Emotions

Richard_Marken2 · January 4, 2004, 11:45pm

[From Rick Marken (2004.01.04.1545)]

Marc Abrams (2004.01.04.1706)--

David Goldstein (2004.01.04.1236 EST)--

If you all think this is a helpful way to proceed, maybe we
could have a good discussion on this important topic.

No, I don't think this is helpful

Why not? It looks to me like David is just following Bill's suggestion
and trying to start a discussion aimed at getting to some consensus
about what emotion is. It seems to me like a good idea to agree on
what we're trying to explain before we propose an explanation of it.

I think of emotions as experiences that I point to with words like
"fear", "anger", "sadness", "happiness" and "joy". So in answer to
David's first question, I think of emotion from the insider's point of
view. It's a particular kind of subjective experience. It's an
experience that involves perceptions of bodily state (what are often
called "feelings") and the external world. I experience an emotion that
I call "fear", for example, when I am looking down from certain high
places. The emotion involves feelings like general arousal, sweaty
hands and tightening in the chest as well as the visual perception of
being at or near the top of a precipice. Indeed, I can have this
emotion by imagining myself or watching others in this situation.

So that's what emotion is to me: a perceptual experience that involves
feelings and the perception of some external circumstance (being near a
precipice, being rejected by a lover, being attacked by a bear, getting
a paper accepted for publication, etc). Feelings alone -- like pain,
arousal or sweating -- are not emotions, from my point of view. They
are perceptions that may be rather far from their references (as in the
case of pain) and, thus, unpleasant. But I wouldn't call them emotions.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

Bill_Powers · January 4, 2004, 11:51pm

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.04.1650 MST)]

Rick Marken (2004.01.04.1545)--

I think of emotions as experiences that I point to with words like
"fear", "anger", "sadness", "happiness" and "joy". So in answer to
David's first question, I think of emotion from the insider's point of
view. It's a particular kind of subjective experience. It's an
experience that involves perceptions of bodily state (what are often
called "feelings") and the external world. I experience an emotion that
I call "fear", for example, when I am looking down from certain high
places. The emotion involves feelings like general arousal, sweaty
hands and tightening in the chest as well as the visual perception of
being at or near the top of a precipice. Indeed, I can have this
emotion by imagining myself or watching others in this situation.

So that's what emotion is to me: a perceptual experience that involves
feelings and the perception of some external circumstance (being near a
precipice, being rejected by a lover, being attacked by a bear, getting
a paper accepted for publication, etc). Feelings alone -- like pain,
arousal or sweating -- are not emotions, from my point of view. They
are perceptions that may be rather far from their references (as in the
case of pain) and, thus, unpleasant. But I wouldn't call them emotions.

Aren't you leaving something out in this description? In each of these
situations, what is it that you would like to DO?

Best,

Bill P.

Richard_Marken2 · January 5, 2004, 12:04am

[From Rick Marken (2004.01.04.1600)]

I can't believe I keep getting the year right!

Bill Powers (2004.01.04.1650 MST)

Rick Marken (2004.01.04.1545)--

So that's what emotion is to me: a perceptual experience that involves
feelings and the perception of some external circumstance (being near
a
precipice, being rejected by a lover, being attacked by a bear,
getting
a paper accepted for publication, etc)...

Aren't you leaving something out in this description? In each of these
situations, what is it that you would like to DO?

Of course. I did leave that out. How un-PCTish of me. I want to get
away from the precipice, be accepted by the lover, avoid the bear and
get the paper accepted. My goal is the third important component of
emotion for me. So the three components of emotion for me are: goal
(the most difficult to notice), actual situation and bodily feeling.

Sounds like emotion is a normal part of controlling, indeed.

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

Marc_Abrams1 · January 5, 2004, 1:13am

from [Marc Abrams (2004.01.04.1849)]

[From Bill Williams 4 January 2004 5:20 PM CST]

Actually I thought some of David's suggestions were excellent. I was
replying to David in kind for this post;

[From David Goldstein (2004.01.02.1812 EST)]
[About Bill Powers (2004.01.02.0846 MST)]

No, I don't see a coherent theory of emotion or behavior in Marc's
communications.

David
David M. Goldstein, Ph.D.

···

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
Do you remember the 'vote' Bill Powerws asked for? David saw fit to be one
of two people to respond for Bill's plea to justify his trashing of me and
my ideas. Well, if you didn't remember you certainly are aware of it now.
_NOBODY_ likes to have their ideas discounted out of hand _ESPECIALLY_ in
David's case where he wrote that response without fully understanding what
it was I was trying to say. How do I know this? Maybe you missed this post
as well;

From [David Goldstein (2004.01.01.1142 EST)]
From [Marc Abrams (2004.01.01.1117)]

Marc,

I'll think I wait for the other two installments to your ideas.
At this point, my only reaction is that your ideas are too abstract and
not detailed enough.
I don't really understand what they are, where they are going or how
they work.
I don't understand how they are the same or different from other ideas I
am familiar with about emotions, including those of Bill Powers.
This is why I asked for you to provide some concrete examples.
I would like to understand your ideas better.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Now I was trying to be helpful (but it obviously was not taken as such) when
I replied with;

from [Marc Abrams (2004.01.01.1117)]

From [David Goldstein (2004.01.01.0735 EST)]

Can you give a concrete example of your ideas in an everyday, life

situation?

Hi David, Why not give me an example you're comfortable with and feel you
understand well. I think that might make it easier for both of us.

