Facts and Theories (was Understanding control of behavior)

CSGnet Archive CSG2014
1

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.27.1400)]

···

Martin Taylor (2014.11.25.23.02)–

MT: I

think the discussion would be much less confused if we insisted on
talking of control as being only of perception, with stabilization
of externally observable variables being talked about as a
consequence of control of perception rather than as having equal or
primary status.

RM: I think this proposal gets to the heart of my problem with this whole “control of behavior” thread. The problem with this proposal, from my point of view, is that it privileges theory over fact. I think of control – whether it’s control of the position of a cursor on a computer screen or control of the position of a person’s finger on a table – as an observable (and measurable) phenomenon: a fact (as per the subtitle of LCS III, “The Fact of Control”). PCT is a theory that explains that fact.

RM: So when Martin proposes"…talking about control as being only of perception…" I hear him suggesting that we talk about control in terms of theory, with the facts – the “externally observable variables” – talked about only secondarily, as a consequence of the theory. And, indeed, much of the discussion about “control of behavior” has privileged theory over fact. So Martin’s proposal made me realize that it was this privileging of theory over fact – and not the resistance to the idea that behavior can be controlled – that was disturbing to me about this discussion of control of behavior.

RM: What I liked most about what we now call PCT when I first discovered it was that Powers always put fact before theory by providing demonstrations of the facts that the theory was designed to explain. The basic tracking task, for example, demonstrates the basic phenomenon (fact) of control. It doesn’t show that behavior is the control of perception; it shows that a person can keep a variable (cursor position) in a pre-selected state, protected from disturbances that are neither detectable not predictable. That is what we observe in a tracking task: that is the fact of control.

RM: Control theory (PCT) explains that fact by positing that the person doing the tracking is organized as a negative feedback control system that is controlling a perception of cursor position relative to an internal reference for the state of that perception. That’s the theory that explains the observed phenomenon perfectly (as you can see for yourself at http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/BasicTrack.html).

RM: The rubber band demo of control of behavior is equivalent to the basic tracking demo of control of cursor position, though the variables are not measured as precisely in the former as in the latter. But rubber band demo is another example of Powers demonstrating the phenomenon – fact – that is to be explained by the theory. Like the basic tracking task, the rubber band demo is clearly a demonstration of a control phenomenon, where in this case the variable under control is the position of S’s finger rather than the position of a cursor. As in the basic tracking task, the demonstration doesn’t show that behavior is the control of perception; it shows that a person (E) can keep a variable (S’s finger position) under control. The explanation of how E is able to do this will have to take into account the fact that S is also controlling a variable (the distance from knot to coin). And PCT does explain these facts – the fact that E is controlling S’s finger position while S is controlling the relationship between knot and coin – quite precisely.

RM: The problem with putting theory before fact is that you are likely to come up with explanations of facts that might not be facts. For example, the proposal that we talk of “…control as being only of perception, with stabilization of externally observable variables being talked about as a consequence of control of perception” assumes that it is a fact that control of a perception can be better than control of the observable correlate of that perception. But I know of no evidence that this is, indeed, a fact. The idea that it is a fact is based on a theory; the theory that the perceptions people control are derived in part from imagination and, therefore, may not correspond to the observable (environmental) correlates of those perceptions.

RM: It may be that control of a perception can be better than control of the observable correlate of that perception. But it seems to me that it would be better to produce evidence that this is in fact the case before developing a theory to account for it. When we put theory before fact like this we start taking about things that should be true (factual) according to the theory as though they were, in fact, true. This obviously can create terrible problems since the theoretically predicted fact may not, in fact, be a fact. And this is why I am so disturbed by discussions that put theory before fact. It can lead to constructing a very complicated bridge (the theory) to nowhere.

RM: So I guess I don’t care whether people like the idea that behavior can be controlled or not. But it would be nice if we could try to temper our theoretical musings with the facts.

