better.Not because they _are_ better, I don't know that yet,
but if I'm going to spend my time, effort, and money, it's going to be on
something I believe in.

What way is it gonna happen? Do you mean you want people to test your model
_instead_ of testing mine? Should they decide against my model without
testing it? I thought that we accepted models by testing them all and
picking the one that predicts best. Also, isn't it a little early to start
believing in ideas that you haven't worked out yet? You seem to be saying
that science consists of stating beliefs and then trying to prove that
you're right. Do the beliefs come before the proofs?

At any rate, I'm just as happy to keep CSGnet peaceable.

Best,

Bill P.

from [Marc Abrams (2004.01.12.1133)]

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.12.0843 MST)]

Yes, I'd appreciate it, or a URL through which I can get it. I can
accomodate that without going over my message-size limit, which is
currently set at 3 Megs.

You got it. 525K. I'll send it right after this

I haven't laid claim to anything.

Sure you have and your entitled to.

There is a solid core of theory, some less solid conjectures, and the rest

is either work in progress or a class

of phenomena I still haven't touched, and may never get to. I don't,

however, confine myself to a 100 mile >circle. How about everything within a
radius of 13 billion light years?

Whatever floats your boat.

What limits have you set for yourself?

Many, and none I need to go into here and with you.

PCT is a model of human and animal organization. You say I don't need
models of that model. I don't even know what that means.

Oh I see, from a model of 'purposeful human behavior' it has turned into a
model and theory of 'human and animal organization'. Will it wash my windows
as well? I _really_ think your overreaching here. But I'm certainly in no
position to judge such things

What way is it gonna happen? Do you mean you want people to test your

model

_instead_ of testing mine?

_Absolutely_ not. First, I have nothing to test, second this is _my_ baby, I
don't expect anyone else to even understand what it is I'm trying to
accomplish yet. There are ay number of ways I might take this and right now
I don't have a clue where I'll be going with it. I have a lot of organizing
to do and many small things to test and put together before I can even think
about _where_ I might want to begin. So this argument of you/me is shear
nonsense. It is not about whose ideas are superior. It's about where I want
to spend my resouces. I have a limited amount of energy, money, and time and
just like you built on Weiner's model, I'm going to build on yours so I
guess you could either be flattered or feel like I'm trying to 'steal'
something from you and be _real_ paranoic_ about the whole thing. It's your
choice, I have no control over how you perceive me and what I'm attempting
to do.

All I know is that you and I have different ideas about how things are
organized & structured. Bill, this is not a crime, ok? Hopefully one day we
will all have a beter idea of what is actually going on through
experimentation and modeling.

Should they decide against my model without testing it?

Wrong question Bill. The question is _WHAT_ should be tested? You have your
ideas and everyone else besides Rick has theirs. We all vary as to what we
feel is important and what isn't. Just because you think something should be
looked at doesn't necessarily mean anyone else does. I really don't expect
_anyone_ else to have my interests. I did, but I realized what futility that
entailed when I understood that I was the only one who really understood
where I wanted to go with all of this. I'm _very_ comfortable with my ideas
and very comfortable with the idea that I'm on a _solo_ mission _until_ I
can provide enough data to convince others that I'm worth looking at. I need
to be able to present my ideas so a 5th grader can understand them and
_then_ I need to make sure that what I have to say wil be of interest to the
audience I',m trying to address. These are all _very_ important questions
that must be answered _before_ I can do _anything_ meaningful with my work.
And quite frankly, it may never reach that stage.

I thought that we accepted models by testing them all and
picking the one that predicts best.

This sounds wonderful but not doable in the real world. I once gave you a
review paper on Olfaction. It tied our ability to perceive taste and smell
on past experience. The paper had 60 cites. B:CP has 72 just to understand
that this review was not based on a whole bunch of hand waving. It took you
about 1 hour to trash it. Did you test the model as it was proposed? I don't
think so. What model of Memory & Olfaction did you use in determing what
role it plays in the construction of perceptions?

Also, isn't it a little early to start believing in ideas that you haven't

worked out yet?

See Bill, this is what I have a _real_ hard time with. If you show me some
data, I'll be more than happy to change a position I hold based on it. But
you have _not_ done that. You tell me that neurologists know nothing about
the nervous system like you do. What data do you have to back up your claim?
I'm open. Skeptical, but open. You claim your hiearchal model represents the
physiological reality of our bodies. _A_ hierarchy, _maybe_. _Your_
hierarchy, kind of doubtful. Not impossible, but I just don't see it. Now,
just because I don't hold a firm unyielding view on something doesn't mean I
can't believe in certain concepts, or _not_ believe in others.

