Emotions

[From Marc Abrams (2002.11.01.0900)]

[From Bruce Abbott (2002.11.01.0745 EST)]

>Marc Abrams (2002.10.31.1730) --
>
>Nice to see your still with us Bruce.

Thanks, Marc. Same to you!

>. . . I like Bill P's formulation.

Well, nobody's perfect . . . (:->

:slight_smile:

Marc

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.01.0719 MST)]

Bruce Abbott (2002.10.31.1630 EST)--

I've been more-or-less keeping up with the discussion of emotions and agree
with Bill P. that emotions are control phenomena. However, I do have a
very different "take" on the subject.

Well, Bruce, I value your friendship more than I value winning an argument
with you, so I'm sort of handicapped here, but I don't believe a word of
this proposal and I never have, in the fifty or more years since I first
heard it. The basic problem is that it requires built-in systems to know
too much about the world of a single lifetime, and it lacks the required
higher learned systems to carry out actions appropriate to the surroundings
of the moment. The reason I have proposed the model of emotion under
discussion recently is that it doesn't suffer from the shortcomings of the
model you are putting forth; it was intended to solve some of the problems
raised by the idea of innate, yet environment-specific, responses.

But I don't want to argue about this. If my model doesn't strike you as an
improvement, then it doesn't, and I can't do much about that. I don't have
any more experimental evidence that my model is right than you have that
your model is right. The facts we both know about and would agree on would
support either model, because they're too sketchy to force a decision
either way. I can only say that my model strikes me as more economical of
invented entities and unexplained causal relations, and just seems less
ad-hoc. But that's not a scientific argument, just a statement of preferences.

So, I'm running short of friends lately and I think I'll leave it at that.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Marc Abrams (2002.11.01.1235)]

[From Rick Marken (2002.11.01.0815)]

> But what is an insuperable disturbance, if not a conflict.

It is simply a disturbance that is so large that it exceeds the output
capabilities of the control system. For example, I control for standing up

(the

controlled perception) by exerting output forces that counter the

disturbing

forces that would push me over (gravity, the shear and torque forces I

generate

when I walk, etc). But there are limitations in how much force I can

produce. So

if a 100 mph blast of wind suddenly pushes on me with 1000 lbs of force

and the

maximum countering force I can generate is 200 lbs, then I will lose

control of

standing up. A 1000 mph wind is, thus, an insuperable disturbance to

control of

standing up for a person who can generate a maximum of 200 lbs of

countering

force. There is no conflict (internal or external) involved in this

situation.

Conflict (in control theory terms) is a specific phenomenon: it occurs

when at

least two control systems are acting to keep the same variable in

different

reference states. Conflict, as so defined, is not the same as disturbance

(which

can be insuperable) to a controlled variable.

Ok, I understand this, but is insuperable disturbance _alone_ sufficient to
cause emotion?

> _must_ you have physiological reactions to be emotional?

Yes. At least according to the PCT model....

Rick you failed to address the second part of the question. I asked;

_must_ you have physiological reactions to be emotional?, and by "act" I
assume you mean imagining as well.

Rick, this is a _prime_ example of your selectivity in "picking" your
arguments. I find it _very_ frustrating. If you don't know, or have any
opionion, just say so. Ignoring a question is rude and gives the impression
that you respond only to things that can advance your line of thinking.

Another example , in the same post;

You said:

So we feel grief. And we continue to feel grief until we can reorganize and
stop wanting to see the loved one again. That reorganization process is
calledmourning" and it can take one heck of a long time.

I asked:
"OK, but there is nothing here that is physiological. are your sweat glands
producing for the entire duration of your mourning period?, do you cry
_continuously_ throughout the period? My dad died 3 years ago and I still
have lots of moments of "emotional" thoughts. Sometimes I cry, sometimes I
laugh. I quit smoking 9 years ago and there are times I feel the "urge" for
a cigarette. Thank god it doesn't last long:-). I think much more, or lack
of control, takes place in our brain/imagination/memory then in the physical
world."

