Emotions

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.03.17309 MST)]

Rick Marken (2002.11.03.1100)--

>I think that people _do_ try to control perceptions of emotion. But I think

this, not because of any neurophysiological evidence but because I have
experienced this phenomenon myself. I have tried to control my own emotional
perceptions, like sadness, in the sense that I've wanted them to go away.
So at least one person (me) has tried to control the perception of emotional
feelings directly. This kind of control is most evident to me when I am _not_
conscious of the actual cause of the emotion (in the sense that I don't know
what perception I'm failing to control). So when I feel sadness but don't
know why my first inclination is just to make the sadness go away. Of
course, my ability to actually control my emotional experience is rather
poor. Successful control of the emotion requires, first, identification of
the perception I'm not successfully controlling (perhaps I'm not getting
enough attention from my wife, say) and, second, identification of the
reason for the failure of control (internal conflict, insuperable
disturbance or skill failure).

You make an important point, Rick. You remind me that since emotions are
perceptions, we do indeed sometimes try to control them as if they
themselves are a problem. But the emotional feelings will not go away until
the frustration of control from which they arise is remedied. I think what
most people mean when they talk about controlling their emotions is setting
up an internal conflict to hide the fact (from others or from themselves)
that they are afraid, angry, or whatever. This, of course, further
frustrates whatever it is they want to do. It's like trying to fix the
horrible noise your car makes when you start it by removing the battery.

David G. (2002.11.03.1306 EST) makes the point that sometimes the emotional
state is so extreme that chemical means are needed to calm things down
enough to accomplish psychotherapy. As he knows, I am deeply suspicious of
the claims made by the pill-pushers, though I grudgingly admit that there
could be cases where he is right. I have seen (and others have too) abrupt
changes in emotional state during the MOL, just upon changing the point of
view -- I doubt that any pill could have worked any faster in the cases
I've seen. Have you seen that, too, David?

Best,

Bill P.

[David Goldstein (2002.11.03.1957 EST)]

Rick: Thanks for describing your personal experience. It is consistent with
what I see with the people who come to see me. One of the goals of people is
that they just want to feel better. It is a struggle to get them to accept
the PCT idea that if they have better control over their life they will feel
better.

Bill: For people with severe anxiety or depression problems, which are
generalized over a wide range of situations and people, I have not seen the
significant change that you talk about from doing the MOL.

There is a young man I am seeing now, in his 20s, who is a very bright guy
(almost 1600 on GREs), and who has a social anxiety problem. I have been
teaching him PCT. He is taking a year off from college because of the
anxiety problems. He recently started to work in a supermarket as a stacker.
The first day, he had severe anxiety symptoms. We did the MOL, and
identified a conflict at the highest levels. He wanted to focus his
awareness inwardly, but he wanted to focus his awareness outwardly in order
to do the job. This is a general pattern we see over and over in his case.

The next session, after the MOL session, we continued the discussion to
social interactions in general. He can notice when he is switching from an
internal to an external focus. He doesn't know why.

He uses the ideas of PCT and technique of MOL to help him come out of
depressed moods. He is doing this more and more sucessfully.

However, the biggest mood change within a session came after I used HEG
Biofeedback. This involves an infrared sensor that picks up heat from the
frontal lobe of the brain. During the session, he was able to increase the
readings, which reflect increase heat, and presumedly increased activity in
the frontal lobes. He noticed that with a 15 or 20 minute session, his mood
was less depressed, and less anxious. I think of HEG Biofeedback and other
Biofeedback modalities as working more directly with the Reorganization
system.

There is no doubt in this case that the PCT approach is very compatible with
his pursuit of experiences and exploration of awareness. In the past he has
used drugs to explore his experiences. He has a classification system for
the different kinds of drugs he has used. He is very happy to know PCT and
has been looking for a theory like this for a very long time.

David,
I would just like to say I have found your posts very relevant and
refreshing from an onlooker perspective. I have found them plain english
applications or discussions of the theory.

I am one who is part of the list and is looking for insights into how to
apply this theory to a broader field in PhD research. My interest is not as
much in developing PCT as a science, while a very relevant and noteworthy
task, but apply it to a field of established study to hopefully provide
insights and developments to this field they are not aware of.

