[From Jeff Vancouver 940718]
Well, getting to my office once a week certainly puts me behind
the times. I can only skim the posts. Several posts where
RE: Replies to Paul and Jeff, but were actually only to Paul.
Please be careful, the subject headings on one way I reduce
information overload. Incidently, Paul, glad to see a kindred
spirit on the net. Our kindred is not in our professions (I am a
psychologist), but in our message (seek similarities with others,
not differences).
Ironically, to seek that goal I am still seeking to understand
some of the differences. Tom [940711.1655] thanks for the post
regarding feedforward, it helped somewhat. But I am beginning to
worry that Locke is right, or we are arguing semantics.
You said "Carrying an umbrella when I leave the house after
hearing a weather report that predicts rain is present-time
perceptual control, not feedforward." Does it matter if the
weather report was given that morning or the night before?
Surely you are not saying the perception of impending rain,
compared to a reference signal would produce a "get umbrella"
output. Instead, you are saying the weather report triggers a
memory of the perception of walking in the rain which is compared
with a desire not to get wet to produce the output "get an
umbrella when you are going out." The use of a memory store, an
not real time perceptions is what I mean by feedforward.
Bill P. [940711.2115] says "You can't plan actions; you can only
plan the perceivable consequences of actions." and later "All
you can do is plan _goals_, and leave it up to your control
systems to bring them about in real-time perception, dealing with
the world as it actually is, in all its detail."
This is exactly what I mean by feedforward. We do not propagate
the planning too far down the hierarchy. Such detail would get
us into the trouble of over specifying a situation that is too
variable. In a private post from Charles Tucker, he seemed to be
saying that Bill P. has a precise definition for feedforward that
1) requires the propagation and 2) is therefore not relevant. He
suggests using the term planning. How does this sound?
P.S. That the plan are goals (reference signals), not actions is
often, though not always missed by cognitive psychologists.
Back to Tom. You said you would address the rest of my questions
after fixing your tux, but I never saw a followup. Did I miss
something?
Marken [940711.2200]
on the feedforward question you say:
"the actions that will compensate for disturbances cannot (and
need not) be anticipated."
I say that we (complex systems) need not, cannot completely, but
can grossly anticipate disturbances. The fundamental issue is
the role of conscious processing in humans. I am trying to say
that complex systems use anticipatory mechanisms to more
effectively maintain their essential (intrinsic) and controlled
(perceptual) variables. Further, I am saying that conscious
processes are heavily involved in that process. What role does
conscious processes have in PCT?
As I reread some of Locke and other psychologists I see the issue
of free will raised as central to their problem with PCT. They
often go too far - action is a function of conscious will. Do
you take the other extreme - action is random? Locke seems to
think you do. I think the answer is in between. Action is
indeterminable, but related to the perceptions one is
controlling. This moves the free will debate to the question of
will over perceptions controlled. I have no idea where PCT
stands here (I certainly have my own ideas).
I certainly agree with you Marken [940711.2200] "Conventional
psychology and PCT ... are talking PAST one another." You say
because they don't study control. Humor me, I say they do
sometimes study it, just not always exactly like you. I say a
difference is the emphasis on an individual's concept of their
place in the world versus the actual hierarchy. The concept is a
perverse rendition particularly because it rarely uses a PCT
image. But, psychologist, me among them, say that concept is
relevant to how they act _and_ perceive. I think some in PCT
think that as well. Again I ask, where does PCT stand on the
self-concept?
By the way, the humor in your tenure post was the vacillation on
the causes of paper acceptance. Reread it, given the right frame
of mind you too may find it funny. I do appreciate the thought,
though.
I did have a strong objection to your calling Carver & Scheier
liars. The may have been mistaken, but not intentionally so (at
least, I would give them the benefit of the doubt). Using a word
like "lying" is inappropriate. I don't buy that you are just
talking among yourselves. As Dag just noted, you have a number
of lurkers. This is a public net. Beside, _I_ expect civility.
On precision:
Your faith in the TEST is great. Yet, even Runkel said it is
hard to determine controlled perceptions during reorganization.
There may be other ways. PCTers need not pursue them, but can't
they let others without saying it is useless?
On the E.coli model:
Thanks Dag, I got the simulations. I have run most.
Unfortunately, the E.coli, where you "showed" reinforcement does
not work confirms my straw model argument. Reinforcement is
operationalized as "use the last turn that resulted in denser
foodstuffs" according to your documentation. Why not remember
the last vector. Why not remember the last set of vectors? I am
not proficient in this type of modeling, but your model does not
convince you have given reinforcement theory a fair shot. (I am
not bring it up to argue for reinforcement theory, but to note
the use straw models).
[Bill Leach 940707.23:28]
You say: "I don't think that anyone on the net has a problem with
the idea that people can control more than one operation at a
time as long as it is physically possible to do so. Though I
don't see 'an issue' here between PCT and any other 'model'."
The issue is one of cognitive resources not physical. Some
psychological models are concerned with the limitation of our
cognitive processes/attentional resources. This is why I want to
understand the role of cognitive processes in PCT. BTW, the
distinction between cognitive and conscious not always made in
these models, but I don't want to revisit that either, unless it
is relevant to the question at hand.
in conclusion:
I have printed a number of the posts between Paul and the PCTers.
I will try to read them before my next visit to my office. I
like the model. It gives a good reference for discussion. For
example, is D what psychologists try to study? Here's a juice
one, if numerous individuals F4's produce Hs that represents F in
nearly identical ways and given that F3 is constant across people
can I model (in Bandura's sense) someone's D to affect H, which I
think is affecting F? The point of the question is that many of
the components in the model can be ignored without much cost to
predictive ability. I am going out to shoot myself now 
Later
Jeff
