I’ll start from the end, as problem there is somehow continuing »story« throughh the whole your post.
You don’t perceive a “bump of the wind” unless you have mounted a detector for such things onto the hood of your car.
I perceive what I, we call the »wind« (from my previos experiences) if my car window is opened (sensors for pressure), or usualy I can hear (perceive) it as »bump« or feel specific »trembling« of the car. So I can distinguish special sounds and »tremblings« (at least what I call sound and trembling) when wind »bump« into a car. And beside that I also perceive deviation of the front side of the car from reference. It’s »Complex perception«.
If you don’t perceive such a »CEV« than I understand why you have to mount devices for »detecting« such »complex stimuli« J. It seems to me, that difference between your and my perception is in the way we perceive. I for example use CEP (Complex Environmental Perception). It’s something like a »multi-media« perception. There are numerous perceptual inputs through which I perceive at the same time many »analogs« of environmental variables which form some »complex perceptual constructions« of environment on different levels in hierarchy. So I don’t need to mount detector for any physical quantity as my own numerous Input functions are effective enough J.
You perceive the location of the car on the road, which has departed from its reference value.
If you would read some rows above in my past post you could see my description of what you described as »deviation from reference« caused by a wind. It’s quite similar. So you didn’t need to repeat explanation. I’ve already know it. J
An outside observer might know that the error was due to a “bump of the wind”, but you can’t tell whether it was a dip in the road surface – at least I can’t. When I’m on the highway, I often wonder whether a deviation is cause by wind, road surface, or (I hope not) a defect in the car such as a tire going flat.
I don’t see how outside observer »might know« that »error« was due to »bump of the wind« ? What kind of »remote« sensors did he mount on the car to know it ? Martin I’m sorry to say, but we are exaggerating. J.
….but you can’t tell whether it was a dip in the road surface – at least I can’t. When I’m on the highway, I often wonder whether a deviation is cause by wind, road surface, or (I hope not) a defect in the car such as a tire going flat.
Martin, maybe you will not beleive me, but I do clearly distinguish the sound and trembling of what we call wind when it »bump« into a car, from the sound and trembling when I perceive my car drive into something you call »dip in the road surface« or sound and trembling caused by tyre defect. As I said I use »CEP«. But If you don’t distinguish that sounds or »tremblings« with »CEV« I can teach you to use my »CEP«. It’s easy to use. If I happen to make a trip to Canada and if you’ll alove me to visit you J we can drive arround and try to find windy area and area with dips on the road and than we can put nails on the road and drive over them to cause tyre defect. Every event will have at least specific sound and specific trembling (perceptions)so some specific overall sensation. But I’m wondering how do you know for wind, surface defect or tyre defect as you don’t distinguish them on the highway ? You don’t have self-experiences ? Did somebody tell you about that ?
The Complex ENVIRONMENTAL Variable is a function in the environment of some variables in the environment. It corresponds to a perception inside an organism (a person, perhaps). If the variables are the environmental correlates of what the peripheral sensors send into the organism, then that’s what they are. But they don’t have to be. The point is that changing the value of the CEV will also change the value of the corresponding perceptual signal. It is something you perceive to be in the environment.
HB : I don’t know if Rick made a mistake when sending his post several times, or he wanted to tell us something about CEV. I see you alredy answered so I’ll let you chat about this one.
The temperature sensors produced a signal. If that signal corresponds to a feeling of hot or cold, then the perception is that there exists outside the body something that is hot or cold. That “something” has a property called “temperature”, which is the CEV corresponding to the perception of the temperature of the “something” in the environment.
[Maybe the following is an unnecessary complication at this point, but it’s worth remembering.]
We know that most of these functions change over time. For example, perceived brightness doesn’t have a fixed relationship with the flux of photons onto the retina, because we adapt to the overall level of illumination. The adaptation is slow compared to the rate at which illumination can change, so over short time periods there is a function relating changes in photon flux to changes in perceived brightness. The same seems to be true of any perceptual function I can think of at the moment. They all depend on history as well as what is currently coming from the sensors, but if the effect of history changes slowly compared to the changes in the sensors, it is still reasonable to say there is a functional relationship between perception and changes in the environmental variable.
On contrary. I see it as very necessary complication as it shows how vague perceptions can be. I can add to your »complication«, that not only adaptation and history of sensors activity (input function) but also structure of input function, »min and max trasholds«, refractory period… influence (non)linear transduction of »external stimuli« to »perceptual signal«. So we can see how »deformed« can be perceptual signal in comparison to »external physical stimuli«. Andi if we add upgrade of perceptual hierarchy to perceptual intensities, we see that quite odd »CEV« or »CEP« can be formed. It seems to be entiraly subjective, depending from all those specific characteristics of input functions and central nervous system.
