FW: CEV and RREV (was Re: Doing Research on Purpose...)

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2019-04-26_06:43:39 UTC]

Bill,

yes, seems a pretty good agreement.

Actually, I really liked Martin’s choice of “diligent gnomes” for one main reason.
The ridiculousness of the options does, I think, a wonderful job of emphasizing the truth that irrespective of what we believe we can not actually
know what is generating our inputs to our sensors.

Me too!

Taking things to the extremes of epistemology, no we don’t know that there is any sort of actual
things in the environment outside of us. Indeed, we don’t know that we even exist in a bodily form!

Yes, we could exist as characters in the stories the gnomes tell to each other.

But back to a more practical approach.
The assertion that there is an RREV—a reference set, somehow—for a particular world view that says that what we perceive, in general, exists in the “real world” (which the world view also assumes to exist) as we
perceive them, I think, is a given.

If that is true (and I do believe that it is) then yes, the RREV exists independently in the environment. However, all perceptions of the same, and all conclusions about the RREV are still produced
wholly within a person. So they are perceptions and like all perceptions may or may not be a completely correct representation of what the RREV actually is.

Agree, except I think we may never know how completely correct representations we have of what RREV actually IS.

Your example of the map points out part, I think, of the problem with this whole idea that the RREV is important enough to be
included within PCT.

Suppose the map provided no terrain information (a common situation for most maps since the maps that use color for terrain do not provide enough information to use) however travel was always successful
using the map.

Not sure I follow here. The goodness of the map and the sufficiency of its information depends on its use. If you use it to navigate from one place to another (using a flying vehicle), you may not necessarily need any details about the
quality of the terrain.

First, the user and observer would, of course, conclude the map was an accurate tool.
Another observer, say viewing a actual trip visually from a distance, would come to the same conclusion but might notice something like the vehicle used, maintained a consistent ground clearance, and thus supplied the correction
for lack of “Y” dimension information.

This distant observer would have generally the same conclusion about the value of the map but only because this same observer had a perceptual input (data) that those aboard the vehicle did not have
(or at least consider). So distant observer’s conclusion would include the additional ideas concerning terrain.

My point here is that it is ALL perception.

Yes, my point was just to show by that example that if you have a map (as a perception of the terrain) you can use it for navigating in the terrain (as an RREV of which you may have no other perceptions in addition to that map) if there
is some correspondence between the terrain and the map i.e. between the perception and the RREV.

image002113.png

···

Here is where I say something that might result in others objecting to what I’m going to say…

Using an RREV either as a concept or in a specific instance of behavior (control of perception), is dangerous as it points toward a stimulus-response sort of approach
to a person not grounded in the implications of PCT.

I can’t see here any special danger. People believing or not in S-R do not change this way of thinking of them because of speculations about Real Reality. But if you try tell them that there does not exist any structures in the external
reality which mediate our output to our input they will regard our PCT even more incredible than they would else do.

Where I can see a possible value to the concept is in working with the higher levels of the control system hierarchy.
Areas where we currently have no hard research data and very sketchy ideas of how they function.

Good! I forgot this: understanding of evolution, social systems and hierarchically higher perceptions require the concept of RREV.

The difficulty, especially at this point in the development of the theory, is great.
The RREV focus would be on what perceptions can be detected from the particular RREV. What perceptions (if any) might be missed or incorrectly perceived by a subject. And how those perceptions present disturbances to achieving
control (or even prevent successful control).

From there, drawing in the possible “world view” perceptions one might begin to understand how and why various perceptual reference are altered to achieve purposeful behavior.

Even the William James famous example of the iron filings-magnet-paper, and Romeo-Juliet suggest that analysis of the ‘real world’ situation is essential for successful control.

For me, just that is the basis of the usefulness of that term and concept. It cannot be used in calculations, we get no data from RREVs but only from perceptions but with it we can better detail our assumptions
and understandings about what is happening especially in complex control situations like for example in evolutionary development and social systems.

Actually I agree with the above paragraph even though I think my conclusions differ. For the RREV to be useful, then the perceptions of the RREV
must provide data. Not necessarily calculation data but repeatable results.

Where you say “…but only from perceptions but with it…” is, I think, correct.

Here I must again stress that we get data only via perceptions. The RREV as an object of perceptions does not offer any data of itself past our perceptions. In a same way that we can say that our perceptions are perceptions about the RREV
we can sau that our data is about the RREV but that is dangerous. Data is always only recorded perceptions.

It is important to remember that everything we ‘know’ about the nature of an RREV is physics (or maybe meta-physics) based.

Thus, if you are studying how the feedback path influences the change(s) that will be perceived, and the RREV is understood to be the sum total of our physics conception (perception) of what we think
is actually present in the environment, I see it as potentially useful.

I further suggest that RREV is in the realm of physics and not behavioral science, thus not something to be included explicitly in PCT. It certainly can be thought to be included implicitly as is physics
itself.