You seem to be saying that science consists of stating beliefs and then

trying to prove that

you're right.

No, that's what you seem to be practicing.

Do the beliefs come before the proofs?

I hope so.

At any rate, I'm just as happy to keep CSGnet peaceable.

I will never be a problem in this area again.

Marc

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.12.1136 MST)]

Marc Abrams (2004.01.12.1133)--

> PCT is a model of human and animal organization. You say I don't need

> models of that model. I don't even know what that means.

Oh I see, from a model of 'purposeful human behavior' it has turned into a
model and theory of 'human and animal organization'.

Who said 'purposeful human behavior?' That was Bruce Gregory, wasn't it?

Will it wash my windows as well? I _really_ think your overreaching
here. But I'm certainly in no position to judge such things.

Judging from these comments, I'd say you're right. At least object to what
I, not someone else, said.

So this argument of you/me is shear nonsense. It is not about whose ideas
are superior. It's about where I want to spend my resouces. I have a
limited amount of energy, money, and time and just like you built on
Weiner's model, I'm going to build on yours so I guess you could either be
flattered or feel like I'm trying to 'steal' something from you and be
_real_ paranoic_ about the whole thing. It's your choice, I have no
control over how you perceive me and what I'm attempting to do.

I agree about the limited resources; I'm feeling stretched right now, too.
Incidentally, I learned about control theory before I ever read Wiener and
Ashby. Wiener and Ashby were not control engineers. Wiener was a
mathematician, and Ashby was a psychiatrist. I learned my control theory
from engineering texts, analog computing, and developing control systems
for medical and scientific uses.

I thought that we accepted models by testing them all and
picking the one that predicts best.

This sounds wonderful but not doable in the real world.

On the contrary, this is how models are selected in all the real sciences.
They are not selected by "believing in them." They either predict well or
predict poorly. It's not hard to pick the one you prefer.

I once gave you a
review paper on Olfaction. It tied our ability to perceive taste and smell
on past experience. The paper had 60 cites. B:CP has 72 just to understand
that this review was not based on a whole bunch of hand waving. It took you
about 1 hour to trash it. Did you test the model as it was proposed? I don't
think so.

There wasn't anything I could see to test that was within my experimental
capabilities, or those of the authors, either.

What model of Memory & Olfaction did you use in determing what
role it plays in the construction of perceptions?

I don't have one outside my general model of how memory is related to
perception.

>Also, isn't it a little early to start believing in ideas that you haven't
worked out yet?

See Bill, this is what I have a _real_ hard time with. If you show me some
data, I'll be more than happy to change a position I hold based on it.

But I don't believe in things first and then set out to prove them. To the
degree that I believe anything in PCT, the belief comes only after I have
proposed a model and shown at least some reason to accept it. I have spent
many years developing concrete demonstrations of the principles of PCT,
demonstrations that anyone can use to verify that the phenomena exist and
work as I propose they do. Even so, what I "believe" is a very limited set
of the things in the demos, and I do not cling to or defend those beliefs.
If challenged, I can go back to the basic principles and observations from
which I derived my proposals, and lay out my reasoning so anyone can check
up on me. It's always possible that I made some mistake that others will
discover, and I try to make it as easy as possible for others to find any
mistakes.

But you have _not_ done that. You tell me that neurologists know nothing
about the nervous system like you do. What data do you have to back up
your claim?

When I get that book, I'll cite chapter and verse. Just one hint. How many
studies have you seen in which a neurologist varied the frequencies of
impulses in a set of signals coming into the dendrites of a neuron, and
measured the output frequency of the neuron's firings? I will predict that
the approximate number is zero. Yet this is the only way to determine the
nature of the analog computation performed by the neuron.

I'm open. Skeptical, but open. You claim your hiearchal model represents the
physiological reality of our bodies. _A_ hierarchy, _maybe_. _Your_
hierarchy, kind of doubtful. Not impossible, but I just don't see it. Now,
just because I don't hold a firm unyielding view on something doesn't mean I
can't believe in certain concepts, or _not_ believe in others.

You seem to think that belief is a virtue. In science, it's a vice that one
is supposed to try to get rid of, especially when trying to develop
something new. Belief shapes our perceptions more strongly than anything
else: given alternatives, we choose the perception that matches what we
believe. Think of what that does do your ability to discover anything
contrary to your belief!

