From Kent McClelland (951220.1500 CST)
re Bruce Abbott (951213.2215 EST) and Bill Powers (951217.0830 MST)
replying to my earlier post, Kent McClelland (951213.1000 CST) about
socially defined facts.
Both Bruce and Bill quite properly point out the distinction between facts
as lower-order perceptions, or as Bruce puts it, "empirical observations,"
and facts as higher order, verbally formulated "interpretations of
observations." The former type of fact should be perceptible by any
competent member of society whose perceptual apparatus are working
properly, and therefore, as both Bruce and Bill point out, need not have
social confirmation (though individuals can sometimes be mistaken). The
latter type of fact is, as both concede, a matter of social agreement. And
I have no problem with any of this.
I'd like, however, to try defending my earlier point. Scientific facts, I
would argue, are a hybrid of the two types of facts we've distinguished.
Science might even be defined as the process of making incontrovertible
links between facts-as-empirical-observations and verbally formulated
facts-as-scientific-interpretations. Scientists put a great deal of effort
into capturing otherwise hard to perceive aspects of the physical and
biological world as meter readouts or dramatic-looking graphs (i.e.,
low-order perceptions)--which they hope will admit to only one
interpretation--the interpretation supplied by their theory. Scientific
facts thus have a rhetorical function: convincing others of the
correctness of one's high-level perception of the world. And so they must
combine the socially-agreed-upon with direct observation.
My arguments here are adapted from French sociologist Bruno Latour, whose
book, _Science in Action_ (Harvard University Press, 1987), is unusually
entertaining for a sociology book, not only because it contains a lot of
funny pictures, but also because it's written in a lively style. I think
it's also a useful source for anyone trying to foment a scientific
revolution. Also, I'd recommend it because Latour's point of view seems to
me quite compatible with PCT.
Bill raises a couple of other points I'd like to comment on. . .
Consider another kind of fact. One of the neat facts in mathematics is
that the number e raised to the power pi*i, where i is the square root
of -1, is equal to -1.
Imagine citing imaginary numbers as facts! But seriously, the "facts" of
mathematics are especially useful to scientists because, they, like
low-level observations need no further social corroboration and can thus be
combined unproblematically with other kinds of facts to produce the hybrid
facts that support a scientific argument.
(me) Facts are, of course, "collectively controlled perceptions",
because they have been agreed upon as true by a relevant group of
individuals who have been able to persuade each other that they all
see the things in question the same way, the way they collectively
deem as factual. Establishing the facts of the case means coming
to agreement over what "really" happened, that is, agreeing upon a
set of verbally communicable reference standards that can be used
by everyone participating in the collective action of perceptual
control to control without undo error their own perception of the
alleged event or phenomenon.(Bill)
When you say "Establishing the facts of the case means ... agreeing upon
a set of verbally communicable reference standards that can be used by
everyone participating in the collective action of perceptual control",
you are speaking of socially-agreed facts, which is the natural purview
of the sociologist. But if that were the only kind of fact there is,
then it would be a fact that all facts are social phenomena only if we
agree that they are, and if I say I disagree I have disproven your
statement. Your thesis is therefore self-negating when applied to
itself.
In saying something is a "collectively controlled perception," I am
emphatically not arguing that the complete agreement of everyone involved
is necessary for the perception to be controlled, so your comment that it's
"self-negating" misses the mark. As my spreadsheet simulations have shown,
a group controlling a single variable but using more than one reference
level will successfully control that variable at the "virtual reference
level" emerging from their interaction, at least as long as the concurrent
conflict hasn't pushed them to their output limits. In terms of the
argument I was making, something could be a fact whether you agree or not,
as long as the preponderance of those who are socially designated as
competent to make the judgment agree that it is.
Getting back to the original exchange between Bill and Bruce, I'd say that
the social reality of the "science" of psychology in 1995 is that
"reinforcement" is a fact. Of course, I'd say it's an incorrect fact, but
a fact nonetheless. Thus, in order to get psychologists to change their
minds about PCT, we will need to change their minds about what the facts
are. Chris Cherpas's post (951219.1212 PT) suggesting that animals change
their behavior radically after just one "reinforcement" indicates to me how
difficult it will be for PCTers to reeducate psychologists about the facts,
when Chris, who's begun to understand all this, still gets confused.
(Please don't take that as a negative comment, Chris. The PCT way of
thinking has taken years to get used to for most folks who've tried it,
including me.)
Best to all,
and Season's Greetings!
Kent