Emotions

Marc_Abrams1 · January 6, 2004, 12:12am

from [Marc Abrams (2004.01.05.1837)]

From Bill Powers (2004.01.05.1128 MST)]

>Did I make myself clearer?

Not in the sense I'm after. It's very hard to get across what I am asking
about. I'm not asking for a scientific objective definition of emotion, or
what causes emotion, or how one emotion compares with another, or how
intense an emotion is. The question I'm asking is more like -- how do you
know you're feeling angry?

Traditional discussions of emotions are a lot like discussions of
consciousness. People write all about these things without ever saying
exactly what they're talking about. The reader is just supposed to know
what they mean. That doesn't satisfy me.

Did you read my reply to Bruce Gregory carefully? From [Marc Abrams
(2004.01.05.1519)]

What are your thoughts on that post, including a different definition.

Marc

Marc_Abrams1 · January 6, 2004, 12:36am

from [Marc Abrams (2004.01.05.1913)]

Last post this evening I got 4 hours of home work to do and I need to get up
at 6:00 am. I'll get to some more tomorrow

[From Bruce Gregory 92004.01.05.1851)]

Wonderful. Then why did you say:

Where did you dig this up from? I gave you a new defintion in this post. Why
are you putting this on the table? It's irrelevant.

"Again, my definition given in my post on 1/1/01. The one David
Goldstein did
not understand and found too 'abstract'. btw David, exactly what part of
this definition gave you the most trouble?

OUR EMOTIONS/FEELINGS ARE IMPORTANT SIDE EFFECTS OF OUR SENSORY INPUTS
AND
OUR ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL THEM, COGNITIVELY, PHYSIOLOGICALLY,
VOLUNTARILY, AND
INVOLUNTARILY, AS WELL AS THE SATISFACTION WE FEEL AFTER HEDONIC ACTS."

>
> Beats the hell out of me. I assume that when someone says they are
> angry,
> they are in fact angry. Do you know of some procedure to verify the
> fact
> that when a person says I feel ... that this person is saying
> something that
> is 'true' and the same as what you think he is saying? I don't think
> so. How
> do you even know if your introspection is accurate, let alone someone
> else's.

But apparently we can measure this quantitatively, Do you see the
problem?

No. When someone _says_ they are angry I will believe them. Do _you_ see a
different set of standards for judging PCT and other theories? You say PCT
is a quantitative theory. Great. _WHAT_ is quantified? The perceptual
signal? What the hell is a perceptual signal? Yet you seem to have no
problem measuring this. You have no problem measuring the 'error' signal and
the 'gain' What the hell are those and how do you measure them? and how do
you know you're measuring gain and error. Bruce, I'd worry more about those
things a lot more than about whether we are a actually talking about anger
or something else.

Do you see the problem?

>
>> It would help me to know what you experience about emotion that you
>> are
>> trying to explain. Otherwise, I am afraid I cannot contribute anything
>> useful to the discussion.
>
> Simple. How do emotions affect the control process and how does the
> control
> process effect emotions. Let me try to expand upon this a bit.

The zeroth order answer is given by Bill's description of emotions.
What experiences do you have that leads you to conclude that this is
insufficient?

Nothing more than what I have already presented.

I ask, not because I don't think it is possible to
improve on Bill's explanations, but because I want to know where and
why you think improvement is needed.

I'm not the only one. It seems to me that many people feel tha PCT is
lacking _BIG_ time in this area. In my last post to you which you either
totally ignored or felt wasn't worth much contained everything in a nice
ball of wax, I will present it here again for the last time, I have nothing
further to say on this matter at the present time. I have other things to do
besides CSGnet: Scholl, and the development of a theory, Bruce, go with
whatever it is that floats your boat:

You:

It would help me to know what you experience about emotion that you are
trying to explain. Otherwise, I am afraid I cannot contribute anything
useful to the discussion.

Me:
Simple. How do emotions affect the control process and how does the control
process effect emotions. Let me try to expand upon this a bit.

And what you didn't bother quoting in this post. Any comments about this? I
think your agenda might be showing a bit.