Happy Thanksgiving

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

Shakespeare, Twelfth Night

2

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.27.17.50]

This is refreshing! I don't think I've heard such a passionate

defence of naive realism since my undergraduate days. It makes me
feel young again. For the last 60 years, almost everyone I have had
any dealings with on the issue has accepted that all “facts” depend
on some kind of theory. “Fact” and “theory” are usually thought to
be mutually interdependent. So it’s nice to hear a totally contrary
opinion for once.
But I am rather surprised to hear it from such a staunch supporter
of Bill Powers, the man who above practically all else (academic)
insisted that the only facts of which you can be sure are your own
perceptions.
I don’t think there’s any need to comment on the rest of this.
Martin

···

On 2014/11/27 4:58 PM, Richard Marken
( via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

rsmarken@gmail.com

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.27.1400)]

            Martin Taylor

(2014.11.25.23.02)–

            MT: I think the discussion would be much less

confused if we insisted on talking of control as being
only of perception, with stabilization of externally
observable variables being talked about as a consequence
of control of perception rather than as having equal or
primary status.

      RM: I think this proposal gets to the heart of my problem with

this whole “control of behavior” thread. The problem with this
proposal, from my point of view, is that it privileges theory
over fact. I think of control – whether it’s control of the
position of a cursor on a computer screen or control of the
position of a person’s finger on a table – as an observable
(and measurable) phenomenon: a fact (as per the subtitle of
LCS III, “The Fact of Control”). PCT is a theory that explains
that fact.

      RM: So when Martin proposes"...talking

about control as being only of perception…" I hear him
suggesting that we talk about control in terms of theory, with
the facts – the “externally observable variables” – talked
about only secondarily, as a consequence of the theory. And,
indeed, much of the discussion about “control of behavior” has
privileged theory over fact. So Martin’s proposal made me
realize that it was this privileging of theory over fact –
and not the resistance to the idea that behavior can be
controlled – that was disturbing to me about this discussion
of control of behavior.

      RM: What I liked most about what we now

call PCT when I first discovered it was that Powers always put
fact before theory by providing demonstrations of the facts
that the theory was designed to explain. The basic tracking
task, for example, demonstrates the basic phenomenon (fact) of
control. It doesn’t show that behavior is the control of
perception; it shows that a person can keep a variable (cursor
position) in a pre-selected state, protected from disturbances
that are neither detectable not predictable. That is what we
observe in a tracking task: that is the fact of control.

      RM: Control theory (PCT) explains that

fact by positing that the person doing the tracking is
organized as a negative feedback control system that is
controlling a perception of cursor position relative to an
internal reference for the state of that perception. That’s
the theory that explains the observed phenomenon perfectly (as
you can see for yourself at http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/BasicTrack.html).

      RM: The rubber band demo of control of

behavior is equivalent to the basic tracking demo of control
of cursor position, though the variables are not measured as
precisely in the former as in the latter. But rubber band demo
is another example of Powers demonstrating the phenomenon –
fact – that is to be explained by the theory. Like the basic
tracking task, the rubber band demo is clearly a demonstration
of a control phenomenon, where in this case the variable under
control is the position of S’s finger rather than the position
of a cursor. As in the basic tracking task, the demonstration
doesn’t show that behavior is the control of perception; it
shows that a person (E) can keep a variable (S’s finger
position) under control. The explanation of how E is able to
do this will have to take into account the fact that S is also
controlling a variable (the distance from knot to coin). And
PCT does explain these facts – the fact that E is controlling
S’s finger position while S is controlling the relationship
between knot and coin – quite precisely.

      RM: The problem with putting theory

before fact is that you are likely to come up with
explanations of facts that might not be facts. For example,
the proposal that we talk of “…control as being only of
perception, with stabilization of externally observable
variables being talked about as a consequence of control of
perception” assumes that it is a fact that control of a
perception can be better than control of the observable
correlate of that perception. But I know of no evidence that
this is, indeed, a fact. The idea that it is a fact is based
on a theory; the theory that the perceptions people control
are derived in part from imagination and, therefore, may not
correspond to the observable (environmental) correlates of
those perceptions.

      RM: It may be that control of a

perception can be better than control of the observable
correlate of that perception. But it seems to me that it would
be better to produce evidence that this is in fact the case
before developing a theory to account for it. When we put
theory before fact like this we start taking about things that
should be true (factual) according to the theory as
though they were , in fact, true. This obviously can
create terrible problems since the theoretically predicted
fact may not, in fact, be a fact. And this is why I am so
disturbed by discussions that put theory before fact. It can
lead to constructing a very complicated bridge (the theory) to
nowhere.

