Flame in terms of PCT

Please help me here. I'm still trying to understand how PCT is put to
practical use.

The incidence of flame would seem to me to be an ideal situation
where PCT should be used.

As I understand it, the perception of flame in a post occurs *only*
in the mind of the recipient (the reader). This is irrespective of
whether a post is perceived as a flame by anyone else.

In this situation, shouldn't the technique of "Method of Levels"
(MOL) be employed? This would recommend the recipient going to a
higher level - to view the post as a piece of information that either
does or does not contain useful information. At this level, the tone
of the message is of no consequence.

To pay attention to the flame element of a post would seem to me to
be going down a level by the recipient, where the error signal
produces unpleasant emotions. This is the choice of the recipient and
is no fault of the sender of the message, where his or her "flame"
might be motivated by his or her perception of the message.

Isn't this the way PCT should view the situation? Or, am I missing something?

Peter Small

Author of: Lingo Sorcery, Magical A-Life Avatars, The Entrepreneurial
Web, The Ultimate Game of Strategy and Web Presence
http://www.stigmergicsystems.com

···

--

[From Bryan Thalhammer (2004.03.21.1455)]

Peter,

Thank you for replying. The perceptual signals would be relevant to both a
particular contributor (at the time of composition) and a particular
recipient (at the time of reading and reflection). Also, I guess you could
view the issue of disturbance at a number of levels. They could be at lower
levels:

Program: The presence of certain words produces a direct error signal, since
such words by themselves are a disturbance.

But I would bet that the disturbance would really be at higher levels:

Principle: One is not supposed to use words like that. Such words are
injurious.
System Image: I don't use words like that, and when I do, I am not the
person I want to be.

Any other levels? Any other issues?

Thank you!

--Bryan

···

-----Original Message-----
From: Control Systems Group Network (CSGnet)
[mailto:CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu]On Behalf Of Peter Small
Sent: Sunday, March 21, 2004 1:30 PM
To: CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu
Subject: [CSGNET] Flame in terms of PCT

Please help me here. I'm still trying to understand how PCT is put to
practical use.

The incidence of flame would seem to me to be an ideal situation
where PCT should be used.

As I understand it, the perception of flame in a post occurs *only*
in the mind of the recipient (the reader). This is irrespective of
whether a post is perceived as a flame by anyone else.

In this situation, shouldn't the technique of "Method of Levels"
(MOL) be employed? This would recommend the recipient going to a
higher level - to view the post as a piece of information that either
does or does not contain useful information. At this level, the tone
of the message is of no consequence.

To pay attention to the flame element of a post would seem to me to
be going down a level by the recipient, where the error signal
produces unpleasant emotions. This is the choice of the recipient and
is no fault of the sender of the message, where his or her "flame"
might be motivated by his or her perception of the message.

Isn't this the way PCT should view the situation? Or, am I
missing something?

Peter Small

Author of: Lingo Sorcery, Magical A-Life Avatars, The Entrepreneurial
Web, The Ultimate Game of Strategy and Web Presence
http://www.stigmergicsystems.com

--

Please help me here. I'm still trying to understand how PCT is put to
practical use.

The incidence of flame would seem to me to be an ideal situation
where PCT should be used.

As I understand it, the perception of flame in a post occurs *only*
in the mind of the recipient (the reader). This is irrespective of
whether a post is perceived as a flame by anyone else.

In this situation, shouldn't the technique of "Method of Levels"
(MOL) be employed? This would recommend the recipient going to a
higher level - to view the post as a piece of information that either
does or does not contain useful information. At this level, the tone
of the message is of no consequence.

To pay attention to the flame element of a post would seem to me to
be going down a level by the recipient, where the error signal
produces unpleasant emotions. This is the choice of the recipient and
is no fault of the sender of the message, where his or her "flame"
might be motivated by his or her perception of the message.

Isn't this the way PCT should view the situation? Or, am I missing something?

You aren't missing much, except for your use of "should" at the start
of para 4. If you change that to "couldn't the technique...", I think
you are pretty close.