We perceive feelings from our bodies that relate our state of well-being,
our energy and stress levels, our mood and disposition. How do we have these
feelings? What neural processes do they represent? I am _suggesting_, PLEASE
REMEMBER. I SAID 'SUGGESTING' AS IN TOSSING ON THE TABLE FOR DISCUSSION,
that our 'feelings' are the substrates for our emotions and self awareness.
William James hypothesized this, Antonio Damasio has carried James' torch
into current thinking and research has backed up this claim, so emotions are
a kind and type of feeling. Feelings we perceive include temperature, pain,
itch, tickle, sensual touch, muscular and visceral sensations, vasomotor
flush, hunger, thirst, air hunger and others related to the body's state.
These are _DIFFERENT_ than what is provided to us by our 5 senses, yet, I
believe, are every bit as important to what and how we perceive and control
those very same perceptions.

See ya tomorrow,

Marc

Bruce_Gregory4 · January 6, 2004, 2:05am

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.01.05.2105)]

Marc Abrams (2004.01.05.1913)

No. When someone _says_ they are angry I will believe them. Do _you_
see a
different set of standards for judging PCT and other theories? You say
PCT
is a quantitative theory. Great. _WHAT_ is quantified? The perceptual
signal? What the hell is a perceptual signal? Yet you seem to have no
problem measuring this. You have no problem measuring the 'error'
signal and
the 'gain' What the hell are those and how do you measure them? and
how do
you know you're measuring gain and error. Bruce, I'd worry more about
those
things a lot more than about whether we are a actually talking about
anger
or something else.

Do you see the problem?

Yes, I do. It is sometimes called an impedance mismatch. We seem to be
talking the same language, but we are not. Whatever you think a model
is, it is nothing like what I think a model is. I think we will have to
agree to disagree. I sincerely wish you luck with your model.

Bruce Gregory

"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no
one was listening, everything must be said again."
Andre Gide

"What is hateful to you, do not to your fellow men. That is the entire
Law; all the rest is commentary."

The Talmud

Marc_Abrams1 · January 6, 2004, 4:23am

from [Marc Abrams (2004.01.05.2310)]

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.01.05.2105)]

> Do you see the problem?

Yes, I do. It is sometimes called an impedance mismatch. We seem to be
talking the same language, but we are not. Whatever you think a model
is, it is nothing like what I think a model is. I think we will have to
agree to disagree. I sincerely wish you luck with your model.

Thanks Bruce, I really appreciate the thoughts.

Marc

Richard_Marken2 · January 6, 2004, 6:34am

[From Rick Marken (2004.01.05.2230)]

Marc Abrams (2004.01.05.1819)--

Rick Marken (2004.01.05.1145)--

My own experience is more like Bill's.

Gee, what a surprise. The more interesting thing here is why you
actually
believe this to be true. How do you know this?

I know it only from my many discussions with Bill about this. Of
course, I don't really know that we experience the world in the same
way. It's just that what Bill says about his experience usually strikes
me as being something I would say about my own.

How do you know _what_ Bill's experience is, and more importantly...
how do you know that what you each experienced was the 'same'?
is there any real way of validating this claim?

Of course we'll never know whether or not what any of us experiences is
truly the _same_ as what anyone else experiences. But I think there
are ways to do some validation of sorts, as is done in the study of
perception. The fact, for example, that I and most everyone else, as
far as I know, report seeing spontaneous perspective reversals when
viewing the Necker cube suggests that we are all having a similar
experience.

My consciousness seems to normally resides in higher-level systems.

How do you know this?

It's just my impression from introspection and my ability to willfully
become conscious of perceptions of different types.

How can you tell what is up and what is down?

HIgher level perceptions depend on lower level ones for their
existence. I can see colors with no shape but I can't see shapes when
there is no color (including grey scale), for example. So perception
of shape is at a higher level than perception of sensation.

What does a higher level thought mean. Is it more important?

No. It is simply composed of lower level perceptions.