      RM: So I guess I don't care whether

people like the idea that behavior can be controlled or not.
But it would be nice if we could try to temper our theoretical
musings with the facts.

Happy Thanksgiving

Best

Rick

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.

          Author of  [Doing Research on Purpose](http://www.amazon.com/Doing-Research-Purpose-Experimental-Psychology/dp/0944337554/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1407342866&sr=8-1&keywords=doing+research+on+purpose).

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

            Shakespeare, Twelfth

Night

3

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.27.1610)]

Martin Taylor (2014.11.27.17.50)

MT: This is refreshing! I don't think I've heard such a passionate defence of naive realism since my undergraduate days. It makes me feel young again. For the last 60 years, almost everyone I have had any dealings with on the issue has accepted that all "facts" depend on some kind of theory.

RM: That's because almost everyone you have had dealings with on the issue have made the intellectual error that Powers describes on pp. 19-26. of "Making Sense of Behavior". Interestingly enough, it is also an error that comes from privileging theory over fact. The error is assuming that what Bill calls the "outside view of perception", the view that comes observing a person from the outside, is the same as the "inside view", that view the comes from being the person. Bill notes that the outside view of perception is theoretical (end of para. 1, p. 20); the inside view is not theoretical; it's real. The intellectual error Bill talks about on p. 19-26 (a must read for PCTers I think) is taking the (very plausible) theoretical external view of perception to be true of the reality that is the internal view of perception. Based on this error people have concluded that what we perceive -- the inside view of perception -- depends on theory.

MT: But I am rather surprised to hear it from such a staunch supporter of Bill Powers, the man who above practically all else (academic) insisted that the only facts of which you can be sure are your own perceptions.

RM: Exactly, the facts of which I speak are our own perceptions; the internal view of perception; what we experience as reality. When we do experiments we are manipulating perceptions -- but perceptions from our internal view, not the theoretical perceptions of the external view. Our perceptions are our reality -- they are the facts that we are trying to explain with our theories. This was certainly Bill's point of view, as you can glean from what he says on p. 19-26 of MSOB . So Bill was definitely not one of your acquaintances who "accepted that all "facts" depend on some kind of theory". For Bill (and me) perceptions (from the internal perspective) are the facts.
RM: But knowing that you believe that facts depend on theory helps me understand why you have so little interest in doing empirical research. After all, why do empirical tests when the results of those tests depend on the current theory you hold? The theory you hold determines what the results of the tests will look like. So I would imagine that, given your perspective, the first thing to do is to get the right theory and then do the tests (although the tests seem rather superfluous since they will come out the way your theory says they will).

Best
Rick

···

I don't think there's any need to comment on the rest of this.

