From model to practice

CSGnet Archive CSG1999
1

[From Bruce Abbott (991211.1430 EST)]

Rick Marken (991210.1940) --

The point of the exercise was to show what _could_ happen (and,
indeed, is very likely to happen) if a child actually managed to
commititself to controlling a perception at some reference level
selected by some outside agent.

I agree that the exercise shows what happens to a fixed hierarchical system
when a lower-level system's reference level is fixed, but as I have already
noted, the actual system supposedly being modeled here has the ability to
adapt to such conditions, whereas your spreadsheet model does not, and this
makes all the difference.

On what basis you make the assertion that what you say _could_ happen (given
your model) is "very likely to happen" in an actual child? You provide no
argument to support that assertion.

Commiting to keep a perception
at some level may seem like a good idea to the agent but it may
end up being a very poor idea for the hierarchical control
system (child) who commits to it. Getting a child to commit
to control some perception -- for reasons other than those of
the child itself-- can wreck the child's ability to control (if
the child is a hierarchical input control system).

This sounds more to me like you have a prior belief and are simply looking
for a way to justify it in terms of HPCT. It certainly isn't an implication
of HPCT itself, as I have shown. Furthermore, if you get down to specific
examples, one can easily see that your fears for the child's ability to
control are not likely to be realized in the RTP situation we have been
discussing. Do you really believe that the child is going to be in serious
danger of losing control over variables important to its well-being, merely
by agreeing not to be disruptive in the classroom? Millions of children are
able to follow rules like this every day, without serious difficulties
arising as a result.

If, as you keep insisting, an implication of HPCT is that such an agreement
will "wreck the child's ability to control," then clearly there is something
seriously wrong with HPCT, because such problems rarely arise in real life.
People -- even children -- are able to adapt to many social rules that
restrict the means used to control certain perceptions or set boundaries on
the values those perceptions are allowed to take. The problem, of course,
is really not with HPCT as a general theory but with the overly simple model
on which you base your conclusions.

Regards,

Bruce A.

2

[From Rick Marken (991211.1840)]

Bruce Abbott (991211.1430 EST)--

I agree that the exercise shows what happens to a fixed
hierarchical system when a lower-level system's reference
level is fixed, but as I have already noted, the actual
system supposedly being modeled here has the ability to
adapt to such conditions, whereas your spreadsheet model
does not, and this makes all the difference.

Why would you want to force a system to go through a
reorganization process like this?

Me:

Commiting to keep a perception at some level may seem like
a good idea to the agent but it may end up being a very poor
idea for the hierarchical control system (child) who commits
to it.

Bruce:

This sounds more to me like you have a prior belief and
are simply looking for a way to justify it in terms of HPCT.
It certainly isn't an implication of HPCT itself, as I have
shown.

I've shown that forcing a hierarchical control system to control
a particular perception at some particular reference level can
destroy the system's ability to control other variables. You
have said (not shown) that a system can reorganize out of
this situation. I'm accepting your claim but, again, why put
someone through this? It's like asking Glenn Gould to control
for keeping his nose farther from the keyboard because you think
that variable should be controlled at that reference. If you were
able to get Glenn to commit to controlling this perception, his
playing would probably have deteriorated considerably. You are
saying that reorganization would have brought his playing back to
its previous stupendous level. I doubt it. But assuming
reorganization would do this, why put a person through it?

Do you really believe that the child is going to be in serious
danger of losing control over variables important to its
well-being, merely by agreeing not to be disruptive in the
classroom?

Yes. I think it's very possible. If the agreement is forced.

If, as you keep insisting, an implication of HPCT is that such
an agreement will "wreck the child's ability to control," then
clearly there is something seriously wrong with HPCT, because
such problems rarely arise in real life.

Kids have ways of getting around these "agreements" if they need
to. Anyway, I said the problems would result if kids actually
could be forced to make a commitment to control a perception
at a particular level.

The problem, of course, is really not with HPCT as a general
theory but with the overly simple model on which you base
your conclusions.