What data do you have to comfirm that the nierarchy you are
basing this on, even if it is _or_ isn't Bill's, or even that a
hierarchy
and not some other organization actually exists?

Bill describes a lot of evidence for the hierarchical organization of
perception in B:CP. I have described some evidence in papers in _Mind
Readings_ (Levels of Control) and _More Mind Readings_ (Hierarchical
Behavior of Perception). I think there are three main types of
evidence for the hierarchical organization of perception (and control):
1) subjective observation which shows that perceptions depend on the
existence of others 2) neuro-anatomical evidence, which shows a
hierarchical organization of structures in the nervous system and 3)
relative timing, which shows perception and control processes nested
within slower and, presumably, higher level, perception and control
processes.

It seems to me that I am normally more aware of the programs,
principles
and system concepts I control than I am of the sensations,
configurations
and transitions I control.

How would this look in Bill's 'other' hierarchy. The one from the
emotions
chapter in LCS II, and how do you know which one would be more
appropriate
at this time?

I don't know what the 'other' hierarchy is.

What data do you have to support your claim?

The only data I have are my own subjective experiences.

Rick, this all a wonderful story with _ZERO_ data to support it.

It depends on what "it" is. There is quite a bit of data to support the
idea of a hierarchical organization of perception and control. There is
not much data regarding where, in this presumed hierarchical structure,
consciousness normally resides.

Is this post your idea of talking 'science'?

I suppose.

If so, how is it any different than _my_ post on emotions?

I'm describing experiences -- subjective data mainly -- not a model to
explain those experiences.

What do you think is so interesting about your
personal experiences that I or anyone else would be interested in them?

They're just descriptions of what I think I experience. If people
aren't interested I suppose they'll just ignore them.

Is there some common thread here that you are postulating as being a
definition
of consciousness, awareness, or emotion?

I think the only common thread is the idea of experiencing the world in
terms of several different levels of perception simultaneously. You
can perceive what I am writing, for example, in terms of configurations
(the shapes of the letters and words), the grammar of the sentences,
the meaning of the words, the meaning of the whole sentence, the idea
being communicated, etc. The common thread is the notion that we
experience (and control) the world in terms of a hierarchy of
simultaneously experienced types of perceptions.

Best

Rick

···

---

Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

David_Goldstein1 · January 6, 2004, 1:07pm

Message
[From David M. Goldstein (2004.01.06.0739
EST)]
Bill Powers (2004.01.05.1155 MST)

Bill: How would a theory of emotion make reference to specific actions? Are you speaking of things like a desire to attack or flee, where attacking and fleeing might be considered as actions (I would think of them as goals)?

David: Yes. Consider Plutchik’s list of emotions and some their derivatives.

Emotion Behavioral Language

Fear Escape

Anger Attack

Joy Mate

Sadness Cry

Acceptance Groom

Disgust Vomit

Expectation Map

Surprise Stop

Bill: OK, but is there any specific action that always goes with achieving a given goal? Considering the disturbances that usually exist?

David: No. Just as the concept of perception is multi-meaning, the concept of behavior is multi-meaning. Sometimes people refer to molecular stuff like muscle tensions and glandular secretions and other time they are referring to something that comes closer to functional language, goals and stuff.

David: The example you give makes clear what you have in mind. I have no clue how one would model this in a quantitative way. It sounds like a discussion that might take place in a therapy session.

If one just put the Emotion statement down, it would certainly lack the specificity that all the other stuff provides.

So, for a complete description of emotion, we have the sequence of descriptions.

Situation.

Error

Desired result of action

Conflict

Emotion

Resolution

The error description is something we should talk about some more, in another email. Have to go.

David

David M. Goldstein, Ph.D.

Bill_Powers · January 6, 2004, 1:54pm

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.06.06750 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.01.05.1621)--
\

I can see why you say this, but I disagree. I was telling a story, not
perceiving a set of principles, or so it seems to me.

What you have difficulty doing, in my view, is telling a story which
satisfies you after you have told it. I admit that is very difficult.
What is not clear to me is that it involves perceiving and controlling
principles and systems. It seems to me that it involves controlling
what you say.