Is there anything in particular you're having a difficult time with or have
questions about?

I do have some concrete ideas on how all this might look in a model, but I
would really prefer to get some feedback on the basic concepts and iron
those out before plunging ahead. I don't want to get ahead of myself, and
here it would be very easy to do. I know, I already did it by writing and
throwing out about 10 posts prior to this one.
In fact this was going to be the first of three long posts. This was my
intro, followed by a post on the physiology of the model and the last one
devoted to the model itself. Again, _way_ ahead of myself.

Marc
_---------------------------------------------------------------------------
---

Anyway, the entire point of my post which I thought everyone would pick up
on immediately was my duplication of David's word's aimed at me. This
response was done tongue-in-cheek. I hope David, in the future will think a
bit more about how his actions affect others. I really have no idea what he
had in mind (and I really don't care what it was) when he posted that
CSGnet.

Now in answer to your post

You say:

Piaget and other developmental psychologists have studied the
development of emotions in people. There is a literature.

You bet, and good stuff it is. I studied Piaget a few years ago and found
his work incredible. One big problem; No control perspective, and _THAT_ is
the main problem with all prior and current emotional research.

It seems to me that he is making a useful suggestion. Before possibly

setting off to invent a wheel, wouldn't it be a >good idea to consider what
other people have come-up with when they've considered the question of
emotions?

_ABSOLUTELY_. Is there a _SPECIFIC_ idea that either you or David has in
mind? How would this idea work in the control model? I'm all ears?

You might not be interested in doing a literature review,

Huh? You know me better than that Bill. I _THRIVE_ on reviewing the
literature. What specifics do you have in mind? I currently monitor 32
journals on a weekly and monthly basis (down from the 175 I started with in
gaining access to the SUNY library system last January). Plus the weekly
Proceedings of the NAS. Is there a specific journal you had in mind? You saw
how quickly I responded to your suggestion the other day on a book you
thought worthwhile.

but I'm a bit vague about the issue of whether we run because we are

frightened, or we are frightened because we >run

BOTH. What is confusing here is that you _THINK_ you are viewing _TWO_
linear S -> R events. They aren't. Both are interelated. The emotion of
'FEAR' is a cognitive emotion, that is, it can, to a certain degree, can be,
and is modulated by us voluntarily. We have some control over the intensity
and duration of the experience. We 'experience' 'FEAR' as a result of
_ERROR_, or more accurately, we experience fear because we perceive danger
and that results in an error signal that kicks the ATP system into gear and
we experience the feelings. The release of chemicals is not in response to a
cognitive thought, it's in response to a tightening of the muscles,
involuntarily, in anticipation of action. The error causes us to take the
action of _RUNNING_ to reduce the error, or again, more accurately, we run
to reduce our _perception_ of danger. The problem here is that the error is
not reduced specifically because of the action of running. It is reduce
because the perception of danger or fear has changed.

-- or whether there is some third or fourth already existing alternative

that I'm not aware of.

NO, I think a answer is right there for us. We don't have the specifics yet
but we will.

Marc

Marc_Abrams1 · January 5, 2004, 3:17am

from [Marc Abrams (2004.01.04.2158)]

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.04.1650 MST)]

Rick Marken (2004.01.04.1545)--

>So that's what emotion is to me: a perceptual experience that involves
>feelings and the perception of some external circumstance (being near a
>precipice, being rejected by a lover, ...

Aren't you leaving something out in this description? In each of these
situations, what is it that you would like to DO?

Again, my definition given in my post on 1/1/01. The one David Goldstein did
not understand and found too 'abstract'. btw David, exactly what part of
this definition gave you the most trouble?

OUR EMOTIONS/FEELINGS ARE IMPORTANT SIDE EFFECTS OF OUR SENSORY INPUTS AND
OUR ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL THEM, COGNITIVELY, PHYSIOLOGICALLY, VOLUNTARILY, AND
INVOLUNTARILY, AS WELL AS THE SATISFACTION WE FEEL AFTER HEDONIC ACTS.

Yes Bill and Rick, you keep on trying to define something that the model
already handles and explains. How is that possible? And if the model already
'handles' it, why bother? Seems like much ado about nothing. The model got
it covered. Right Rick?

[From Rick Marken (2004.01.02.1515)]

So the hierarchical control models already handles "internal"
disturbances to controlled perceptions. If controlled perceptions at
level 2 and up in the hierarchy of control systems were based, in part,
on perceptions of emotions --

···

_________________________________________________________

Interesting, Bill's adrenal gland perceives the environment and your
emotions have perceptions. Hey, it's a brave new world out there. What the
hell do I know?

btw, don't respond Rick, I know you did not mean to have it taken that way,
but we all seem to 'see' what suits our needs.

Marc

Martin_Taylor2 · January 5, 2004, 4:00am

[Martin Taylor 2004.01.04.2257]

From [Marc Abrams (2004.01.04.2158)]

Again, my definition given in my post on 1/1/01. The one David Goldstein did
not understand and found too 'abstract'. btw David, exactly what part of
this definition gave you the most trouble?

OUR EMOTIONS/FEELINGS ARE IMPORTANT SIDE EFFECTS OF OUR SENSORY INPUTS AND
OUR ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL THEM, COGNITIVELY, PHYSIOLOGICALLY, VOLUNTARILY, AND
INVOLUNTARILY, AS WELL AS THE SATISFACTION WE FEEL AFTER HEDONIC ACTS.