Discussion seem to always spiral into science type questions (and intense
critic that goes with it), and debate about things PCT has already
established(?). It would be great if could hear more about PCT application
and use of methodogy in a plain english way rather than algorithms. I know
many love it, but its hard to follow if you haven't got that understanding
yet and are not really sure if you want to go there.

I suppose I'm just saying what I am controlling for in regards to staying
with the list.

Cheers Rohan

···

-----Original Message-----
From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
[mailto:CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu]On Behalf Of David Goldstein
Sent: Monday, November 04, 2002 12:29 PM
To: CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu
Subject: Re: Emotions

[David Goldstein (2002.11.03.1957 EST)]

Rick: Thanks for describing your personal experience. It is consistent with
what I see with the people who come to see me. One of the goals of people is
that they just want to feel better. It is a struggle to get them to accept
the PCT idea that if they have better control over their life they will feel
better.

Bill: For people with severe anxiety or depression problems, which are
generalized over a wide range of situations and people, I have not seen the
significant change that you talk about from doing the MOL.

There is a young man I am seeing now, in his 20s, who is a very bright guy
(almost 1600 on GREs), and who has a social anxiety problem. I have been
teaching him PCT. He is taking a year off from college because of the
anxiety problems. He recently started to work in a supermarket as a stacker.
The first day, he had severe anxiety symptoms. We did the MOL, and
identified a conflict at the highest levels. He wanted to focus his
awareness inwardly, but he wanted to focus his awareness outwardly in order
to do the job. This is a general pattern we see over and over in his case.

The next session, after the MOL session, we continued the discussion to
social interactions in general. He can notice when he is switching from an
internal to an external focus. He doesn't know why.

He uses the ideas of PCT and technique of MOL to help him come out of
depressed moods. He is doing this more and more sucessfully.

However, the biggest mood change within a session came after I used HEG
Biofeedback. This involves an infrared sensor that picks up heat from the
frontal lobe of the brain. During the session, he was able to increase the
readings, which reflect increase heat, and presumedly increased activity in
the frontal lobes. He noticed that with a 15 or 20 minute session, his mood
was less depressed, and less anxious. I think of HEG Biofeedback and other
Biofeedback modalities as working more directly with the Reorganization
system.

There is no doubt in this case that the PCT approach is very compatible with
his pursuit of experiences and exploration of awareness. In the past he has
used drugs to explore his experiences. He has a classification system for
the different kinds of drugs he has used. He is very happy to know PCT and
has been looking for a theory like this for a very long time.

[From Dick Robertson, 2002.11.05.1610CST]

Bill Powers wrote:

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.03.17309 MST)]

Rick Marken (2002.11.03.1100)--

>I think that people _do_ try to control perceptions of emotion. But I think
>this, not because of any neurophysiological evidence but because I have
>experienced this phenomenon myself. I have tried to control my own emotional
>perceptions, like sadness, in the sense that I've wanted them to go away.

Well, doggone it. I think there is another firestorm of semantic confusion
arising here as it does on CSGnet. I do have experiences similar to that Rick
describes here. And they involve perceptions of "emotions" in the sense of what
are also often called "feelings" especially by us shrinks. But there are other
defintions of emotions that need to be distinguished. Sometimes the word refers
to what seem like preprogrammed outputs coming from lower ("instinctive" ?) brain
centers along the lines that Bruce Abbott was pointing out, if I didn't
misinterpret what he was saying in his recent post. When it is said that someone
"snapped" (a new trendy description of behavior that seems more of a preprogrammed
sequence of violent actions than of conscious intent and execution) this is often
termed an emotional expression or an emotional outburst. One could argue that
such action is also an output to control some unbearable _feeling_, but it could
also be aiming to control the perception of a perceived source of disturbance to a
value = 0, i.e. "kill, kill.."

I sure would love to see that old scientific motto, "Define your terms," in play
in these discussions.