I partially agree. Two notes:

  1. The knowledge of physics is as much based on perceptions as any other knowledge (and thus it can also be depending on the diligence of the gnomes).

  2. I refer to my favorite meta-physician John Heil who says that the (fundamental) physics has a special duty to (try to) tell the deep story about the reality but that does not mean that the stories of other sciences were less true (and reducible
    to the stories of the physics).

PCT does not need to study the structures of RREV, it is not its duty. Neither needs it to study the structures of nerve cells and other structures of the interior of the organism. It has its own place in the division of the labor of the
sciences, but it can and must (critically) utilize the stories of other sciences.

Eetu

bill

Eetu

bill

On 4/23/19 5:22 AM, Eetu Pikkarainen (eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2019-04-23_06:07:51 UTC]

[Rick Marken 2019-04-17_14:36:15]

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2019-04-17_08:22:20 UTC]

EP: RREV is a so called theoretical concept, about which you cannot get any data. So in practice you may never need it yourself. The duty of the theoretical concepts is to help to explain some data, for example the
phenomenon that two observers get similar perceptions can be explained so that a) their perceptual functions are similar AND b) their perceptions are caused by same RREV. (Note that (a) can be explained with (b).)

RM: But the concept of an RREV seems inconsistent with two easily made observations.
One is that the same reality can result in two different perceptions. Here’s the famous wife-mother-in-law illusion where the same physical reality produces two different perceptions – in the same person or in two different people. So is the RREV the
wife or the mother in law?

No, neither, but the RREV is that something which I would call “picture� or “object of perception� which makes it possible and very probable that creatures with similar visual perceptual functions
and contextual knowledge as us will see either the wife or the mother in law, but not a tree, a car, an elephant or something else. It could very well be Adelbert’s office like Martin suggests, but I like somewhat simpler speculations
:wink:

Another, even worse, problem is the fact that different realities can result in the same perception.
This happens in color perception where the same color can be produced by different combinations of wavelengths; add in context effects and the number of different realities that will produce the same color is very large. So which is the actual RREV that
corresponds to the color perception?

No one can require that there should be one to one correspondence between RREVs and perceptions. The important point is that not any but only some RREVs can produce a certain perception via
a certain perceptual functions and a certain RREV cannot be perceived as any but only some perceptions. A second point is that those wavelengths and their combinations are also perceptions and we should ask what is the RREV which produces both color perceptions
and wavelength perceptions.

RM: I think it’s the perceptual function – not an RREV – that is responsible for the stuff we perceive. As I said to Kent, I think the RREV is a concept that comes from confusing a perception (such as a table)
with the physical reality that is the basis of that perception.

Yes, perceptual function is responsible to create a perception from the effects it gets from the RREV. The RREV is responsible (especially from our point of view) to add the effects of our
output to the other possible effects called disturbance and then mediate them in a coherent way to our perceptual functions.

EP: Perhaps you do not accept that data could be explained with something from which you cannot get data.

RM: No, what I require of a concept like RREV is a demonstration of how it explains the data. This could be done by showing how the RREV functions in a working model that accounts for the data. I have done plenty
of modeling of control data and I have done it all quite successfully without using the concept of RREV. So did Bill Powers. As I said, it seems to me that the concept of an RREV is both unnecessary and an impediment to progress in PCT science. But if someone
can show me how the concept of RREV explains some control data that can’t be explained without it I’ll certainly reconsider and incorporate it into my work.

As I said, at this certain kind of the basic level research you can well do without it, you just abstract it away as a needless self-evidence. Still it is there and the affirmation of it would
gather more interest to PCT than the negation of it.

Perhaps RREV has a close relation to feedback functions (and disturbance functions)? This is just an initial thought. Anyway the functions how the output effects are mediated to input effects
is most we can know about RREVs, I think.

EP: …At least I personally find it difficult to get interested in data which had no connection to some structures in the real world.

RM: I think that all data is presumed to be “connected” to some aspect of the real world; whether it’s connected to structures (like molecules) or something else has to be inferred from the data and knowledge
of how it was collected.

Molecules are models of RREV. We can have models of them and these models are based on our experiences of controlling our perceptions. For me, molecules are somewhat more credible models than
Martin’s gnome armies, but that is maybe a question of taste. If we accept the there could be such structures like molecules in RR then we should also accept that there can be chemical compounds and physical bodies and stuffs and mixtures (like lemonade) and
further even organisms and other people and social structures etc. etc.

We cannot know for sure do these things exists and if they do, do they somehow resemble our perceptions of them, but the long history of evolution, during which our perceptual functions have
been developed to collect from our environment such combinations and transformations of effects which are somehow essential to our living and which are controllable, would suggest that there must be (often) quite close connection.