So sometimes it’s hard to say what is »real« and what’s »illusion«, »hallucination« or what we didn’t want to perceive and what we wanted to perceive and what we missed to perceive…. But I agree with you : »it is still reasonable to say there is a functional relationship between perception and changes in the environmental variable«. We perceive and control quite efficially to survive.
From the rest of our discussion I concluded that we agree about »controlled and uncontrolled perceptions« that they go through the same »perceptual chanel« or as you wrote : »…all perceptions are equally constructed by the operation of layers of perceptual functions on the firing patterns of neurons connected to sensors,… ». So I concluded that all perceptions are formed in the same input functions and end in comparator.
So my conclusion is that Bill’s generic diagram is right showing that all perceptions (uncontrolled and controlled) travel through the same perceptual input function to the comparator. Now I need to apologize to you as I was misleading you with saying that all these perceptions are controlled. You were right. They are not. But I affirm now that all perception (controlled and uncontrolled) are compared in comparator. Some of them are controlled and some are not. Some values of uncontrolled perceptions are added to controlled as you said, or uncontrolled perception are »turned« into controlled (for ex. sudden deviation of the car)… I have quite strong physiological evidence for this affirmation.
It seems also that you are right about Bill’s diagram that shows only controlled perceptions. I don’t know whether he ever mentioned what’s happening to uncontrolled or how uncontrolled are added to controlled perceptions, or otherwise dismissed or included in futher process of hierarchical control.
···
From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Taylor
Sent: Wednesday, August 27, 2014 11:53 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Environmental variables (was: Why we fight…)
[Martin Taylor 2014.08.27.13.48]
On 2014/08/27 12:51 PM, Boris Hartman wrote:
Martin,
sorry for the delay…J. It’s the beggining of school year…
MT :
Every perceptual function defines a CEV. If you happen to have a perceptual function that produces an output proportional to 3 times the temperature in degrees Kelvin plus twice the number of minutes since last midnight, then 3*(deg K)+2*(minutes) is the CEV for that perception. It’s a nonsense one, of course, but nonsense sometimes is useful to illuminate sense.
HB :
Do I understand right, that CEV is something what happens in sensor (afferent) nerves - output of »input function« ?
The Complex ENVIRONMENTAL Variable is a function in the environment of some variables in the environment. It corresponds to a perception inside an organism (a person, perhaps). If the variables are the environmental correlates of what the peripheral sensors send into the organism, then that’s what they are. But they don’t have to be. The point is that changing the value of the CEV will also change the value of the corresponding perceptual signal. It is something you perceive to be in the environment.
In your case if I understand right temperature receptors »transformed« some physical stimuli from outer environment into »CEV«, that »coresponds« to the temperature outside ?
The temperature sensors produced a signal. If that signal corresponds to a feeling of hot or cold, then the perception is that there exists outside the body something that is hot or cold. That “something” has a property called “temperature”, which is the CEV corresponding to the perception of the temperature of the “something” in the environment.
MT :
If you have a perceptual function, by definition its output is a perceptual signal that changes when the environmental variables that enter into it change.
HB:
Well I think I don’t understand this one clearly. Are you assuming that there is linear (precise) relationship between changes in values of environmental variables that enters in »input function« and changes in perceptual signal ?
No. Any function will do. I always assume that a perceptual function is nonlinear, but that doesn’t usually matter much when dealing with control unless you are doing very precise simulation.
[Maybe the following is an unnecessary complication at this point, but it’s worth remembering.]
We know that most of these functions change over time. For example, perceived brightness doesn’t have a fixed relationship with the flux of photons onto the retina, because we adapt to the overall level of illumination. The adaptation is slow compared to the rate at which illumination can change, so over short time periods there is a function relating changes in photon flux to changes in perceived brightness. The same seems to be true of any perceptual function I can think of at the moment. They all depend on history as well as what is currently coming from the sensors, but if the effect of history changes slowly compared to the changes in the sensors, it is still reasonable to say there is a functional relationship between perception and changes in the environmental variable.
[end complication]
So that changes in »outside physical variables« are varying in the same time and intensity with changes in perceptual signal ?
There are always delays and time-averaging incorporated in the perceptual process, and the “intensity” won’t vary in the same ratio as the perceptual signal, but you have the core of the idea correct.
