Free Will

CSGnet Archive CSG1997
1

[From Bruce Abbott (970130.1240 EST)]

Scott Sterling (30 Jan 1997 18:52:02) --

Scott, I wish there were many more students like you where I teach; it is
refreshing to hear from one who has been concerned about issues like this
one and thought carefully about them. However, I really must take exception
to some of your statements, as noted below.

       For the determinist, an individual becomes a relationship of
physical phenomena. If anyone is going to thoroughly adopt this view,
then why not be consistent and live according to the conclusions that are
adumbrated by the merest consideration of it? Ethics, law, family,
education, justice, and on and on will need major overhauling if
determinism is true. If you view everything the same way after you've
adopted a deterministic Weltannschaung, you are hardly accepting the
responsibility that comes with that knowledge, are you?

You seem to equate determinism with an absence of personal influence: all
acts are "caused" by something external to the individual, therefore the
individual is just a hapless vehicle through which these external causes
bring about their results. Yet PCT shows how a particular system of
interacting parts can have intentions, can will to realize certain
perceptions, and often can carry out these intentions even when opposed by
external forces. This organization is called a control system. It is the
scientific explanation of will.

Because the reference levels for these systems are internally set, the
individual can be held accountable for his or her intended acts, if they are
undertaken in full knowledge of the consequences which have been imposed by
one's moral education, family, lawmakers, or other members of society.
(Whether imposing such consequences is necessary or appropriate is another
issue.) Thus I do not see that adopting a deterministic Weltannschaung
constrains me to the conclusions you assert are "adumbrated by the merest
consideration of it." (Also, I have not the faintest idea what you mean by
"accepting the responsibility that comes with [the determinist viewpoint]."
_What_ responsibility?)

       In a discussion with my mother on this rather shocking event, my
mother expressed the typical behavioralist view that the poor kid must
have had a tough upbringing, and must have never had "the good"
reinforced in his life. I tried to explain to my mom that it was more
likely that, given this kid was originally just as healthy as the next
guy, he had adopted the widely held, popular belief system of
behaviorism and the determinism that fairly goes hand in hand with it,
at a very early age. And so even if he had seen any opportunity for a way
out of his sorry life, he would have likely doubted the efficacy of any
effort on his part to take advantage of it, what with the world being a
system of chance, authoritative control, and personal powerlessness in
the face of genes and environment.

Despite the tragic outcome you depicted, I found myself chuckling at the
idea that this poor kid shot himself to death because he had adopted
determinism as his world view. More likely he saw himself in a hopeless
position and elected to end his life rather than face the consequences he
anticipated lay before him. It was not determinism that led him to this
decision but his inability to control his current situation in a (to him)
satisfactory way _except_ by suicide. Personal powerlessness should not be
equated with determinism.

In addition, you seem to be arguing that the conventional notion about this
kid being the product of his upbringing must be wrong. That upbringing
determines, among many other things, how you will go about attempting to
control the myriad perceptions of momentary or lasting importance to you --
the options available to you and those you _perceive_ to be available. I
think it would be foolhardy to ignore the importance of experience, whether
one holds a determinist position or not.

       I think the determinist position is a knee-jerk reaction to a
fairly rudimentary understanding of the world.

How so? And how does the nondeterminist position improve on that?

I am not arguing that
free will is a fact, or that it is even a term which refers to any
reality in any dimension of the universe.

And it will probably never be possible to rule it out. However, as I noted
in an earlier post, for scientific purposes it is better to assume its
absence than the contrary. For me it is a working assumption, not a fact.

I am arguing that 1) an appeal
to complexity of relationships of physical events is not an
argument against free will or for determinism--it's a tactic that can
be used to draw a premature conclusion about whatever you want. If there
are 10 to the trillionth possible connections in the brain (including
varying synaptic strengths, or "weights"), but only 10 to the
eighty-seventh square meters in the universe, what does that prove? They
are just appeals to complexity, which could be used to push any
conclusion about consciousness, duality, freedom, or what have you.

I didn't present the complexity of relationships of physical events as an
argument against free will. In fact, such complexity probably assures that
there will be no practical way to rule nondetermined will out.

2) given the state of ignorance of the brain and the evidence of our own
subjective states (which tell us that we are conscious, free, and having
mental states that are just opaque to any present, third person
investigation--try this at home, I tried it last night, close your eyes
and picture something, anything, and be amazed that you can picture whole
landscapes, imaginary shapes, fantasies of all kinds, and then try to be
content with a closed minded view of how the brain works), it would be
most wise to turn toward the view of personal freedom and responsibility
and spread it everywhere you can, especially to young people, parents,
and teachers.