Then I presume that your more sophisicated model leads you to
the conclusion that it's a good idea to get children to make
commitments. Could you explain why your model leads to that
conclusion?

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

3

[From Bruce Abbott (991212.0930 EST)]

Rick Marken (991211.1840) --

Bruce Abbott (991211.1430 EST)

I agree that the exercise shows what happens to a fixed
hierarchical system when a lower-level system's reference
level is fixed, but as I have already noted, the actual
system supposedly being modeled here has the ability to
adapt to such conditions, whereas your spreadsheet model
does not, and this makes all the difference.

Why would you want to force a system to go through a
reorganization process like this?

Bruce Nevin has already done an excellent job of explaining this to you, if
you would care to listen. The child's current organization gets him or her
into trouble in the classroom. The objective of the program is to help the
child to reorganize in ways that allow the child to continue to control
those perceptions important to it while respecting the rights of others and
thereby avoiding serious conflict. The result should be a child who is able
to function successfully within the school, learn better, and feel happier.
Why _wouldn't_ you want to guide (not "force") the child through a
reorganization process like this?

Do you really believe that the child is going to be in serious
danger of losing control over variables important to its
well-being, merely by agreeing not to be disruptive in the
classroom?

Yes. I think it's very possible. If the agreement is forced.

As I recall, there has been considerable discussion of the fact that in the
RTP, much time is spent helping the child to see that such an agreement (to
commit to the RTP process) is fair and in his or her own best interests, not
to mention the interests of others in the class. My own view, however, is
that even if the agreement were "forced," the child would begin to perceive
the benefits of compliance after a bit of experience with the procedures,
and would thereafter comply voluntarilly. (That's a matter requiring
evidence to decide, however.)

I've shown that forcing a hierarchical control system to control
a particular perception at some particular reference level can
destroy the system's ability to control other variables. You
have said (not shown) that a system can reorganize out of
this situation. I'm accepting your claim but, again, why put
someone through this? It's like asking Glenn Gould to control
for keeping his nose farther from the keyboard because you think
that variable should be controlled at that reference. If you were
able to get Glenn to commit to controlling this perception, his
playing would probably have deteriorated considerably. You are
saying that reorganization would have brought his playing back to
its previous stupendous level. I doubt it. But assuming
reorganization would do this, why put a person through it?

Your example is an extreme one that is unlike what the child in the RTP is
asked to do. I could come up with even more extreme examples -- say we
asked Glenn Gould to control for not breathing. Neither of these examples
involves a _reasonable_ request, and in both cases there are no alternative
means available for maintaining the necessary level of control over the
affected variable (playing superbly or keeping the blood oxygenated). In
contrast, the child in the RTP has many avenues through which to continue to
control those variables whose control formerly (prior to the agreement)
resulted in disruption of the classroom.

If, as you keep insisting, an implication of HPCT is that such
an agreement will "wreck the child's ability to control," then
clearly there is something seriously wrong with HPCT, because
such problems rarely arise in real life.

Kids have ways of getting around these "agreements" if they need
to. Anyway, I said the problems would result if kids actually
could be forced to make a commitment to control a perception
at a particular level.

I don't see that it would matter to your analysis whether they were forced
or adopted the commitment voluntarily. Were in your model does that
parameter enter in?

The problem, of course, is really not with HPCT as a general
theory but with the overly simple model on which you base
your conclusions.

Then I presume that your more sophisicated model leads you to
the conclusion that it's a good idea to get children to make
commitments. Could you explain why your model leads to that
conclusion?

Nobody is claiming that any and all commitments are necessarily good -- for
anyone. What we've been discussing are commitments that are fair and
reasonable, even from the child's point of view. Under the RTP system, the
child agrees to abide by the rules, and benefits from doing so, most
directly from the elimination of serious conflict with other autonomous
control systems.

Regards,

Bruce A.