There is exactly one outside physical variable defined by the processes that lead to one perceptual signal. That outside physical variable may be a very complicated function of the basic physical variables of mass, distance, force, voltage, time, etc. Even the response of a sensor is a very complex function of the basic variables. Sometimes we take the CEV of a sensor to be a basic physical variable, but that’s just as arbitrary as saying that the perceived taste of lemonade is not a physical variable. Sometimes we call “momentum” and “energy” basic variables even though they are functions of other basic variables. It’s all models and functions and what you want to do as an analyst, after all. To the perceiver, there’s just something “out there”, and for each perceptual variable we call what is “out there” a Complex Environmental Variable.
MT :
I have often said to you that Bill’s DIAGRAMs contain only controlled perceptions, because they are diagrams of how those perceptions are controlled. Uncontrolled perceptions have values that may or may not contribute to the values of controlled perceptions. It’s irrelevant in a diagram intended to show how control works. I don’t have any particular model for uncontrolled perceptions, nor do I think one is needed.
HB :
So If I understand right in first sentence you say that Bill’s diagram contain only controlled perception and in second sentence you say that uncontrolled perception have values that may or may not contribute to the values of controlled perceptions. So if I try to make a cocnlusion »uncontrolled perception« which contribute to the values of controlled perception go through the same »perceptual channel« as controlled goes. How could they otherwise contribute to controlled perception ?
![]()
O.K. maybe we could make some example to release misunderstanding.
Suppose that you are driving a car (it’s top example in PCT) and you are controlling the perception of front side of the car in just enough close range to reference perception of the middle right side of the street, that we say you have it »under control«. And you are looking also arround.
You don’t need to add “looking around”. All you need to say is something like: “There are shadows across the road that affect your perception of the edge, and maybe the sun gets into your eyes. Perhaps there is rain on the windscreen. You aren’t controlling those, but they do influence your perception of the relation of the car to the edge of the lane.”
I assume that beside »controlled perception«, you accept also »uncontrolled perception« of surrounding (maybe trees, fields, buildings, people and so on). I suppose that all these perception goes through the same pathway as you describe it : »…all perceptions are equally constructed by the operation of layers of perceptual functions on the firing patterns of neurons connected to sensors,… ».
Yes. But say “pathways”, plural. There are at least millions, maybe billions of such pathways.
»Suddenly a «bump« of wind »pushed« your perception of the front side of the car »away« from reference (right side of the street). Is this »bump of the wind« in first moment controlled or uncontrolled perception ? Where does it go ?
You don’t perceive a “bump of the wind” unless you have mounted a detector for such things onto the hood of your car. You perceive the location of the car on the road, which has departed from its reference value. An outside observer might know that the error was due to a “bump of the wind”, but you can’t tell whether it was a dip in the road surface – at least I can’t. When I’m on the highway, I often wonder whether a deviation is cause by wind, road surface, or (I hope not) a defect in the car such as a tire going flat.
Martin
From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Taylor
Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 6:21 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Environmental variables (was: Why we fight…)
[Martin Taylor 2014.08.23.23.52]
On 2014/08/23 10:36 AM, Boris Hartman wrote:
Martin,
I’m not a good reader of your »English«, so I don’t know whether I understood some thoughts of yours, as you wanted to be understaood.
MT :
The problem with this, and it is a bone I have picked with Bill as well, is that the same is true of EVERY perception. Bill seemed to take an internally inconsistent view, saying on the one hand that all we ever know is our perception, no matter what kind of perception it might be, and on the other hand that there were some privileged environmental variables that are “real” and some that are not.
HB :
Where did Bill wrote that some privileged environmental variables are more real than others ? I really don’t recall »meating« this in his books. But I’m not some specialy good »English« reader. It’s possible that I missed something.
Rick references B:CP, 2nd Ed. p 112 as an example. On rereading it, I can see that the writing is ambiguous. I read it (as Rick seems to have done) as saying that there are environmental variable corresponding to first-level perceptions, but not to higher-level perceptions, which are constructed.
MT :
The argument that the taste of a given glass of lemonade is different for every person cannot hold water
There is no way that we can say that any perception in one person is the same as a perception in someone else. My perception of “blue” may not be yours, just as my perception of the trustworthiness of the neighbourhood loan shark or municipal politician may not be yours.
HB :
I really don’t see the point. In the first sentence it seems to me, that you are saying »that the taste of a given glass of lemonade is different for every person cannot hold water« so I understand it, that different persons have the same perception of taste (can not »hold water«). It seems to me that you are denying the existance of different taste of lemonade. In the other senstences I understand that perceptions are different for any person. Did I misssed something ?