Martin

RM: So when Martin proposes"...talking about control as being only of perception..." I hear him suggesting that we talk about control in terms of theory, with the facts -- the "externally observable variables" -- talked about only secondarily, as a consequence of the theory. And, indeed, much of the discussion about "control of behavior" has privileged theory over fact. So Martin's proposal made me realize that it was this privileging of theory over fact -- and not the resistance to the idea that behavior can be controlled -- that was disturbing to me about this discussion of control of behavior.
RM: What I liked most about what we now call PCT when I first discovered it was that Powers always put fact before theory by providing demonstrations of the facts that the theory was designed to explain. The basic tracking task, for example, demonstrates the basic phenomenon (fact) of control. It doesn't show that behavior is the control of perception; it shows that a person can keep a variable (cursor position) in a pre-selected state, protected from disturbances that are neither detectable not predictable. That is what we observe in a tracking task: that is the fact of control.
RM: Control theory (PCT) explains that fact by positing that the person doing the tracking is organized as a negative feedback control system that is controlling a perception of cursor position relative to an internal reference for the state of that perception. That's the theory that explains the observed phenomenon perfectly (as you can see for yourself at <http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/BasicTrack.html&gt;http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/BasicTrack.html\).
RM: The rubber band demo of control of behavior is equivalent to the basic tracking demo of control of cursor position, though the variables are not measured as precisely in the former as in the latter. But rubber band demo is another example of Powers demonstrating the phenomenon -- fact -- that is to be explained by the theory. Like the basic tracking task, the rubber band demo is clearly a demonstration of a control phenomenon, where in this case the variable under control is the position of S's finger rather than the position of a cursor. As in the basic tracking task, the demonstration doesn't show that behavior is the control of perception; it shows that a person (E) can keep a variable (S's finger position) under control. The explanation of how E is able to do this will have to take into account the fact that S is also controlling a variable (the distance from knot to coin). And PCT does explain these facts -- the fact that E is controlling S's finger position while S is controlling the relationship between knot and coin -- quite precisely.
RM: The problem with putting theory before fact is that you are likely to come up with explanations of facts that might not be facts. For example, the proposal that we talk of "..control as being only of perception, with stabilization of externally observable variables being talked about as a consequence of control of perception" assumes that it is a fact that control of a perception can be better than control of the observable correlate of that perception. But I know of no evidence that this is, indeed, a fact. The idea that it is a fact is based on a theory; the theory that the perceptions people control are derived in part from imagination and, therefore, may not correspond to the observable (environmental) correlates of those perceptions.
RM: It may be that control of a perception can be better than control of the observable correlate of that perception. But it seems to me that it would be better to produce evidence that this is in fact the case before developing a theory to account for it. When we put theory before fact like this we start taking about things that should be true (factual) according to the theory as though they were, in fact, true. This obviously can create terrible problems since the theoretically predicted fact may not, in fact, be a fact. And this is why I am so disturbed by discussions that put theory before fact. It can lead to constructing a very complicated bridge (the theory) to nowhere.
RM: So I guess I don't care whether people like the idea that behavior can be controlled or not. But it would be nice if we could try to temper our theoretical musings with the facts.
Happy Thanksgiving
Best
Rick

--

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of <http://www.amazon.com/Doing-Research-Purpose-Experimental-Psychology/dp/0944337554/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1407342866&sr=8-1&keywords=doing+research+on+purpose&gt;Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there's no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.
Shakespeare, Twelfth Night

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of <http://www.amazon.com/Doing-Research-Purpose-Experimental-Psychology/dp/0944337554/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1407342866&sr=8-1&keywords=doing+research+on+purpose&gt;Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble
In nature there's no blemish but the mind
None can be called deformed but the unkind.
Shakespeare, Twelfth Night

4

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.27.23.04]

Yes, I suppose that is why I put so much effort last year into

making a generalized tracking program to test a few theoretical
notions…Ooops. I shouldn’t have said that!
Interesting that you omitted the qualifying sentence in your quote.
I guess my exaggeration leads to yours in a classic conflict
escalation. Sorry about that.
But that doesn’t alter the FACT that if you believe the THEORY of
perceptual control to be worth investigating and discussing, you
really ought to play by its rules, among which are the rules of
control. One rule of control, whether biological or engineering, is
that the controlled variable is the one that is directly compared
with a reference value. Any other place in a control loop where
something is visibly stabilized, the stabilization is due to the
stabilization of the variable that is compared with a reference
value. I know politicians think they can replace laws of nature by their
own laws (e.g. pi = 22/7 in, I think, Kentucky), but in a scientific
discourse, one really shouldn’t do that.
Now, if you wanted to use the publicly visible stabilization of an
environmental variable (the FACT you keep harping on) as evidence
that there is a controlled variable somewhere and that variable is
closely linked to the stabilized environmental variable (in the
manner of the “Test for the Controlled Variable”), I would applaud.
But recently you haven’t been doing that.
If you wanted to use that apparent stabilization of something in the
environment as evidence that the environmental variable is actually
being controlled (as you now seem to be doing), I would ask – and
do ask – where is the reference value in the environment to which
its current value is continually being compared, and what is the
mechanism in the environment for making that comparison?
I suppose also, though this isn’t a scientific point but an
emotional one, that if you wanted to honour Bill Powers in a
discussion group devoted to discussing his theory, you would be well
advised to start with the title of his main book “Behaviour: the
control of PERCEPTION”, and stop trying to change the theory into
“Behaviour: the control of things in the environment”.
Martin

···

On 2014/11/27 7:12 PM, Richard Marken
( via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

rsmarken@gmail.com

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.27.1610)]

            Martin Taylor

(2014.11.27.17.50)

                  MT:

This is refreshing! I don’t think I’ve heard such
a passionate defence of naive realism since my
undergraduate days. It makes me feel young again.
For the last 60 years, almost everyone I have had
any dealings with on the issue has accepted that
all “facts” depend on some kind of theory.