If you treat this as a definition, aren't you rather pre-empting
research into what causes them, and how they might relate to things
happening in the control systems? I see this statement more as a
theory of what causes emotions than as a definition or description of
what they are.

A useful definition of emotion would not reference the mechanism that
gives rise to it (them).

Martin

Bill_Powers · January 5, 2004, 4:21am

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.04.2100 MST)]

Marc Abrams (2004.01.04.2158)--

OUR EMOTIONS/FEELINGS ARE IMPORTANT SIDE EFFECTS OF OUR SENSORY INPUTS AND
OUR ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL THEM, COGNITIVELY, PHYSIOLOGICALLY, VOLUNTARILY, AND
INVOLUNTARILY, AS WELL AS THE SATISFACTION WE FEEL AFTER HEDONIC ACTS.

This doesn't say what you think emotions are. It says that whatever they
are, they are side-effects of sensory inputs and attempts to control them.
So, what are those side-effects as they are experienced? Sensations from
the body like tightness in the chest, shortness of breath, a feeling of
something swelling up inside, a tingling in the extremities? Is there an
urge toward some kind of action, a desire that something should happen? Is
a feeling of satisfaction a sense of calmness, or exhiliration, or
relaxation? Is it the result of having an problem and then having it
removed? Would there be any special feeling of satisfaction if no problem
had existed first? This is the sort of question I have in mind when I ask
how others experience emotions. It has nothing to do with theory.

"Hedonic" acts are acts that leave you feeling better than before, but is
there any special kind of act that is hedonic, as opposed to acts that are
not hedonic? It seems to me that "hedonic" refers to pleasurable
consequences of acts, not to the acts themselves. Just what acts will lead
to pleasure depends a good deal on circumstances, and there is more than
one way to get the same result. I think this is simply a allusion to
control -- acting to make perceptions match reference signals. If the act
results in achieving a match, the result is "hedonic." Otherwise it's the
opposite.

Yes Bill and Rick, you keep on trying to define something that the model
already handles and explains. How is that possible?

I don't understand what you're getting at here. I'm talking about
describing a phenomenon that a model would then be used to explain.
Phenomena are what you observe or experience, not the model or theory with
which you attempt to explain observations or experiences. I have my own
definition of the experiences called emotions, and have offered a model
based on HPCT to explain them, but as I keep saying, if others are thinking
of a different phenomenon, my explanation won't mean much to them. I'm
trying to find a consensus on what we think we're talking about, instead of
just assuming that everyone knows.

And if the model already 'handles' it, why bother? Seems like much ado
about nothing. The model got it covered. Right Rick?

Is this supposed to be sarcastic, or am I missing the point? There's
something you're getting at here, but it's not coming across.

Best,

Bill P.

Bruce_Gregory4 · January 5, 2004, 1:51pm

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.01.05.0850)]

Bill Powers (2004.01.04.1536 MST)

Yes, and I have proposed that this would be expected if the error in
question were at a relatively low order (configurations to categories)
so
the adjustment of somatic state occurs for reasons not apparent to
consciousness. The assumption is that consciousness normally (but not
always) resides in higher-level ("cognitive") systems such as programs,
principles, and system concepts.

My attention almost never resides at the level of programs, principles,
or system concepts. Rather it resides where it is needed to facilitate
the control of the some low level perception (tuning the radio, avoid
the car in front of me). For me, at least, the higher-level concepts
seem to be stories I tell in response to queries about why I am
carrying out some series of actions. So in my case, I am always paying
attention either to something I am seeing, hearing, tasting or
smelling, or to some interior story I am telling myself.

Bruce Gregory

"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no
one was listening, everything must be said again."
Andre Gide

"What is hateful to you, do not to your fellow men. That is the entire
Law; all the rest is commentary."

The Talmud

Bruce_Gregory4 · January 5, 2004, 2:01pm

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.01.05.0900)]

Marc Abrams (2004.01.04.2158)

Again, my definition given in my post on 1/1/01. The one David
Goldstein did
not understand and found too 'abstract'. btw David, exactly what part
of
this definition gave you the most trouble?

OUR EMOTIONS/FEELINGS ARE IMPORTANT SIDE EFFECTS OF OUR SENSORY INPUTS
AND
OUR ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL THEM, COGNITIVELY, PHYSIOLOGICALLY,
VOLUNTARILY, AND
INVOLUNTARILY, AS WELL AS THE SATISFACTION WE FEEL AFTER HEDONIC ACTS.

I agree with Martin that this seems to be a hypothesis about the
mechanism behind feelings and emotions rather than a definition of
feelings and emotions. I agree with Bill that "the satisfaction we feel
after hedonic acts" seems to say nothing more than 'the satisfaction we
feel after acts that make us feel satisfied" and so does not belong in
a definition or a theory. What is needed is a description of what
satisfaction feels like, I think.

Bruce Gregory

"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no
one was listening, everything must be said again."
Andre Gide

"What is hateful to you, do not to your fellow men. That is the entire
Law; all the rest is commentary."

The Talmud

Marc_Abrams1 · January 5, 2004, 5:46pm

from [Marc Abrams (2004.01.05.1158)]

First day of classes for the winter semester. Great stuff

I will attempt to address both Bruce and Martin's concerns here. Bill P, I
saw your post and will address it when I come back later this afternoon from
a doctors a[ointment

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.01.05.0900)]

I agree with Martin that this seems to be a hypothesis about the
mechanism behind feelings and emotions rather than a definition of
feelings and emotions.