You make an important point, Rick. You remind me that since emotions are
perceptions,

under one definition, dammit.

we do indeed sometimes try to control them as if they
themselves are a problem. But the emotional feelings will not go away until
the frustration of control from which they arise is remedied. I think what
most people mean when they talk about controlling their emotions is setting
up an internal conflict to hide the fact (from others or from themselves)
that they are afraid, angry, or whatever. This, of course, further
frustrates whatever it is they want to do. It's like trying to fix the
horrible noise your car makes when you start it by removing the battery.

Oh, good enough

David G. (2002.11.03.1306 EST) makes the point that sometimes the emotional
state is so extreme that chemical means are needed to calm things down
enough to accomplish psychotherapy. As he knows, I am deeply suspicious of
the claims made by the pill-pushers, though I grudgingly admit that there
could be cases where he is right. I have seen (and others have too) abrupt
changes in emotional state during the MOL, just upon changing the point of
view -- I doubt that any pill could have worked any faster in the cases
I've seen. Have you seen that, too, David?

As usual David sticks his neck out, experimenting around to find things that work
in the world, and comes up with some fascinating tryouts. Go for it David.

···

Best, Dick R.

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2003.12.13.1042)]

If I understand Martin correctly, we can say that the HPCT model
incorporates emotions, but emotions are controlled indirectly as the
side effects of perceptual control. To the extent that we control
perceptions in order to indirectly control emotions, I suppose it is
O.K. to think of emotions as "motivators" of actions.

Bruce Gregory

"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no
one was listening, everything must be said again."

                                                                                Andre Gide

[From Bill Powers (2003.12.13.0851 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2003.12.13.1042)--

If I understand Martin correctly, we can say that the HPCT model
incorporates emotions, but emotions are controlled indirectly as the
side effects of perceptual control. To the extent that we control
perceptions in order to indirectly control emotions, I suppose it is
O.K. to think of emotions as "motivators" of actions.

I think that perceived emotions can also be intended objects of control,
rather than just being side-effects. At least according to my proposed
theory of emotion (I don't know how many participants here accept it), when
there are error signals, the resulting outputs are distributed both to
behavioral systems and to somatic systems that govern body states. The
resulting changes in body states are sensed as feelings that, in
combination with the kind of goal involved, we learn to perceive as emotions.

Some people really don't like to feel emotions (even good ones), and will
adjust their actions to minimize such experiences. Others really revel in
their emotions (even bad ones) and behave so as to have them as often as
possible. So perceptions of emotions can certainly be controlled.

One popular theory of emotion is that environmental events can directly
cause emotions which then become causes of behavior. I think this theory is
mistaken, I would say that lower-order control processes initiate actions
and changes in bodily state when disturbances occur, and this leads to
changes in feeling states which higher-order systems may experience only
after the fact. So that makes it seem, from the higher-order point of view,
that the emotion was externally caused, since the higher-order system did
nothing to produce an emotion. The automatic opposition to a disturbance,
with accompanying feelings, is mistaken for a stimulus-response effect, so
it seems that the disturbance caused the feelings. Since the actions arose
at the same time and continued afterward, the feelings are seen as the
cause of the actions. I claim that this is just a misinterpretation of a
control action involving significant preparation for physical effort.

A "motivator" is something that causes movement or action. In PCT, the only
direct motivator is the error signal in a control system. Indirectly,
reference signals can seem to act as motivators, although the amount and
direction of any action also depends on the state of the corresponding
perception. Likewise, disturbances can seem to act as motivators, since
they normally produce actions having opposing effects on controlled variables.

Since the term motivation can mean many different things, I think it would
be better to drop the term and use the more specific PCT analysis.
Actually, I recommend the same treatment of the word emotion.

I do not expect my recommendations to have the slightest effect.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2003.12.13.1234)]

Bill Powers (2003.12.13.0851 MST)

Bruce Gregory (2003.12.13.1042)--

If I understand Martin correctly, we can say that the HPCT model
incorporates emotions, but emotions are controlled indirectly as the
side effects of perceptual control. To the extent that we control
perceptions in order to indirectly control emotions, I suppose it is
O.K. to think of emotions as "motivators" of actions.

I think that perceived emotions can also be intended objects of
control,
rather than just being side-effects.

