Forssell's observations

[From Bruce Abbott (960907.1455 EST)]

Dag Forssell (960907.0900) --

Bruce Abbott and many before him and many to come will continue to point to
people who sense that people are indeed goal driven etc. But it is a
mistake in this forum to suggest that we be impressed by such simple,
elementary, commonplace observation and consider it to be good enough to
build on. Unless there is an explicit, correct explanation of perceptual
feedback control, we do not have anything to build on, quite the contrary --
what we have is yet another authority who thinks he or she knows something.

Dag, no one is suggesting that "we be impressed by such simple, elementary,
commonplace observation," nor is anyone suggesting that we "consider it to
be good enough to build on." What I _am_ suggesting (and have provided the
evidence to support) is that Herbert Simon, writing in 1968, was among those
who recognized that the complex patterns of behavior evidenced by purposive
systems reflect more the complexity of the environments in which they
operate than of the systems themselves. Whereas you evidently find this
threatening (for reasons about which I can only guess), I see this as
providing another source confirming what PCT has to say about such matters.
Indeed, as I mentioned in another post, it was Simon's book that helped to
prepare me for what B:CP had to offer.

In scientific work it is considered proper form to acknowledge all those who
expressed a particular idea that one is now repeating; in a paper I might
make the following statement:

  The complexity of the behavior of a purposive system reveals more about the
  complexity of the environment in which the system must operate than of the
  system itself, which indeed may be quite simple (Powers, 1973; Simon, 1969).

In bringing up Simon's thinking I am merely pointing out that this fact has
been discovered and discussed by several thinkers and giving credit where
credit is due.

In this forum, for the purpose of spreading a correct understanding of what
behavior is and how it works, we are better off building on people who are
new to the field and do not claim prior understanding, but who are curious
for some reason -- dissatisfaction with something. Bruce came to study PCT
because of dissatisfaction.

This sounds to me more like a prescription for building a religion than a
science. That therapy guy who borrowed from PCT, altered it into something
else, then had all those with variant ideas cast out of his institute comes
to mind.

By the way, Bruce, you post like a PCTer most
of the time nowadays. (This last post seems a throwback.)

If that post seem like a throwback to you, it is because you didn't like the
message. What about that message disturbed you?

Regards,

Bruce

Bruce Abbott (960907.1455 EST)

In scientific work it is considered proper form to acknowledge all those who
expressed a particular idea that one is now repeating; in a paper I might
make the following statement:

The complexity of the behavior of a purposive system reveals more about

the complexity of the environment in which the system must operate than of
the system itself, which indeed may be quite simple (Powers, 1973; Simon,
1969).

In bringing up Simon's thinking I am merely pointing out that this fact has
been discovered and discussed by several thinkers and giving credit where
credit is due.

You might also add Powers, Clark, and MacFarland, 1960. Or others prior to
that, like James, 1895.

The problem with going up a level of verbal abstraction is that you could be
referring to very different -- even opposite -- underlying ideas. The
complexity of behavior reveals complexity in the environment, but in what
way? Does it reveal how complex the contingencies, reinforcers, and
discriminative stimuli are, such that complex actions are the result of
simple responses to complex environmental causes? Or is it that the
apparent complexity of behavior is only a side-effect of a relatively simple
process of controlling perceptions, with most of the behavior being aimed at
_preventing_ the environment from causing changes in what matters to the
organism?

These are obviously completely different ideas, yet by the use of general
enough terminology they can be made to seem the same. We have the same
problem with talking about purposive behavior. Many people agree that things
can "have a purpose." But to some, this means only that they have a
_function_ -- that they can be used in a way that is useful in the
production of some result. So a stone wall can be said to "have a purpose"
in that it serves some need or requirement of the person or organization who
built it, or in that it keeps the bulls separated from the cows, and so on.
On the other hand, in PCT when we say that a person has a purpose, we means
that there is a reference signal inside the person defining what is to be
experienced -- a stone wall could not be said to have a purpose, because it
contains no reference signals. However, the common usage is a very powerful
constraint, and people often prefer to keep their private purposes hidden,
so they would rather talk about "objective" purposes. A father who finds his
son prying lumber apart with a screwdriver may deliver a lecture about the
"proper purposes of a tool," which is much more impressive than saying "I
don't want you to use my screwdriver that way."

So someone may agree with you that behavior is purposive and that the
complexity of behavior reflects the complexity of the environment, yet hold
a theory of behavior that is completely antithetical to yours.

Best,

Bill P.

ยทยทยท

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[From Bruce Abbott (960908.1025 EST)]

Bill Powers (Sat, 7 Sep 1996 15:27:57) --

Bruce Abbott (960907.1455 EST)

In bringing up Simon's thinking I am merely pointing out that this fact has
been discovered and discussed by several thinkers and giving credit where
credit is due.

You might also add Powers, Clark, and MacFarland, 1960. Or others prior to
that, like James, 1895.

Yes, of course. My short list was just an illustration. (By the way, did
James _really_ point out that the complexity of behavior primarily reflects
the complexity of the environment? On what page?)

The problem with going up a level of verbal abstraction is that you could be
referring to very different -- even opposite -- underlying ideas. The
complexity of behavior reveals complexity in the environment, but in what
way? Does it reveal how complex the contingencies, reinforcers, and
discriminative stimuli are, such that complex actions are the result of
simple responses to complex environmental causes? Or is it that the
apparent complexity of behavior is only a side-effect of a relatively simple
process of controlling perceptions, with most of the behavior being aimed at
_preventing_ the environment from causing changes in what matters to the
organism?

What you prefer to call "going up a level of verbal abstraction" I prefer to
call "stating a conclusion." But you are absolutely correct: the
theoretical constructs that let up to that conclusion could be wildly
different from those leading to the same conclusion within PCT.

So someone may agree with you that behavior is purposive and that the
complexity of behavior reflects the complexity of the environment, yet hold
a theory of behavior that is completely antithetical to yours.

There exists a certain form of mathematical proof in which the conclusion
does not depend on the particular form of the functions involved. The
mathemaician states that A = f(g) and then goes on to prove that a certain
result holds true for _any_ function f whatsoever. In a similar way,
certain propositions about what Simon calls artifactual systems can be
adduced without assuming any particular form for the system. Simon assumed
only that the system has an inner organization that allows it to perform
some function (its purpose) and a permissive environment in which that
function can be carried out. This is enough to conclude that the behavior
of the system reveals almost nothing about the mechanism through which the
function is carried out, that the variation in its behavior reflects mainly
the characteristics of the environment.

Simon may or may not hold to an input-output model of behavior; judging from
what I have read he is familiar with closed-loop, negative feedback control
but is also willing to hold that much behavior may be generated open-loop as
well. His background is in digital computing, and that, I think, has
powerfully influenced his thinking in the direction of sequential-state
models of behavior.

Nevertheless, I think he makes some interesting points that PCTers would
find illuminating, if they weren't so damned frightened of other people's
ideas. Unfortunately, if I were to present these points, all I would get is
a bunch of defenders of the faith figuratively holding their fingers in
their ears and shouting "la la la la" at the tops of their lungs to drown me
out.

Regards,

Bruce