And I agree with both of you. But I, along with others believe that a
definition of emotion is the conclusion, not the starting point, of many
investigations into emotion theory. Perhaps emotion theory is now at a stage
analogus to evolutionary theory not to long ago. It is a theory that tends
to summerize results, rather than predict them. Now, an s->r definition of
emotions might be -- like the peptides and hormones that are released with
their occurance -- mechanisms for motivating or facilitating behavior. As a
PCTer I know that certainly could be a contributing factor, but I know
'error' is the mechanism for facilitating actions, hence my feeling that
error and emotions are related.

I agree with Bill that "the satisfaction we feel after hedonic acts" seems

to say nothing more than 'the satisfaction >we feel after acts that make us
feel satisfied" and so does not belong in

a definition or a theory. What is needed is a description of what
satisfaction feels like, I think.

_That_ can be measured quantifiably _but_, only relative from one person to
another. As with _anything_ we can never know the true feelings,
perceptions, goals, or anything else about another individual. They will
forever be a mystery to us. But, I am suggesting that there _are_ ways, and
good ones too, that will allow us to understand the _intensities_ people
apply to different labels, so I could understand just how angry or happy you
are compared to someone else regardless of the words or labels that are used
to describe them. These feelings are all on an continuum. When I say I'm
angry and you say your angry, they don't necessarily mean the same intensity
level of anger exists between us. Even if I say I'm mildly annoyed and you
say your mildly annoyed. They have different connotations for each of us. In
this area I have a very large body of work and research (actually when I did
this it wasn't research, it was a business practice :-)) that backs up my
claims here.

Did I make myself clearer? btw, Bruce I know what aspects you do and don't
agree with me on, but what about _your_ folk theory of emotions, we all have
them, Same for you Martin, what's your feeling's about them, or is this
discussion limited to dissecting _my_ notions? Again, I was hoping for
an exchange of ideas, you never know where something important will come
from. If we limited this discussion to people who have only read more than 1
book on the subject we wouldn't have many participants, and if you think
this is going to be a 'scientific' discussion then we must _only_talk about
the aspects of emotions that each of us has the data to support, so in
effect _that_ would close off almost all exchanges on CSGnet. So how do we
decide what is acceptable to talk about and what isn't? We can certainly
build models without data. But why bother? So Would say that what we need to
do is figure out what kind of data we need to help support a model we can
build that would be able to predict rather than summarize.

Marc

Bruce_Gregory4 · January 5, 2004, 6:55pm

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.01.05.1355)]

Marc Abrams (2004.01.05.1158)

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.01.05.0900)]

I agree with Martin that this seems to be a hypothesis about the
mechanism behind feelings and emotions rather than a definition of
feelings and emotions.

And I agree with both of you. But I, along with others believe that a
definition of emotion is the conclusion, not the starting point, of
many
investigations into emotion theory.

I don't mean to be dense, but how can you agree with us when we thought
we were differing with you? Can I assume that you are withdrawing your
definition of emotion? Or relabeling it as a tentative hypothesis about
emotion?

I agree with Bill that "the satisfaction we feel after hedonic acts"
seems

to say nothing more than 'the satisfaction >we feel after acts that
make us
feel satisfied" and so does not belong in

a definition or a theory. What is needed is a description of what
satisfaction feels like, I think.

_That_ can be measured quantifiably _but_, only relative from one
person to
another.

What can be measured quantitatively? Satisfaction? How do we know what
we are measuring if we don't agree on the experiences we associate with
it?

Did I make myself clearer?

Not yet, but I can see you're trying!

btw, Bruce I know what aspects you do and don't
agree with me on, but what about _your_ folk theory of emotions, we
all have
them,

When bad things happen I feel bad. When good things happen, I feel
good. When nothing happens, I feel bored.

Same for you Martin, what's your feeling's about them, or is this
discussion limited to dissecting _my_ notions? Again, I was hoping
for
an exchange of ideas, you never know where something important will
come
from. If we limited this discussion to people who have only read more
than 1
book on the subject we wouldn't have many participants, and if you
think
this is going to be a 'scientific' discussion then we must _only_talk
about
the aspects of emotions that each of us has the data to support, so in
effect _that_ would close off almost all exchanges on CSGnet.

I think there is a misunderstanding about the meaning of data. What I
am talking about is something I can look at my own experience of. For
example, earlier today I posted to Bill my experience that my attention
is rarely, if ever, focussed on perceptions of principles. Bill's
experience may be different. If he can provide an example that he feels
involves perceptions of principles, I will look at my experience and
see what that looks like for me. That's what I mean by data.

So how do we
decide what is acceptable to talk about and what isn't? We can
certainly
build models without data. But why bother? So Would say that what we
need to
do is figure out what kind of data we need to help support a model we
can
build that would be able to predict rather than summarize.

It would help me to know what you experience about emotion that you are
trying to explain. Otherwise, I am afraid I cannot contribute anything
useful to the discussion.

Bruce Gregory

"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no
one was listening, everything must be said again."
Andre Gide

"What is hateful to you, do not to your fellow men. That is the entire
Law; all the rest is commentary."