Perhaps side effects is not the proper term. I was using it in the
sense that we do not control our perception of hunger, for example, by
direct action on hunger, but by the indirect action of eating. (Indeed
we sometimes eat without even being hungry to indirectly control other
feelings.) I do not disagree with your analysis.

A "motivator" is something that causes movement or action. In PCT, the
only
direct motivator is the error signal in a control system. Indirectly,
reference signals can seem to act as motivators, although the amount
and
direction of any action also depends on the state of the corresponding
perception. Likewise, disturbances can seem to act as motivators, since
they normally produce actions having opposing effects on controlled
variables.

I was using the term colloquially.

Since the term motivation can mean many different things, I think it
would
be better to drop the term and use the more specific PCT analysis.
Actually, I recommend the same treatment of the word emotion.

I was trying to address Marc's concern.

I do not expect my recommendations to have the slightest effect.

A clear example of learning! Nevertheless, I think it is worthwhile to
attempt to understand common terms such as motivation and emotion in
HPCT terms.

Bruce Gregory

"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no
one was listening, everything must be said again."

                                                                                Andre Gide

[From Bill Powers (2003.12.13.1048 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2003.12.13.1234)--

A clear example of learning! Nevertheless, I think it is worthwhile to
attempt to understand common terms such as motivation and emotion in
HPCT terms.

You're right, of course. The problem we keep running into when trying to
translate is that the common terms have multiple meanings in HPCT, and the
meanings don't necessarily have anything to do with each other. Recall the
discussion of learning. Learning can mean reorganization, or memorization,
or application of an algorithm (say, a method of study), and probably other
meanings too. In common language, people can discuss "learning" without
establishing which meaning is intended, and so think they are talking about
the same thing when they aren't. For other terms, consider "control",
"perception," and "intention," which all have multiple meanings in common
language.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2003.12.13.1100)]

Bruce Gregory (2003.12.13.1234)--

Perhaps side effects is not the proper term. I was using it in the
sense that we do not control our perception of hunger, for example, by
direct action on hunger, but by the indirect action of eating.

I think the perception of hunger is a controlled perception like any
other controlled perception: we act (in the case of hunger, by eating)
to keep the perception at the reference (usually at zero, in the case
of hunger, though I do act on occasion to keep hunger greater than
zero, like prior to a Thanksgiving meal).

I don't think hunger is controlled any more indirectly than any other
perception. For example, we control the optical angle of a fly ball,
not by doing anything directly to the ball or the ball's image, but by
moving our legs. I think the same applies to emotions as well, when
they are objects of control: we control other perceptions (as in the
case of hunger, where we control the perception of food and catching
fly balls, where we control leg movements) as the means of controlling
the emotion.

Since the term motivation can mean many different things, I think it
would be better to drop the term and use the more specific PCT
analysis.
Actually, I recommend the same treatment of the word emotion.

I was trying to address Marc's concern.

What is Marc's concern?

Best regards

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[From Bruce Gregory (2003.12.13.1525)]

Rick Marken (2003.12.13.1100)

I think the perception of hunger is a controlled perception like any
other controlled perception: we act (in the case of hunger, by eating)
to keep the perception at the reference (usually at zero, in the case
of hunger, though I do act on occasion to keep hunger greater than
zero, like prior to a Thanksgiving meal).

Yes, perhaps the distinction I was making is not useful.

I was trying to address Marc's concern.

What is Marc's concern?

He seemed to be saying that the HPCT model of perceptions fails to
incorporate emotions and imagination.

Bruce Gregory

"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no
one was listening, everything must be said again."

                                                                                Andre Gide

[From Rick Marken (2003.12.13.1400)]

This is so fun. I'm posting from my public library!

Bruce Gregory (2003.12.13.1525)]

I was trying to address Marc's concern.

What is Marc's concern?

He seemed to be saying that the HPCT model of perceptions fails to
incorporate emotions and imagination.

Why not just refer him to B:CP (Chapter 13 which includes discussion of
imagination) and LCS II (Chapter on Emotion)? I think he can get copies at
the library!

Best regards

Rick

[From Bill Williams 13 December 2003 5:17 PM CST]

Rick says,

Why not just refer him to B:CP (Chapter 13 which includes discussion of
imagination) and LCS II (Chapter on Emotion)? I think he can get copies at
the library!