Eetu

Best

Rick

Eetu

From: Richard Marken csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Tuesday, April 16, 2019 6:55 PM
To: csgnet csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: CEV and RREV (was Re: Doing Research on Purpose…)

[Rick Marken 2019-04-16_08:54:18]

[Martin Taylor 2019.04.15.17.49]

RM: I think the concept of RREV is unnecessary for practical reasons; it seems to be irrelevant to doing research aimed at determining the perceptual variables around which any particular example of behavior is organized. If this isn’t the case – if your concept
of RREV is indeed relevant to this goal, which is the main goal of research based on PCT – then please explain how it is; it would help me with my current project of explaining to conventional psychologists how to do PCT research.

MT: My main goal of research based on PCT, if I must name one of the many I have, is to work on the ways multiple control loops (in the same or different bodies) interact. In support of this goal, I may sometimes have a supporting goal of “d* oing research
aimed at determining the perceptual variables around which any particular example of behavior is organized*”. But that is certainly not my main goal of research based on PCT,

RM: Could you explain why the concept of an RREV is essential to your research on how multiple control loops interact. It would be nice to get back to a discussion of actual data and how the PCT model explains it.

Best

Rick

any more than getting the steering wheel to the correct angle is my main goal when driving a car in traffic. Some other goals of PCT research might include to examine the interactions among the control systems of the experimenter and the subject in a TCV, or
at the other end of the scale of importance, to study collective control by politically related and politically opposed groups, or to study how the processes of evolution and reorganization actually do work to enhance the effective operation of an organism
and its descendants in an unknowable, and apparently dynamic Real Reality environment. A couple at an intermediate scale are if and why interactions of the control loops involved in a simple barter imply that a stable economy requires steady inflation, and
to examine the initial development of language in mother-child interaction. There are lots of possible goals of PCT-based research that
The concept of an RREV might help you in your own main goal, however, because you might like to explain to your students why the hierarchy of control is rather more than a simple assertion or something that accounts for observed data. It gives you the fundamental
“why” of the hierarchy. No, it doesn’t help you to find the variable (which of many?) someone is controlling in a particular situation. If that is all you want to do, the concept of the RREV is not helpful in any way I can see.

RM: I think the concept of RREV is an impediment to the development of PCT as a science because it implies that how well organisms control depends on how accurately they perceive what is known to be “out there”.

Well, I have never claimed that a controller would or could know which gnomes sitting at which desks read our outputs to RR and which ones actually read the rule-books to determine how our sensors ought to be tickled to make us perceive what we do. In fact,
I never actually claimed that Real Reality even has such gnomes. And yet, RR does seem to produce reasonably consistent changes of perception when we do thus and so in what we perceive as this or that circumstance. That appears to be all that a controller
requires, in order for the hierarchy to reorganize effectively.

This implies that the observer knows what the behaving system should be controlling, which would lead researchers to believe that the goal of PCT research is to determine how well organisms control what an observer “knows” they should be controlling.

I’m sorry, but even if it were true that we would have to know whether the gnome doing the analysis for a particular instance of control was Adelbert or Zebonia, I don’t see where an outside observer would get into the action. Nor do I see where “should” comes
into play, even if the intrusion of an observer has a simple explanation.

Of course there are circumstances where we do want to know how well a person controls a variable that the person should be controlling, for example, in training pilots to do instrument flying.

Again, I don’t see any logical connection with the foregoing. I understand “should” in this case as referring to a reference value in the teacher, who appears here in order to provide a specific situation in which an observer is required. But this seems to
have little to do with your point that the concept of RREV is bad for PCT. Rather, it seems to support the idea that the concept of the RREV makes it easier to understand the inter-organism feedback loops involved in situations like teaching.

RM: So unless you can show me how the concept of an RREV contributes to our ability to understand what perceptual variables organisms are controlling when they are seen carrying out various behaviors I’m afraid I will continue to consider it an unnecessary
obstruction to the development of PCT science.

I don’t expect that I have been able to show you, but I hope I have shown other CSGnet readers (a) that there is more to PCT research, and to PCT-based research than the search for the controlled variable, and (b) that the concept of the RREV as distinct from
the CEV and from Powers’s CV, is useful in simplifying a PCT analysis of many different kind of problem at a wide range of social importance from the control of one variable by one control loop to the clash of cultures that can lead to war.

Martin

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you

have nothing left to take away.�

                            --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you

have nothing left to take away.�

                            --Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Eetu, thank you for leading a very reasoned
argument against what I said in my posting. This is the sort of
approach that leads to careful thought and I really do
appreciate your effort and approach.

···

On 4/26/19 2:07 AM, Eetu Pikkarainen
( via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi

        [Eetu

Pikkarainen 2019-04-26_06:43:39 UTC]

Bill,

yes, seems a pretty good agreement.

        Actually, I really liked

Martin’s choice of “diligent gnomes” for one main reason.
The ridiculousness of the
options does, I think, a wonderful job of emphasizing the
truth that irrespective of what we believe we can not
actually
know what is generating our inputs to our sensors.