No. I’m afraid my English was not clear enough. It’s “the argument” (for the non-existence in the environment of a variable corresponding to the taste of lemonade) that cannot hold water. I made no claim about whether different people, or the same person at different times, would or would not perceive the same taste from a particular glass of lemonade.
MT :
My preferred position on this is, I think, more consistent than Bill’s. I assume that there exists a “real world” that influences my sense organs and on which I can act in ways that influence the inputs to my sense organs. I know not what is in that world, but my nervous system constructs a perceived reality by operations on those sensory inputs (plus all the history of operations on earlier sensory inputs). Every perception thus produced defines some function of present and past states of the environment that have and had some influence on my sensors. Those functions describe a presumed reality “out there”, no one function, no one presumed environmental variable thus constructed having any priority over any other.
HB :
I never felt that Bill had different opinion from yours. But he did once have a discours of »solipsism« but he asked himself whether his thinking was »solipsist« view or not. Well whatever I never have a feeling that he is solipsist or something different from your perceptual understanding of »real world«.
Solipsism doesn’t come into this discussion, except that we have to dismiss it before we can have a discussion that includes talk about an external environment. Basically, it’s totally irrelevant. We agree it’s wrong, and then deal with our theories.
MT :
In this, I believe internally consistent, view, the brightness of a light, the taste of lemonade, the willingness of my dog to follow me, the autocratic tendencies of my political leaders, all have equal validity as existing states of the external environment. I call them Complex Environmental Variables, because they are environmental variables defined by complex perceptual functions. There’s no way to say that second, fifth, or ninth-level perceptions are of environmental variables more or less real than each other.
HB :
I really don’t imagine what »Complex Environemntal Variable« (CEV) can be ? If I assume that intensities as first level controlled variables which »integrate« into second level »sensations« and so on through the whole heirarchy, what is CEV ?
Every perceptual function defines a CEV. If you happen to have a perceptual function that produces an output proportional to 3 times the temperature in degrees Kelvin plus twice the number of minutes since last midnight, then 3*(deg K)+2*(minutes) is the CEV for that perception. It’s a nonsense one, of course, but nonsense sometimes is useful to illuminate sense.
Maybe your »perceptual mosaic« of the world which you assume to be »outside«. As you said. You beleive that your view is internally consistent. Others beleive that Bill’s view or their view is internally consistent. How can we know which »view« is internally consistent ? But it seems interesting what’s your theory of how we perceive the »world« outside. How does »Complex Perceptual Functions« (CPF) work ?
Are not all perceptual functions complex? I don’t mean in the mathematical sense of using numbers with real and imaginary components, but in the everyday sense of being rather complicated.
MT :
Those functions describe a presumed reality “out there”, no one function, no one presumed environmental variable thus constructed having any priority over any other.
HB :
So if I choose to control some variable in »environment«, are you saying that, it has no priority over other perceived variables in »environment« in that moment ?
It matters not whether you choose to control a perception. Any function you define creates a value. That value is a variable whose magnitude depends on the values of the inputs to the function. Perceptual functions are no different. If you have a perceptual function, by definition its output is a perceptual signal that changes when the environmental variables that enter into it change.
MT :
As for the taste of lemonade having no special physical effects on anything else, except the person tasting the mixture, that is true of every uncontrolled perception.
HB :
If I recall right you said that Bill’s model assume only controlled perceptions in the diagram. So where do »uncontrolled perceptions« go in your model ?
No. I have often said to you that Bill’s DIAGRAMs contain only controlled perceptions, because they are diagrams of how those perceptions are controlled. Uncontrolled perceptions have values that may or may not contribute to the values of controlled perceptions. It’s irrelevant in a diagram intended to show how control works. I don’t have any particular model for uncontrolled perceptions, nor do I think one is needed.
MT :
Since all perceptions are equally constructed by the operation of layers of perceptual functions on the firing patterns of neurons connected to sensors,…
HB :
Do I understand right that all perceptions (controlled and uncontrolled) are equally constructed in nervous system ? So I suppose that we can assume that all perceptions go though the same perceptual »chanell« what is from physilogical view right. So how do we distinguish the pathway of »controlled and uncontrolled« perceptions in your theory ?
You don’t. The only difference is whether at any particular moment the perception is being controlled – whether you are actively doing something to keep it near its reference value, if it has one.
MT :
I have disagreed with Bill on this for a couple of decades without changing his opinion, and I don’t imagine my argument will change anyone else’s opinion. All the same, I thought it worth putting “out there” for the consideration of anyone who might be interested.