…

            RM:

But knowing that you believe that facts depend on
theory helps me understand why you have so little
interest in doing empirical research.

            After

all, why do empirical tests when the results of those
tests depend on the current theory you hold? The theory
you hold determines what the results of the tests will
look like. So I would imagine that, given your
perspective, the first thing to do is to get the right
theory and then do the tests (although the tests seem
rather superfluous since they will come out the way your
theory says they will).

5

How about this:

“Living Control Systems III: The Fact of Control”

How subjective is that title?

Warren

···

On 2014/11/27 7:12 PM, Richard Marken
( via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

rsmarken@gmail.com

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.27.1610)]

            Martin Taylor

(2014.11.27.17.50)

                  MT:

This is refreshing! I don’t think I’ve heard such
a passionate defence of naive realism since my
undergraduate days. It makes me feel young again.
For the last 60 years, almost everyone I have had
any dealings with on the issue has accepted that
all “facts” depend on some kind of theory.

…

            RM:

But knowing that you believe that facts depend on
theory helps me understand why you have so little
interest in doing empirical research.

            After

all, why do empirical tests when the results of those
tests depend on the current theory you hold? The theory
you hold determines what the results of the tests will
look like. So I would imagine that, given your
perspective, the first thing to do is to get the right
theory and then do the tests (although the tests seem
rather superfluous since they will come out the way your
theory says they will).

6

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.27.2330)]

···

Martin Taylor (2014.11.27.23.04

MT: Yes, I suppose that is why I put so much effort last year into

making a generalized tracking program to test a few theoretical
notions…Ooops. I shouldn’t have said that!

RM: Yes you should. I shouldn’t have said what I said and I humbly apologize. Not only was it wrong – you have done much excellent empirical research – but it was an ad hominum attack. I have no idea what got into me; I hope you will accept my apology. I was wrong, wrong, wrong.

MT: But that doesn't alter the FACT that if you believe the THEORY of

perceptual control to be worth investigating and discussing, you
really ought to play by its rules, among which are the rules of
control. One rule of control, whether biological or engineering, is
that the controlled variable is the one that is directly compared
with a reference value. Any other place in a control loop where
something is visibly stabilized, the stabilization is due to the
stabilization of the variable that is compared with a reference
value.

RM: I agree completely. And that is always part of my modeling. When the model controls a perception like p = aX + bX, where Y and Y are variables in the model of the physical environment, it is also controlling aX+bY, the aspect of the physical environment that corresponds to the controlled perception.

MT: Now, if you wanted to use the publicly visible stabilization of an

environmental variable (the FACT you keep harping on) as evidence
that there is a controlled variable somewhere and that variable is
closely linked to the stabilized environmental variable (in the
manner of the “Test for the Controlled Variable”), I would applaud.
But recently you haven’t been doing that.

RM: Then I haven’t been clear. And I agree that I have probably not been clear about this in the past. You are right that it is very likely that the environmental variable that is seen to be controlled – the one that I say indicates the “fact” of control --may not correspond to the perceptual variable that the system is controlling. Indeed, we found that out in the tracking study that you developed (so much for you not doing empirical research) and that I analyzed and described in the paper reprinted as Chapter 4 in “Doing Research on Purpose”.

RM: In that paper the fact of control was indicated by the subject stabilizing t-c, the distance between target (t) and cursor (c). The variable t-c is an environmental variable and the fact that it is controlled suggests that the perception controlled is proportional to t-c. But it turns out that a better guess about the perception controlled is one that is proportional to the angle between t and c, specifically arcsin[t-c)/s], where s is the vertical distance between t and c, t-c being the horizontal distance. This angle is also an environmental variable – a variable aspect of the environment – that can be perceived by the controller. And it turns out that assuming that the controller is controlling a perception of this aspect of the environment – the angle between t and c–gives a better fit of model to data than assuming that the perception controlled is of t-c.

