[From Bruce Gregory (980411.2255 EDT)]
How was Bill able to "decide" to limit his posts to CSGnet and to
concentrate on model building? By moving his attention from one to the
other. This increases the gain associated with one perception, "I am
building an important model" and lowers the gain associated with another
perception, "I am responding to that idiot Bruce Gregory in order to keep
the record straight." Who you become is given by the perceptions you
control.
BO
[From Rick Marken (980411.2120)]
Bruce Gregory (980411.2255 EDT) --
How was Bill able to "decide" to limit his posts to CSGnet and to
concentrate on model building? By moving his attention from one
to the other.
How was he able to move his attention from "posting to CSGNet" to
"concentrating on mopdel building"? What you have said is
equivalent to: "A person decides to move his attention by moving
his attention". I think we have to model whatever does the moving;
that would be a start at a model of consciousness. I think Bill
actually provides this start in the "Learning" Chaper of B:CP.
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/
[From Bruce Gregory (980412.0641 EDT)]
Rick Marken (980411.2120)
How was he able to move his attention from "posting to CSGNet" to
"concentrating on mopdel building"? What you have said is
equivalent to: "A person decides to move his attention by moving
his attention". I think we have to model whatever does the moving;
that would be a start at a model of consciousness. I think Bill
actually provides this start in the "Learning" Chaper of B:CP.
Thanks, I'll reread it. (Although this does not not sound I like an example
of what I would call learning.)
BO
[From Bruce Gregory (980412.0810 EDT)]
Rick Marken (980411.2120)
Bruce Gregory (980411.2255 EDT) --
How was Bill able to "decide" to limit his posts to CSGnet and to
concentrate on model building? By moving his attention from one
to the other.How was he able to move his attention from "posting to CSGNet" to
"concentrating on mopdel building"? What you have said is
equivalent to: "A person decides to move his attention by moving
his attention". I think we have to model whatever does the moving;
that would be a start at a model of consciousness. I think Bill
actually provides this start in the "Learning" Chaper of B:CP.
If I understand Bill, his attention moved from CSGnet to modeling as a
result of persistent errors arising from his efforts to control his
perceptions on the net. His reorganizing system moved his attention to
modeling in an effort to reduce overall system error. He might have had
thoughts such as "I must get back to modeling" but these thoughts are not
part of the organizing system that actually redirected his attention.
Perhaps they are part of a higher level control system, perhaps they are
simply noise or somethingthing to keep him diverted why reorganization does
its job. The story Bill tells us about his "decision" might simply be a
rationalization of the shifts in attention and gain produced by ongoing
reorganization.
BO
[From Rick Marken (980412.1030)]
He is risen! Mazel tov!
Bruce Gregory (980412.0810 EDT) --
If I understand Bill, his attention moved from CSGnet to
modeling as a result of persistent errors arising from his
efforts to control his perceptions on the net.
Ok. This is a step towards a model. What you are saying is
that error in a control system causes attention to move. Since
error, e, and (I presume) attention, a, (becuase it moves) are
variables, you are proposing that a = f(e).
His reorganizing system moved his attention to modeling in an
effort to reduce overall system error.
Now we have to figure out how variations in attention might
reduce overall system error. I presume attention does this
by reducing the error in the system that causes the attention
to move. So something like e = g (a) may be what you are
thinking (in particular, e =1/a ; as attention to the error
is increased then the error decreases).
So it looks like we have a closed loop system where a = f(e)
and e = 1/a simultaneously. Is this getting close?
If we keep working on this we may get to where Bill was 40
years ago;-)
Best
Rick "The Sycophant" Marken
--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/
[From Bruce Gregory (980412.1956 EDT)]
Rick Marken (980412.1030)
So it looks like we have a closed loop system where a = f(e)
and e = 1/a simultaneously. Is this getting close?If we keep working on this we may get to where Bill was 40
years ago;-)
I don't know about you, but for me this would represent real progress.
BO
[From Bruce Gregory (980413.1200 EDT)]
Rick Marken (980412.1030)
Now we have to figure out how variations in attention might
reduce overall system error. I presume attention does this
by reducing the error in the system that causes the attention
to move. So something like e = g (a) may be what you are
thinking (in particular, e =1/a ; as attention to the error
is increased then the error decreases).So it looks like we have a closed loop system where a = f(e)
and e = 1/a simultaneously. Is this getting close?
Sounds good to me. Now if attention is part of a closed loop system (which
it must be in order to be purposeful) it is controlled by a higher order
system. We have also assumed (tentatively) that attention is involved in
reorganization.
