"explaining" phenomena

[Martin Taylor 970910 10:25]

Bruce Gregory (970909.1010 EDT)

As a general principle, it is probably a good idea
to avoid explaining a phenomenon by invoking a mechanism that
we understand less than the phenomenon itself.

Probably a good idea, but an idea more honoured in the breach than in the
observance, throughout human history. Witness the reliance on magical or
"will of God" explanations of events of importance to people in all
cultures.

In the end, the explanatory mechanism demands explanation by a mechanism
that demands explanation by ... that we understand less than the phenomenon
itself. All we can say is that each successive level in this explanatory
hierarchy can be used to "explain" more phenomena than its predecessor.
Going the other way, each successive level upward (toward the phenomenon)
adds some arbitrary specificity that allows a more precise description
of the phenomenon.

I used the word "description" advisedly in the last sentence. In my view,
an "explanation" is neither more nor less than a way of describing a
phenomenon very succinctly, using language that is also available for
describing other phenomena. In contrast, a "dormitive principle" describes
a phenomenon using language that is available to "explain" only that
particular phenomenon. A "description", as the term is usually applied
on CSGnet, is much more long-winded than an "explanation," but that,
to my mind, is the only difference between them. In terms of the preceding
paragraph, a "description" consists largely of "arbitrary specificity",
with little that can be applied to other phenomena.

To say we "understand" a mechanism is probably to say that we can apply it
successfully to a wide range of phenomena _and have previously done so_.
In the end, it all comes down to magic, which is a word for what we don't
understand, but that nevertheless happens.

Martin

[From Bill Powers (970910.0914 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 970910 10:25--

I used the word "description" advisedly in the last sentence. In my view,
an "explanation" is neither more nor less than a way of describing a
phenomenon very succinctly, using language that is also available for
describing other phenomena.

I've heard this idea for as long as I've been connected with science, and
I've never understood it. Suppose the phenomenon to be explained is this:
when you flip the light-switch up, the light goes on; when you flip it
down, the light goes off. How do you explain this, and how is the
explanation simply a more succinct way of describing the phenomenon?

Best,

Bill P.

Three kinds of explanation that I have seen in science:

Analogy. Draw parallels between something that is well understood and the
thing to be explained. To the extent that the parallels are valid, the
well-understood thing is a model of the thing being explained. Model
building as in PCT is a refinement of analogical explanation.

Reduction. Show that something that seems complex emerges from
characteristics of simpler things that are well understood. HPCTheorists
sometimes make reductionist claims about social phenomena, some of which
have been modelled (ring and arc formation in crowd behavior), others not
(language).

Generalization. Identify and apply principles, rules, processes, etc. that
marshall the data to be described into perspicuous categories. To the extent
that the description is simpler, or is made an instance of or part of the
description of otherwise unrelated phenomena, the principles, etc. are felt
to "explain" something. Here's an instance from

Avery Andrews 970910.0939 --

Some evidence the third sentence has a processing rather than a
grammatical problem is that `center-embedded' sentences become a lot
more palatable if the scenarios they describe are sufficiently banal:

the car the guy the cops are looking for is driving is a red Corolla.

Here's a counterexample, no less banal:

The car the guy the cops caught drove crashed.

I suggest the difficulty has to do with the reduced intonation of a relative
clause. A relative clause generally repeats something known, associating
familiar information with a particular word repeated in the host sentence,
where something new is being said involving that word. The repeated word is
represented by a relative pronoun who, which, that, etc. in the relative
clause. Within the relative clause, we typically lower pitch, perhaps
increase pace, are less precise with pronunciation, and so on. (The main
exception is contrastive stress -- e.g."the guy the cops *caught*".)

A center-embedded relative clause is basically a paratactic interruption. At
its end, we pick up the intonation pattern that prevailed before the
interruption. Repeated center embedding is difficult (I suggest) because we
run out of intonational means for differentiating the boundaries of the
successive relative clauses.

The counterexample sentence is more difficult than Avery's sentence not
because it is less banal, but because we can't use the monosyllabic verbs
"caught" and "drove" as carriers for a resumed intonational contour.

Avery's observation about banality possibly is related to familiarity of the
information in the relative clauses. If the interrupting clauses carry novel
information, we are less free to rush over them in a "you know about this,
I'll just remind you" kind of way.

So Avery's and my accounts are an instance of explanation by generalization.

Martin Taylor 970910 10:25--

I used the word "description" advisedly in the last sentence. In my view,
an "explanation" is neither more nor less than a way of describing a
phenomenon very succinctly, using language that is also available for
describing other phenomena.