The Talmud

Bill_Powers · January 5, 2004, 6:55pm

From Bill Powers (2004.01.05.1128 MST)]

Marc Abrams (2004.01.05.1158)–

That can be measured quantifiably
but, only relative from one person to

another. As with anything we can never know the true feelings,

perceptions, goals, or anything else about another individual. They
will

forever be a mystery to us. But, I am suggesting that there are ways,
and

good ones too, that will allow us to understand the intensities
people

apply to different labels, so I could understand just how angry or happy
you

are compared to someone else regardless of the words or labels that are
used

to describe them. These feelings are all on an continuum. When I say
I’m

angry and you say your angry, they don’t necessarily mean the same
intensity

level of anger exists between us. Even if I say I’m mildly annoyed and
you

say your mildly annoyed. They have different connotations for each of us.
In

this area I have a very large body of work and research (actually when I
did

this it wasn’t research, it was a business practice :-)) that backs up
my

claims here.

Did I make myself
clearer?

Not in the sense I’m after. It’s very hard to get across what I amasking about. I’m not asking for a scientific objective definition of
emotion, or what causes emotion, or how one emotion compares with
another, or how intense an emotion is. The question I’m asking is more
like – how do you know you’re feeling angry? If I could look over your
shoulder at the whole field of your present-time experiences, exactly
what features of the landscape would you point out as being the things
you experience as anger? Or, of course, any other specific emotion you
want to talk about (Marc or anyone else).
Since nobody can experience anyone else’s emotions (not even to feel
their pain), we have to start with subjective descriptions of our own
emotions. Normally we just have them and are focused on whatever the
emotion is about. But to make a group enquiry about emotion, we have to
try to compare our experiences somehow – say things about them that
others will recognize as true for them, too. So far, as in David’s
survey, there are some things we agree on. The feeling aspect of it is
pretty well established, although I doubt that we have exactly the
same sensations. The role of reference levels, goals, desires,
urges and so on hasn’t been agreed on so explicitly. Maybe we can get at
least a rough general agreement. I would say, for example, that anger,
for me, involves a desire to attack or retaliate or destroy or drive away
– some sort of direct physical action against the thing I say I am angry
about. That’s why it makes sense to me to see the physical sensations of
anger as my body being prepared to take energetic or even violent action.
I know that if I actually stop wanting to attack, the sensations of anger
very quickly die out.

This doesn’t supply a model of emotion, but it does drop a lot of hints
about how such a model ought to be organized (unless, of course, eveyone
listening to my descriptions thinks I must be nuts). Somehow wanting to
take action should create not only that action (with the neuromotor
systems being deployed), but a state of the body that can support action
at a higher than normal level. We sense that heightened state of
preparedness as feelings in the body. That’s the kind of reasoning I
followed in getting to my model.

Traditional discussions of emotions are a lot like discussions of
consciousness. People write all about these things without ever saying
exactly what they’re talking about. The reader is just supposed to know
what they mean. That doesn’t satisfy me.

Best,

Bill P.

Richard_Marken2 · January 5, 2004, 7:43pm

[From Rick Marken (2004.01.05.1145)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.01.05.0850)--

Bill Powers (2004.01.04.1536 MST)

The assumption is that consciousness normally (but not always)
resides in higher-level ("cognitive") systems such as programs,
principles, and system concepts.

My attention almost never resides at the level of programs, principles,
or system concepts. Rather it resides where it is needed to facilitate
the control of the some low level perception (tuning the radio, avoid
the car in front of me). For me, at least, the higher-level concepts
seem to be stories I tell in response to queries about why I am
carrying out some series of actions. So in my case, I am always paying
attention either to something I am seeing, hearing, tasting or
smelling, or to some interior story I am telling myself.

My guess is that when you wrote this your attention was on the ideas you
were trying to express (regarding where your attention usually resides)
rather than on the lower level perceptions (such as the letter patterns and
fingertip locations) that were used to expresses these ideas. These ideas
are, I believe, perceptions ("cognitions") controlled by higher level
systems. That doesn't mean that your consciousness is normally at the level
that controls for such ideas ("cognitions"). And it may be that you were
controlling for this idea unconsciously. But if you were conscious of trying
to communicate this idea -- that your consciousness spends more time a
levels lower than programs, principles and system concepts -- then it shows
that your consciousness resides, at least some of the time, at these higher
levels.

My own experience is more like Bill's. My consciousness seems to normally
resides in higher-level systems. It seems to me that I am normally more
aware of the programs, principles and system concepts I control than I am of
the sensations, configurations and transitions I control. My attention tends
to go to the lower levels only when something goes noticeably wrong at those
levels -- a stubbed toe, a missed shot, an awkward phrase -- but generally I
seem to be conscious of higher level perceptions (cognitions) I am
controlling (or trying to control): the proposal I want to write, the
briefing I plan to give, etc. I think my consciousness tends to reside
mainly at the higher levels because that's were I typically have the most
difficulty controlling. Indeed, it's probably where I am spending the most
time reorganizing because I have less control at these levels. I find it
much harder to control for producing a proposal than for producing the words
that will make up that proposal. I don't know if there is really any way to
study this objectively. I think we will just have to listen to what each
other say and see whose descriptions of their experience seems to best match
our own.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

Bill_Powers · January 5, 2004, 7:48pm

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.05.1220 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.01.05.0850)–

My attention almost never resides
at the level of programs, principles,

or system concepts. Rather it resides where it is needed to
facilitate

the control of the some low level perception (tuning the radio,
avoid

the car in front of me).