        Me

too!

        Taking things to the extremes of epistemology,

no we don’t know that there is any sort of actual
things in the environment outside of us. Indeed, we don’t know that we even
exist in a bodily form!

        Yes, we could exist as characters in the

stories the gnomes tell to each other.

      But back to a more practical approach. 

The assertion that there is
an RREV—a reference set, somehow—for a particular world
view that says that what we perceive, in general, exists in
the “real world” (which the world view also assumes to
exist) as we perceive them, I think, is a given.

        If

that is true (and I do believe that it is) then yes, the
RREV exists independently in the environment. However, all
perceptions of the same, and all conclusions about the RREV
are still produced wholly within a person. So they are
perceptions and like all perceptions may or may not be a
completely correct representation of what the RREV actually
is.

        Agree, except I think we may never know

how completely correct representations we have of what RREV
actually IS.

  We certainly have NO disagreement on that

statement.

        Your example of the map points out part, I

think, of the problem with this whole idea that the RREV is
important enough to be
included within PCT.

        Suppose

the map provided no terrain information (a common situation
for most maps since the maps that use color for terrain do
not provide enough information to use) however travel was
always successful using the map.

        Not sure I follow here. The goodness of

the map and the sufficiency of its information depends on
its use. If you use it to navigate from one place to another
(using a flying vehicle), you may not necessarily need any
details about the quality of the terrain.

        First, the user and observer would, of course,

conclude the map was an accurate tool.
Another observer, say
viewing a actual trip visually from a distance, would come
to the same conclusion but might notice something like the
vehicle used, maintained a consistent ground clearance, and
thus supplied the correction for lack of “Y” dimension
information.

        This

distant observer would have generally the same conclusion
about the value of the map but only because this same
observer had a perceptual input (data) that those aboard the
vehicle did not have (or at least consider). So distant
observer’s conclusion would include the additional ideas
concerning terrain.

        My

point here is that it is ALL perception.

        Yes, my point was just to show by that

example that if you have a map (as a perception of the
terrain) you can use it for navigating in the terrain (as an
RREV of which you may have no other perceptions in addition
to that map) if there is some correspondence between the
terrain and the map i.e. between the perception and the
RREV.

    While I liked the map example, the map is a

representation. Itself created because of a goal to produce a
graphic representation of an existing perception of one or more
aspect(s) of the ‘real world.’

    While cartographers might well have as many

or even more reasons why they produce maps, no doubt one of the
reasons is to produce a tool that will be useful to others in
navigating in the region covered by the map. But the map is
still no more the RREV than is someone’s perception of the
region.

        Here

is where I say something that might result in others
objecting to what I’m going to say…

        Using

an RREV either as a concept or in a specific instance of
behavior (control of perception), is dangerous as it points
toward a stimulus-response sort of approach
to a person not grounded in the implications of PCT.

        I can’t see here any special danger.

People believing or not in S-R do not change this way of
thinking of them because of speculations about Real Reality.
But if you try tell them that there does not exist any
structures in the external reality which mediate our output
to our input they will regard our PCT even more incredible
than they would else do.

    And here, I think, you have directly

addressed the most fundamental reason for my objection. Bill
Powers spent years trying to explain to William Glasser and, I
think Norbert Wiener why were not correct in their assessment of
the significance of the nature of control systems when applied
to living organisms. They, and others, always ‘fell back’ to
explaining how something in the environment caused behavior to
be emitted.

    Their focus was on how changes in the 'real

world’ caused changes in behavior. ** This is a HUGE
mistake!****** For example, if I am trying to close a
door to a room that an engineered control system maintains at a
positive pressure with respect to wherever the door leads, I
might notice that the resistance to my action (disturbance)
increases or I might not, but I will automatically increase the
force that I apply to the door until it is closed.

What is vitally important to
understand is that it is NOT the increase in resistance that caused
the change in my behavior but the reference for ‘door closed’
that caused the change.

    Those behavioral scientists (and indeed,

unfortunately, many engineering types) that focus so sharply on
our perceptions of RR and how that effects the subject is
the problem. For any sort of PCT research to be useful, it is
absolutely essential to determine what perceptions are being
controlled. Without that most difficult to obtain
knowledge you fall back to ‘stimulus-response’ thinking (whether
one wants to call it that or not).

        Where I can see a possible value to the concept

is in working with the higher levels of the control system
hierarchy.
Areas where we currently
have no hard research data and very sketchy ideas of how
they function.

        Good! I forgot this: understanding of

evolution, social systems and hierarchically higher
perceptions require the concept of RREV.

    But I don't see where it is required beyond

the acknowledgement that some sort of real world exists out
there but all we can know about that world is what we perceive
and that our perceptions are not necessarily all that accurate.

Detail about that real world IS
essential when studying individual specific behavior and that is
hardly denied by anyone, that I know of, that does actual
research. When Bill and others describe in detail examples of
the feedback process, they engage with physics and mathematics
for those presentations.