You seem to be saying that science consists of stating beliefs and then
trying to prove that you're right.

No, that's what you seem to be practicing.

>Do the beliefs come before the proofs?

I hope so.

If you don't see the complete contradiction between your last two
statements, I give up. You seem to think that a belief in a explanation
should come before proving that the explanation is correct. I say you
should first show that the explanation is correct (as nearly as you can)
and then decide what degree of belief, if any, to invest in it.

Well, this goes nowhere. Let's move on to other things.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.01.12.1430)]

Bill Powers (2004.01.12.1136 MST)

Who said 'purposeful human behavior?' That was Bruce Gregory, wasn't
it?

I was misled by the title, _Behavior: The Control of Perception_. I
trust the mistake is forgivable.

Bruce Gregory

"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no
one was listening, everything must be said again."
                                                                                Andre Gide

"What is hateful to you, do not to your fellow men. That is the entire
Law; all the rest is commentary."

                                                                                The Talmud

from [Marc Abrams (2004.01.12.1429)]

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.12.1136 MST)]

I say you
should first show that the explanation is correct (as nearly as you can)
and then decide what degree of belief, if any, to invest in it.

An explanation of what? What is the difference between a thought, an idea, a
series of ideas, and a belief?

What does it mean to say or think I _really_ believe in something vs. simply
saying I believe in something?

What does it mean to 'prove' something?

You don't need any literature from me. You should write your own physiology
text and package it with B:CP. Your concept of how a neuron operates is very
creative. I think you can only do justice with your ideas by rewriting the
neuroscience and physiology texts to reflect your deep understanding of the
processes involved. I await with great anticipation the publishing of your
ideas.

And you are absolutely right. It is time to move on. This is going nowhere.

Marc

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.12.1422 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.01.12.1430)--

Who said 'purposeful human behavior?' That was Bruce Gregory, wasn't
it?

I was misled by the title, _Behavior: The Control of Perception_. I
trust the mistake is forgivable.

I said that 31 years ago. You said it yesterday. I think Marc misread the
attribution in you post.

But of course you are forgiven, always.

Best,

Bill P.

from [Marc Abrams (2004.01.12.1833)]

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.12.1422 MST)]

I said that 31 years ago. You said it yesterday. I think Marc misread the
attribution in you post.

But of course you are forgiven, always.

Exactly what has changed in HPCT in 31 years to give it it's new meaning?

Marc

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.12.1932 MST)]

Marc Abrams (2004.01.12.1833) --

> I said that 31 years ago. You said it yesterday. I think Marc misread the

> attribution in you post.
>
> But of course you are forgiven, always.

Exactly what has changed in HPCT in 31 years to give it it's new meaning?

What new meaning? This was always a structural model, a model of physical
organization. That's what all those diagrams in B:CP show: they don't show
behavior, they show how a system is organized. As a result of this
organization, the system behaves so as to control the perceived state of
its environment. That's the long way to say the title of the book.

Call off the lawyers.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2003.03.30.1740)]

Bill Powers (2003.03.30.1655 MST)--

Thanks (also to Bruce G.) for that response, I think we may get further if
we try to get specific (lower-order perceptions), by picking some
particular emotion you have had (better yet, are having, but that might be
difficult) and trying to describe what it was like while you were having
it. That is, describe everything you could notice and now remember that you
were conscious of that had to do with that particular emotion: thoughts,
sensations,feelings, attitudes, anything like that. We can leave
generalizations for later.

For example, the last time I got angry...

I can't recall having any particularly intense emotions resulting from real life
experiences in quite some time. Some things have happened recently that made me
happy but the emotional component of the happiness was not very strong. I just
felt kind of nice.

I guess I'll confess that the strongest emotional experiences I've had recently
have come from watching movies. This happened just last weekend while Linda and I
were watching _Gigi_ (one of our favorites, that happened to be on last
Saturday). It turns out (to Linda's astonishment and, I think, amusement) that I
turn into a weepy bundle of sentimentality every time I watch the scene in _Gigi_
where Maurice Chevalier and Hermione Gingold reminisce about their long past love
affair in the song "Ah yes, I remember it well". I'm getting all choked up right
now just thinking about it. Indeed, one aspect of what I feel when I watch the
scene is "choking up", which is a kind of a shortness of breath. I also start
getting all teary and feel all mushy inside (it's funny, when I start trying to
describe it I lose it, and I obviously lose any ability to describe the experience
articulately).