I think I said “consciousness”. When your awareness or
consciousness resides at a given level, what you attend to are all the
relevant elements of the lower levels. But you’re doing, mentally, all
the things typical of the levels at which your consciousness resides:
you’re categorizing, reasoning, pursuing the right and avoiding the
wrong, and so forth. The lower-level materials you described above are
what I call the “foreground” of experience: the things you see
right in front of you and are manipulating or following closely. But
while you do that, you are thinking about what you’re doing: for
example, you think “the higher-level concepts seem to be stories I
tell in response to queries about why I am carrying out some series of
actions.” That is what I call a “background” thought, and
is evidence of, or a symptom of, organization at a higher level. That
level is making judgments about what consciousness is involved with, and
effectively about the very subsystems with which consciousness is
identified at that time. Note that I deliberately make no attempt to link
levels encountered in this way with my proposed 11 levels.
If you were now to shift your attention to the thoughts about telling
stories and so on, I’m sure you could amplify on them, saying in more
detail what you mean by a “story” and how you distinguish it
from telling “truth,” and so on. After considering those ideas
for a while, you (or someone listening to your descrptions) might
discover that there is another background thought there, this time
about the thoughts concerning telling stories and so forth.

Each time you perform a shift like these, your consciousness becomes
involved with a different subsystem (so goes this story). Your attention
is on the thoughts that are in the foreground (the former background
thoughts), and initially you are unaware of the new level at which
consciousness resides, even though it is determining everything you do.
Am I telling stories here, or pointing to things you can
observe?

So in my case, I am always
paying

attention either to something I am seeing, hearing, tasting or

smelling, or to some interior story I am telling
myself.

I would say that there is obviously a self attending to seeing, hearing,
tasting, and so on (this is a steak I am tasting), and a self attending
to the meaning of what you’re seeing hearing and tasting (“this
sizzling brown steak is overdone”), and a self that is observing
those observations (" I am tasting a sizzling brown steak and
thinking it is overdone") and a self that is observing that
observation and thinking “All this is just a bunch of stories I tell
myself or other people.” And what does the next self think about
that idea? There isn’t much farther than that that you can go, but
there are a few more steps. When I point to your statement that these are
stories you tell yourself, what do you think? “That’s
right”?

These phenomena are highly subjective, yet there does seem to be some
uniformity in the phenomena various people notice, even skeptics. What do
you think?

Best,

Bill P.

Bruce_Gregory4 · January 5, 2004, 9:21pm

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.01.05.1621)]

Rick Marken (2004.01.05.1145)

My guess is that when you wrote this your attention was on the ideas
you
were trying to express (regarding where your attention usually resides)
rather than on the lower level perceptions (such as the letter
patterns and
fingertip locations) that were used to expresses these ideas. These
ideas
are, I believe, perceptions ("cognitions") controlled by higher level
systems.

I think my concentration was on what I said and if that was what I
wanted to say.

That doesn't mean that your consciousness is normally at the level
that controls for such ideas ("cognitions"). And it may be that you
were
controlling for this idea unconsciously. But if you were conscious of
trying
to communicate this idea -- that your consciousness spends more time a
levels lower than programs, principles and system concepts -- then it
shows
that your consciousness resides, at least some of the time, at these
higher
levels.

I can see why you say this, but I disagree. I was telling a story, not
perceiving a set of principles, or so it seems to me.

My own experience is more like Bill's. My consciousness seems to
normally
resides in higher-level systems. It seems to me that I am normally more
aware of the programs, principles and system concepts I control than I
am of
the sensations, configurations and transitions I control. My attention
tends
to go to the lower levels only when something goes noticeably wrong at
those
levels -- a stubbed toe, a missed shot, an awkward phrase -- but
generally I
seem to be conscious of higher level perceptions (cognitions) I am
controlling (or trying to control): the proposal I want to write, the
briefing I plan to give, etc. I think my consciousness tends to reside
mainly at the higher levels because that's were I typically have the
most
difficulty controlling.

What you have difficulty doing, in my view, is telling a story which
satisfies you after you have told it. I admit that is very difficult.
What is not clear to me is that it involves perceiving and controlling
principles and systems. It seems to me that it involves controlling
what you say.

Indeed, it's probably where I am spending the most
time reorganizing because I have less control at these levels. I find
it
much harder to control for producing a proposal than for producing the
words
that will make up that proposal.

In my experience, producing the words _is_ producing the proposal. What
do you see as the difference?

I don't know if there is really any way to
study this objectively. I think we will just have to listen to what
each
other say and see whose descriptions of their experience seems to best
match
our own.

Fair enough.

Bruce Gregory

"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no
one was listening, everything must be said again."
Andre Gide

"What is hateful to you, do not to your fellow men. That is the entire
Law; all the rest is commentary."

The Talmud

Bruce_Gregory4 · January 5, 2004, 9:42pm

[From Bruce Gregory 92004.01.05.1642)]

Bill Powers (2004.01.05.1220 MST)

These phenomena are highly subjective, yet there does seem to be some
uniformity in the phenomena various people notice, even skeptics. What
do you think?

I think that you call foreground experiences, I simply call
experiences. What you call background thoughts, I call stories. You can
ask me to tell you a story about a story (in your terms, I think,
"going up a level"), but for me this is simply another story. I see no
need to invoke a hierarchy. The background thoughts are things I am
reminded of and I can express them as stories. My picture is more a
network than a hierarchy. I don't see the need for many selves, but
simply one self that has experiences and tells stories about those
experiences.

Psychotherapy is a process in which one tells stories and hopefully
finds a story that allows one to improve one's ability to exercise
control.

Bruce Gregory

"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no
one was listening, everything must be said again."
Andre Gide

"What is hateful to you, do not to your fellow men. That is the entire
Law; all the rest is commentary."