You seem to have lost your way here (the sentence is a run-on). What does
being able to fantasize have to do with determinism? I have personal
freedom (and therefore can be held responsible for my acts, if that is
deemed necessary), because I can do whatever I want (within the limits
imposed by the environment and my abilities). The next question is, _why_
do I want what I want? As a scientist, I would begin a search for the
answer by examining the physical conditions under which such a want appears.

Regards,

Bruce

2

[From Bill Powers (970131.030 MST)]

Bruce Abbott (970130.1240 EST) writing to Scott Stirling --

You seem to equate determinism with an absence of personal influence: all
acts are "caused" by something external to the individual, therefore the
individual is just a hapless vehicle through which these external causes
bring about their results. Yet PCT shows how a particular system of
interacting parts can have intentions, can will to realize certain
perceptions, and often can carry out these intentions even when opposed by
external forces. This organization is called a control system. It is the
scientific explanation of will.

I think what bothers non-determinists is not only the "external causation"
idea but the inevitability of all events. If the state of every particle in
the universe is determined by the influences of all other particles, then
the "sense of free will" is a mockery, because it, too, is simply the
consequence of all physical interactions prior to now. Even arguments in
favor of determinism are pointless, because however you argue, you could
have said nothing else -- your argument was predetermined by the Big Bang
and all the events subsequent to it, just as your being killed by a comet,
or not, was predetermined millions of years ago in the Oort cloud, which in
turn was implicit in all prior events. This makes life into a movie which,
no matter how many times you show it, must always come out the same.

You wrote your post as you did and when you did because of all the events in
your life that brought you to the point of moving your fingers in that
particular way. The _content_ of what you wrote, however seemingly original,
was predetermined; even the typos (if any) were predetermined. Your warm
acceptance of Scott Stirling means nothing, because his writings, together
with all your other experiences, made you produce those words. The words
carry nothing nonphysical from one person to another; they are simply marks
on paper or phosphor that excite the senses.

The papers you are going to write about the rat experiments are already
written, or not written as the case proves to be when the time comes. They
are already accepted or rejected. You, as the experiencer of this unfolding
series of events, can only wait to see what the future holds; you can do no
more about it than the patron in the movie theater can do about the plot
unfolding on the screen. Even if you take action in a purposive way, your
purposes and the actions they produce are already part of the script. "The
moving finger writes, and having writ/ moves on. Nor all your piety nor wit/
can call it back to cancel half a line,/ nor all your tears wash out a word
of it." If I've remembered that incorrectly, it's only because I could not,
all things considered, have written it any other way.

Even your response to these comments will be whatever it must be. All you
can do is wait to see what comes out. And I, or Scott, or someone will
respond with still further words, and on and on it will go, around and
around, as meaningless and inevitable as the circling of a dead planet
around a burned-out cinder of a star in an observerless universe.

Best (but what else could I say?),

Bill P.

3

[From Bruce Abbott (970202.1245 EST)]

Tracy Harms (1997;01,31.17:30 PST) --

I agree that Bill (and Scott Stirling and I, among others) have been doing
what you say, but I don't see it as an error. Rather, I see the error as
being in your using the word "determinism" to denote a world-view wherein
all causation is natural and amenable to explanatory inquiry. Fostering
such a world-view seems to be your goal, and I find that laudible. Indeed,
I share that view, I just don't think it should be tied to determinism.

If you can show me how such a world-view can be maintained in the absence of
determinism, I would not object to the separation.

The kind of determinism I have in mind allows quantum _in_determinism, and
quantum indeterminism precludes a clockwork Laplacian universe in which
every event from beginning to infinity was set into motion at the start.

In that case you are simply not arguing that the changes in reality are
deterministic. I can adjust my vocabulary to accept your use of the word,
of course; and at some point, to some degree, I do. But I think it
important to warn against what you are doing, for I think it misleading in
a manner which promotes avoidable errors.

Well, perhaps indeterminism is like pregnancy -- you either have it or you
don't -- but I see indeterminism at the quantum level as a rather limited
variety: events at this level often occur spontaneously (e.g., virtual
particles boiling boiling out of and disappearing into the quantum vacuum,
radioactive decay) and yet in the statistical aggregrate these events are
quite predictable as to frequency over time (e.g., decay half-lives). The
introduction of this random element precludes predestiny, yet the aggregate
behavior of matter at the level at which neurons and neurotransmitters
operate will appear to operate deterministically, Penrose not withstanding.
Unfortunately, neither "determinism" nor "indeterminism" as terms seem to
convey this viewpoint adequately. Would "limited indeterminism" do?