And maybe should have added What do you think?, at the end, but I thought
that was obvious by the way I said it.

Marc

[From Rick Marken (2002.11.01.1300)]

Marc Abrams (2002.11.01.1235)--

Ok, I understand this, but is insuperable disturbance _alone_ sufficient to
cause emotion?

Yes, in the sense that such disturbances, by definition, make it impossible to
bring a controlled variable to its reference. Emotion results (according to PCT)
when there is loss of control (uncorrectable error) so anything that results in
loss of control, such as an insuperable disturbance, is sufficient to cause
emotion. Actually, when you are in a conflict (intra or interpersonal) the actions
of each control system involved in the conflict (assuming that the gains and
output limits of the two systems are equivalent) are an insuperable disturbance to
the variable controlled by the systems.

> > _must_ you have physiological reactions to be emotional?
>
> Yes. At least according to the PCT model....

Rick you failed to address the second part of the question. I asked;

>>_must_ you have physiological reactions to be emotional?, and by "act" I
>>assume you mean imagining as well.

Rick, this is a _prime_ example of your selectivity in "picking" your
arguments. I find it _very_ frustrating.

I'm sorry. I read what you said -- "and by "act" I assume you mean imagining as
well" -- as a statement rather than a question. If it's a question, then my
answer is "yes, I do mean imagining as well".

Another example , in the same post;

You said:
>So we feel grief. And we continue to feel grief until we can reorganize and
>stop wanting to see the loved one again. That reorganization process is
>calledmourning" and it can take one heck of a long time.

I asked:
"OK, but there is nothing here that is physiological. are your sweat glands
producing for the entire duration of your mourning period?, do you cry
_continuously_ throughout the period? My dad died 3 years ago and I still
have lots of moments of "emotional" thoughts. Sometimes I cry, sometimes I
laugh. I quit smoking 9 years ago and there are times I feel the "urge" for
a cigarette. Thank god it doesn't last long:-). I think much more, or lack
of control, takes place in our brain/imagination/memory then in the physical
world."

Sorry, I was just trying be as brief as possible. You seem to have answered your
own question here, though. The physiological events that we perceive as emotion do
seem to ebb and flow as you describe it. Immediately after the death of a loved
one there is (for me) a huge physiological rush that I experience as an emotion
that I would call "grief". But the physiological reaction apparently dissipates
after a while and, thus, the emotional experience goes down. But sometimes the
physiological reaction returns, especially in situations where I particularly
notice the loss of the loved one. So the error (and associated physiological
reaction and associated grief) comes back only to dissipate again. So the
emotional experience comes and goes during the period of mourning. Eventually I
get to the point where I remember the loved one with fondness but no longer get
the physiological responses that were associated with the initial loss. In that
case, I experience an "intellectual" loss: I miss the fact that the loved one is
longer there to be with but I don't actually experience the emotion. I felt
terrible grief, for example, when my grandpa died 30 years ago. But now I can
think of that wonderful, loving, generous, capable man and feel hardly a twinge of
sadness because he is now comfortably available to me in my memory whenever I want
him. Actually, when I start imagining in detail certain specific things that ol'
"Maxie the Taxi" did for us grandkids I do start to "well up" a bit. I presume
that what I am feeling -- the sappy emotional experience I am having at this
moment-- is physiologically based. I am creating error for myself by imagining
something that I will never be able to experience again; the result is (I presume)
physiological changes that I experience as an emotion that I would describe as
"sadness".

I've got to dry my eyes and get back to work.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.01.1147 MST)]

Marc Abrams (2002.11.01.1235)]
>but there is nothing here that is physiological. are your sweat glands

producing for the entire duration of your mourning period?, do you cry
_continuously_ throughout the period?

Isn't the problem here that we are talking about a word that was invented
long ago, before anyone had any idea of what our good or bad feelings are
or where they come from? Just chase the word around in a dictionary and
you'll see that nobody at least in the dictionary-publishinbg business has
had a clue about what it is; for "emotion," see "feeling." For "feeling",
see "emotion."