The Talmud

Richard_Marken2 · January 5, 2004, 10:29pm

[From Rick Marken (2004.01.05.1430)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.01.05.1621)]

I think my concentration was on what I said and if that was what I
wanted to say.

Yes, of course. But I think there are many different aspects of what we say
on which we can concentrate. We can concentrate on the sound patterns, the
grammatical structure or the idea being expressed, for example. I think
these are different perceptual levels at which we can be aware of what we
say.

I was telling a story, not
perceiving a set of principles, or so it seems to me.

Sure. When I talk about higher level (cognitive) perceptions I don't mean
that they necessarily correspond to the proposed higher levels in the HPCT
hierarchy. When you see in your story an idea -- like the idea about where
your consciousness resides -- that idea is a perception that differs from
(and, I believe, is at a higher level than) the perception of the words or
word arrangements used to express it.

What you have difficulty doing, in my view, is telling a story which
satisfies you after you have told it.

Sure. But what aspect of the story doesn't satisfy me? I might like the
words and the grammar but be unhappy with the idea they express. I often
tell (or hear) stories in which I like the words and grammar but don't like
the ideas expressed. And occasionally vice versa.

What is not clear to me is that it involves perceiving and controlling
principles and systems.

I tried to stay away from using those particular terms. I don't know what to
call the higher level aspects of the stories I tell. All I know is that I
can perceive ideas in my stories that are separate from the words used to
tell the stories. I know this because I can use different words to express
the same ideas.

It seems to me that it involves controlling what you say.

Yes. But I think the term "what you say" refers to a lot of different
perceptions. The sentence I just typed is something I said. But what was it
I said? Is it the set of letters I typed, the set of words, the order of the
words, the idea I expressed? I think it was all of these things. What I
said, I think, was a result of a hierarchical control process that was
producing all these results -- letters, words, word order, ideas --
simultaneously, the lower level results (letters, words, word order) being
produced as the means of producing the higher level result (the idea).

In my experience, producing the words _is_ producing the proposal. What
do you see as the difference?

I hope I've made it clear. Producing the words is producing the proposal if
you only look at the proposal from a particular perceptual perspective --
the perspective of words. Unfortunately, the people who judge the proposals
look at it from other perspectives as well -- mainly from the perspective of
the ideas expressed by those words. If all I had to do was fill a proposal
with words, I would be done by now. Unfortunately, I have to use those
words to express particular ideas -- the ones I think the foundation wants
to perceive. It's controlling for these ideas that's the problem for me.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

Marc_Abrams1 · January 5, 2004, 11:17pm

from [Marc Abrams (2004.01.05.1519)]

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.01.05.1355)]

>> I agree with Martin that this seems to be a hypothesis about the
>> mechanism behind feelings and emotions rather than a definition of
>> feelings and emotions.
>
> And I agree with both of you. But I, along with others believe that a
> definition of emotion is the conclusion, not the starting point, of
> many investigations into emotion theory.

I don't mean to be dense, but how can you agree with us when we thought
we were differing with you? Can I assume that you are withdrawing your
definition of emotion? Or relabeling it as a tentative hypothesis about
emotion?

Ok, do you see the word _ But_ in the second sentence? If so, you will see
that I state that although Martin is correct in his analysis and I agree
with his analysis. I _DON'T_ agree with his conclusion. I _Do Not_ believe
that we need to define anything up front (do you see that in the second
sentence?) That many investigations are conducted with the definition being
the conclusion of an investigation.

>
>> I agree with Bill that "the satisfaction we feel after hedonic acts"
>> seems
> to say nothing more than 'the satisfaction >we feel after acts that
> make us
> feel satisfied" and so does not belong in
>> a definition or a theory. What is needed is a description of what
>> satisfaction feels like, I think.
>
> _That_ can be measured quantifiably _but_, only relative from one
> person to
> another.

What can be measured quantitatively? Satisfaction?

What can be measured is the intensity of our perception of what each of us
believes 'satisfaction' to be.

How do we know what we are measuring

Beats the hell out of me. I assume that when someone says they are angry,
they are in fact angry. Do you know of some procedure to verify the fact
that when a person says I feel ... that this person is saying something that
is 'true' and the same as what you think he is saying? I don't think so. How
do you even know if your introspection is accurate, let alone someone
else's.

When someone tickles you, are you happy? Would you say you felt happy? Maybe
yes, or at least until the pain started. How do you know someone else is in
pain? and how much pain is 'tolerable'? What does tolerable mean?

if we don't agree on the experiences we associate with it?

How do you know that what you are agreeing to is valid?

> Did I make myself clearer?

Not yet, but I can see you're trying!

How about now

> btw, Bruce I know what aspects you do and don't
> agree with me on, but what about _your_ folk theory of emotions, we
> all have
> them,

When bad things happen I feel bad. When good things happen, I feel
good. When nothing happens, I feel bored.

See we _do_ agree.

I think there is a misunderstanding about the meaning of data. What I
am talking about is something I can look at my own experience of. >For
example, earlier today I posted to Bill my experience that my attention
is rarely, if ever, focussed on perceptions of principles. Bill's
experience may be different. If he can provide an example that he feels
involves perceptions of principles, I will look at my experience and
see what that looks like for me. That's what I mean by data.