RM: This is an aspect of the TCV that I had failed to consider until I analyzed the data from your experiment. What I learned is that you can find evidence that control is happening – evidence for the fact of control – by observing that an aspect of the environment – actually an aspect of one’s own perception – is stabilized while the system may (and very likely is) controlling a perception of a different – but very similar – aspect of the environment.

RM: What this means for the rubber band demo of control of behavior is that the fact that one can see that S’s finger location (x,y position) is being stabilized does not mean that it is a perception of this aspect of the environment that is under control. It may be that it is not the x,y but the polar coordinates (r, theta) of the finger that is stabilized. Or some other aspect of the situation.

RM: This aspect of the TCV is actually handled by the recommendation that the test be done until all disturbances to the hypothetical perception are found to have little or no effect. But it is true that one’s inclination is to proclaim that the perception controlled in a particular situation is a perception of the first environmental variable that is used to establish the fact that control is going on. And your point makes it clear that establishing the fact that control is happening is really the first step in determining more accurately the perception that is actually under control.

MT: If you wanted to use that apparent stabilization of something in the

environment as evidence that the environmental variable is actually
being controlled (as you now seem to be doing), I would ask – and
do ask – where is the reference value in the environment to which
its current value is continually being compared, and what is the
mechanism in the environment for making that comparison?

RM: The reference value is in the control system but it might be a reference for a perception that is somewhat different than the environmental variable measured to establish the fact that control is happening.

MT: I suppose also, though this isn't a scientific point but an

emotional one, that if you wanted to honour Bill Powers in a
discussion group devoted to discussing his theory, you would be well
advised to start with the title of his main book “Behaviour: the
control of PERCEPTION”, and stop trying to change the theory into
“Behaviour: the control of things in the environment”.

RM: You are absolutely right. Thank you for helping me understand that the first measure of the environmental variable that is under control is not necessarily the aspect of the environment that corresponds to the perception that is actually under control. The perception that is under control is bound to be very closely related to the aspect of the environment that is measured as the first estimate of the perception under control – closely related in the sense that it will be highly correlated with it, just as arcsin[t-c)/s] is highly correlated with t-c – but it is not necessarily the aspect of the environment that establishes the fact that control is happening.

RM: Again, I humbly and profusely apologize for the false and ad hominum attack in my previous post. You are a very smart guy and a wonderful debating partner. And when we have had disagreements you have always argued against me fiercly but fairly and always without attacking me personally. Mea Culpa, mea maxima culpa (I think that’s it; my lapsed Catholic wife is up north with our granddaughter so I can’t easily check it with her; but I will and I’m sure she’ll give me the proper number of Hail Mary’s and Our Father’s to say).

Best regards

Rick

Martin

–
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

Shakespeare, Twelfth Night

            RM:

But knowing that you believe that facts depend on
theory helps me understand why you have so little
interest in doing empirical research.

7

[From Fred Nickols (2014.11.28.0822 EDT)]

Good for you, Rick.

Fred Nickols

···

From: Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) [mailto:csgnet@lists.illinois.edu]
Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 2:27 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Facts and Theories (was Understanding control of behavior)

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.27.2330)]

Martin Taylor (2014.11.27.23.04

RM: But knowing that you believe that facts depend on theory helps me understand why you have so little interest in doing empirical research.

MT: Yes, I suppose that is why I put so much effort last year into making a generalized tracking program to test a few theoretical notions…Ooops. I shouldn’t have said that!

RM: Yes you should. I shouldn’t have said what I said and I humbly apologize. Not only was it wrong – you have done much excellent empirical research – but it was an ad hominum attack. I have no idea what got into me; I hope you will accept my apology. I was wrong, wrong, wrong.

MT: But that doesn’t alter the FACT that if you believe the THEORY of perceptual control to be worth investigating and discussing, you really ought to play by its rules, among which are the rules of control. One rule of control, whether biological or engineering, is that the controlled variable is the one that is directly compared with a reference value. Any other place in a control loop where something is visibly stabilized, the stabilization is due to the stabilization of the variable that is compared with a reference value.