Each kind of explanation is a description, but not all descriptions, however
succinct, are explanations. And while a final textbook rendition may be
satisfyingly succinct, brevity isn't necessarily a good guide when
explanations are in the making. (I'm thinking here of C.S. Pearce's
criticism of tidy pyramidal proofs in mathematics, after the fact
misrepresenting how people actually arrive at conclusions.)

        Bruce Nevin

[From Bruce Abbott (970910.1345 EST)]

Bill Powers (970910.0914 MDT) --

Martin Taylor 970910 10:25

I used the word "description" advisedly in the last sentence. In my view,
an "explanation" is neither more nor less than a way of describing a
phenomenon very succinctly, using language that is also available for
describing other phenomena.

I've heard this idea for as long as I've been connected with science, and
I've never understood it. Suppose the phenomenon to be explained is this:
when you flip the light-switch up, the light goes on; when you flip it
down, the light goes off. How do you explain this, and how is the
explanation simply a more succinct way of describing the phenomenon?

I hope you two don't mind my butting in, but question you ask is not the
sort that may be answered by a descriptive explanation. To ask why flipping
the light-switch up/down is instantly followed by the going on/off of the
light is to request a mechanistic explanation.

The question to which a descriptive explanation applies is, why has the
light suddenly come on (or gone off)? One possible descriptive explanation
is that the light-switch as been thrown on (or off).

Regards,

Bruce

[Martin Taylor 970912 21:50]

Bill Powers (970910.0914 MDT)

Martin Taylor 970910 10:25--

I used the word "description" advisedly in the last sentence. In my view,
an "explanation" is neither more nor less than a way of describing a
phenomenon very succinctly, using language that is also available for
describing other phenomena.

I've heard this idea for as long as I've been connected with science, and
I've never understood it. Suppose the phenomenon to be explained is this:
when you flip the light-switch up, the light goes on; when you flip it
down, the light goes off. How do you explain this, and how is the
explanation simply a more succinct way of describing the phenomenon?

I've puzzled over this message for three days now, quite sure that you
mean to ask some question that has a point, and wishing to answer to
the point. But I'm stumped. Just what are you asking?

Perhaps you could provide what you think is an explanation, and we could
look at it to see whether it illustrates some issue relating to the
passage of mine that you quoted?

Or maybe you could raise your point a little less obliquely?

Martin

[From Bill Powers (970913.0400 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 970912 21:50 --

I used the word "description" advisedly in the last sentence. In my view,
an "explanation" is neither more nor less than a way of describing a
phenomenon very succinctly, using language that is also available for
describing other phenomena.

I've heard this idea for as long as I've been connected with science, and
I've never understood it. Suppose the phenomenon to be explained is this:
when you flip the light-switch up, the light goes on; when you flip it
down, the light goes off. How do you explain this, and how is the
explanation simply a more succinct way of describing the phenomenon?

I've puzzled over this message for three days now, quite sure that you
mean to ask some question that has a point, and wishing to answer to
the point. But I'm stumped. Just what are you asking?

Perhaps you could provide what you think is an explanation, and we could
look at it to see whether it illustrates some issue relating to the
passage of mine that you quoted?

I didn't want to offer my own explanation until I saw yours, but if you
like I'll give one appropriate for my brother-in-law's house:

Flipping the switch up closes a contact that connects a 24-volt power
supply to a relay coil; the relay in turns closes a contact that connects a
remote A.C. generator to wires that go to the light bulb, heating the
filament to incandescence (0f course a complete explanation would be even
more detailed).

I fail to see this as a "more concise" way of explaining the observation
that flipping the switch turns the light on or off. You must have in mind
some other mode of "explanation."

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (970913.0745 EDT)]

"The proposals I am going to make about biology are somewhat
similar to this shift of perspective from the geocentric to a
heliocentric view of the planetary system. Despite the power of
genocentric biology to explain an impressive amount of
biological data, there are basic areas where it fails. One of these,
the most important, concerns its claims that understanding genes
and their activities is enough to explain the properties of organisms.
I argue that this is simply wrong."

                        Brian Goodwin
                        What Ever Happened to Organisms?
                        _How the Leopard Changed It's Spots_

bruce

From Remi Cote (970913.0858 EDT)

In the same current [Bill Powers (970913.0400 MDT)].

I would like to read from Bill on how he explain explanation in
HPCT terms.

1) What does a human control system when he seek for
an explanation to a perception?

Is he experimenting an error (discrepancy).

Example: Why does this lamp doesn't work? Is it the switch,
the cord or the power bill (sorry, I couldn't help).
Am I controlling a perception or am I reorganising something
now?

2) What he does when he comes up with an explanation?

I hypothesised that an explanation is a reorganisation of
a program...switched in imaginary mode.

I would like to know from Mark or Bill or anyone else...

Remi