The fact is that we have feelings and we have desires and goals; they go
together as part of the operation of the whole human system. I have offered
one proposal for how having goals leads to preparing for action (or for any
required state of being), which leads to feeling-states that we can
recognize and name. Maybe not everyone agrees that this is how it works,
but there is _some_ way that it works; there's no magic involved, nothing
supernatural or otherwise beyond understanding. Nothing outside us causes
our feelings; they arise because of our own control processes (low-level or
high-level or both).

Since _all_ action of any kind requires adjustments in physiological
state,all control processes result in such changes, big or small. We can
feel some of those changes, or immediate consequences of those changes. We
don't need to call them anything else -- they're just how we feel. This way
we don't have to worry whether mourning is accompanied by physiological
states and is therefore "really" an "emotion," or whether one can have an
"emotion" without any change in physiological state. We all understand what
is meant by perceptions, reference signals, error signals, actions, and so
forth. What else do we need, save for the sole purpose of communicating
with people who have not yet learned PCT? Among ourselves, we don't need
the term "emotion" at all -- whatever we want to say can be said clearly
without using that term.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Marc Abrams (2002.11.01.1815)]

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.01.1147 MST)]

The fact is that we have feelings and we have desires and goals; they go
together as part of the operation of the whole human system. I have

offered

one proposal for how having goals leads to preparing for action (or for

any

required state of being), which leads to feeling-states that we can
recognize and name. Maybe not everyone agrees that this is how it works,
but there is _some_ way that it works; there's no magic involved, nothing
supernatural or otherwise beyond understanding. Nothing outside us causes
our feelings; they arise because of our own control processes (low-level

or

high-level or both).

Since _all_ action of any kind requires adjustments in physiological
state,all control processes result in such changes, big or small....

Don't disagree with any of this. My question was and is, is a _thought_ an
action.

It seems to me that we can reduce error through thought alone ( ie without
any physical action ) and as you proposed in Chap 15 of BCP our perceptions.
reference levels or disturbances can come from memory. Am I mistaken in this
belief? Please straighten my butt out. :slight_smile:

Marc

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.01.1350 MST)]

Marc Abrams (2002.11.01.1815) --

It seems to me that we can reduce error through thought alone ( ie without

any physical action ) and as you proposed in Chap 15 of BCP our perceptions.
reference levels or disturbances can come from memory. Am I mistaken in this
belief? Please straighten my butt out. :slight_smile:

OK, in the imagination mode, we can reduce errors just by substituting an
imagined result for the real one, as if we had really corrected the error.
This can be useful when it's not important whether the objective error is
corrected. And of course in some cases, as when you're solving problems in
your head, there isn't any objective error to correct. Yet another case: we
can resolve conflicts sometimes by changing a goal so as to reduce an error
to zero (I decide that it's OK not to convince someone that I'm right).

Is this the sort of thing you mean?

Best,

Bill P.

[From Marc Abrams (2002.11.01.1911)]

from Rick Marken (2002.11.01.1300)]

Thanks Rick.

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.01.1350 MST)]

OK, in the imagination mode, we can reduce errors just by substituting an
imagined result for the real one, as if we had really corrected the error.
This can be useful when it's not important whether the objective error is
corrected. And of course in some cases, as when you're solving problems in
your head, there isn't any objective error to correct. Yet another case:

we

can resolve conflicts sometimes by changing a goal so as to reduce an

error

to zero (I decide that it's OK not to convince someone that I'm right).

Is this the sort of thing you mean?

What is the difference between an "imagined" result and a "real" one as far
as a control system is concerned?

How is an objective error different from any other kind, or is there any
other kind?

How is "importance" determined?

Bill, have some patience please :slight_smile:

Marc

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.01.1519 MST)]

Marc Abrams (2002.11.01.1911)--

>What is the difference between an "imagined" result and a "real" one as
far >as a control system is concerned?

As far as the control system receiving imagined perceptions is concerned,
none. Of course when we imagine, we imagine many perceptions at once, but
not as many as we would experience in the "real perception" mode. So an
imagined experience is never as rich in detail as a real one.