Suppose someone has the thought that they want to reorganize. Say they want
to give up smoking. They are experiencing an error signal in the loop with
the reference signal "I not a smoker", but the gain on the control loop for
smoking is much stronger and they continue to smoke. This has gone on for
some years. Whatever reorganization that has taken place has minimized
system error, but left the person in this predicament. It would seem to me
that change is only possible if a disturbance to some _other_ controlled
perception is sufficiently large that the reorganization system reduces the
gain on smoking in order to minimize total system error. I though
disturbances were environmental. Does this imply that an external "push" is
necessary to initiate reorganization in this case, and presumably in others?
Speak Oh Great Marken.
BO
[From Rupert Young (980413.1800 BST)]
Rick Marken (980412.1030)
Now we have to figure out how variations in attention might
reduce overall system error. I presume attention does this
by reducing the error in the system that causes the attention
to move. So something like e = g (a) may be what you are
thinking (in particular, e =1/a ; as attention to the error
is increased then the error decreases).So it looks like we have a closed loop system where a = f(e)
and e = 1/a simultaneously. Is this getting close?
Bruce Gregory (980413.1200 EDT)
Sounds good to me. Now if attention is part of a closed loop system (which
it must be in order to be purposeful) it is controlled by a higher order
system. We have also assumed (tentatively) that attention is involved in
reorganization.
What do you mean by attention ? One way of looking at it is as the
terminology that is given to the _observed_ behaviour that a living system
goes through when it carrying out some task relative to specific aspects of
the environment (and is said to be 'attending' only to those aspects), or in
other words, when it is controlling perceptions to reduce error. This is
already explained within PCT and at best 'attention' is synonomous with 'the
behaviour of reducing perceptual error' and as such has no place in the
terminology and theory of PCT. For example, if you are looking for a blue
object the higher levels set non-zero reference values for blue and zero
reference values for red resulting in behaviour relative only to blue objects,
ie, 'attending to blue'.
Looking for 'attention' variables in the loop seems futile. But, perhaps I'm
oversimplifying things.
BO
I'll send you some soap ?
--
Regards,
Rupert
[From Bruce Gregory (980413. 1415 EDT)]
Rupert Young (980413.1800 BST)]
Looking for 'attention' variables in the loop seems futile. But,
perhaps I'm
oversimplifying things.
It's even simpler than you imagine. Also, you cannot find it in a loop.
Attention is what Bill calls "awareness". It is what the observer does. I'll
try to remember to use the more familiar terminology.
I'll send you some soap ?
Everyone on the net would be grateful.
BO
[From Bruce Nevin (980413.1456)]
Rupert Young (980413.1800 BST)--
What do you mean by attention ? One way of looking at it is as the
terminology that is given to the _observed_ behaviour that a living system
goes through when it carrying out some task relative to specific aspects of
the environment (and is said to be 'attending' only to those aspects), or in
other words, when it is controlling perceptions to reduce error. This is
already explained within PCT and at best 'attention' is synonomous with 'the
behaviour of reducing perceptual error' and as such has no place in the
terminology and theory of PCT. For example, if you are looking for a blue
object the higher levels set non-zero reference values for blue and zero
reference values for red resulting in behaviour relative only to blue
objects,
ie, 'attending to blue'.
What about when there is no observable behavior but the person (e.g.
yourself) reports shifting attention from that blue object on the screen to
that humming sound to the smell of smoke to a memory of a camping
experience to the imagined experience of going camping this weekend, now
there's a good idea, whoops where's that smoke coming from? And at this
point you see some observable action for the first time.
Could still be controlling perceptual inputs of a higher-level PIF to
reduce error at that level? What do you think?
BO
I'll send you some soap ?
Gee, and all this time I thought it was short for "best offer", instead of
"best."
Be well,
BN
[From Bruce Gregory (980413.1505 EDT)]
Bruce Nevin (980413.1456)]
Gee, and all this time I thought it was short for "best offer", instead of
"best."
I like that much better than "Bruce the Obscure". From now on, "best offer"
it is. Thanks.
BO
[From Bruce Gregory (980413.1617 EDT)]
Rick Marken (980413.1250)]
Bruce Gregory (980413.1200 EDT)--
> Speak Oh Great Marken.
Well, since you put it that way...