4

[From Bill Powers (991212.0853 MDT)]

Bruce Abbott (991212.0930 EST)--

Nobody is claiming that any and all commitments are necessarily good -- for
anyone. What we've been discussing are commitments that are fair and
reasonable, even from the child's point of view. Under the RTP system, the
child agrees to abide by the rules, and benefits from doing so, most
directly from the elimination of serious conflict with other autonomous
control systems.

We are growing closer to agreement. I would say not "even" from the child's
point of view, but "above all" from the child's point of view. The child is
simply not going to adopt a structure of goals that causes error in the
child's own highest control systems -- not for long. You can force
_apparent_ compliance and cooperation, but to make it real the child must
feel that this kind of behavior -- whatever the adult is demanding -- is
satisfying in all ways, at all levels.

I think the crux of this argument is whether we should try to get the child
to produce behavior acceptable to others or to seek goals acceptable to the
child as well as others. Do we want to teach control of actions, or of
results? PCT says there's no point in controlling actions, because if those
actions are the means for controlling higher variables, they must remain
free to vary to counteract disturbances. Of course we recognize that
varying actions entails varying reference signals defining those actions as
the consequences of still more detailed levels of action, but perhaps the
argument makes more sense when said this way. If you have a preferred way
of holding your right arm, it's going to be hard to put on a shirt (though,
as Martin suggests, you will probably manage, however awkwardly).

The problem with terms like "fair" and "reasonable" is that they appeal to
a nonexistent universal standard. If the child does not consider a rule to
be fair and reasonable, you will be wasting your breath if you insist that
it is. Even if you can get a child to agree that a rule is fair and
reasonable in principle, the child will simply be unable to live up to it
if doing so causes some large error in the child. Are we going to accuse
children of willful disobedience for being in severe internal conflict? Or
are we going to help them figure out what will _really_ get them what they
_really_ want?

I think we simply have to discard all our old ways of thinking of children
and their place and role in society. There is no natural law that says
children must obey an adult or be quiet while an adult is talking. There is
no natural law that says they must go to school, or eat at particular times
of day, or go to bed when it gets dark, or do any of the myriad other
things adults think they have to make children do. The natural laws that do
exist, however, say that children are small, and weak, and ignorant, and
eager to learn, and curious about how the world works, and unsure of their
own goals, and needful of adult help, friendship, and reassurance. The
natural laws that do exist say that children must learn how to control what
happens to them in many ways and at many levels, and that they need to see
how adults do it so they can understand how the world works and work it
themselves. I think these real natural laws are a sufficient basis for
working out how to help children grow up to be confident, happy, and
competent adults. And wouldn't it be a wonderful world if the people in it
were actually confident, happy, and competent, instead of what most of them
actually are?

Best,

Bill P.

5

[From Rick Marken (991212.1812)]

Bruce Abbott (991212.0930 EST) --

Congratulations. I think you have found a beautiful new velvet
glove to conceal the iron fist of behavior modification. It's
called "reorganization". No one will ever notice that you care not
a whit about the child's own structure of wants. And those who
disagree with you will appear to be advocates of disruption and
chaos.

The objective of the program is to help the child to reorganize
in ways that allow the child to continue to control those
perceptions important to it while respecting the rights of
others and thereby avoiding serious conflict.

Yes. What could be nicer? We force a child to commit to making
no disruptions for the child's own sake. Anyone who points out
that forcing this commitment ignores the child's own structure
of wants is obviously an advocate of classroom mayhem.

Why _wouldn't_ you want to guide (not "force") the child
through a reorganization process like this?

Why, indeed? In my case, it's because I believe it's better
for a child to make such a commitent for his or her own reasons
(see Bill Powers (991212.0809 MDT)).

My own view, however, is that even if the agreement were
"forced," the child would begin to perceive the benefits of
compliance after a bit of experience with the procedures,
and would thereafter comply voluntarilly.

Of course this is your view. It's reinforcement theory.
Beneficial consequences (rewards, reinforcements) will
stengthen the child's commitment. But in PCT, the result of
reorganization is not predictable. As Bill Powers (991212.0746 MDT)
notes "That reorganization could include getting rid of you".