    So, as I see it PCT does acknowledge and

deal with what the RREV concept presents but does so without any
need to invent a new term. Instead, it properly uses physics,
mechanics, chemistry, mathematics, etc. for that task and does
not try to position itself as a science in those fields.

        The difficulty, especially at this point in the

development of the theory, is great.
The RREV focus would be on
what perceptions can be detected from the particular RREV.
What perceptions (if any) might be missed or incorrectly
perceived by a subject. And how those perceptions present
disturbances to achieving control (or even prevent
successful control).

        From

there, drawing in the possible “world view” perceptions one
might begin to understand how and why various perceptual
reference are altered to achieve purposeful behavior.

        Even

the William James famous example of the iron
filings-magnet-paper, and Romeo-Juliet suggest that analysis
of the ‘real world’ situation is essential for successful
control.

          For me, just

that is the basis of the usefulness of that term and
concept. It cannot be used in calculations, we get no data
from RREVs but only from perceptions but with it we can
better detail our assumptions and understandings about
what is happening especially in complex control situations
like for example in evolutionary development and social
systems.

    The concept already exists in PCT.  The

term does not add any value from my perspective.

    While I can hear the claim that defining

the RREV for a specific case would improve the ability to
analyze that case, I again assert that this is a mistake. First
whatever RREV is defined is still a perception (in the analysts
mind) and second removes the focus on what really matters and
that is what are the controlled perceptions of the subjects.
It is those, more than anything else, that determine what
happens, what behaviors ensue.

        Actually

I agree with the above paragraph even though I think my
conclusions differ. For the RREV to be useful, then the
perceptions of the RREV
must provide data. Not necessarily calculation data
but repeatable results.

        Where

you say “…but only from perceptions but with it…” is, I
think, correct.

        Here I must again stress that we get data

only via perceptions. The RREV as an object of perceptions
does not offer any data of itself past our perceptions. In a
same way that we can say that our perceptions are
perceptions about the RREV we can sau that our data is about
the RREV but that is dangerous. Data is always only recorded
perceptions.

  No argument there.  However, it is important

to remember that in rigorous research data is reproducible
independent of the researcher. And thus, what we consider to be
valid data does ‘carry a bit more weight’ than data in general.
In all cases, conclusions (whether agreed to or not) are opinion.

        It is important to remember that everything we

‘know’ about the nature of an RREV is physics (or maybe
meta-physics) based.

        Thus,

if you are studying how the feedback path influences the
change(s) that will be perceived, and the RREV is understood
to be the sum total of our physics conception (perception)
of what we think is actually present in the environment, I
see it as potentially useful.

        I

further suggest that RREV is in the realm of physics and not
behavioral science, thus not something to be included
explicitly in PCT. It certainly can be thought to be
included implicitly as is physics itself.

I partially agree. Two notes:

  1.           The knowledge of physics is as much based
    

on perceptions as any other knowledge (and thus it can
also be depending on the diligence of the gnomes).

  What is important here, I think, is the

recognition that rigorous research produces results that remain
consistent. So irrespective of how the RR reacts, you can rely
upon the RR to react the same way each time it is tested.

  1.           I refer to my favorite meta-physician
    

John Heil who says that the (fundamental) physics has a
special duty to (try to) tell the deep story about the
reality but that does not mean that the stories of other
sciences were less true (and reducible to the stories of
the physics).

  Even Bill, who claimed not to be a religious

believer pointed out that the highest level of his postulated
hierarchy provided the entry point for such a meta-physical
phenomenon. So there really isn’t any argument there either
beyond agreeing that does or does not happen.

        PCT does not need to study the structures

of RREV, it is not its duty. Neither needs it to study the
structures of nerve cells and other structures of the
interior of the organism. It has its own place in the
division of the labor of the sciences, but it can and must
(critically) utilize the stories of other sciences.

    Again, we agree.  All of those sciences are

important to PCT. The physical studies of the construction and
operation of living beings has been quite supportive of PCT
whether others recognize it or not.

bill

Eetu

[Eetu
Pikkarainen 2019-04-26_06:43:39 UTC]

    ...

···

… I think we may never know how
completely correct representations we have of what RREV
actually IS.

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2019-04-30_11:15:11 UTC]

Bill, still some comments

···

From: Bill Leach csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Friday, April 26, 2019 1:37 PM

While I liked the map example, the map is a representation. Itself created because of a goal to produce a graphic representation of an existing perception of one or more aspect(s) of the
‘real world.’

While cartographers might well have as many or even more reasons why they produce maps, no doubt one of the reasons is to produce a tool that will be useful to others in navigating in the
region covered by the map. But the map is still no more the RREV than is someone’s perception of the region.