In my experience, producing the words _is_ producing the proposal. What
do you see as the difference?

Before I offer any serious comments on all this, I'd like to know whether
you really mean what you appear to be saying here, or if you're just
baiting us. Your statements seem to imply a rather severe degree of
reductionism -- is that what you intend?

Best,

Bill P.

Bill_Powers · January 6, 2004, 1:57pm

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.06.0854 MST)]

Bruce Gregory 92004.01.05.1642)--

I think that you call foreground experiences, I simply call
experiences. What you call background thoughts, I call stories.

Fine, I'll call them stories, too. Do you see and hear and taste and touch
these stories in the same place where experiences take place, or do they
appear in some other form (when not actually spoken or written down)?

Oh, and I should also ask, are some stories better or more satisfactory
than others?

Best,

Bill P.

Bill_Powers · January 6, 2004, 2:26pm

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.06.0712 MST)]

Marc Abrams (2004.01.05.1837)--

Did you read my reply to Bruce Gregory carefully? From [Marc Abrams

(2004.01.05.1519)]

What are your thoughts on that post, including a different definition.

You didn't offer any definition of emotion that would tell me what you mean
by the word. You may think you did, but you didn't. I'm not even sure that
we mean the same thing by "definition." Your statement that people often do
studies without any definitions and arrive at definitions at the end almost
convinces me that we don't use the term "definition" in the same way. You
can't study something without saying or knowing what a Something looks
like, feels like, tastes like, or sounds like when you observe it, can you?

To me, your statement sounds as if I could say, "OK, I'm going to study
Uggles. First, let's set up a situation where several people experience an
Uggle, and then we'll see if one person experiences more of it than another
person." Wouldn't you be saying, by the time I got to the third sentence,
"Hold on a minute -- what's an Uggle?"

Just substitute a word like "emotion" or "anger" for "an Uggle" to see what
I mean by defining a term. How is anyone to know if they're seeing an
Uggle? What is it like to experience an Uggle? You seem to assume that if
you use the word "anger", I know what you're talking about, and for
informal conversations that's probably good enough. But if we're going to
do any kind of meaningful study, we have to pretend we're telling a Martian
about this, or someone who doesn't speak much English, Exactly what tells
you you're experiencing anger, or sadness, or happiness, or any emotion? We
can't just take it for granted that everyone knows what we mean by these
words. We have to relate the words to other experiences, non-word experiences,

Best,

Bill P.

Bruce_Gregory4 · January 6, 2004, 2:51pm

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.01.06.0950)]

Bill Powers (2004.01.06.06750 MST)

Before I offer any serious comments on all this, I'd like to know
whether
you really mean what you appear to be saying here, or if you're just
baiting us. Your statements seem to imply a rather severe degree of
reductionism -- is that what you intend?

I'm not sure what you mean by reductionism in this case, so I can't
answer your question. I am not trying to bait anyone. I suspect this is
one issue where it is best to agree to disagree.

Bruce Gregory

"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no
one was listening, everything must be said again."
Andre Gide

"What is hateful to you, do not to your fellow men. That is the entire
Law; all the rest is commentary."

The Talmud

Bruce_Gregory4 · January 6, 2004, 3:05pm

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.01.06.1005)]

Bill Powers (2004.01.06.0854 MST)

Bruce Gregory 92004.01.05.1642)--

I think that you call foreground experiences, I simply call
experiences. What you call background thoughts, I call stories.

Fine, I'll call them stories, too. Do you see and hear and taste and
touch
these stories in the same place where experiences take place, or do
they
appear in some other form (when not actually spoken or written down)?

I'm sorry, but I don't follow you. We don't normally see and hear and
taste our thoughts (unless we have some form of synesthesia). I take
that back. You could say that one hears on one's thoughts, I suppose.
But we hear them differently (in a different place?) than things we
believe originate outside ourselves.

Oh, and I should also ask, are some stories better or more satisfactory
than others?

Certainly. It depends on why we are telling the story.