The questions one would have to ask in a PCT analysis relate to the
possible controlled perceptions of each participant. Call them people
S (sender) and R (reader). If R perceives a message from S as a
flame, what does that mean? I think it means that R perceives S to
have the intention of hurting R. And what, in turn, does that mean?
To "have the intention" means to have a reference value for some
perception. That perception would have to be related to S's
perception of R. If S "intended" to hurt R, S wants to perceive R as
being in some way damaged.

How, then, would S be able to damage R, if R's perception of S's
intent happened to be right?

S would have to perceive (rightly or wrongly) that S was controlling
some perception that R could disturb by the medium of an e-mail
message. Quite possibly S might perceive that R was controlling a
perception of how "the world" perceived him, with a reference value
we caould casually call "as being a fine fellow".

At this point the analysis is getting a bit hard to follow, but bear with me.

Let's suppose R is wrong about S's intention, meaning S is not
controlling for a perception with a reference of seeing R hurt.
Nevertheless, S has sent a message that does hurt R. How is that
possible? It can happen only if R is controlling some perception that
is disturbed by reading S's message, and that disturbance affects R's
perception in a way that S finds difficult to counter through
immediate (or even forecast) control actions. That doesn't make it be
a flame, though, especially if R perceives S to have had no intention
to hurt.

S's message does, as you say, provide information to R about S. It
provides not only information about what S thinks about the overt
topic of the message (and possibly therefore about the topic itself),
but also about S's mode of approaching communication. Other things R
knows about S will affect whether R perceives in the message an
intent by S to hurt.

R may, instead for example, perceive that S is controlling for some
other disturbed perception--perhaps that S had been hurt previously
by R and is simply trying to bring the "hurt" perception back to its
reference value. For example, damaging the reputation of one's
opponent is a way of reducing the effect of what the opponent says
about oneself, but a message that the opponents perceives as damaging
to his reputation is likely to be one that disturbs a perception he
controls--leading to another shot in the flame war.

This kind of recursive perception of one's interlocutor and the
interlocutor's perception of oneself is at the heart of the PCT
(Layered Protocol Theory) of communication. It's complicated to
analyze, and to use your way of looking at things, it can generate
all kinds of different dynamic behaviour, from fixed-point to
chaotic, as the various perceptions and their control actions
interact.

I don't know if any of this will make sense to you, but it's an
attempt to do in a very brief way what took around 100 pages the last
time we published it.

The essence is easy. The working out is not.

Martin

says,

Please help me here. I'm still trying to understand how > PCT is put to

practical use.

The incidence of flame would seem to me to be an ideal situation where

PCT should be used.

As I understand it, the perception of flame in a post
occurs *only* in the mind of the recipient (the reader). > This is

irrespective of whether a post is perceived as > a flame by anyone else.

Peter, I think Martin's explanation of how "flaming email" can be
considered in control theory terms is an excellent one. However, as I am
sure must be obvious to you, the CSGnet community has not yet reached a
consensus about issues such as "responsibility" and whether "words can hurt"
and many similar questions. And, despite Martin's excellent explanation he
and I do not always agree concerning policy implications and how control
theory ought to find application. We would agree that the other understands
control theory ( at least I think we are in agreement in this respect ) but
we come, sometimes at least, to divergent conclusions.

Martin, as I understand his position, takes a Kantian sort of position that
he is going to behave in a manner such that if everyone behaved as he does
the world would be a fine place. And, Martins policy works very well under
most circumstances. In my view of things, Martin's policy may break down in
situations where someone misuses their capacities to treat other people
unfairly. What if there is a predator-- a serial killer-- at work what
then? Or, in less dramatic example what if a nasty jerk does stuff-- or
just says stuff that makes other people feel bad? I am supposing a
situation in which there are predators and prey. And, I am also supposing
that the prey do not have strengths that Martin has to maintain his
self-conception when they are verbally attacked. Is Martan's policy a
fully adequate and responsible one in this sort of situation? I do not wish
to attempt what might be an impertenent judgment, so I will limit what I
say to this: It isn't clear to me that Martin's policy is one that is suited
to all situations.