HB:
I’m always interested. But as far as I was talking to Bill and read his books I really don’t understand what was your and Bill’s disagreement ? It seems to me a little bit confusing. I think I always understood Bill’s theory and your understanding of it as something very similar, specialy as you frquently pointed out, that you talked with Bill for days and hours and that he »filled« some of your diagrams with his knowledge.
I have always believed that my understanding of Bill’s theory was very close to his. Our differences, as I perceived them, were always on the margins. For example, I have never been convinced by the specific levels Bill describes in his hierarchy. Neither was he, to judge from the way he inverted the order of levels in his models, and the number of times he explicitly said that his set of levels was always subject to revision. There have been many times I have disagreed with Bill and sometimes one of us changed our mind, other times when we agreed to disagree. But on the big things, I don’t think we disagreed much, if at all. This issue of whether all or only some environmental variable are constructed by perceptual functions is a very little thing.
Martin
Boris
From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Martin Taylor
Sent: Saturday, August 23, 2014 5:26 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Environmental variables (was: Why we fight…)
[Martin Taylor 2014.08.22.22.57]
[From Rick Marken (2014.08.22.1940)]
Martin Taylor (2014.08.22.14.41)–
RM: I think I mistakenly read this to mean that you were saying that control also involves reducing the variability of the external environment. But, in fact, you never said that; you were correctly implying that control involves reducing the variability of perceptual aspects of the environment, keeping them from varying around their “desired states”.
MT: That’s true, but as you often point out, controlling a perceptual (internal) variable also implies reducing the variability of the corresponding environmental variable.
RM: I would rather say that controlling a perceptual variable implies controlling the environmental correlate of the perceptual variable. The reason for this slight change in terminology is to emphasize the fact that there may be no environmental variable that corresponds to the controlled perceptual variable. For example, in B:CP (p. 112 of 2nd edition) Bill gives the example of controlling for the perception of the taste of lemonade. That perception is a construction (by a perceptual function) “…derived from the intensity signals generated by sugar and acid (together with some oil smells)… the mere intermingling of these physical components has no special physical effects on anything else, except the person tasting the mixture.” The same is true of many other perceptions that we control, such as the perception of variability (if we can perceive it). The variability of independent events that happen with different probabilities is an aspect of these events that we can perceive but it has no more physical significance than some other aspect of these events that we can perceive, such Morse code patterns.
The problem with this, and it is a bone I have picked with Bill as well, is that the same is true of EVERY perception. Bill seemed to take an internally inconsistent view, saying on the one hand that all we ever know is our perception, no matter what kind of perception it might be, and on the other hand that there were some privileged environmental variables that are “real” and some that are not. Since all perceptions are equally constructed by the operation of layers of perceptual functions on the firing patterns of neurons connected to sensors, on what grounds can one say a perception such as “intensity” is of an environmental variable more real than the taste of lemonade?
The argument that the taste of a given glass of lemonade is different for every person cannot hold water
There is no way that we can say that any perception in one person is the same as a perception in someone else. My perception of “blue” may not be yours, just as my perception of the trustworthiness of the neighbourhood loan shark or municipal politician may not be yours.
My preferred position on this is, I think, more consistent than Bill’s. I assume that there exists a “real world” that influences my sense organs and on which I can act in ways that influence the inputs to my sense organs. I know not what is in that world, but my nervous system constructs a perceived reality by operations on those sensory inputs (plus all the history of operations on earlier sensory inputs). Every perception thus produced defines some function of present and past states of the environment that have and had some influence on my sensors. Those functions describe a presumed reality “out there”, no one function, no one presumed environmental variable thus constructed having any priority over any other.
In this, I believe internally consistent, view, the brightness of a light, the taste of lemonade, the willingness of my dog to follow me, the autocratic tendencies of my political leaders, all have equal validity as existing states of the external environment. I call them Complex Environmental Variables, because they are environmental variables defined by complex perceptual functions. There’s no way to say that second, fifth, or ninth-level perceptions are of environmental variables more or less real than each other.
As for the taste of lemonade having no special physical effects on anything else, except the person tasting the mixture, that is true of every uncontrolled perception. If the person is not controlling the perception of the taste of the lemonade, any taste will do. But if the taste is a controlled perception and it doesn’t match its reference value, the person will act, and those actions definitely will have effects on something else, perhaps only by adding sugar to the mixture, perhaps by throwing the glass at the poor waiter who brought this foul tasting mixture.
I have disagreed with Bill on this for a couple of decades without changing his opinion, and I don’t imagine my argument will change anyone else’s opinion. All the same, I thought it worth putting “out there” for the consideration of anyone who might be interested.
Martin