Definitely, the map in the example was meant rather to play the role of the perception, not at all that of the RREV. The terrain (I am not sure whether it is the best English word for that) instead was meant to play the role of the RREV.
(And respectively the terrain is not thought to be a perception, because as a blind one who moves with a flying vehicle you could have no perceptions of the terrain.)

One problem here may be the question whether a perception is a representation at all. For me it is acceptable that a basic level perception (lowest in the hierarchy) is said not to be a representation, but the higher level perceptions
(and perhaps the whole hierarchy) seems to be a representation in the same way as the map is a representation of the terrain. (I think Martin meant something like that in his comment.)

And here, I think, you have directly addressed the most fundamental reason for my objection. Bill Powers spent years trying to explain to William Glasser and, I think Norbert Wiener why
were not correct in their assessment of the significance of the nature of control systems when applied to living organisms. They, and others, always ‘fell back’ to explaining how something in the environment caused behavior to be emitted.

Their focus was on how changes in the ‘real world’
caused changes in behavior. **This is a HUGE mistake! ** For example, if I am trying to close a door to a room that an engineered control system maintains at a positive pressure with respect to wherever the door leads, I might notice that the resistance
to my action (disturbance) increases or I might not, but I will automatically increase the force that I apply to the door until it is closed.

What is vitally important to understand is that it is NOT the increase in resistance that
caused the change in my behavior but the reference for ‘door closed’ that caused the change.

Yes of course the root cause of your action is your reference, but it alone cannot cause your external or perceivable behavior. In addition there must be the disturbance which causes the perception to differ from the reference and thus
the error which causes the output. So – assuming the reference remains the same – the changes inn output are caused by changes in the disturbance. Thus the increase in resistance in deed caused the change in your door closing behavior even though the initial
cause of that door closing behavior to exist at all is your reference.

Those behavioral scientists (and indeed, unfortunately, many engineering types) that focus so sharply on our perceptions of RR and how that effects the subject
is the problem. For any sort of PCT research to be useful, it is absolutely essential to determine what perceptions are being controlled. Without that
most difficult to obtain knowledge you fall back to ‘stimulus-response’ thinking (whether one wants to call it that or not).

I think the most common problematic way of thinking is some kind of combination of S-R way and cognitivist way. According to it people have internal references, intentions and plans which they try to realize but still the effects, stimuli
or disturbances of the environment can make them change. Thus they may think that an open door can cause in you an intention to close the door and the increase of the resistance can strengthen your intention. Instead the PCT way of thinking is that you already
had a reference for closed door and that reference is not changed by the openness or the resistance of the door even though your perceivable behavior clearly changes because of them.

That leads to an interesting question about what such perceptions we control which are already in their reference value and thus they cause no behavior at all.

But I don’t see where it is required beyond the acknowledgement that some sort of real world exists out there but all we can know about that world is what we perceive and that our perceptions
are not necessarily all that accurate.

Detail about that real world
IS essential when studying individual specific behavior and that is hardly denied by anyone, that I know of, that does actual research. When Bill and others describe in detail examples of the feedback process, they engage with physics and mathematics
for those presentations.

Yes, physics (and mathematics) are proper tools if we study very low level perceptions. But while it is hard to describe biological and sociological models with only the language and tools of physics (even though it may be possible in
principle) I believe it is still harder to study the higher level perceptions. But even if we use the models of physics we must remember that even they are models and perceptions and the RREV is still a different thing.

So, as I see it PCT does acknowledge and deal with what the RREV concept presents but does so without any need to invent a new term. Instead, it properly uses physics, mechanics, chemistry,
mathematics, etc. for that task and does not try to position itself as a science in those fields.

The concept already exists in PCT. The term does not add any value from my perspective.

A concept without a term is not very useful. Or do you think that there is already a corresponding term of that concept? What could it be? RR, feedback function?

It cannot be RR because it means the whole real reality, I think.
Even though we can say that everything affects everything it is clear that there are (or at least can be) different areas or structures in the RR as many RREVs so that if you turn around and start controlling the openness of a window
instead of the door you will then interact with different RREV(s).

(I think that feedback function could perhaps come quite near to RREV, not sure though.)

RREV is not a very nice term, it must be admitted, but neither are many others already in use. I would like to use more colloquial phrase “object of perception�. But anyway some term is needed if some concept should be used in discussions.
RREV is good that is not easily mixed with some other terms.

I still stress that RREV is not an object (at least any main object) of the research in PCT. Rather it is a pointer to the limit of our knowledge, to something which there is, or can be, or must be in the RR which mediates our output and
other possible effects to the effects to our sense organs.

While I can hear the claim that defining the RREV for a specific case would improve the ability to analyze that case, I again assert that this is a mistake. First whatever RREV is defined
is still a perception (in the analysts mind) and second removes the focus on what really matters and that is
what are the controlled perceptions of the subjects. It is those, more than anything else, that determine what happens, what behaviors ensue.