As a result of observing the process at work in a number of contexts similar
to CSG over a number or years, I have come to the conclusion that it is not
morally responsible to ignore situations in which predators are actively
doing things that injure other people. Ideally there might be a sufficient
sense of community so that predators would be constrained by an awareness
that they are not strong enough to carry out attacks upon vulnerable
people-- not when others in the community are ready to defend those who are
potentially victims. Unfortunately, situations often arise in which there
is an insufficient sense of solidarity in a community and as a result
predators run loose. And, often the situation is a mixed one which is
intellectually, and morally confused. What to do? I think there is a moral
basis for an argument that one has not only a moral right to defend oneself,
but in addition a moral obligation to do so. Not defending oneself amounts
to offering encouragement to predators. Not defending oneself amounts to a
failure, a moral failure in regard to one's responsibilities to the
community. The same can be said of a failure to come to the aid of a person
who is under attack. The matter of _how_ such an ethos is going to be
implemented may, and usually will, be problematic. I wouldn't go so far as
to say that such an ethos is a logical consequence of adopting a control
theory point of view. But, it is an ethos that can be implemented using
insights derived from control theory. The economist Kenneth Boulding's 1960
or so _Conflict and Defense_ provides a description of at least some of the
issues involved. Boulding, it might be noted was a Quaker and from the part
of the Quaker faith that is passivist.

Where Martin and I may differ (Martin can correct me) is that in his
analysis of "Flame" Martin makes no mention of the fact that the "Flame"
going on is a result of a conflict in regard to values. What is the status
of these values, are they real? Or, are they merely subjective? Can these
values be subject to assessment in a way that will disclose something
useful. Or, are these values to be viewed in a relativist context in which
they are arbitrary? Unless I am mistaken Martin leaves such issues out of
his, otherwise, very able presentation of how control theory may put to use
in considered the phenomena of email "flames." Everyone, as far as I am
aware, makes appeals to concepts of "right" and "wrong." The question , or
at least one of the first questions, as I see it is whether or not such
questions are given a sustained or a superficial consideration.

Bill Williams

···

From: "Peter Small" <peter@PETERSMALL.NET>

[Martin Taylor 2004.03.22.01.15]

Bill Willimas, responding to Peter Small, makes some good
observations. I have only a couple of small comments.

From: "Peter Small" <peter@PETERSMALL.NET>

says,

Please help me here. I'm still trying to understand how > PCT is put to

practical use.

The incidence of flame would seem to me to be an ideal situation where

PCT should be used.

As I understand it, the perception of flame in a post
occurs *only* in the mind of the recipient (the reader). > This is

irrespective of whether a post is perceived as > a flame by anyone else.

Martin, as I understand his position, takes a Kantian sort of position that
he is going to behave in a manner such that if everyone behaved as he does
the world would be a fine place.

Actually, I don't think that, on PCTheoretic grounds. I think it's
not an evolutionarily stable state, and would lead to a lot of
conflict.

In my view of things, Martin's policy may break down in
situations where someone misuses their capacities to treat other people
unfairly.

Yes. As Bill Powers has said in similar discussions years ago, a good
defence against actual attack is also necessary. I do include that in
my policy, but I use it only when I am unable to control my
perception of the other person at a level that says he won't attack.
In other words, I prefer to try to interact (if I must) in such a way
as not to sooth, and provoke, but if that fails, more direct defence
(i.e. conflict) becomes the preferred mode.

As a result of observing the process at work in a number of contexts similar
to CSG over a number or years, I have come to the conclusion that it is not
morally responsible to ignore situations in which predators are actively
doing things that injure other people.

I agree with that, too. But again--and it's more difficult when the
others are also interacting with the predator--my preference is to
try to get them not to want to act predatively, rather than (to put
it colloquially) annoying them further.

Where Martin and I may differ (Martin can correct me) is that in his
analysis of "Flame" Martin makes no mention of the fact that the "Flame"
going on is a result of a conflict in regard to values.

I think it's possible, but not necessary. If you were to give an
example where this is so, it might help. My own example did not use
or need a conflict in regard to values, but I'm sure some flame wars
do have that as a base issue.