It all depends upon what you wish to acomplish, doesn't it?

Bill Williams

[From Rick Marken (2003.12.13.1610)

Bill Williams (13 December 2003 5:17 PM CST)

Rick says,

Why not just refer him to B:CP (Chapter 13 which includes discussion
of
imagination) and LCS II (Chapter on Emotion)? I think he can get
copies at
the library!

It all depends upon what you wish to acomplish, doesn't it?

I suppose.

I answered as I did because Bruce Gregory (2003.12.13.1525) had said
that Marc Abrams was concerned about the fact that:

the HPCT model of perceptions fails to incorporate emotions and
imagination.

So it seems that what Marc wants to accomplish is a wonderful thing:
saving HPCT from failure by incorporating emotions and imagination into
it. What I want to accomplish is saving Marc from unnecessary effort
since what he wants to accomplish has already been accomplished.
Saving HPCT by incorporating emotions and imagination into it would be
like saving _Romeo and Juliet_ by incorporating a Friar and Nurse into
it. They're already incorporated.

Best regards

RIck

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[From Bill Powers (2003.12.14.0751 MST)]
Something I keep meaning to say about emotions, but keep forgetting to
say:
We often treat negative-emotion problems as if the feelings were
the problem: “If I could just get rid of this feeling of anger, I
could get along with people.” But according to the theory I have
proposed, the feeling is not the problem: the goal is. What we should
think instead is “If I could just get rid of this goal of destroying
people who disagree with me, I wouldn’t feel angry all the time and I
could get along with people.”

The goal is the problem, not the feeling.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2003.12.14.0855)]

Bill Powers (2003.12.14.0751 MST)--

Something I keep meaning to say about emotions, but keep forgetting to say:

We often treat negative-emotion problems as if the feelings were the problem: "If I could just get rid of this feeling of anger, I could get along with people." But according to the theory I have proposed, the feeling is not the problem: the goal is.

I think this is true of so many human problems. From a PCT perspective, anyway. Conflict is certainly another example, where the problem is the goal, not the perception.

What we should think instead is "If I could just get rid of this goal of destroying people who disagree with me, I wouldn't feel angry all the time and I could get along with people."

I still like my earlier suggestion: "You can't always want what you want". I agree that this might appeal most to those of us of Sir Mick's generation.

Another possibility, for all generations, might be: "It is the cause. It is the cause. My goal".

Best regards

Rick

···

----

Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[From Rick Marken (2003.12.14.1320)]

Marc Abrams (2003.12.14.1426)--

Rick Marken (2003.12.13.1400)--

Bruce Gregory (2003.12.13.1525)]

What is Marc's concern?

He seemed to be saying that the HPCT model of perceptions fails to
incorporate emotions and imagination.

Why not just refer him to B:CP (Chapter 13 which includes discussion of
imagination) and LCS II (Chapter on Emotion)? I think he can get copies at
the library!

First, If I did read Chap. 13 it wouldn't b e about imagination. It would be about the higher levels, Chap _15_ is the one on memory and since your in the library maybe you should double-check it yourself.

Oops. You're right. I was doing it from memory. But at least you see that imagination is part of HPCT.

Second, _which_ one of the several scenario's Bill has speculated on should I use in the model?

Depends on what you're trying to model. Look at Bill's discussion of how he went about building the hierarchical model of agents in the Crowd demo. Which imagination "scenario" you use in a model depends on what you want the model to do, that is, what phenomenon you're trying to explain with the model.

The chapter in LCS II on emotions, B:CP's 'forgotten' chapter, is really a fascinating and I think terrific chapter, it really ties B:CP together.

I think so too. So you see that emotion, too, is part of HPCT.

I hope you're no longer concerned about the presumed failure of HPCT to incorporate emotion and imagination. It looks like you can see that it does incorporate them.

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[From Bill Powers (2003.12.14.1543 MST)]

Marc Abrams (2003.12.14.1426)–

Bill, In LCS II, The
'hidden’chapter of B:CP, That is Chap. 26 on Emotions.

How current are those thoughts? I mean all of the material you
presented

in that chapter. It goes quite a bit beyond emotions and I think
it’s

pertinent to this thread.