How is an objective error different from any other kind, or is there any
other kind?

If there is a difference between an imagined perception and the reference
level for that perception, I would call that an "imagined error" (somewhat
loosely). An "objective error" would be the difference between a real-time
perception and a reference signal. Presumably, objective errors reflect
something that another person could see. I can see your problem: I didn't
mean imagining an error when there was none.

Example: suppose you're using a joystick to keep a cursor on an erratically
moving target. If you imagine that the cursor is staying on the target, you
won't produce any action because the error in the control system is zero.
But of course since you're not moving the joystick, the cursor that other
people would see will not be on the target (except by chance once in a
while), and there will be an "objective error." I guess "imagined error"
isn't quite the right term, is it?

How is "importance" determined?

I have proposed a definition of "importance" to mean the gain in the output
function of a control system. It's a measure of how much effort you will
generate to correct a given size of error. I mean, of course, the
importance that the person doing the controlling apparently assigns to
correcting the error, not the objective importance in the universe at
large. A person can put out very little effort to control an error, showing
that he doesn't consider it to be important, while that error is in fact
killing him (so someone else might consider it VERY important).

Now you'll tell me I didn't use it that way. Oh, well.

Bill, have some patience please :slight_smile:

For you, Marc, anything.

Best,

Bill P.

[From David Goldstein (2002.11.02.0955 EST)]

Rick said: " I don't understand how an emotion can be thought of as a
control system."

Rick, don't you think people try to control their emotions intentionally? or
without
conscious intentions? (defenses)

A reference to Plutchik is: Robert Plutchik: The nature of emotions

The reference gives a more complete discription.

from a person who happens to like pet monkeys,
David

···

----- Original Message -----
From: Richard Marken <marken@MINDREADINGS.COM>
To: <CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu>
Sent: Friday, November 01, 2002 8:19 AM
Subject: Re: Emotions

[From Rick Marken (2002.11.01.0815)]

> David Goldstein (2002.10.31.2140 EST)--
>
> Each of the basic emotions can be thought of as a control system that
> controls certain experiences.

I don't understand how an emotion can be thought of as a control system.
Personally, I'm much more comfortable with the idea that emotion is a

perceived

side effect of failed control.

> Plutchik doesn't really understand the way a control system
> works, but he comes close.
> The emotion of fear controls for the perception of danger/no danger.

If Plutchik thinks that "fear controls for the perception of danger/no

danger"

then I don't think he is all that close to understanding the way a control

system

works.

> Each of the other emotions can be described in terms of the experience
> controlled.

This sounds more like it.

> Just thought Bruce and the other might like to know about Robert

Plutchik.

> His work is very rich clinically.

It seems to me that there is far more clinical richness in the PCT notion

that

emotion is a side effect of failed control, and that the interpretation of

the

emotion is in terms of the perceptual goal that is not being achieved. It

sounds

like Plutchik might have understood something like the latter, but it

doesn't

sound like he really grasped the former.

Marc Abrams(2002.10.31.2337)--

> But what is an insuperable disturbance, if not a conflict.

It is simply a disturbance that is so large that it exceeds the output
capabilities of the control system. For example, I control for standing up

(the

controlled perception) by exerting output forces that counter the

disturbing

forces that would push me over (gravity, the shear and torque forces I

generate

when I walk, etc). But there are limitations in how much force I can

produce. So

if a 100 mph blast of wind suddenly pushes on me with 1000 lbs of force

and the

maximum countering force I can generate is 200 lbs, then I will lose

control of

standing up. A 1000 mph wind is, thus, an insuperable disturbance to

control of

standing up for a person who can generate a maximum of 200 lbs of

countering

force. There is no conflict (internal or external) involved in this

situation.

Conflict (in control theory terms) is a specific phenomenon: it occurs

when at

least two control systems are acting to keep the same variable in

different

reference states. Conflict, as so defined, is not the same as disturbance

(which

can be insuperable) to a controlled variable.