Bruce Gregory

"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no
one was listening, everything must be said again."
Andre Gide

"What is hateful to you, do not to your fellow men. That is the entire
Law; all the rest is commentary."

The Talmud

Bill_Powers · January 6, 2004, 3:05pm

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.06.0748 MST)]

David M. Goldstein (2004.01.06.0739 EST)]

Bill
Powers (2004.01.05.1155 MST)

Bill: How would a theory of emotion
make reference to specific actions? Are you speaking of things like a
desire to attack or flee, where attacking and fleeing might be considered
as actions (I would think of them as goals)?

David: Yes. Consider Plutchik’s
list of emotions and some their derivatives.

Emotion
Behavioral Language

Fear
Escape

Anger
Attack

Joy
Mate

Sadness
Cry

Acceptance Groom

Disgust
Vomit

Expectation Map

Surprise
Stop

Pretty close to my thoughts. However, the behavior is not necessarily
indicative of an emotion, is it? It’s just that if there were an emotion,
the associated behavior would be likely to occur. So, if you saw (for
example) “mating” taking place, you would still have to
demonstrate by some independent means that the emotion going on was
“joy”. Not too likely if it’s a rape you’re
witnessing.

For the first two, I might even insist that if the behavior listed takes
place, the person doing it would probably not say that the corresponding
emotion was taking place. If you actually attack, you might feel psyched
up and energetic, but the feelings would be much more like anger if you
desired to attack but couldn’t actually do so. Same for fear: the emotion
would be much stronger if you wanted to leave the burning building, but
found the only exit locked.

The hope of finding reliable indicators of emotion that an outside
observer could recognize is probably vain. We can tell, pretty
well, when a person is behaving as if an emotion is going on, just from
judging how we behave when we know there is an emotion. But we can’t
reeally know if we’re looking at real emotion or simulated emotional
behavior.

So,
for a complete description of emotion, we have the sequence of
descriptions.

Situation.

Error

Desired result of action

Conflict

Emotion

Resolution

Right. I don’t see how we can get along without the subjective
aspects. “Conflict” isn’t necessarily on the list – the entry
there should just be “Difficulty in correcting error.”
The conflict itself isn’t what causes a problem; it’s the iunability to
correct the error that results in (negative) emotion, I think.

Best,

Bill P.

Kenneth_Kitzke_Value · January 6, 2004, 4:23pm

[From Kenny Kitzke (2004.01.06)]

If one is awake, can you not pay attention to your physical senses?

When you are telling yourself an interior story, is that different than thinking? If one is awake, can you not think?

I see sensing and thinking as things humans do all the time when they are alive and awake. They are involved in controlling perceptions and behaving. What is novel here?

Bruce_Gregory4 · January 6, 2004, 5:09pm

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.01.06.1208)]

Kenny Kitzke (2004.01.06)

I see sensing and thinking as things humans do all the time when they are alive and awake. They are involved in controlling perceptions and behaving. What is novel here?

Sorry to disappoint you by my lack of originality.

Bruce Gregory

"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no one was listening, everything must be said again."
Andre Gide

"What is hateful to you, do not to your fellow men. That is the entire Law; all the rest is commentary."

The Talmud

Bill_Powers · January 6, 2004, 7:56pm

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.06.1248 MST)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.01.06.1005)--

I think that you call foreground experiences, I simply call
experiences. What you call background thoughts, I call stories.

Fine, I'll call them stories, too. Do you see and hear and taste and
touch
these stories in the same place where experiences take place, or do
they
appear in some other form (when not actually spoken or written down)?

I'm sorry, but I don't follow you. We don't normally see and hear and
taste our thoughts (unless we have some form of synesthesia). I take
that back. You could say that one hears on one's thoughts, I suppose.
But we hear them differently (in a different place?) than things we
believe originate outside ourselves.

That's all I was getting at. If you say the stories are in the form of
thoughts, then what I mean by "background thoughts" is what you mean by
"stories." Do I have that right? By the way, I hear some of my thoughts,
too, but sometimes they are visual (words or images of things happening in
imagination).