Yes, I agree (whatever that means :-)) with your asessment here and what I
agree with is that like most things, (see right above) at some level our
interpretations will be different because of the experience each of us
brings to our perceptions. Look, the main reason us humans haven't killed
each other off yet is because basically, we only interact with others on a
_need-to_ basis, and when we do interact, most things others do don't affect
us. Martin Taylor's LPT is fascinating reading. He is an optimist and
concludes his paper on a positive note. I'm not so sure he has all that much
to be enthusiastic about. :-). In your statement above, how do you know that
your definiton of 'principles' are the same as Bill's? How do you know that
'principles' represent the same experience? Well, I'm suggesting that is
really doesn't matter all that much because we can all _probably_ agree that
we might have _some_ common elements in our definitions.

It would help me to know what you experience about emotion that you are
trying to explain. Otherwise, I am afraid I cannot contribute anything
useful to the discussion.

Simple. How do emotions affect the control process and how does the control
process effect emotions. Let me try to expand upon this a bit.

We perceive feelings from our bodies that relate our state of well-being,
our energy and stress levels, our mood and disposition. How do we have these
feelings? What neural processes do they represent? I am _suggesting_, PLEASE
REMEMBER. I SAID 'SUGGESTING' AS IN TOSSING ON THE TABLE FOR DISCUSSION,
that our 'feelings' are the substrates for our emotions and self awareness.
William James hypothesized this, Antonio Damasio has carried James' torch
into current thinking and research has backed up this claim, so emotions are
a kind and type of feeling. Feelings we perceive include temperature, pain,
itch, tickle, sensual touch, muscular and visceral sensations, vasomotor
flush, hunger, thirst, air hunger and others related to the body's state.
These are _DIFFERENT_ than what is provided to us by our 5 senses, yet, I
believe, are every bit as important to what and how we perceive and control
those very same perceptions.

Am I coming in a bit clearer here? I hope so, because I feel much more
confident with each post in what I do and don't know and what I think I
know. As social psychologist, Karl Weick said "How do you know what you
think, until you see what you say"

Marc

Marc_Abrams1 · January 5, 2004, 11:35pm

from [Marc Abrams (2004.01.05.1819)]

No tongue-in cheek and no venom in this post Rick. Just some questions

[From Rick Marken (2004.01.05.1145)]

My own experience is more like Bill's.

Gee, what a surprise. The more interesting thing here is why you actually
believe this to be true. How do you know this? How do you know _what_ Bill's
experience is, and more importantly, even if you did go through the same
kinds of events, how do you know that what you each experienced was the
'same'? is there any real way of validating this claim? We all imagine a
great many things.

My consciousness seems to normally resides in higher-level systems.

How do you know this? How can you tell what is up and what is down? What
does a higher level thought mean. Is it more important? What data do you
have to comfirm that the nierarchy you are basing this on, even if it is
_or_ isn't Bill's, or even that a hierarchy and not some other organization
actually exists?

It seems to me that I am normally more aware of the programs, principles

and system concepts I control than I >am of the sensations, configurations
and transitions I control.

How would this look in Bill's 'other' hierarchy. The one from the emotions
chapter in LCS II, and how do you know which one would be more appropriate
at this time? What data do you have to support your claim?

Rick, this all a wonderful story with _ZERO_ data to support it. Is this
post your idea of talking 'science'? If so, how is it any different than
_my_ post on emotions? What do you think is so interesting about your
personal experiences that I or anyone else would be interested in them? Is
there some common thread here that you are postulating as being a definition
of consciousness, awareness, or emotion?

Marc

Bruce_Gregory4 · January 5, 2004, 11:51pm

[From Bruce Gregory 92004.01.05.1851)]

Marc Abrams (2004.01.05.1519)

Ok, do you see the word _ But_ in the second sentence? If so, you will
see
that I state that although Martin is correct in his analysis and I
agree
with his analysis. I _DON'T_ agree with his conclusion. I _Do Not_
believe
that we need to define anything up front (do you see that in the second
sentence?) That many investigations are conducted with the definition
being
the conclusion of an investigation.

Wonderful. Then why did you say:

"Again, my definition given in my post on 1/1/01. The one David
Goldstein did
not understand and found too 'abstract'. btw David, exactly what part of
this definition gave you the most trouble?

OUR EMOTIONS/FEELINGS ARE IMPORTANT SIDE EFFECTS OF OUR SENSORY INPUTS
AND
OUR ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL THEM, COGNITIVELY, PHYSIOLOGICALLY,
VOLUNTARILY, AND
INVOLUNTARILY, AS WELL AS THE SATISFACTION WE FEEL AFTER HEDONIC ACTS."

Beats the hell out of me. I assume that when someone says they are
angry,
they are in fact angry. Do you know of some procedure to verify the
fact
that when a person says I feel ... that this person is saying
something that
is 'true' and the same as what you think he is saying? I don't think
so. How
do you even know if your introspection is accurate, let alone someone
else's.

But apparently we can measure this quantitatively, Do you see the
problem?

It would help me to know what you experience about emotion that you
are
trying to explain. Otherwise, I am afraid I cannot contribute anything
useful to the discussion.

Simple. How do emotions affect the control process and how does the
control
process effect emotions. Let me try to expand upon this a bit.

The zeroth order answer is given by Bill's description of emotions.
What experiences do you have that leads you to conclude that this is
insufficient? I ask, not because I don't think it is possible to
improve on Bill's explanations, but because I want to know where and
why you think improvement is needed.

Bruce Gregory

"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no
one was listening, everything must be said again."
Andre Gide

"What is hateful to you, do not to your fellow men. That is the entire
Law; all the rest is commentary."

The Talmud