I don't know what to call the emotion that I feel. Maybe bittersweet joy, which
feels like happiness and sadness all rolled into one oddly pleasant experience.
The cognitive component has to do with my appreciation of people who have loved,
even if they have failed. I love it that Hermione is still fond of Chevalier even
though she knows he's a rogue and that Chevalier still loves Hermione even though
he knows she is the marrying kind. I guess I love the acceptance, the forgiveness,
the love in that scene -- all goals I have for human interaction.

It's interesting to me that it is very hard to be analytic about this emotional
experience. As soon as I adopt an analytic attitude toward the emotional
experience the experience itself goes away. Maybe what's happening is what
happens during MOL; when I look at the controlling that is involved in the
emotional experience the emotional aspects of the experience disappear.

There, now I've confessed one of my most embarrassing secrets (don't even ask
about the last scene in _Music Man_ where the kids turn into a real band). No
wonder I don't do research on emotion. Too personal.

Best regards

Rick

¡¡¡

---
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313

[From Rick Marken (2003.03.30.1845)]

Rick Marken (2003.03.30.1740)

Indeed, one aspect of what I feel when I watch the
scene is "choking up", which is a kind of a shortness of breath. I also start
getting all teary and feel all mushy inside (it's funny, when I start trying to
describe it I lose it, and I obviously lose any ability to describe the experience
articulately).

Quick added note:

As I replayed the scene in memory again after posting I realize that I also feel a
prickly sensation at the back of my neck. The actually feelings I get as I remember
the scene actually change through the scene. The choking up occurs in the early part;
the prickly sensation occurs near the end when Hermoine tells Chevalier that he's not
getting old and what a great lover he was.

Best

Rick

¡¡¡

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313

[From Bill Powers (2003.03.30.202w7 MST)]

Rick Marken (2003.03.30.1740)--

> one aspect of what I feel when I watch the scene is "choking up", which
is a kind of a >shortness of breath. I also start getting all teary and
feel all mushy inside (it's >funny, when I start trying to describe it I
lose it, and I obviously lose any ability >to describe the experience
articulately).

The implication is that simply thinking about the depicted situation is
sufficient to set certain somatic systems to a state you immediately
recognize as a pattern in present time, well enough that you can give names
to the configuration. I assume you're not consciously doing this
adjustment, but that you're hooked up so that when certain errors occur,
the adjustments happen automatically. Does that seem more or less right for
what you experience?

In any case, the question that remains is, "What are the errors about?" The
answer, of course, is none of my business or anyone's but yours. The only
question of public importance is whether you can pin down the nature of the
error, present or past, and satisfy yourself as to what the goal was, and
the discrepancy. If you can, that is all anyone here needs to know. If
there is no error, of course, we'd need to know about that, too.

I cry at movies that have happy endings, but not sad movies. Probably
something similar going on. Unfinished business.

Best,

Bill P.

from David Goldstein (2003.03.30.2231)
About: Re: Emotion

Some statements which I believe are derived from PCT about emotion.

Emotion is a perception related to one's own body state. If a person
does not notice his/her emotions (feelings) then the person is not in
touch with his/her body state for some reason.

Emotion is related to error signals in acquired control systems.
(I am not sure about errors in intrinsic control systems. We may just
feel sick or not well.)

Emotion can exist at different perceptual levels.
Intensity-- It can be strong/weak experience.
Sensation --It is a different kind of sensation than others (visual,
auditory, etc..)
Configuration-- There are different configurations of it, say anger.
Transitions--There are transitions of it, for example, anger can
increase or decrease.
Events-- There are events, anger can have a beginning and ending.
Relationships--It can be associated with specific experiences, which is
a relationship.
Categories-- There can be categories of it, different kinds of anger.

Some things which I tell patients about emotions are:

We can't change emotions directly. We can change the perception or
reference perceptions upon which they are based. Emotions are derived
kinds of things. We can check our perceptions to make sure that we are
correct in our interpretation of the situation. We can check our
reference perceptions to make sure that what we want is within our
abilities to obtain, and is consistent with our higher level perceptions
of who we are.

Emotions are important to pay attention to because they provide
information about how successful or not successful we are controlling. A
person who does not pay attention to emotions is limited in the same way
that Mr. Spock or Data is limited (Star Trek characters).

When emotions become very strong, thinking can become negatively
impacted. The reason is that a person may act based on the strong
feeling or feel an urge to act.

It is very important to slow down, and not act when emotions are strong,
in order to give thinking a chance to enter the picture. Thinking is
associated with higher levels of perception and takes longer to enter
into a person's experience.