Perhaps in PCT language every thought is a perception but the RREV as thought or concept is about something which is not a perception. Thus it is imagined perception. It is not a physical model (any empirical scientific or non-scientific
model). It is just an idea that there must be some structure mediating just that output to that input even if the output is a physical test and the input a measurement result.

What is important here, I think, is the recognition that rigorous research produces results that remain consistent. So irrespective of how the RR reacts, you can rely
upon the RR to react the same way each time it is tested.

Yes, if it is the same part of RR i.e. the same RREV which is tested.

Eetu

I sure a heck won’t accuse you of not
thinking deeply about this matter!

···

On 5/2/19 3:03 AM, Eetu Pikkarainen
( via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

eetu.pikkarainen@oulu.fi

[Eetu Pikkarainen 2019-04-30_11:15:11 UTC]

Â

Bill, still some comments

Â

From: Bill Leach <csgnet@lists.illinois.edu >
Sent: Friday, April 26, 2019 1:37 PM

      <snip>
        While I liked the map example, the map is a

representation. Itself created because of a goal to produce
a graphic representation of an existing perception of one or
more aspect(s) of the ‘real world.’

        While cartographers might well have as many or

even more reasons why they produce maps, no doubt one of the
reasons is to produce a tool that will be useful to others
in navigating in the region covered by the map. But the map
is still no more the RREV than is someone’s perception of
the region.

        Definitely, the map in the example was

meant rather to play the role of the perception, not at all
that of the RREV. The terrain (I am not sure whether it is
the best English word for that) instead was meant to play
the role of the RREV. (And respectively the terrain is not
thought to be a perception, because as a blind one who moves
with a flying vehicle you could have no perceptions of the
terrain.)

  Yes, terrain is an excellent choice of terms

for this discussion. Terrain itself is a perception though there
is little doubt that it represents something that exist in the
RR.Â

        One problem here may be the question

whether a perception is a representation at all. For me it
is acceptable that a basic level perception (lowest in the
hierarchy) is said not to be a representation, but the
higher level perceptions (and perhaps the whole hierarchy)
seems to be a representation in the same way as the map is a
representation of the terrain. (I think Martin meant
something like that in his comment.)

  I think in the above you are narrowing the

meaning of the term from what was the original intended meaning.Â
Low level perceptions are representations of that which they
sense. This is true whether the organism is conscience of the
perception or not. Or for that matter, “make any sense” of the
perception.

        And here, I think, you have directly addressed

the most fundamental reason for my objection. Bill Powers
spent years trying to explain to William Glasser and, I
think Norbert Wiener why were not correct in their
assessment of the significance of the nature of control
systems when applied to living organisms. They, and others,
always ‘fell back’ to explaining how something in the
environment caused behavior to be emitted.

        Their focus was on how changes in the 'real

world’
caused changes in behavior. ** This is a HUGE
mistake! ** For example, if I am trying to close a door
to a room that an engineered control system maintains at a
positive pressure with respect to wherever the door leads, I
might notice that the resistance to my action (disturbance)
increases or I might not, but I will automatically increase
the force that I apply to the door until it is closed.

What is vitally important to understand is that it is NOT the
increase in resistance that
caused the change in my behavior but the reference
for ‘door closed’ that caused the change.

        Yes of course the root cause of your

action is your reference, but it alone cannot cause your
external or perceivable behavior. In addition there must be
the disturbance which causes the perception to differ from
the reference and thus the error which causes the output. So
– assuming the reference remains the same – the changes in
n
output are caused by changes in the disturbance. Thus the
increase in resistance in deed caused the change in your
door closing behavior even though the initial cause of that
door closing behavior to exist at all is your reference.

    And here is the issue in what I think is

the most important point. It is the “root cause” of behavior
that matters AND only the root cause! I’m going to say that
again. If you want to study and understand the behavior of
living systems then you have to understand that only the root
cause matters!

    Overwhelming disturbances can help one to

understand why in specific instances why the subject’s
behavior changes drastically but ONLY if you recognize
that it is the references (root causes) that are ‘driving’ that
behavior.

    William James famous example, ignored

almost entirely by ‘main stream behavioral science,’ points
directly to this concept. Romeo uses whatever method he can
find to overcome the obstacles (disturbances) that prevent him
from minimizing the error between his references and his
perceptions. It is not the wall, the height, his
inability to enter through the front door that cause his
behavior.

    Do such things affect how he chooses to

solve his problem, yes of course they do. But it is a serious
mistake to conclude that these are what drives his behavior.Â
Doing so IS the fundamental mistake that is made by
behaviorists today (and, for the most part, in the past).

        Those behavioral scientists (and indeed,

unfortunately, many engineering types) that focus so sharply
on our perceptions of RR and how that effects the subject
is the problem. For any sort of PCT research to be
useful, it is absolutely essential to determine what
perceptions are being controlled. Without that
most difficult to obtain knowledge you fall back to
‘stimulus-response’ thinking (whether one wants to call it
that or not).