> >The emotion occurs because there is simply no way to
> >bring the loved one back to life.

> Is this not conflict?

It certainly _could_ involve conflict. But I was describing the simple

case where

you want to be with someone but that is no longer possible because they

have died.

Death is an insuperable disturbance to the perception of that person being

alive.

> _must_ you have physiological reactions to be emotional?

Yes. At least according to the PCT model. Physiological reactions

(accelerated

heart rate and respiration, adrenaline "rush", etc) are presumed to be the

basis

of the perception of the emotion. Whether that perception is called

"fear",

"anger", etc depends (according to PCT) on what you were trying to

achieve.

Best regards

Rick
--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.02.09078 MST)]

David Goldstein (2002.11.02.0955 EST)--

Rick said: " I don't understand how an emotion can be thought of as a
control system."

Rick, don't you think people try to control their emotions intentionally? or
without conscious intentions? (defenses)

Well, I try to control the position of my car on the road intentionally,
but I don't think that the position of my car is a control system. Are you
proposing that perceptions are control systems?

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2002.11.01.0850)]

Bjorn Simonsen (2002.11.02,09:40 EST)]

Also I think emotion is coexisting with conflicts...

I think of emotion _resulting_ form the lack of control that comes from
conflict.

I like Bill P's formulation.

Me too. I kind of think what I have been articulating _is_ Bill P's
formulation.

The concept "insuperable disturbance" is new for me and I don't experience
it compatible with PCT.

It is quite compatible with PCT. Here's a simple, quantitative example. Suppose
you are trying to keep a perceptual variable, p, at reference level r=0. The
controlled perception, p, is proportional to the sum of your action ,o, and
prevailing disturbances, d. So, p = o + d. Suppose that the maximum action you
can produce is 50 and the minimum is -50. So -50<=o<=50. As long as the
disturbance is between -50 and 50 you can keep p under control. So, for
example, when d = -32 you generate an o of 32 and p=32-32=0 = r. However, when
d is >50 or <-50 you cannot keep p under control. For example, when d = -75 the
maximum o you can produce is 50 so p =50-75=-25. So p<>r and there is
considerable error. This error results from the fact that you were unable to
produce output sufficient to compensate for the disturbance and keep p=r. In
fact, any disturbance >50 or <50 is insuperable.

This analysis ignores the dynamics of control but I just wanted to explain what
is meant by "insuperable disturbance". Also, note that to some extent, the
"insuperability" of a disturbance depends on the reference setting, r. If r is
25 then the range of "insuperability" (the range of disturbance values that
cannot be resisted) changes to <-25 to >75 instead of <-50 to >50.

The emotion that occurs when we lose a loved one may be the result of
conflict:

Yes. It may be. But in the case I described there was no conflict. Death is
simply an insuperable disturbance to the perception of someone being alive. In
my example, the disturbance that is death (d) is -infinity.

If the wind is pushing me with ( a more normal) 220 lbs of force and my
maximum countering force is 200 lbs., I still will be beaten down. (Physical
law). In this example there is a chance that I wish to be standing up.
Therefore I see a conflict between the two control systems with references
"I will stand up" and "I don't think I can stand up when the wind is so
strong, but I wish it".

My point is that if we perceive what you name an insuperable disturbance
with a really great value, we don't wish to resist it. And if we don't
resist it, it isn't an insuperable disturbance. There are marginal values of
disturbances. Then there also is a conflict.

My point is simply that large (insuperable) disturbances can create error in a
control system and, hence, emotion. Conflict is not necessary. When someone
dies you don't have to be in conflict about anything to experience the error
resulting from the effect of the death on the perceptions you are controlling.

My point is not that conflict is _not_ a source of error and, hence, emotion.
My point is that _failure of control_ is the ultimate cause of emotion. And
control can fail for several reasons: conflict, overwhelming (insuperable)
disturbance and lack of skill (which I haven't mentioned but is certainly a
familiar source of the emotion called "frustration"; the feeling we get when we
can't sit down at the piano and dash off a Chopin waltz on the first try).