That is all for now.
David

When emotions become very strong,
thinking can become negatively

impacted. The reason is that a person may act based on the strong

feeling or feel an urge to act.
About: Re: Emotion

Some statements which I believe are derived from PCT about
emotion.

Emotion is a perception related to one’s own body state. If a
person

does not notice his/her emotions (feelings) then the person is not
in

touch with his/her body state for some reason.

Emotion is related to error signals in acquired control systems.

(I am not sure about errors in intrinsic control systems. We may
just

feel sick or not well.)

Emotion can exist at different perceptual levels.

Intensity-- It can be strong/weak experience.

Sensation --It is a different kind of sensation than others
(visual,

auditory, etc…)

Configuration-- There are different configurations of it, say
anger.

Transitions–There are transitions of it, for example, anger can

increase or decrease.

Events-- There are events, anger can have a beginning and ending.

Relationships–It can be associated with specific experiences, which
is

a relationship.

Categories-- There can be categories of it, different kinds of
anger.

Some things which I tell patients about emotions are:

We can’t change emotions directly. We can change the perception or

reference perceptions upon which they are based. Emotions are
derived

kinds of things. We can check our perceptions to make sure that we
are

correct in our interpretation of the situation. We can check our

reference perceptions to make sure that what we want is within our

abilities to obtain, and is consistent with our higher level
perceptions

of who we are.

Emotions are important to pay attention to because they provide

information about how successful or not successful we are controlling.
A

person who does not pay attention to emotions is limited in the same
way

that Mr. Spock or Data is limited (Star Trek characters).

When emotions become very strong, thinking can become negatively

impacted. The reason is that a person may act based on the strong

feeling or feel an urge to act.

It is very important to slow down, and not act when emotions are
strong,

in order to give thinking a chance to enter the picture. Thinking
is

associated with higher levels of perception and takes longer to
enter

into a person’s experience.

That is all for now.

David
[From Bill Powers (2003.03.31.0553 MST)]

David Goldstein (2003.03.30.2231) –

Very nice expansion on the subject of emotion, I especially like your
reminder that emotion is experienced at various levels – you could have
gone on!

I would suggest one change: you say,

For “emotions become very strong” I would substitute “when
errors become very large.” Strong emotions follow from large errors.
Action based on a very large error can be distorted in the same way that
music can be distorted when the volume is turned up too high. Most real
control systems work best in the mid-range of output; at extremes they
become unstable, imprecise, and too costly to operate. Thinking becomes
distorted simply because of errors beyond what can be corrected. When
this happens, a person may well need some help with bringing the error
down to a more tolerable level. Here I hope it is clear that I argue
partly from experience and partly from theory. No publicly checkable data
except for possible agreements from others doing the same
thing.

Note that I say bring the error down to a more tolerable level. Since
the feelings are a consequence of the error, this will reduce them, too.
Reducing the feelings without also lessening the error will not help much
with the real problem. The person may feel better off without anything
actually having been done to be better off.

Yes, it’s our old argument again.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2003.03.31.0830)]

Bill Powers (2003.03.30.202w7 MST)

The implication is that simply thinking about the depicted situation is
sufficient to set certain somatic systems to a state you immediately
recognize as a pattern in present time, well enough that you can give names
to the configuration. I assume you're not consciously doing this
adjustment, but that you're hooked up so that when certain errors occur,
the adjustments happen automatically. Does that seem more or less right for
what you experience?

Yes, indeed.

In any case, the question that remains is, "What are the errors about?" The
answer, of course, is none of my business or anyone's but yours.

I'm happy to have them be your business too. They're really about things that are
quite prosaic. But if there is any sex and violence in the background maybe it
would help get CSGNet up on its feet;-)

The only
question of public importance is whether you can pin down the nature of the
error, present or past, and satisfy yourself as to what the goal was, and
the discrepancy. If you can, that is all anyone here needs to know. If
there is no error, of course, we'd need to know about that, too.

I was thinking about this and I think the analysis in my original post is close to
what's going on. I said: I guess I love the acceptance, the forgiveness, the love
in that scene -- all goals I have for human interaction. I think the emotion is
created by the art of the scene itself. Perhaps it is most effective for people,
like me, who have the goal of seeing love and acceptance in human interaction. I
think the emotion is created by the scene's initial creation of error in the
systems. In the song Gingold is mocking Chevalier's constant mistakes in how he
remembers the details of their affair; he is conning her and she is having nothing
to do with it. So error is building up in the systems (in me) that are
controlling for seeing acceptance and forgiveness. And I'm probably experiencing
some of the unpleasant somatic side effects of this error. So that is the "bitter"
part of the emotional feeling. And then the song closes with Gingold lovingly
reassuring this charming old rogue that he is still a charmer and that he had been
a prince of love when he was courting her. All the acceptance and forgiveness
errors close up and out gush the tears as the somatic error responses too quickly
dissipate. I think this is called "tear jerking" in the trade and it shows that
you don't need to know PCT to understand how emotions work. Lerner and Lowe
understood how emotions work.