In that chapter (written, remember, some time before 1973), I proposed
that emotions were perceived intrinsic error signals. I have doubts about
that now, but the answer will depend on just how reorganization proves to
work. If there are reorganizing control systems at the level of intrinsic
variables like blood pressure and glucose concentration, it would be
pretty unlikely that anything about the reorganizing system (other
than its effects) would ever appear in consciousness.
In Martin’s discussion of reorganization, which I think is probably the
best statement to date, it was made clear that what we experience when
there is intrinsic error is most probably not the actual intrinsic error,
but some physical condition that depends on it. For example, when blood
glucose is low, we don’t experience low blood glucose, but sensations we
can learn to recognize as symptomatic of hypoglycemia (weakness,
dizziness, whatever – I don’t know the real list). We may not know,
initially, what is causing those sensations, so we don’t know how to make
them go away. But reorganization will commence because of the
hypoglycemia (not because of the perceived symptoms), and will stop only
when we do something that restores glucose concentration to
normal. Then the symptoms will disappear. After that, when those symptoms
appear we control them by doing what we did before, but of course we
don’t know (except intellectually) that the essential effect is to
increase glucose concentration. We think we eat a candy bar to cure the
feeling of weakness, when what we’re really doing is bringing the glucose
concentration closer to its reference level. Since we do this as soon as
we get the sensations, reorganization doesn’t have a chance to start
up.

That’s one possible view based on the idea that the reorganizing system
works strictly behind the scenes at a level below that of the neuromotor
hierarchy.

It is also possible that the reorganizing process is a brain function and
is potentially accessible to consciousness. In that case at least some of
the intrinsic error signals might become part of direct experience. I
don’t like that much any more, but I can’t rule it out.

The big question remains how to set up experiments that could test any of
these hypotheses. It’s good to get the statement of theory laid out in as
self–consistent a way as possible, but that simply tells us what kinds
of experiments are needed to test the theory. The subjective experiences
from which the initial model was constructed have to be replaced by more
formal procedures eventually.

Best,

Bill P.

This is Phil Runkel on 14 Dec replying to Bill Powers's 2003.12.14.1543
MST:

Bill, thanks for the update on emotions.

Blank
From [Marc Abrams (2003.12.14.1426)]

[From Rick Marken (2003.12.13.1400)]

Bruce Gregory (2003.12.13.1525)]

I was trying to address Marc’s concern.

What is Marc’s concern?

He seemed to be saying that the HPCT model of perceptions fails to
incorporate emotions and imagination.

Why not just refer him to B:CP (Chapter 13 which includes discussion of
imagination) and LCS II (Chapter on Emotion)? I think he can get copies at
the library!

First, If I did read Chap. 13 it wouldn’t b e about imagination. It would be about the higher levels, Chap 15 is the one on memory and since your in the library maybe you should double-check it yourself.

Second, which one of the several scenario’s Bill has speculated on should I use in the model? He wasn’t quite sure himself. In fact if I remember correctly, at one conference Dag proposed a memory model without ‘switches’ in it. When was the last time you read that chapter? What is your recommendation(s)? I know what Bill’s is

Third, The chapter in LCS II on emotions, B:CP’s ‘forgotten’ chapter, is really a fascinating and I think terrific chapter, it really ties B:CP together. I think it was very unfortunate that the editors at the time probably thought (correctly, I might add) that this chapter would not have made Bill many friends in the scientific community.

I never got a response from Bill on this;

(Attachment Blank Bkgrd57.gif is missing)

···

From [Marc Abrams (2003.12.03.1221)]

Bill, In LCS II, The 'hidden’chapter of B:CP, That is Chap. 26 on Emotions.
How current are those thoughts? I mean all of the material you presented
in that chapter. It goes quite a bit beyond emotions and I think it’s
pertinent to this thread


This along with chap. 15 make for some very interesting speculation, but I guess if we are going to discuss either of these two subjects on CSGnet we can only discuss the viability (through argument alone) of Bill’s ideas, or through data only, discuss any alternatives to Bill’s ideas, after all, it’s his theory. Makes perfect sense to me.

Marc