Your example is an extreme one that is unlike what the child
in the RTP is asked to do.

Exactly _what_ you require the child to do is beside the point;
what you require may seem obviously reasonable (like not disrupting)
or unreasonable (like keeping the nose a certain distance from
the keyboard). The point is that your concern is with what
_you_ want (a nondisruptive child, Gould's nose a certain
distance from the keyboard), not what the child wants.

I don't see that it would matter to your analysis whether they
were forced or adopted the commitment voluntarily.

That's correct. Forced or voluntary, a person cannot commit to
an arbitrarily selected reference state for a perception (look
at how hard it is for you to commit to a diet). If you want a
person to control a particular perception at a particular level
you have to let the person figure out how to fit that into his/her
existing hierarchy of goals. This is almost certainly what happens
in the RTC room in successful RTP programs. A good RTC teacher
knows how to work with the kids to help them "go up a level"
and see what higher level perception they could control by not
disrupting in class. Fred Nickols (991211.1035 EST) describes
the process nicely (I've edited Fred's comment to make it a
statement rather than a question):

if the reference levels for the perceptions to be controlled are
negotiated, discussed and adopted in an atmosphere of fairness
and understanding, especially an appreciation of the person's
limitations, stages of development and competencies ...the
adoption of externally-posed reference levels [don't] wreak the
same kind of havoc

Bruce A.:

What we've been discussing are commitments that are fair and
reasonable, even from the child's point of view.

How are you determining that these commitments are fair and
reasonable from the child's point of view? I know that this
is actually done in successful RTP programs; but the program
you are describing doesn't take the kids wants into consideration
at all. You are apparently willing to force the kid to make a
commitment not to disrupt and rely on reorganization to iron
things out. I think you are describing the way most schools
are currently run (but you are using PCT terminology). I
don't think it works. A reorganizing kid is a violent kid.
There is apparently plenty of reorganizing going on in
conventional schools.

Bruce Abbott (991212.1215 EST)

The child, having the best intensions to keep the commitment,
may have temporarily forgotten it in the heat of the moment.

So I presume that you are an advocate of posting the Ten
Commandments (or whatever your favorite set of moral
commitments may be) in the schools? Since it's so easy to
forget those commitments in the heat of moment, it must be
good to have them around all the time as a reminder.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/

6

[From Rick Marken (991213.0740)]

Me to Bruce Abbott (991212.0930 EST) --

Congratulations. I think you have found a beautiful new velvet
glove to conceal the iron fist of behavior modification. It's
called "reorganization". No one will ever notice that you care not
a whit about the child's own structure of wants. And those who
disagree with you will appear to be advocates of disruption and
chaos.

Bruce Gregory (991213.0654 EST)]

Damn, Bruce. Rick's on to us. Time to switch to Plan B......

What would really be nice would be if you and Bruce A. and
the other behavior modifiers got on to __yourselves_ and
switched to plan PCT.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates mailto: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

7

[From Bruce Gregory (991213.0654 EST)]

Rick Marken (991212.1812)

Bruce Abbott (991212.0930 EST) --

Congratulations. I think you have found a beautiful new velvet
glove to conceal the iron fist of behavior modification. It's
called "reorganization". No one will ever notice that you care not
a whit about the child's own structure of wants. And those who
disagree with you will appear to be advocates of disruption and
chaos.

Damn, Bruce. Rick's on to us. Time to switch to Plan B......

Bruce Gregory

8

[From Rick Marken (991213.1420)]

Me:

Congratulations. I think you have found a beautiful new velvet
glove to conceal the iron fist of behavior modification. It's
called "reorganization".

Bruce Abbott (991213.1455 EST)--

You've lost me there. Perhaps you would care to elaborate.
Is there an argument here somewhere?

I was just pointing out the implications of things you've
said, such as:

My own view, however, is that even if the agreement were
"forced," the child would begin to perceive the benefits of
compliance after a bit of experience with the procedures,
and would thereafter comply voluntarilly.