Martin

From[Bill Williams 22 March 2004 8:30 AM CST]

[Martin Taylor 2004.03.22.01.15]

Bill Willimas, responding to Peter Small, makes some > good observations.

I have only a couple of small

comments.

Close readers of the CSGnet discussions have all agreed, at least those who
have posted, that Martin is a fine fellow. And, the way he opens his
critique provides a demonstration of his characteristic irenic approach to
discussion. Notice how suavely he rejects my characterization of his
approach to discussion as an application of the Kantian maxim, act in such a
way that if everyone acted this way things would work out great.

>Martin, as I understand his position, takes a Kantian >>sort of position

that he is going to behave in a manner >>such that if everyone behaved as he
does the world >>would be a fine place.

Actually, I don't think that, on PCTheoretic grounds. I
think it's not an evolutionarily stable state, and would
lead to a lot of conflict.

>In my view of things, Martin's policy may break down >>in situations

where someone misuses their capacities >>to treat other people unfairly.

Yes. As Bill Powers has said in similar discussions
years ago, a good defence against actual attack is >also necessary.

I do include that in my policy, but I use it only when I am > unable to

control my perception of the other person at >a level that says he won't
attack.

In other words, I prefer to try to interact (if I must) in >such a way as

not to sooth, and provoke, but if that >fails, more direct defence (i.e.
conflict) becomes the >preferred mode.

>As a result of observing the process at work in a >>number of contexts

similar to CSG over a number or >>years, I have come to the conclusion that
it is not

>morally responsible to ignore situations in which >>predators are

actively doing things that injure other >>people.

I agree with that, too. But again--and it's more difficult >when the

others are also interacting with the predator-->my preference is to try to
get them not to want to act >predatively, rather than (to put it
colloquially) annoying >them further.

I would have to agree that in a situation in which conflict is going on and
it looks as if the conflict could be moderated or eliminated by distracting
the parties to the conflict so that they go off and do other less
destructive or more productive things what Martin is suggesting may be the
prefered policy.

>Where Martin and I may differ (Martin can correct me) >>is that in his

analysis of "Flame" Martin makes no >>mention of the fact that the "Flame"
going on is a >>result of a conflict in regard to values.

Readers may note that since I am confident that Martin approaches issues in
an irenic spirit, it is only respectful for me to acknowledge this by
inserting a "may differ" and in a sense welcoming him to disgree with me in
a cordial discussion.

I think it's possible, but not necessary. If you were to >give an example

where this is so, it might help. My own > example did not use or need a
conflict in regard to >values, but I'm sure some flame wars do have that as
a base issue.

Now here is where Martin and, I think, conceive of things a bit differently
(notice the irenic minimization of the difference using the phrase "a
bit" ). Martin's comment on Flames in control theory terms proceeds on what
I will describe as a "causal" or "scientific" basis. And, Martin provides a
through and accurate explain of Flames from this standpoint. Martin
acknowledges that he did not in his perception include what he regards as
"value" considerations in his treatment of the Flame process. Again in a
subtle way Martin proceeds in an irenic mode by explicitly acknowledging
that although he did not include value considerations in his discussion,
that there may be room and a place for such a consideration.

If I understand Martin's approach ( notice the irentic bit) however, it
seems to me that what is ordinarily in control theory and in PCT theory too,
almost always ignored is that control theory processes are, and always are,
a matter of values, or axiology. Given that control theory applications to
human behavior is a field that has emerged from science and engineering it
isn't at all surprising that the value theoretic or axiologic aspect of the
analysis has been slighted. There may be as a result of a residual
positivism in the contributors to PCT or control theory applied to human
behavior an inclination to regard value theory as a squishy subjective
question. However, economics which is my field of concentration, is a field
that has been for some time been concerned with values, and value theory in
a practical way.

Rather than extend my discussion, what I would like to do is ask Martin,
since we all recognize that he has consistently been making a fine
contribution to CSG, and CSGnet, to elaborate his all too brief remarks
about the Flame process and his approach to the problems it presents.