But perhaps I should clarify one point: I do agree that these indeterminate
quantum events can rapidly amplify to produce radical alterations in the
evolution of the universe -- what Lorenz termed the "butterfly effect."
(Note that Lorenz's (Edward, not Konrad) butterfly effect assumed a
determinate system; however, the amplification of small differences is the
critical element here.) Yet that, it seems to me, is a different issue from
the question of whether the brain can introduce its own _directed_ changes
in the evolutionary path which we denote by the term "free will."

I agree that "free will" has too often been reified in a manner which
substitutes assertion for explanation, and this courts irrationality by
insisting on acceptance of such assertion against investigation.
Indeterminist libertarianism has a task in cleaning up this historical mess
it made, but I am confident that these errors are not inherent to the basic
theoretical position.

In other words, you are confident that you can make a case for it, but
won't, at least not now.

Without preparing a rebuttal at length I will but comment that I presently
favor a view wherein the genuine fact of personal freedom (being but one of
the indeterminacies of the world as a whole) is not dependent upon
impossibility of tracing or explaining thoughts, impulses, or behaviors in
regard to their origins. If this view is correct, theories of
indeterminate freedom are *not* in a defensive posture against scientific
advances, nor does indeterminism need be suspended in order to approach
psychological problems in a scientific manner.

Does "in regard to their origins" mean _physical_ origins? Sounds
fascinating -- how about laying out the argument? I'm not wed to my current
understanding, but then again, you will have to convince me that you have a
better one.

Regards,

Bruce

4

[From Rupert Young (2013.09.14 15.00 BST)]

As mentioned previously here is a draft of an article about free will,
which is related to purposive behaviour. Any comments welcome prior to
publication.

Fyi, it is destined for an atheist website.

FreeWill.pdf (104 KB)

···

--

Regards,
Rupert

5

Hi Rupert, it seems very fair and accurate and consistent with PCT, but where is PCT in the article? At least PCT provides one of the only scientific accounts that actually utilises deterministic mechanisms to enable free will and purpose...
Hope it gets published and well read!
Warren

···

Sent from my iPhone

On 14 Sep 2013, at 15:06, Rupert Young <rupert@MOONSIT.CO.UK> wrote:

[From Rupert Young (2013.09.14 15.00 BST)]

As mentioned previously here is a draft of an article about free will, which is related to purposive behaviour. Any comments welcome prior to publication.

Fyi, it is destined for an atheist website.

--

Regards,
Rupert

<FreeWill.pdf>

6

Rupert:

I read it twice but I must confess to only marginally "getting it." I had
to go to Wikipedia to see what "determinism" and "deterministic" are as
schools of thought or metaphysical whatevers and I'm still not sure I get
it. It feels like "predestination" but I don't know if that's what you mean
or not. If it is than I agree with you that our behaviors and actions are
not predestined. I also agree with you that some kind of "deterministic" (I
prefer "reliable") universe "out there" is essential to our exercise of
control. Were we unable to count on certain things, especially the effects
of our actions, we would be very ineffective, inefficient and we probably
wouldn't last long.

It's also not clear me whether you're simply arguing against those "God made
me do it" proponents or whether you're trying to make the case for purposive
behavior. If it's the latter, I agree with Warren who earlier asked
"Where's PCT?"

Lastly, there is a typo toward the end of your paper in the paragraph
immediately above the bullet-point summary. "Has" appears where I believe
"have" should be used. But then I know you know I'm a nitpicker and you put
it there deliberately in order to make me comment about it. You manipulated
me, Rupert, you rascal you. You used that "deterministic universe" of which
I'm one small part.

Fred (the nitpicker) Nickols

From: Rupert Young [mailto:rupert@MOONSIT.CO.UK]
Sent: Saturday, September 14, 2013 10:07 AM
To: CSGNET@LISTSERV.ILLINOIS.EDU
Subject: Free Will

[From Rupert Young (2013.09.14 15.00 BST)]

As mentioned previously here is a draft of an article about free will,

which is

···

-----Original Message-----
related to purposive behaviour. Any comments welcome prior to publication.

Fyi, it is destined for an atheist website.

--

Regards,
Rupert

7

[From Rick Marken (2013.09.15.0920)]

Rupert Young (2013.09.14 15.00 BST)--

As mentioned previously here is a draft of an article about free will, which
is related to purposive behaviour. Any comments welcome prior to
publication.