Bruce:

For the record, it is simply not true that I "care not a
whit about the child's structure of wants."

I'm sure that's true of you personally. It's just not part
of your program for dealing with kids. I'm sure you are a
perfectly decent fellow. But, remember, even B. F. Skinner
was a perfectly decent parent; it was just his ideas about
parenting that were so ignorant and cruel.

Those of us who have taken the "other side" of this argument
have never suggested that the "child's own structure of wants"
is irrelevant.

True. But you've never said _why_ it matters. Or how taking it
into account influences how you go about dealing with kids.
All you do is say "I respect the kids" or "I get the child to
agree to the rules". It sounds great but you never explain
how you respect the kids or how you get them to agree to the
rules while taking their existing structure of wants into
account. You never even suggest trying to find out what that
structure of wants might be.

You also continue to ignore the fact that the child has other
means to control perceptions important to it, which can still be
exercised while refraining from doing those things that will create
a classroom disruption.

The spreadsheet demo shows why this point is incorrect. You simply
have no way of knowing that the child has "other means to control
perceptions important to it" unless you know the child's entire
structure of wants.

This "degrees of freedom" argument of yours is just a bogus way
for you to justify forcing the kid to do what you know is right.
For example, it may seem to you that a child can do X, Y or Z
instead of disrupting to get what it wants. Little do you know,
however, that the child is disrupting because a bully has told
him "disrupt this class or I beat up your sister; tell and
you are toast". The child is disrupting to control a perception
of his and his sister's physical safety. When you force the kid
to commit to X, Y or Z you have just gotten his sister beaten up;
if he tells you why he can't do X, Y or Z he has probably gotten
himself beaten up. This is an extreme example but I _hope_
you get the point.

Even if the child does have other means of controlling
perceptions important to it, you have no way of knowing in advance
whether any of those means will be any more acceptable to you
than was disrupting. You are looking at the situation from a
completely behavioral (ie. self-centered) perspective. I'm
surprised that the RTP people listening in have not jumped in
to point this out to you.

Me:

I believe it's better for a child to make such a commitent
for his or her own reasons (see Bill Powers (991212.0809 MDT)).

Bruce A.

Believe it or not, Rick, those of us on this side of the
argument believe the same thing, and said so long before
Bill did.

It would have been easier for me to see this if you had spent
less time explaining how you "give kids a choice" and more
time explaining how you allow kids to make whatever commitments
they want to make for their own reasons.

Whether the _child_ (or pianist) perceives the request as
reasonable or not is what is important here.

Not true. Doesn't a diet sound like a reasonable idea? As Mae
West might say, "Reason (like goodness) has nothing to do
with it". You can't keep commitments, reasonable or unreasonable,
if doing so conflicts with your existing structure of wants.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates mailto: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken

9

[From Bruce Abbott (991213.1455 EST)]

Rick Marken (991212.1812) --

Bruce Abbott (991212.0930 EST)

Congratulations. I think you have found a beautiful new velvet
glove to conceal the iron fist of behavior modification. It's
called "reorganization".

You've lost me there. Perhaps you would care to elaborate. Is there an
argument here somewhere?

No one will ever notice that you care not
a whit about the child's own structure of wants. And those who
disagree with you will appear to be advocates of disruption and
chaos.

For the record, it is simply not true that I "care not a whit about the
child's structure of wants." You have been doing a lousy job of reading my
mind for years, and this is just one more example.

Those of us who have taken the "other side" of this argument have never
suggested that the "child's own structure of wants" is irrelevant. The
argument has been that the child can adapt to the rules if the child
perceives them as fair and reasonable, and fairly and reasonably applied.
Bruce Nevin has pointed out that children do this sort of thing all the
time, as when conforming to the rules of "playing tag." Given this, it
would seem that the evidence is against your conclusion, supposedly derived
from HPCT, that imposing restrictions on behavior necessarily leads to
conflict and dissention.

No one has suggested that you are an advocate of disruption and chaos,
either. Is that how you think you appear?