So can you buy that idea? That it's a failure of control (or imagined failure
of control) and the resulting error that causes physiological reactions that is
the basis of the perception of emotion. Conflict is certainly one of the main
causes of failure of control; it is certainly the one of greatest clinical
interest. But emotions also result from overwhelming disturbances to the
variables we control; and it also results from lack of ability to control those
variables.

David Goldstein (2002.11.02.0955 EST)--

Rick said: " I don't understand how an emotion can be thought of as a
control system."

Rick, don't you think people try to control their emotions intentionally? or
without conscious intentions? (defenses)

Yes, indeed. People certainly do try to control their emotions. But in that
case I would call emotion a controlled variable, not a "control system". Maybe
I should have understood that to be what you meant. Sorry.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.02.09078 MST)]

David Goldstein (2002.11.02.0955 EST)--

>Rick said: " I don't understand how an emotion can be thought of as a
>control system."
>
>Rick, don't you think people try to control their emotions intentionally?

or

···

----- Original Message -----
From: Bill Powers <powers_w@FRONTIER.NET>
To: <CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu>
Sent: Saturday, November 02, 2002 11:09 AM
Subject: Re: Emotions

>without conscious intentions? (defenses)

Well, I try to control the position of my car on the road intentionally,
but I don't think that the position of my car is a control system. Are you
proposing that perceptions are control systems?

Best,

Bill P.

[David Goldstein (2002.11.02.1317 EST)]

Bill,

The position of your car is part of (related to input components) of a
control system
that accomplishes this result. The control system is acquired, learned.

I too think that a feeling/emotion is a perception of a person's body state.
I know
that people try to control their feelings/emotions. And that sometimes they
are aware
of it, and sometimes they are not.

When a certain feeling/emotion is experienced, say fear, people have
definite goals with
respect to it (reduce it or increase it) and they have learned ways of
accomplishing it. Some
of the components may be inborn, and some are undoubtedly acquired/learned.

Do you not think that you have within you a control system for controlling
the experience we call
fear?

I don't think that I am understanding the objections raised by you and Rick.

David

···

----- Original Message -----
From: Bill Powers <powers_w@FRONTIER.NET>
To: <CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu>
Sent: Saturday, November 02, 2002 11:09 AM
Subject: Re: Emotions

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.02.09078 MST)]

David Goldstein (2002.11.02.0955 EST)--

>Rick said: " I don't understand how an emotion can be thought of as a
>control system."
>
>Rick, don't you think people try to control their emotions intentionally?

or

>without conscious intentions? (defenses)

Well, I try to control the position of my car on the road intentionally,
but I don't think that the position of my car is a control system. Are you
proposing that perceptions are control systems?

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2002.11.02.1420)]

David Goldstein (2002.11.02.1317 EST)--

I don't think that I am understanding the objections raised by you and Rick.

My only objection was to your wording. You said an emotion is a control system.
I think you must have meant that an emotion is a controlled perception.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.02.1524 MST)]

David Goldstein (2002.11.02.1317 EST)--

>I too think that a feeling/emotion is a perception of a person's body state.

I know that people try to control their feelings/emotions. And that
sometimes they are aware of it, and sometimes they are not.

Not to say you are wrong, but my view is NOT that people try to "control
their feelings/emotions." I think that they try to control various things,
and that when errors get large enough they feel emotions while they are
trying to control those things (not control the emotions). When a person
feels fear while walking too close to the edge of a high place like an
overlook at the Black Canyon of the Gunnison (I speak from experience),
that person, if like me, experiences a very large error concerned with
proximity to the edge. To stay anywhere near the edge creates some very big
errors -- and the immediate uprush of feelings of fear as the brain
prepares the body for a large effort to get away from the edge. But it is
not the feelings of fear that are being controlled -- those feelings are
part of the actions of controlling, in this case controlling the distance
from the edge. You could give me a pill that would suppress all the fear
feelings, and I would _still_ not want to go near the edge. It's the strong
determination to stay away from the edge that leads to the feeling of fear,
not the other way around. If I move back 10 feet (well, make it 20), the
error goes away, and the sensation of fear rapidly fades. The sensations
are still there for a while, but since the error is gone I don't act any
further.