Bill Williams

[From Peter Small (2004.03.22)]

Martin Taylor wrote:

R may, instead for example, perceive that S is controlling for some
other disturbed perception--perhaps that S had been hurt previously
by R and is simply trying to bring the "hurt" perception back to its
reference value. For example, damaging the reputation of one's
opponent is a way of reducing the effect of what the opponent says
about oneself, but a message that the opponents perceives as damaging
to his reputation is likely to be one that disturbs a perception he
controls--leading to another shot in the flame war.

This kind of recursive perception of one's interlocutor and the
interlocutor's perception of oneself is at the heart of the PCT
(Layered Protocol Theory) of communication. It's complicated to
analyze, and to use your way of looking at things, it can generate
all kinds of different dynamic behaviour, from fixed-point to
chaotic, as the various perceptions and their control actions
interact.

Yes. It does seem to me that this would lead to unpredictable,
chaotic behavior. This is why I was impressed with the PCT strategy
of jumping up a level to escape from a stressful situation.

Bill William's puts these flames into the context of person to person
battles. This I see as going down a level, where the intention is to
deliberately create an unpredictable, chaotic situation. However, I
see nothing wrong with this at all. Creating instabilities at lower
levels in a hierarchy can be beneficial, because however painful they
may be, they often lead to valuable insights and bifurcations.

It must be remembered, the basic premise of PCT is that the world is
always a perceived world i.e., it is only in the eye of the beholder.
Any dialogue can be probing, amusing, combative, vindictive, petty or
anything else depending upon the spin your own psyche puts on it. If
you don't like it, it is easy enough to go up a level, changing the
way you are looking at the situation.

Peter Small

Author of: Lingo Sorcery, Magical A-Life Avatars, The Entrepreneurial
Web, The Ultimate Game of Strategy and Web Presence
http://www.stigmergicsystems.com

···

--

[Martin Taylor 2004.03.22 1750]

From[Bill Williams 22 March 2004 8:30 AM CST]

Rather than extend my discussion, what I would like to do is ask Martin,
since we all recognize that he has consistently been making a fine
contribution to CSG, and CSGnet, to elaborate his all too brief remarks
about the Flame process and his approach to the problems it presents.

We'll have to keep that on low heat on the back burner (so that it
doesn't generate any Flame). Ask me again in a couple of weeks, when
I may have more time.

Martin

From[Bill Williams 22 March 2004 12:10 AM CST]

[From Peter Small (2004.03.22)]

Bill William's puts these flames into the context of person to person
battles.

Did I say this? If I did, I'd like to correct myself. There is, of
course,
a person to person involved. But, I think the intensity of the Flame
is has at least part of its source in an awareness that beyond the
person to person element there is a community or audience
involved. And, there is, in addition a past and an anticipated
future.

This I see as going down a level, where the intention is to
deliberately create an unpredictable, chaotic situation.

I would, in part, agree with Peter here. But, I think the situation
can also be understood in the terminology of competitive sport
and the concept of a "forced error. " In a situation in which it
may not be possible to prevail as a result of direct action, it
may be possible to unbalance the opponate so that the
oponate self-destructs. A short lexicon for such tactics would
include baiting, teasing, trolling,

However, I see nothing wrong with this at all. Creating instabilities at

lower

levels in a hierarchy can be beneficial, because however painful they
may be, they often lead to valuable insights and bifurcations.

I don't _necessarily_ see anything wrong with such tactics. But, I
wouldn't
go so far as Peter in claiming that there isn't _anything "at all" wrong_
with applying such tactics anywhich way. I think it may be possible to
make a distinction between situations in which such tactics can be justified
and situations in which they are unnecessarily unfriendly.

But, the concept of "friendship" it seems to me, involves ideas about
values.
And, it seems to me that discussions on CSG concerning values too often
begin with an implicit assumption that some set of values can be assumed
to have a pre-certified status, and all that remains to do is to apply them.
However, as an empirical matter, it would appear to be obvious that when
some valuation schemes are put to what might be described in terms of
a stress test they are not robust and tend to malfunction.. One of the
reasons for such a lack of robustness and tendency to implode may be
a result of internal contradictions. Value theory might not necessarily
appear to be a topic with obvious connections to PCT. However, it seems
to me that what Martin Taylor is taking about under the caption of Reference
Input Functions is a more contemporary, and operational way of considering
the questions that once were considered under the headings of "the theory of
valuation, or axiology.