The next step in establishing communication here is to ask if some stories
are about other stories. That is, when you consider a story about something
you are observing, do you ever have a thought about that story? Example:
"That wasn't a very convincing story." It might help if you were to give an
example of a real story about some real observation, so we wouldn't be
dealing with imaginary generalities.

Best,

Bill P.

Martin_Taylor2 · January 6, 2004, 8:05pm

[Martin Taylor 2004.01.06.1451]

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.06.0712 MST)]

Marc Abrams (2004.01.05.1837)--

Did you read my reply to Bruce Gregory carefully? From [Marc Abrams

(2004.01.05.1519)]

What are your thoughts on that post, including a different definition.

You didn't offer any definition of emotion that would tell me what you mean
by the word. You may think you did, but you didn't. I'm not even sure that
we mean the same thing by "definition." Your statement that people often do
studies without any definitions and arrive at definitions at the end almost
convinces me that we don't use the term "definition" in the same way. You
can't study something without saying or knowing what a Something looks
like, feels like, tastes like, or sounds like when you observe it, can you?

To me, your statement sounds as if I could say, "OK, I'm going to study
Uggles. First, let's set up a situation where several people experience an
Uggle, and then we'll see if one person experiences more of it than another
person." Wouldn't you be saying, by the time I got to the third sentence,
"Hold on a minute -- what's an Uggle?"

I don't think the analogy is entirely fair. I would be happier with
it if you said "beauty" or "pornography" rather than 'Uggle." As with
"emotion" these words have a kind of "I know it when I see it"
quality, and there seems to be a moderate amount of agreement among
people (though not complete agreement--one person's "beauty" may be
another's "pornography" for example).

If there is some kind of initial agreement as to the use of the word,
there is probably some kind of core that can be discovered by
experiment. When "X" happens, most (preferably all) people agree that
"Y" is a reasonable description. If one finds such an X and Y, and X
is measurable, it can serve as a stand-in for Y, at least for the
purposes of experiments to determine under what conditions X is
observed and not observed.

I commended Marc on the possibility that such a top-down approach
could be argued to be worthwhile, while disagreeing with him as to
the value of David Goldstein's bottom-up approach. By using both, it
may be possible to triangulate both on a more precise definition and
a theory of mechanism(s).

I think on the history of "ague", which term was once as well
understood as "emotion" is now. Now, however, we understand "ague" to
have refered to any number of ailments with quite different causes
and cures, each more precise than "go to bed and drink hot toddy" or
"keep all the windows open and the covers off" and the ague will pass.

We do seem to have as much commonality in our understanding of the
meaning of "emotion", "beauty", and "pornography" as we did 100 years
ago of "ague." Perhaps in another 100 years we will be able to make
more precise descriptions of the various different constellations of
factors these catch-all words can cover. I'd say that if Marc is able
to make a start towards a definition by working top-down on "when X
happens we have emotion Y", more power to him. Meanwhile, if David's
program can lead to a definition and a notion of mechanism, with luck
the two approaches will converge.

Martin

Bill_Powers · January 6, 2004, 8:08pm

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.06.1306 MST)]

Kenny Kitzke (2004.01.06)--

You'll probably get a dozen answer like mine --

If one is awake, can you not pay attention to your physical senses?

Haven't you ever driven somewhere while thinking about a problem, and
realized when you got there that you didn't recall seeing a single
stoplight or stop sign on the way?

Best,

Bill P.

Bill_Powers · January 6, 2004, 8:13pm

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.06.1311 MST)]

Martin Taylor 2004.01.06.1451--

We do seem to have as much commonality in our understanding of the
meaning of "emotion", "beauty", and "pornography" as we did 100 years
ago of "ague." Perhaps in another 100 years we will be able to make
more precise descriptions of the various different constellations of
factors these catch-all words can cover. I'd say that if Marc is able
to make a start towards a definition by working top-down on "when X
happens we have emotion Y", more power to him. Meanwhile, if David's
program can lead to a definition and a notion of mechanism, with luck
the two approaches will converge.

