[From Bill Powers (2006.08.20.0500 MDT)]
Richard Kennaway (2006.08.18.1603 BST) –
I’m looking at Friedman’s Chapter 42 now, and have encountered something
I don’t understand. Consider this passage:
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Consider a court awarding damages. If we really
know nothing at all about other people’s utility, how can a court decide
how much someone owes me for breaking my arm? For all the judge knows, I
enjoyed having my arm broken. Assuming that I disliked it, he has no way
of knowing whether my disutility for a broken arm is measured by a penny
or a billion dollars.
We give presents and award damages, and we do not believe
that other people’s utility is entirely unobservable. What we do believe,
or at least what many of us believe, is that each of us knows more about
his own values than most other people do, and that people are therefore
usually better off deciding what they want for themselves. That is one of
the main arguments in favor of a free society. It is a long step from
that to the claim that we know nothing at all about other people’s
values.
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What is he doing? Taking a poll about what “we” believe? Is
this a method of arriving at a conclusion about knowing other people’s
values? He seems to be saying that because we behave as if we know other
people’s values, and believe that we do, we actually do know them. What
kind of argument is this? Is it valid? I don’t see how it can
be.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Richard Kennaway (2006.08.23.0815 BST)]
[From Bill Powers (2006.08.20.0500 MDT)]
Richard Kennaway (2006.08.18.1603 BST) --
I'm looking at Friedman's Chapter 42 now, and have encountered something I don't understand. Consider this passage:
======================================================================
Consider a court awarding damages. If we really know nothing at all about other people's utility, how can a court decide how much someone owes me for breaking my arm? For all the judge knows, I enjoyed having my arm broken. Assuming that I disliked it, he has no way of knowing whether my disutility for a broken arm is measured by a penny or a billion dollars.
We give presents and award damages, and we do not believe that other people's utility is entirely unobservable. What we do believe, or at least what many of us believe, is that each of us knows more about his own values than most other people do, and that people are therefore usually better off deciding what they want for themselves. That is one of the main arguments in favor of a free society. It is a long step from that to the claim that we know nothing at all about other people's values.
What is he doing? Taking a poll about what "we" believe? Is this a method of arriving at a conclusion about knowing other people's values? He seems to be saying that because we behave as if we know other people's values, and believe that we do, we actually do know them. What kind of argument is this? Is it valid? I don't see how it can be.
He is observing what people believe, and do, and drawing practical conclusions about them that are sufficient for his main purpose: in this case, the conclusion that we are not entirely ignorant of other people's values, but that we know our own much better.
I think the most interesting thing that might come out of contemplating Friedman's oeuvre on economics and law is seeing what happens when his foundation of people with indifference curves is replaced by people consisting of control systems, and modelling the results.
-- Richard
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Richard Kennaway, jrk@cmp.uea.ac.uk, Richard Kennaway
School of Computing Sciences,
University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.