RM: I agree completely. And that is always part of my modeling. When the model controls a perception like p = aX + bX, where Y and Y are variables in the model of the physical environment, it is also controlling aX+bY, the aspect of the physical environment that corresponds to the controlled perception.

MT: Now, if you wanted to use the publicly visible stabilization of an environmental variable (the FACT you keep harping on) as evidence that there is a controlled variable somewhere and that variable is closely linked to the stabilized environmental variable (in the manner of the “Test for the Controlled Variable”), I would applaud. But recently you haven’t been doing that.

RM: Then I haven’t been clear. And I agree that I have probably not been clear about this in the past. You are right that it is very likely that the environmental variable that is seen to be controlled – the one that I say indicates the "
fact" of control --may not correspond to the perceptual variable that the system is controlling. Indeed, we found that out in the tracking study that you developed (so much for you not doing empirical research) and that I analyzed and described in the paper reprinted as Chapter 4 in “Doing Research on Purpose”.

RM: In that paper the fact of control was indicated by the subject stabilizing t-c, the distance between target (t) and cursor (c). The variable t-c is an environmental variable and the fact that it is controlled suggests that the perception controlled is proportional to t-c. But it turns out that a better guess about the perception controlled is one that is proportional to the angle between t and c, specifically arcsin[t-c)/s], where s is the vertical distance between t and c, t-c being the horizontal distance. This angle is also an environmental variab
le – a variable aspect of the environment – that can be perceived by the controller. And it turns out that assuming that the controller is controlling a perception of this aspect of the environment – the angle between t and c–gives a better fit of model to data than assuming that the perception controlled is of t-c.

RM: This is an aspect of the TCV that I had failed to consider until I analyzed the data from your experiment. What I learned is that you can find evidence that control is happening – evidence for the fact of control – by observing that an aspect of the environment – actually an aspect of one’s own perception – is stabilized while the system may (and very likely is) controlling a perception of a different – but very similar – aspect of the environment.

RM: What this means for the rubber band demo of control of behavior is that the fact that one can see that S’s finger location (x,y position) is being stabilized does not mean that it is a perception of this aspect of the environment that is under control. It may be that it is not the x,y but the polar coordinates (r, theta) of the finger that is stabilized. Or some other aspect of the situation.

RM: This aspect of the TCV is actually handled by the recommendation that the test be done until all disturbances to the hypothetical perception are found to have little or no effect. But it is true that one’s inclination is to proclaim that the perception controlled in a particular situation is a perception of the first environmental variable that is used to establish the fact that control is going on. And your point makes it clear that establishing the fact that control is hap
pening is really the first step in determining more accurately the perception that is actually under control.

MT: If you wanted to use that apparent stabilization of something in the environment as evidence that the environmental variable is actually being controlled (as you now seem to be doing), I would ask – and do ask – where is the reference value in the environment to which its current value is continually being compared, and what is the mechanism in the environment for making that comparison?

RM: The reference value is in the control system but it might be a reference for a perception that is somewhat different than the environmental variable m
easured to establish the fact that control is happening.

MT: I suppose also, though this isn’t a scientific point but an emotional one, that if you wanted to honour Bill Powers in a discussion group devoted to discussing his theory, you would be well advised to start with the title of his main book “Behaviour: the control of PERCEPTION”, and stop trying to change the theory into “Behaviour: the control of things in the environment”.

RM: You are absolutely right. Thank you for helping me understand that the first measure of the environmental variable that is under control is not necessarily the aspect of the environment that
corresponds to the perception that is actually under control. The perception that is under control is bound to be very closely related to the aspect of the environment that is measured as the first estimate of the perception under control – closely related in the sense that it will be highly correlated with it, just as arcsin[t-c)/s] is highly correlated with t-c – but it is not necessarily the aspect of the environment that establishes the fact that control is happening.

RM: Again, I humbly and profusely apologize for the false and ad hominum attack in my previous post. You are a very smart guy and a wonderful debating partner. And when we have had disagreements you have always argued against me fiercly but fairly and always without attacking me personally. Mea Culpa, mea maxima culpa (I think that’s it; my lapsed Catholic wife is up north with our granddaughter so I can’t easi
ly check it with her; but I will and I’m sure she’ll give me the proper number of Hail Mary’s and Our Father’s to say).

