[From Rick Marken (930914.1500)]
Gary Cziko (930914.0312) --
I was just conducting a bit of a Test to see if seeing more about
encodingism was a controlled variable. Apparently it is for Tom.
Actually, I prodded Tom into asking you. It turns out that Tom and I
are that social control system you hear tell of. I'm the sensor -
comparator (combined as in Hans' diagram) and Tom's the output function.
We get out reference signal's from Bill P. This social control system
happens to work because neither Tom nor I have a mind (intentions) of
our own.
P.S. Rick Marken, I do not see any fundamental encodingist blunders in how
PCT and HPCT is used to model behavior and perception. So you can continue
your work with peace of mind. However, just about all cognitive theories
that I am aware of make the encodingist blunder.
But they make so many blunders -- the input - output blunder, the
output generation blunder, the behavior in a vacuum blunder, and
now the encodingism blunder. How do you pick your favorite?
Best
Rick
From Tom Bourbon [930915.0949]
[From Rick Marken (930914.1500)]
Gary Cziko (930914.0312) --
I was just conducting a bit of a Test to see if seeing more about
encodingism was a controlled variable. Apparently it is for Tom.
Actually, I prodded Tom into asking you. It turns out that Tom and I
are that social control system you hear tell of. I'm the sensor -
comparator (combined as in Hans' diagram) and Tom's the output function.
We get out reference signal's from Bill P. This social control system
happens to work because neither Tom nor I have a mind (intentions) of
our own.
I agree with Rick's comment that "neither Tom nor I have a mind (intentions)
of our own." As one function box in a social control system, all I do is
wait for the prompt from Rick, then my fingers start flying over the keys.
ยทยทยท
=======
A Fable of Social Control
Actually, Rick has it wrong. You see, I am controlling his actions. To do
that, I disturb an enviornmental variable (Gary Cziko) that I know Rick
acts upon in order to control his (Rick's) perceptions of Gary's states. It
works this way: Gary posts comments about encodingism; Rick replies; Gary
replies; Rick replies; Gary stops replying. I notice that the cycle has
stopped. Knowing a little about Rick's control hierarchy, I decide to
disturb the variable he always tries to control (GC). I know that if I
disturb Gary sufficiently, his state will change in a way that matters to
Rick, who then will act. I post a question to Gary, asking him for a
definition of "encodingism." Gary says he will deliver the definition after
an unspecified weekend has passed. Like a good high-gain negative feedback
control system, Rick notices that the first weekend has gone by without a
definition from Gary. Rick, as input function, signals to Tom, as output
function, saying, "Poke Gary." Tom pokes Gary (it was a *good* disturbance,
though) who replies, "I never said which weekend" and speculates that Tom
was disturbed by his (Gary's) silence. Gary did not realize that Rick
was the one who had been disturbed and that Tom posted to Gary only as a
means to gain control of Rick's actions.
====================
Silly, I admit, but the sort of thing people do all the time in their
social interactions. I have a hard time thinking of the people in an
interaction like that as though each of them were a single function. I have
an equally hard time thinking of individual cells in an organism as though
they engage in such games. But people, as fully-functioning hierarchical
control systems, do such things all the time when they take on certain roles
in an organization or in an informal social group.
Until later,
Tom