Well, I'm a bottom-up man myself in these matters, but if progress can be
made from the other end, that's fine too. However, Marc has been talking in
a pretty bottom-up way, too, so I'm not sure this is the answer to the
current problem.

Best,

Bill P.

Bruce_Gregory4 · January 6, 2004, 10:23pm

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.01.06.17220]

Bill Powers (2004.01.06.1248 MST)

That's all I was getting at. If you say the stories are in the form of
thoughts, then what I mean by "background thoughts" is what you mean by
"stories." Do I have that right?

I believe that was what I said. If not, it is what I meant.

The next step in establishing communication here is to ask if some
stories
are about other stories.

Definitely.

It might help if you were to give an
example of a real story about some real observation, so we wouldn't be
dealing with imaginary generalities.

"Everything we deal with is either an experience or a story."

"Is that a story?"

"Definitely."

"Isn't a story also an experience?"

"Yes."

Bruce Gregory

"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no
one was listening, everything must be said again."
Andre Gide

"What is hateful to you, do not to your fellow men. That is the entire
Law; all the rest is commentary."

The Talmud

Marc_Abrams1 · January 6, 2004, 11:56pm

from [Marc Abrams (2004.01.06.1806)]

[From Bill Powers (2004.01.06.1311 MST)]

Well, I'm a bottom-up man myself in these matters, but if progress can be
made from the other end, that's fine too. However, Marc has been talking

in

a pretty bottom-up way, too, so I'm not sure this is the answer to the
current problem.

Sorry Bill, I'm trying to work both ends toward the middle. The SD modeling
represents the top-down approach with data gathered from the bottom-up
(physiological/biological/cognitive data) approach. Hopefully as Martin
pointed out, it will meet some where, successfully, in the middle.

I realized some very important things of late. I realize now my posting onto
CSGnet was premature, and here is why. I have spent 20 years educating
myself in various ways about human behavior. Most of it informal and
unscientific. I have been deeply interested in systems science and came to
PCT by a gentleman who was also involved in SD at the time. He has been long
gone from this list. So my ideas and notions about feedback and control go
back a long way. The significance of PCT was and is enormous. It was through
PCT that I first began to fully understood the significance of the model
with regard to , not only human psychology, but to the _ENTIRE_ human
experience of purposeful behaviors, from the level of DNA to the entire
organism. In reading Bill's papers in LCS and LCS II and in subsequent phone
conversations with him I began to appreciate and understand (or at least I
thought so, I really didn't and don't) _HIS_ perspective on the significance
and importance of the PCT model to _ALL_ types and kinds of regulatory
processes in humans. I innocently thought I was doing 'PCT' in my work on
emotions but Bill straightened me out. I'm Not, and in giving it some
thought I realize he is right. He is right because that is the way he feels
about it, not because of anything I have or haven't done, and that's ok,
because maybe (I don't know for sure), he feels like I'm messing around with
_his_ ideas (I am), and he just doesn't like that. So I will be forever
indebted to Bill for the experience of learning (as little as I do know) PCT
and dedicate whatever success I might have to his hard work. Thanks Bill.

Of course I have no idea as to whether I will actually succeed with _ANY_ of
this stuff. That is, my education,model formulation, and theory development.
But you know what? I doesn't really matter. I'm in it for the enjoyment of
the ride and so far it's been great.

I also understand that I am asking the impossible from myself and others. I
have some ideas. (more than a few :-)) It involves the integration of a
number of what many would now consider to be disparate disciplines. I alone
understand what is in my head and how all the pieces _might_ fit and I am
not prepared or capable of fully elaborating on those ideas yet. I am asking
for help that I cannot get because, no one has thought of these things like
I have so most people don't understand what I'm attempting to do or what I
will ultimately accomplish if I do it. What's important here is the
_integration_ of ideas, not any one single idea I might possess.

I feel a large burden has been lifted from me and now I can concentrate on
doing what I need to do for myself. When I feel I have something of interest
to CSGnet I will post it, otherwise my research is something _I_ need to do
for myself, and by myself.

Marc