> Suppose someone has the thought that they want to reorganize. Say
> they want to give up smoking.I don't think a person ever wants to reorganize. The person just
wants to produce a perception (of not smoking) and finds that
producing that perception is difficult. This is different from
what typically happens when we want to produce a perception;
typically, we just produce it (I move my hand from the keyboard
to the cup of coffee; no problemo). When it is difficult to produce
a perception we want there must be conflict; we must be controlling
for a perception, like nicotine level, that is disturbed by our
efforts to produce another perception, like "not smoking"
Fair enough. Especially since the effects of reorganization are
unpredictable and most of us don't welcome unpredictability.
> They are experiencing an error signal in the loop with the reference
> signal "I not a smoker"I think that when you produce the perception of "not smoking" the
error is coming mainly from the system that is controlling for
the level of nicotine in the blood.
Yes. I was trying to indicate that when you do smoke the error signal
involves your commitment not to do that any more.
> It would seem to me that change is only possible if a disturbance
> to some _other_ controlled perception is sufficiently large that
> the reorganization system reduces the gain on smoking in order
> to minimize total system error.In the HPCT model, increases in error increase the _rate_ of
reorganization. So any aspect of smoking that creates error
is likely to increase the rate of reorganization. There are many
controlled perceptions that might be disturbed by smoking; social
perceptions, respiratory condition perceptions, etc. If you are
controlling for these variables then errors induced by smoking
will lead to an increased rate of reorganization; if one of the
things you try when reorganizing is just stopping smoking then,
of course, this disturbs nicotine level (reduces it) and, thus,
induces error in the nicotine control system; this will lead to
further reorganizations, which will take the form of efforts to
change in ways that reduce the error in _that_ (nicotine level)
control system -- i.e.. you start smoking again.> I thought disturbances were environmental.
Disturbances are independent influences on controlled perceptions;
they act via the environment of the control systems -- which
might be inside the body. Disturbances are often a side effect of
the controlling done by other control systems. If you are controlling
for not feeling pain in your throat then your efforts to control for
nicotine level by inhaling smoke will be a disturbance to the
throat pain perception.
O.K.
> Does this imply that an external "push" is necessary to initiate
> reorganization in this case, and presumably in others?According to PCT, reorganization is always going on (to some
extent) since there is always some small level of error in some
control systems. Consciousness seems to be involved in this
process; maybe its trying to direct the reorganization process
to the part of the hierarchy experiencing the most error (so that
you try to deal with smoking rather than your sex life) but
there is not too much that consciousness can do; you have to
reorganize in the context of your existing hierarchy of control
systems.
It seems simpler to me to think that consciousness is part of a control loop
that closes the gap between where consciousness is and where the maximum
error is. Sometimes this works (run like hell from that tiger) and sometimes
it leaves consciousness focused on something it can do little about (a
toothache).
There is no miraculous way to reorganize your control hierarchy so
that you are experiencing reduced error.
No, but I thought the "purpose" of the reorganization system is to reduce
overall error. at least this is how I read B:CP.
If you want to stop smoking
(because you're tired of coughing up crap every morning) and you
also want to smoke (because it feels good and it hurts when you
stop) then there you jolly well are. Consciousness might help
by directing you to the problem ("smoking seems to be my problem")
but it can't tell you what to do to solve the problem. If you
try to solve the problem by not smoking you will suffer error
in the systems that are controlling for nicotine in the blood; if
you keep smoking you will experience error in the system that wants
to feel no crap coughed up in the morning.
Yes, indeed.
Consciousness might give you a point of view on the problem that
allows you to try possible solutions;
This sounds fuzzy to me. Let's try for model--see below.
I think that's what happened
in Bill's case; he was able to see his own smoking as the cause
of the craving experienced when quitting; so he was able to
convince himself that the pain that goes with not smoking would
eventually go away; I don't know if this worked; I hope it did.
Me too. My point is that the book Bill read must have disturbed a higher
order perception.
"If this guy is right that I am a jerk." Let's say. The output of this
higher order system would then reset the reference levels for lower level
perceptions that allowed Bill to stop smoking (if that's what he did). Make
sense?
But I don't think one can ever tell _how_ to reorganize.
No that's impossible, since reorganization is presumed to be random. It
seems to me that what must happen is that a higher level perception must be
disturbed sufficiently strongly that reorganization is the only way for it
to restore control. This might be what has to happen whenever learning takes
place. What thinkest thou?
Best Offer
[From Rick Marken (980413.1250)]
Bruce Gregory (980413.1200 EDT)--
Speak Oh Great Marken.
Well, since you put it that way...
Suppose someone has the thought that they want to reorganize. Say
they want to give up smoking.