RM: Thanks for this Rupert. We will definitely be talking about "free
will" eventually in the B:CP class. I didn't read your entire article,
mainly because I feel that it suffers from a problem that afflicts
other discussions that I have read of "free will" and "freedom" and
even "control". The problem is that there is no clear definition of
what these words refer to. This was true in the "Through the Wormhole"
show on "Do we have free will". It was true of a book called "The
Science of Liberty" by the excellent science writer Timothy Ferris,
who wrote the wonderful "Coming of Age in the Milky Way" but who
disappointed me with the "Liberty" book since he never defined what he
meant by the term. It is true of many popular psychology papers about
"control" (such as Langer's "The Illusion of Control") where the
authors never say what the heck control is.

So I would suggest that the first thing you should do in this paper is
define, as clearly as you can, what you are talking about; what, in
other words, do you mean by "free will". I think that will be quite a
challenging (and controversial) project in itself. But it seems to me
it's important to know what one is trying to explain (or dismiss)
before one tries to explain (or dismiss) it.

Best regards

Rick

···

Fyi, it is destined for an atheist website.

--

Regards,
Rupert

--
Richard S. Marken PhD
rsmarken@gmail.com
www.mindreadings.com

8

Thanks. Yes, you were pre-destined to tell me that, but only because
you have a goal for doing so :slight_smile:
Regards,
Rupert

···

[From Rupert Young (2013.09.15 19.00
BST)]

  On 14/09/2013 20:28, Warren Mansell wrote:

Hope it gets published and well read!

  Thanks, as I am the editor of the website I predict a high

probability that it gets published, though not sure about being
well read.

  On 15/09/2013 11:07, Fred Nickols wrote:

I read it twice but I must confess to only marginally "getting it." I had
to go to Wikipedia to see what "determinism" and "deterministic" are as
schools of thought or metaphysical whatevers and I'm still not sure I get
it. It feels like "predestination" but I don't know if that's what you mean
or not. If it is than I agree with you that our behaviors and actions are
not predestined.

  Yes, it seems that the position often given (and I am arguing

against) is that what we do is pre-determined, which is akin to
pre-destination, as an argument against freedom of the will. I am
arguing that that is not a coherent way of viewing determinism,
which, I say, is essential in terms of purposive behaviour.

    It's also not clear me whether you're simply arguing against

those “God made
me do it” proponents or whether you’re trying to make the case
for purposive
behavior. If it’s the latter, I agree with Warren who earlier
asked
“Where’s PCT?”

  The main focus is of *essentialism*      , that the deterministic

universe is necessary for achieving our goals. I could have gone
more into PCT but that would have been a much longer article, and
probably a distraction from the main point. I’ll leave that for
the book :slight_smile:

Lastly, there is a typo toward the end of your paper in the paragraph
immediately above the bullet-point summary. "Has" appears where I believe
"have" should be used. But then I know you know I'm a nitpicker and you put
it there deliberately in order to make me comment about it. You manipulated
me, Rupert, you rascal you. You used that "deterministic universe" of which
I'm one small part.
9

[From Rupert Young (2013.09.19 22.00 BST)]

Rick,

Thanks for your comments. I wanted to keep the article fairly short and informal so was reluctant to get bogged down by a definition of what is a somewhat vague term. I do state what I think is the main aspect of free will towards the end, but I take your point that it should be upfront.

To keep it brief I'd put something such as, free will, the sense that you could have chosen differently.

Do you have an alternative definition, of the common understanding of free will, that you think is suitable?

Regards,
Rupert

[From Rick Marken (2013.09.15.0920)]

Rupert Young (2013.09.14 15.00 BST)--

As mentioned previously here is a draft of an article about free will, which
is related to purposive behaviour. Any comments welcome prior to
publication.

RM: Thanks for this Rupert. We will definitely be talking about "free
will" eventually in the B:CP class. I didn't read your entire article,
mainly because I feel that it suffers from a problem that afflicts
other discussions that I have read of "free will" and "freedom" and
even "control". The problem is that there is no clear definition of
what these words refer to. This was true in the "Through the Wormhole"
show on "Do we have free will". It was true of a book called "The
Science of Liberty" by the excellent science writer Timothy Ferris,
who wrote the wonderful "Coming of Age in the Milky Way" but who
disappointed me with the "Liberty" book since he never defined what he
meant by the term. It is true of many popular psychology papers about
"control" (such as Langer's "The Illusion of Control") where the
authors never say what the heck control is.

So I would suggest that the first thing you should do in this paper is
define, as clearly as you can, what you are talking about; what, in
other words, do you mean by "free will". I think that will be quite a
challenging (and controversial) project in itself. But it seems to me
it's important to know what one is trying to explain (or dismiss)
before one tries to explain (or dismiss) it.

Best regards

Rick

···

On 15/09/2013 17:20, Richard Marken wrote:

Fyi, it is destined for an atheist website.

--

Regards,
Rupert