The objective of the program is to help the child to reorganize
in ways that allow the child to continue to control those
perceptions important to it while respecting the rights of
others and thereby avoiding serious conflict.

Yes. What could be nicer? We force a child to commit to making
no disruptions for the child's own sake. Anyone who points out
that forcing this commitment ignores the child's own structure
of wants is obviously an advocate of classroom mayhem.

You continue to ignore the one-on-one interaction between child and adults
that goes on in the RT program. It is designed so that the child can see
for himself or herself why accepting the rules and procedures of RTP is a
good thing for everyone. As Bruce Neven points out, the child still has
other alternatives, such as attending another school.

You also continue to ignore the fact that the child has other means to
control perceptions important to it, which can still be exercised while
refraining from doing those things that will create a classroom disruption.
For this reason the dire consequences you envision for this rather minor
restriction on the child's freedom simply do not materialize.

Why _wouldn't_ you want to guide (not "force") the child
through a reorganization process like this?

Why, indeed? In my case, it's because I believe it's better
for a child to make such a commitent for his or her own reasons
(see Bill Powers (991212.0809 MDT)).

Believe it or not, Rick, those of us on this side of the argument believe
the same thing, and said so long before Bill did. Evidently neither of you
were paying attention, because you now appear to believe that this is some
sort of counterargument to our position.

My own view, however, is that even if the agreement were
"forced," the child would begin to perceive the benefits of
compliance after a bit of experience with the procedures,
and would thereafter comply voluntarilly.

Of course this is your view. It's reinforcement theory.
Beneficial consequences (rewards, reinforcements) will
stengthen the child's commitment. But in PCT, the result of
reorganization is not predictable. As Bill Powers (991212.0746 MDT)
notes "That reorganization could include getting rid of you".

It's not reinforcement theory, it's control theory. If it's good (from the
child's viewpoint), and there are no conflicting reasons against it, the
child is going to control for it.

Your example is an extreme one that is unlike what the child
in the RTP is asked to do.

Exactly _what_ you require the child to do is beside the point;
what you require may seem obviously reasonable (like not disrupting)
or unreasonable (like keeping the nose a certain distance from
the keyboard). The point is that your concern is with what
_you_ want (a nondisruptive child, Gould's nose a certain
distance from the keyboard), not what the child wants.

Whether the _child_ (or pianist) perceives the request as reasonable or not
is what is important here. The best that the teacher can do is to lay out
the case and hope that the child is pursuaded.

When we begin to discuss what is good for the child, we enter dangerous
ground, because different people will reach different conclusions. A major
problem is that the child, being immature and inexperienced, often does not
know what is good (or bad) for it, and is likely to do things that are not
in its own best interests. Those who presumably have a more mature
perspective (parents, teachers, etc.) are charged with providing the proper
guidance, both for the child's own good and for the good of society.
Sometimes this means that what the child wants cannot be what the child
gets, and that what the child gets may not be what it currently wants. (She
may thank you later.)

I don't see that it would matter to your analysis whether they
were forced or adopted the commitment voluntarily.

That's correct. Forced or voluntary, a person cannot commit to
an arbitrarily selected reference state for a perception (look
at how hard it is for you to commit to a diet). If you want a
person to control a particular perception at a particular level
you have to let the person figure out how to fit that into his/her
existing hierarchy of goals. This is almost certainly what happens
in the RTC room in successful RTP programs. A good RTC teacher
knows how to work with the kids to help them "go up a level"
and see what higher level perception they could control by not
disrupting in class. Fred Nickols (991211.1035 EST) describes
the process nicely (I've edited Fred's comment to make it a
statement rather than a question):

if the reference levels for the perceptions to be controlled are
negotiated, discussed and adopted in an atmosphere of fairness
and understanding, especially an appreciation of the person's
limitations, stages of development and competencies ...the
adoption of externally-posed reference levels [don't] wreak the
same kind of havoc

Bruce Nevin and I and others have been talking about the importance of
negotiation from the start of this conversation. Now that you realize that
it can be characterized as "going up a level," suddenly it becomes important
to you. (You ignored it prior to this.) You now state our point of view as
if it were against our point of view, when all you are really doing is
agreeing with us.