I don't think a person ever wants to reorganize. The person just
wants to produce a perception (of not smoking) and finds that
producing that perception is difficult. This is different from
what typically happens when we want to produce a perception;
typically, we just produce it (I move my hand from the keyboard
to the cup of coffee; no problemo). When it is difficult to produce
a perception we want there must be conflict; we must be controlling
for a perception, like nicotine level, that is disturbed by our
efforts to produce another perception, like "not smoking"
They are experiencing an error signal in the loop with the reference
signal "I not a smoker"
I think that when you produce the perception of "not smoking" the
error is coming mainly from the system that is controlling for
the level of nicotine in the blood.
It would seem to me that change is only possible if a disturbance
to some _other_ controlled perception is sufficiently large that
the reorganization system reduces the gain on smoking in order
to minimize total system error.
In the HPCT model, increases in error increase the _rate_ of
reorganization. So any aspect of smoking that creates error
is likely to increase the rate of reorganization. There are many
controlled perceptions that might be disturbed by smoking; social
perceptions, respiratory condition perceptions, etc. If you are
controlling for these variables then errors induced by smoking
will lead to an increased rate of reorganization; if one of the
things you try when reorganizing is just stopping smoking then,
of course, this disturbs nicotine level (reduces it) and, thus,
induces error in the nicotine control system; this will lead to
futher reorganizations, which will take the form of efforts to
change in ways that reduce the error in _that_ (nicotine level)
control system -- ie. you start smoking again.
I thought disturbances were environmental.
Disturbances are indepdendent influences on controlled perceptions;
they act via the environment of the control systems -- which
might be inside the body. Disturbances are often a side effect of
the controlling done by other control systems. If you are controlling
for not feeling pain in your throat then your efforts to control for
nicotine level by inhaling smoke will be a disturbance to the
throat pain perception.
Does this imply that an external "push" is necessary to initiate
reorganization in this case, and presumably in others?
According to PCT, reorganization is always going on (to some
extent) since there is always some small level of error in some
control systems. Consciousness seems to be involved in this
process; maybe its trying to direct the reorganization process
to the part of the hierarchy experiencing the most error (so that
you try to deal with smoking rather than your sex life) but
there is not too much that consciousness can do; you have to
reorganize in the context of your existing hierarchy of control
systems.
There is no miraculous way to reorganize your control hierarchy so
that you are experiencing reduced error. If you want to stop smoking
(because you're tired of coughing up crap every morning) and you
also want to smoke (because it feels good and it hurts when you
stop) then there you jolly well are. Consciousness might help
by directling you to the problem ("smoking seems to be my problem")
but it can't tell you what to do to solve the problem. If you
try to solve the problem by not smoking you will suffer error
in the systems that are controlling for nicotine in the blood; if
you keep smoking you will experience error in the system that wants
to feel no crap coughed up in the morning.
Consciousness might give you a point of view on the problem that
allows you to try possible solutions; I think that's what happened
in Bill's case; he was able to see his own smoking as the cause
of the craving experienced when quitting; so he was able to
convince himself that the pain that goes with not smoking would
eventually go away; I don't know if this worked; I hope it did.
But I don't think one can ever tell _how_ to reorganize.
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken
[From Stefan Balke (980415)]
Rick Marken (980413.1250)
Consciousness might give you a point of view on the problem that
allows you to try possible solutions; I think that's what happened
in Bill's case; he was able to see his own smoking as the cause
of the craving experienced when quitting; so he was able to
convince himself that the pain that goes with not smoking would
eventually go away; I don't know if this worked; I hope it did.
But I don't think one can ever tell _how_ to reorganize.
What is to "convince oneself" in HPCT terms?
I stopped smoking and know how I managed it for myself. I decided what was more
important for me - to smoke or to avoid the risks. But what is a "decision" ? I
know that I really had no choice. There was only one reasonable way for me - to
stop smoking. I was suprised how easy it was to stop. The hard work was done
before by thinking, comparing and imaginating. Obviously it was a case of lucky
reorganization.
Best, Stefan
[From Bruce Gregory (980415.0945 EDT)]
Stefan Balke (980415)
I stopped smoking and know how I managed it for myself. I decided
what was more
important for me - to smoke or to avoid the risks. But what is a
"decision" ? I
know that I really had no choice. There was only one reasonable
way for me - to
stop smoking. I was suprised how easy it was to stop. The hard
work was done
before by thinking, comparing and imaginating. Obviously it was a
case of lucky
reorganization.