Bill Williams

[From Bjorn Simonsen
(2004.03.23,10:00EuST)]

Peter Small (
about 2004.06.21)

As I
understand it, the perception of flame in a post occurs only

In the mind
of the recipient (the reader). This is irrespective of

whether a
post is perceived as a flame by anyone else.

I don’t quite
understand your last sentence relative to your first sentence. I myself would
write “the
perception of flame in a post occurs only in the mind of a recipient (a reader).

If you had used
Martin’s “could” technique I will say I think as you. I think it is more
difficulty to test which perception S is controlling when he exercises his
actions (sending an e-mail) than people often give voice to.

From Martin Taylor (about 2004.03.21)

If R
perceives a message from S as a

flame, what
does that mean? I think it means that R perceives S to

have the
intention of hurting R. If R perceives a message from S as a

flame, what
does that mean? I think it means that R perceives S to

have the
intention of hurting R. And what, in turn, does that mean?

To
“have the intention” means to have a reference value for some

perception.
That perception would have to be related to S’s

perception
of R. If S “intended” to hurt R, S wants to perceive R as

being in
some way damaged.

I think you explain PCT as I like it. I often
reorganize after reading your mails.

There is another thing I will involve. Take a look
below.

From Bill Williams (about 2004.03.22)

What if
there is a predator-- a serial killer-- at work what

then? Or, in less dramatic example what if a
nasty jerk does stuff-- or

just says stuff that makes other people feel bad?

I will talk
about a receiver’s perception of the sender’s intention. Martin has a hypothetical example; “I
think it means that R perceives S to have the intention of hurting R”. And _I
perceive Bill to have the perception that the serie killer has an intention (reference)
to kill people. I perceive that Peter excludes the sender’s intention when he
controls the flame.

I am sorry but I
have to repeat myself and I will make the most of the opportunity to say that
the world will benefit most from PCT if they (learn PCT and) really understand
that we can’t place side by side a person’s action (writing a letter) and his
intention or purpose.

I am almost
fixedly on the theme that we shall not assume that the sender has an
intention/purpose before she admits the correctness of it.

p = (ke* ko *r + kd

  • d )/ (1 + ko* ke). …………(d#
    the sender’s purpose)

I
know this is a ghost from me and I will use Bills § words to slip through
that we are justified to argue that we know something about the extern
world/the purpose of the Sender.

I agree with Bill P when he [From Bill Powers (2002.06.23.0831 MDT)]
said (my italics):

There is one last twist to this problem:
The idea that the

world consists of perceptions is, of course, also a

perception, as is the idea that we have something called

“a brain” organized into control systems, and so on.

Because the same theory requires that a real world
exist outside us, through which our actions affect
our perceptions, and it tells us that there are
other agencies in that real world that can affect
our perceptions even when we do nothing*. Indeed,
most of our actions are needed to nullify the effect
of unwanted independent disturbances.
* Learning to
control our own perceptions is very much dependent
on learning the effects of actions applied to the
real but invisible world. From
these actions and their

perceived effects,
in innumerable experiments conducted
every moment of the day, we build up a picture that I
is at least consistent, as far as it goes, with the
properties of reality
**.** So while we may never have

any direct knowledge of the real world, we are

continuously in contact with it as it’s reflected

in our perceptual abstractions from it. We are

always acting on it and experiencing the consequences

of its actions on us. That’s a pretty close relationship,

although it’s not what a passionate realist wants.

Let me repeat
with my own words: “Living organisms, also we in CSG can describe parts of the
extern world because we know that our actions try to eliminate the disturbances
which are different from our references. When I react on a force effecting on
me, I know something about that force (the extern world). I know that the force
(the extern world) is in harmony with my reference and in addition the opposite
value of my reaction. If we know our references, and I think we do, then we
know something about the extern world. Using the test, we can learn what other
people really control. This gives us a more fundamental knowledge about the
extern world.”