By the way, please explain how "going up a level" does this. As far as I
can tell, it's not part of HPCT.

Bruce A.:

What we've been discussing are commitments that are fair and
reasonable, even from the child's point of view.

How are you determining that these commitments are fair and
reasonable from the child's point of view?

This assessment takes place, if I understand correctly, in conversations
with the child about the procedures and their reasons for being.

I know that this
is actually done in successful RTP programs; but the program
you are describing doesn't take the kids wants into consideration
at all. You are apparently willing to force the kid to make a
commitment not to disrupt and rely on reorganization to iron
things out.

That's not what I've been advocating at all.

I think you are describing the way most schools
are currently run (but you are using PCT terminology). I
don't think it works. A reorganizing kid is a violent kid.

Oh? This view predicts that there will always be _incredible_ violence in
evidence during piano lessions, basketball practice, and video-game
sessions, because of the reorganizing going on. As this does not seem
generally to be the case, your assertion is disproven.

There is apparently plenty of reorganizing going on in
conventional schools.

I would hope so! (Isn't that what schools are _for_?)

First of all, conventional schools are generally not as violent as you would
have us believe. Most kids get along fine with their teachers and with most
of their schoolmates. A tiny minority is responsible for the violence we
all hear about. Second, I wouldn't attribute what violence does occur to
reorganization, but to the existence of well-developed control systems whose
means of control involve violence against property, other students,
teachers, and administrators.

Bruce Abbott (991212.1215 EST)

The child, having the best intensions to keep the commitment,
may have temporarily forgotten it in the heat of the moment.

So I presume that you are an advocate of posting the Ten
Commandments (or whatever your favorite set of moral
commitments may be) in the schools? Since it's so easy to
forget those commitments in the heat of moment, it must be
good to have them around all the time as a reminder.

It's easy for a child to forget a commitment in the early stages of
practicing it, when the child has not yet developed a reliable control
system for keeping it. Later it becomes habitual, and no further reminders
are necessary. And no, I am not an advocate of posting the Ten Commandments
or any other "set of moral commitments").

Regards,

Bruce A.

10

[From Bruce Gregory (991213.1730 EST)]

Rick Marken (991213.1420)

You can't keep commitments, reasonable or unreasonable,
if doing so conflicts with your existing structure of wants.

Speak for yourself. (And Bill, of course.)

Bruce Gregory

11

[From Bruce Abbott (991213.2155 EST)]

Rick Marken (991213.1420) --

I'm short on time at the moment, but I need to comment on these:

I'm sure that's true of you personally. It's just not part
of your program for dealing with kids.

That last statement is an unfair characterization of what I have said.
Apparently you prefer polemical tactics over a fair and honest discussion.
I did say that forcing the child to "go along with the program" might work
anyway, because the child would then learn through experience about the
benefits it receives from the program. I did not say that I advocated this
approach, and made it clear that discussion and negotiation (within limits)
are what I do advocate. Thus, to say that "it's just not part of [my]
program" is outright false.

I'm sure you are a
perfectly decent fellow. But, remember, even B. F. Skinner
was a perfectly decent parent; it was just his ideas about
parenting that were so ignorant and cruel.

Since you seem to think that you are such an expert on B. F. Skinner,
perhaps you can find something written by B. F. Skinner that supports your
assertion that "his ideas about parenting . . . were so ignorant and cruel."

What were his ideas about parenting, and where did you read about them?
I've read quite a bit of Skinner's work, and I can't recall him stating
_any_ ideas about parenting that could be characterized as "ignorant and
cruel." But I'm willing to admit that I could have missed it. So please,
don't leave me in ignorance. Show me the evidence in Skinner's writing to
back up this astonishing (not to mention libelous) assertion.

Regards,

Bruce A.