Probably not. An example of hierarchical control in which the gain or
reference level for smoking was reset by a higher level (program or
principle). It seems that gain and/or reference levels for smoking and
eating are more readily accessible to higher levels in some individuals than
in others.
BO
[From Rupert Young (980115.1700 UT)]
Bruce Nevin (980413.1456)]
What about when there is no observable behavior but the person (e.g.
yourself) reports shifting attention....
Sure, behaviour can be internal and self-observed.
Could still be controlling perceptual inputs of a higher-level PIF to
reduce error at that level?
Yes. My point was that attention is just a term given to the process of
controlling perception as seen externally and as such is not something _extra_
to PCT which requires locating.
Regards,
Rupert
[From Rick Marken (980415.1300)]
Stefan Balke (980415) --
What is to "convince oneself" in HPCT terms?
I guess I was referring to imaginings that seem to lead, in an
acceptable way, to the goal you want. For example, I've been able to
convince myself, via imagination, that by performing certain kinds
of experiments I would show others how to study organisms as
perceptual control systems. So I developed these experiments, put
them on the web, and, voila, they have shown no one (who didn't
already know) how to study living control systems. So my imagination-
based conviction that people would go to my web site and return
with all kinds of ideas for PCT research has not panned out (so
much for model-based control;-)); but it was a nice conviction
while it lasted;-)
I stopped smoking and know how I managed it for myself.
I'm sure everyone solves their problem differently because 1)
everyone's problems are different (even if they are called the same
thing, like "wanting to quit smoking") and 2) they must be solved
in the context of each person's unique perceptual control
hierarchy.
I stopped smoking and know how I managed it for myself. I decided
what was more important for me - to smoke or to avoid the risks.
But what is a "decision" ?
I think a decision is just the experience of going back and forth
over the incompatible goals you want to achieve by setting the
"problem" goal -- smoking in this case. Since you can't achieve
both you "oscillate": I want health, I want no pain from withdrawl,
I want health, I want no pain of withdrawl... One of your goals
was to avoid health risks; you acheive this goal by setting the
smoking goal to zero. If health were your only goal there would have
been no experience of "decision"; you just set smoking to 0 (you
stop) and that's that. If there was an experience of "deciding" then
there must have been another goal that required smoking to be set
at something other than 0; perhaps it was the goal of not feeling
the pain of withdrawl; perhaps it was the goal of feeling the smoke
inhaled; who knows? But if you felt like you were making a
decision you must have both wanted to smoke (to achieve some
goal) and not wanted to smoke (to achieve some other goal).
I'm glad you worked it out! It does sound like you hit on a
lucky reorganization, though I don't know what it was.
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken
[From Bruce Nevin (980417.1028 EST)]
Rupert Young (980413.1800 BST)--
What do you mean by attention ? One way of looking at it is as the
terminology that is given to the _observed_ behaviour that a living system
goes through when it carrying out some task relative to specific aspects of
the environment (and is said to be 'attending' only to those aspects), or in
other words, when it is controlling perceptions to reduce error. This is
already explained within PCT and at best 'attention' is synonomous with 'the
behaviour of reducing perceptual error' and as such has no place in the
terminology and theory of PCT. For example, if you are looking for a blue
object the higher levels set non-zero reference values for blue and zero
reference values for red resulting in behaviour relative only to blue
objects,
ie, 'attending to blue'.
Me (980413.1456) --
What about when there is no observable behavior but the person (e.g.
yourself) reports shifting attention....
Rupert Young (980115.1700 UT) --
Sure, behaviour can be internal and self-observed.
Me --
Could still be controlling perceptual inputs of a higher-level PIF to
reduce error at that level?
Rupert --
Yes. My point was that attention is just a term given to the process of
controlling perception as seen externally and as such is not something
_extra_
to PCT which requires locating.
Your suggestion seems to be that the shifting of attention is behavioral
means of controlling some higher-level perception, whether or not the
behavior is observable and identifiable with some physical action.
The problem is identifying the physical correlate of the subjective
experience of e.g. shifting attention from peripheral vision on the left to
peripheral vision on the right without moving the eyes.
CAT/PET etc. scans might indicate something. Is anyone in a position to
determine if any neurological investigations have been done along these
lines? I wonder whether it might be difficult to distinguish cause from
effect. For example, an increase in blood flow might be an effect of
increased neural activity or it might be a means for increasing it,
mightn't it?
Awareness remains a mystery to itself, but attention might be explicable.
If so, then, much as an observer has access to the actions of a control
system, awareness has access to its own actions, attention. Perhaps that is
sufficient for modelling it.
Bruce Nevin