As I say, I'm not claiming you're wrong. But when you agree or disagree
with me, it would be best to agree or disagree with what I actually think.

Best,
Bill P.

[From Bruce Nevin (2002.11.02 16:24 PST)]

The relationships between systems in the 'triune brain' (or however the anatomy is parsed these days) might reconcile these two ideas.

Isn't there research about evolutionarily primitive parts of the brain making fast, stereotyped assessments of their perceptual inputs?

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.01.0719 MST)]

[Abbott's proposal] requires built-in systems to know
too much about the world of a single lifetime

Stereotypes are quick & dirty, and liable to be inaccurate, precisely because the primitive systems that generate them don't know (or need to know) much about the world.

and it lacks the required
higher learned systems to carry out actions appropriate to the surroundings
of the moment.

All these primitive systems do (says the hypothesis) is turn on readiness for action (endocrine system) and focus attention. Maybe some primitive action, like the poor guy running from a grizzly because he hadn't established references beforehand for what to do. Systems that have been developed for controlling more refined perceptions of the world then control perceptions in that region of the perceptual field to which attention is directed, and control is influenced by an 'emotional' predisposition to fight, flee, approach amorously, placate, etc. I see nothing irreconcilable in this.

I can elaborate the grizzly bear story if it's not clear.

         /Bruce

···

At 07:31 AM 11/1/2002 -0700, Bill Powers wrote:

[David Goldstein (2002.11.03.1241)]

Rick said:

My only objection was to your wording. You said an emotion is a control

system.

I think you must have meant that an emotion is a controlled perception.

OK. But does that not suggest that there is a control system involved in the
perception of a feeling/emotion.

I am not a Neuropsychologist, but I seem to remember that there are
subcortical structures involved with the experience and expression of
emotions. And that these subcortical structures are specific to different
emotions. I will look them up and check-out my memory.

I also recall that there are cortical differences associated with different
emotional states as measures by the EEG and QEEG. I will find the reference.

I am not saying that we are very good at controlling the emotional
experiences directly. There are big individual differences.

There are some people diagnosed as Bipolar Disorder who show cyclic
variations in their mood, which are not relateable to environmental stresses
in any direct way. These people seem to be stabilized to some degree with
certain kinds of medications. If there were no control systems involved, why
would the people respond to these medications?

Genetic studies are suggesting that some kind of mood disorders have a
genetic basis, that can be inherited.

What is the theoretical reason for eliminating the possiblity that
feelings/emotions may have control systems.

The Reorganization System is supposed to be activated by intrinsic error
signals. Why couldn't a feeling and emotional experiences be an intrinsic
error signal?

David

···

----- Original Message -----
From: "Richard Marken" <marken@MINDREADINGS.COM>
To: <CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu>
Sent: Saturday, November 02, 2002 5:16 PM
Subject: Re: Emotions

[From Rick Marken (2002.11.02.1420)]

> David Goldstein (2002.11.02.1317 EST)--
>
> I don't think that I am understanding the objections raised by you and

Rick.

Best regards

Rick
--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313

[David Goldstein (2002.11.03.1306 EST)

Bill said:

As I say, I'm not claiming you're wrong. But when you agree or disagree
with me, it would be best to agree or disagree with what I actually think.

When people come to a therapist, they often to not know what is causing
their emotional distress.

I wish it were as simple as telling them to not go near the edge of the
cliff.

The art part of being a good therapist is to figure out where the failure to
control is happening in a person's life. The MOL definitely helps. The idea
that an internal conflict may be playing a role definitely helps.The PCT
view seems to pointing to the perceptual control systems to help people in
emotional distress.

Some people come with the belief that it is better to ignore
feelings/emotions.

This belief runs into problems when the degree of emotional distress becomes
strong enough so that a person cannot concentrate or focus or put together
sentences or understand conversation.