I cry at movies that have happy endings, but not sad movies. Probably
something similar going on. Unfinished business.

I think it's what I describe above. Happy endings reduce the errors built up in
the early part of the film. Sad movies don't let up.

Best regards

Rick

¡¡¡

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Senior Behavioral Scientist
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

I suspect that the major
reorganization that occurs in psychotherapy is

the reorganization of the story we tell about
ourselves.
[From Bill Powers (2003.04.01.1022 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2003.0401.0702)–

That might very well be, but the story we tell about ourselves may have a
large impact on whether we live a good life or a horrible one. What we
accept as true about ourselves becomes the reference condition, whether
it’s the best one possible or not. “Oh, I’ve never been good at
math,” a person says, and therefore doesn’t try to learn it, and
therefore maintains the condition of not being good at math, just like
any controlled variable. The story we tell about ourselves becomes a
description of how we are, if we tell it long enough to accept it as
true. Up to a point.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (2003.03.31.1205 MST)]

Good descriptions of the emotion observations. As Tom Hancock pointed out,
the best observations, though the most difficult, would be made while the
emotion is going on. Keep alert.

Best,

Bill P.

[From David Goldstein (2003.03.31.2133 EST)]

[From Bill Powers (2003.03.31.0553 MST)]

Thanks for your comments.

About your correction of “When error signals become large”
for “When emotions become strong.”

I guess this is correct.

However, the thought occurs to me that if the error signals are strong
enough at the lower levels, the process of reorganization may start. Awareness
may be drawn to the lower levels and a person may experience this as not being
able to think clearly or think at all.

I can remember that for weeks/months after I survived an airplane crash
that I had a hard time focusing on almost everything. It was as if I had lost
voluntary control over what I could attend to. My cognitive machinery really
came to a screaming halt. I had a hard time remembering things. Forget about
reading or writing or understanding very well. This made me realize that
emotions/feelings rule when they are very strong.

I am not disputing the fact that a control system may have a hard time
controlling when the error signals are very large. Sometimes we are exposed to
disturbances that exceed our ability to adjust. I am thinking that if the error
signals are very large and very chronic that reorganization may also come into
play.

¡¡¡

[From Bill Powers (2003.03.31.2034 MST)]

David Goldstein (2003.03.31.2133 EST)--

>I am not disputing the fact that a control system may have a hard time
controlling when the error signals are very >large. Sometimes we are
exposed to disturbances that exceed our ability to adjust. I am thinking
that if the error signals >are very large and very chronic that
reorganization may also come into play.

I agree. This, too, would account for the disorganizing effects of strong
emotions. The same large errors that are producing the strong emotional
feelings (to go with the large cognitive errors) would be expected to cause
reorganization, too.

One more thing. I think you'd agree that people tend to avoid consciously
experiencing large errors/strong negative emotions. This drives awareness
away from the systems with the large errors -- but that is where awareness
is needed, if the postulate that reorganization follows awareness is
correct. Psychotherapists have found empirically that the key to resolving
problems is to bring them into awareness with full affect. That is not a
prediction of PCT; it's the other way around. Knowing this about
psychotherapy is one of the things that led me to guess that reorganization
follows awareness.

Best,

Bill P.

1 Like

[From Rick Marken (2004.03.26.1545)

Peter Small (2004.02.26--

As I understand PCT, it is about trying to eliminate any errors that
occur between the perceived world and a reference world in the mind
that represents the world as you would like to perceive it.

As I see the internal worlds as being created as attractor states,
which are very much influenced by emotional states, I cannot see how
you can eliminate emotions from the theory.

The PCT model of emotion is described in chapter three of Powers' _Living
Control Systems II_ (http://www.benchpress.com/Controlb.htm). I believe that
this chapter will also be reprinted in the second edition of Powers'
_Behavior: The Control of Perception_ when it comes out (hopefully) in a
couple of months, which is where it should have appeared in the first place.

Best

Rick

¡¡¡

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
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Cell: 310 729 1400