Best regards

Rick

Martin

–

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of [Doing Research on Purpose](http://www.amazo
n.com/Doing-Research-Purpose-Experimental-Psychology/dp/0944337554/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1407342866&sr=8-1&keywords=doing+research+on+purpose).

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

In nature there’s no blemish but the mind

None can be called deformed but the unkind.

Shakespeare
, Twelfth Night

8

Hi Warren,

Title »The Fact of Control« I beleive is subjective as much beleivers it has, as any other »fact«.

Best,

Boris

···

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Warren Mansell (wmansell@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Friday, November 28, 2014 6:17 AM
To: mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net
Cc: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Facts and Theories (was Understanding control of behavior)

How about this:

“Living Control Systems III: The Fact of Control”

How subjective is that title?

Warren

On 28 Nov 2014, at 04:31, Martin Taylor (mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.27.23.04]

On 2014/11/27 7:12 PM, Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.27.1610)]

Martin Taylor (2014.11.27.17.50)

MT: This is refreshing! I don’t think I’ve heard such a passionate defence of naive realism since my undergraduate days. It makes me feel young again. For the last 60 years, almost everyone I have had any dealings with on the issue has accepted that all “facts” depend on some kind of theory.

…

RM: But knowing that you believe that facts depend on theory helps me understand why you have so little interest in doing empirical research.

Yes, I suppose that is why I put so much effort last year into making a generalized tracking program to test a few theoretical notions…Ooops. I shouldn’t have said that!

Interesting that you omitted the qualifying sentence in your quote.

After all, why do empirical tests when the results of those tests depend on the current theory you hold? The theory you hold determines what the results of the tests will look like. So I would imagine that, given your perspective, the first thing to do is to get the right theory and then do the tests (although the tests seem rather superfluous since they will come out the way your theory says they will).

I guess my exaggeration leads to yours in a classic conflict escalation. Sorry about that.

But that doesn’t alter the FACT that if you believe the THEORY of perceptual control to be worth investigating and discussing, you really ought to play by its rules, among which are the rules of control. One rule of control, whether biological or engineering, is that the controlled variable is the one that is directly compared with a reference value. Any other place in a control loop where something is visibly stabilized, the stabilization is due to the stabilization of the variable that is compared with a reference value.

I know politicians think they can replace laws of nature by their own laws (e.g. pi = 22/7 in, I think, Kentucky), but in a scientific discourse, one really shouldn’t do that.

Now, if you wanted to use the publicly visible stabilization of an environmental variable (the FACT you keep harping on) as evidence that there is a controlled variable somewhere and that variable is closely linked to the stabilized environmental variable (in the manner of the “Test for the Controlled Variable”), I would applaud. But recently you haven’t been doing that.

If you wanted to use that apparent stabilization of something in the environment as evidence that the environmental variable is actually being controlled (as you now seem to be doing), I would ask – and do ask – where is the reference value in the environment to which its current value is continually being compared, and what is the mechanism in the environment for making that comparison?

I suppose also, though this isn’t a scientific point but an emotional one, that if you wanted to honour Bill Powers in a discussion group devoted to discussing his theory, you would be well advised to start with the title of his main book “Behaviour: the control of PERCEPTION”, and stop trying to change the theory into “Behaviour: the control of things in the environment”.

Martin

9

[Martin Taylor 2014.11.28.11.48]

Very handsome of you, and I thank you for it, while adding my own

apology for participating in the conflict escalation.
With luck, we should be able to terminate this and the ancestor
thread at this point.
Martin

···

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.27.2330)]

            Martin Taylor

(2014.11.27.23.04

                          RM:

But knowing that you believe that facts
depend on theory helps me understand why
you have so little interest in doing
empirical research.

            MT: Yes, I suppose that is why I put so much effort last

year into making a generalized tracking program to test
a few theoretical notions…Ooops. I shouldn’t have said
that!

          RM: Yes you should. I shouldn't have said what I said

and I humbly apologize. Not only was it wrong – you have
done much excellent empirical research – but it was an ad
hominum attack. I have no idea what got into me; I hope
you will accept my apology. I was wrong, wrong, wrong.