When people reach this point, they are perfectly willing to take
medications, which seem to reduce their emotional distress. This allows them
to work on figuring out what are the problems.

Some medications seem to affect depressed moods, some affect manic moods,
some affect anxious moods, and some angry moods. There seems to be some
degree of specificity between the type of extreme mood and the type of
medication.

The different medications work on different neurotransmitters.

All of the above suggests to me that in cases of extreme emotional distress,
we may have to "calm down" the Reorganization System to some degree. The
danger to self or danger to others becomes high too allow the trial and
error solution of the Reorganization System. The person's discomfort level
becomes too great. Individual therapy is impossible or difficult under the
extreme emotional distress cases.

All of the therapy suggestions of PCT seem directed at the perceptual
control systems. If a person comes to a therapist earlier in the process,
before the distress becomes too great, this seems to be the best approach.

Are there any PCT suggestions for working with the Reorganization System
directly?

David

···

----- Original Message -----
From: "Bill Powers" <powers_w@FRONTIER.NET>
To: <CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu>
Sent: Saturday, November 02, 2002 5:53 PM
Subject: Re: Emotions

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.02.1524 MST)]

David Goldstein (2002.11.02.1317 EST)--

>I too think that a feeling/emotion is a perception of a person's body

state.

>I know that people try to control their feelings/emotions. And that
>sometimes they are aware of it, and sometimes they are not.

Not to say you are wrong, but my view is NOT that people try to "control
their feelings/emotions." I think that they try to control various things,
and that when errors get large enough they feel emotions while they are
trying to control those things (not control the emotions). When a person
feels fear while walking too close to the edge of a high place like an
overlook at the Black Canyon of the Gunnison (I speak from experience),
that person, if like me, experiences a very large error concerned with
proximity to the edge. To stay anywhere near the edge creates some very

big

errors -- and the immediate uprush of feelings of fear as the brain
prepares the body for a large effort to get away from the edge. But it is
not the feelings of fear that are being controlled -- those feelings are
part of the actions of controlling, in this case controlling the distance
from the edge. You could give me a pill that would suppress all the fear
feelings, and I would _still_ not want to go near the edge. It's the

strong

determination to stay away from the edge that leads to the feeling of

fear,

not the other way around. If I move back 10 feet (well, make it 20), the
error goes away, and the sensation of fear rapidly fades. The sensations
are still there for a while, but since the error is gone I don't act any
further.

Best,
Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2002.11.03.1100)]

David Goldstein (2002.11.03.1241)--

> My only objection was to your wording. You said an emotion is a control
system.
> I think you must have meant that an emotion is a controlled perception.

OK. But does that not suggest that there is a control system involved in the
perception of a feeling/emotion.

I am not a Neuropsychologist, but I seem to remember that there are
subcortical structures involved with the experience and expression of
emotions. And that these subcortical structures are specific to different
emotions. I will look them up and check-out my memory.

I think that people _do_ try to control perceptions of emotion. But I think
this, not because of any neurophysiological evidence but because I have
experienced this phenomenon myself. I have tried to control my own emotional
perceptions, like sadness, in the sense that I've wanted them to go away. So at
least one person (me) has tried to control the perception of emotional
feelings directly. This kind of control is most evident to me when I am _not_
conscious of the actual cause of the emotion (in the sense that I don't know
what perception I'm failing to control). So when I feel sadness but don't know
why my first inclination is just to make the sadness go away. Of course, my
ability to actually control my emotional experience is rather poor. Successful
control of the emotion requires, first, identification of the perception I'm
not successfully controlling (perhaps I'm not getting enough attention from my
wife, say) and, second, identification of the reason for the failure of control
(internal conflict, insuperable disturbance or skill failure).

So I agree that people do try to control their emotions. But I think they can
do that successfully only by identifying the failure of control and the reason
thereof (which is what, I think, therapy helps with). I suppose they can also
control emotions with drugs and alcohol but that doesn't really get at the root
of the problem, which is failure to control.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313