This is a step
forward for me relative to my earlier understanding of PCT. Earlier I quite
definite rejected knowledge about the extern world beyond physical laws
(learned) and statements I agree with other people.

Although
I admit that I can have knowledge about the extern world (here the senders
purpose) I have fallen back on a personal rule (reference).

  1.  Don’t place side by side the sender’s
    

actions and his intentions/purposes.

  1.  If I don’t devote time and
    

energy on coming up with the sender’s intentions/purposes it is advantageous
to forget the whole flame. If I can’t forget it I have to devote time and
energy on coming up with the senders intentions/purposes.

I
will conclude with some axioms (in my words) that I remember from Carl. R.
Rogers. (Am I correct Dick R.?)

  1.  I believe in the dignity and
    

value of all people. I think they are able to understand their own decisions
and I respect their right to carry them out.

  1.  I think all people in all
    

essentials live in their own subjective world. Even when it acts in what
we say is the most objective way it is a result of subjective purposes and
choices.

  1.  I think that all people have
    

their naturally capacity for growth and development and that they realize
themselves in accordance to their capacity.

  1.  I think people are wiser than
    

they have knowledge. (Something unconscious happens us all).

After
this and viewed in the light of this back to the purpose of this letter. I agree
with you Peter Small

bjorn

From[Bill Williams 23 March 2004 5:20 AM CST]

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2004.03.23,10:00EuST)]

Peter Small ( about 2004.06.21)

As I understand it, the perception of flame in a post occurs only

In the mind of the recipient (the reader). This is irrespective of

whether a post is perceived as a flame by anyone else.

In considering the phenomena of a flame, it might be helpful to include the

reference level, or perhaps even better the Reference Input Function of the

sender of the flame. Contrary, perhaps, to Bjorn’s approach, it seems to me

that either when attempting to communicate straightforwardly and productively

or when intending

to send an effective flame and accomplish some destructive

purpose, the sender is going to make use of a model of the

person to whom

the flame is sent and also a model of the audience that will also be receiving

the flaming post. Not only a model of the internal systems of the direct receiver,

and the indirect audience, but also a model of how these two audiences are

functionally connected.

p = (ke* ko r + kd * d )/ (1 + ko ke)

Bill Williams

[From Dick Robertson,2004.03.24.0610CDT]

Bj�rn Simonsen wrote:

  [From Bjorn Simonsen (2004.03.23,10:00EuST)]
Peter Small ( about 2004.06.21)
>As I understand it, the perception of flame in a post occurs *only*
>In the mind of the recipient (the reader). This is irrespective of
>whether a post is perceived as a flame by anyone else.

I don�t quite understand your last sentence relative to your first
sentence.
I myself would write �the perception of flame in a post occurs *only*
in the
mind of _a_ recipient (_a_ reader).
If you had used Martin�s �could� technique I will say I think as you.
I
think it is more difficulty to test which perception S is controlling
when
he exercises his actions (sending an e-mail) than people often give
voice
to.

>From Martin Taylor (about 2004.03.21)
>If R perceives a message from S as a

From Bill Williams (about 2004.03.22)
What if there is a predator-- a serial killer-- at work what
then? Or, in less dramatic example what if a nasty jerk does stuff--

or

just says stuff that makes other people feel bad?

....

And then Bjorn concludes

I will conclude with some axioms (in my words) that I remember from
Carl. R.
Rogers. (Am I correct Dick R.?)

1. I believe in the dignity and value of all people. I think they
are able
to understand their own decisions and I respect their right to carry
them
out.
2. I think all people in all essentials live in their own
subjective world.
Even when it acts in what we say is the most objective way it is a
result of
subjective purposes and choices.
3. I think that all people have their naturally capacity for growth
and
development and that they realize themselves in accordance to their
capacity.
4. I think people are wiser than they have knowledge. (Something
unconscious
happens us all).

After this and viewed in the light of this back to the purpose of this
letter. I agree with you Peter Small

bjorn

Yes, I would say that Carl Rogers held these views.

Best,

Dick R.