        I think the most common problematic way of

thinking is some kind of combination of S-R way and
cognitivist way. According to it people have internal
references, intentions and plans which they try to realize
but still the effects, stimuli or disturbances of the
environment can make them change. Thus they may think that
an open door can cause in you an intention to close the door
and the increase of the resistance can strengthen your
intention. Instead the PCT way of thinking is that you
already had a reference for closed door and that reference
is not changed by the openness or the resistance of the door
even though your perceivable behavior clearly changes
because of them.

    That is exactly the mistake that Glasser

and Wiener made. They tried to fit PCT into the s-r model.Â
That does not work and completely misses the most important
point that Bill was making.

    Can we make valid generalizations about the

real world and what might be the effects on behavior? Yes, of
course we can as long as we also recognize that only are
prediction that behavior will change is ALL that we predict. As
soon as we use that data to try predicting how the behavior will
change we have left the realm of science.

    These generalizations are the realm of

other sciences such as physics, not PCT. It is physics, not
PCT, that tells me that I can not jump over the Empire State
building unaided.

        That leads to an interesting question

about what such perceptions we control which are already in
their reference value and thus they cause no behavior at
all.

  Personally I don't see any question in that

situation at all. It is perfectly congruent with control theory.Â
The same with a constant and unvarying output when the disturbance
is unchanging. What is the question?

        But I don't see where it is required beyond the

acknowledgement that some sort of real world exists out
there but all we can know about that world is what we
perceive and that our perceptions are not necessarily all
that accurate.

        Detail about that real world

IS essential when studying individual specific
behavior and that is hardly denied by anyone, that I know
of, that does actual research. When Bill and others
describe in detail examples of the feedback process, they
engage with physics and mathematics for those presentations.

        Yes, physics (and mathematics) are proper

tools if we study very low level perceptions. But while it
is hard to describe biological and sociological models with
only the language and tools of physics (even though it may
be possible in principle) I believe it is still harder to
study the higher level perceptions. But even if we use the
models of physics we must remember that even they are models
and perceptions and the RREV is still a different thing.

    Physics and such, are proper tools for a

great deal more than lower level perceptions! I offer sending
Voyager I and II clear through the solar system as a rather high
level perception.

    I will grant you that in the sociological

realm they have not been very useful. Indeed, statistics has
lent an aura of science to data that is fundamentally B.S.!

        So, as I see it PCT does acknowledge and deal

with what the RREV concept presents but does so without any
need to invent a new term. Instead, it properly uses
physics, mechanics, chemistry, mathematics, etc. for that
task and does not try to position itself as a science in
those fields.

        The concept already exists in PCT.  The term

does not add any value from my perspective.

        A concept without a term is not very

useful. Or do you think that there is already a
corresponding term of that concept? What could it be? RR,
feedback function?

        It cannot be RR because it means the whole

real reality, I think.
Even though we can say that
everything affects everything it is clear that there are (or
at least can be) different areas or structures in the RR as
many RREVs so that if you turn around and start controlling
the openness of a window instead of the door you will then
interact with different RREV(s

  It is RR!  RREVs would be dealing with

specific instances of RR. Such specific instances are already
recognized in PCT but are also recognized as just being a part of
RR AND the subject of other disciplines of science.

        (I think that feedback function could

perhaps come quite near to RREV, not sure though.)

        RREV is not a very nice term, it must be

admitted, but neither are many others already in use. I
would like to use more colloquial phrase “object of
perception�. But anyway some term is needed if some concept
should be used in discussions. RREV is good that is not
easily mixed with some other terms.

  Boy, I'll probably get into serious trouble

with this comment but:Â I actually like “object of perception”!

        I still stress that RREV is not an object

(at least any main object) of the research in PCT. Rather it
is a pointer to the limit of our knowledge, to something
which there is, or can be, or must be in the RR which
mediates our output and other possible effects to the
effects to our sense organs.

So now PCT needs to embed epistemology too!

        While I can hear the claim that defining the

RREV for a specific case would improve the ability to
analyze that case, I again assert that this is a mistake.Â
First whatever RREV is defined is still a perception (in the
analysts mind) and second removes the focus on what really
matters and that is
what are the controlled perceptions of the subjects. Â
It is those, more than anything else, that determine what
happens, what behaviors ensue.

        Perhaps in PCT language every thought is a

perception but the RREV as thought or concept is about
something which is not a perception. Thus it is imagined
perception. It is not a physical model (any empirical
scientific or non-scientific model). It is just an idea that
there must be some structure mediating just that output to
that input even if the output is a physical test and the
input a measurement result.

    The only way that we can deal with the

world is through our perceptions. We can muse about diligent
gnomes fooling us into believing the world even exists or not.Â
None of that musing is of any usefulness to science (other than
epistemology).

    ALL of the sciences have to rely on the

concept that RR closely resembles our perceptions of it. When
that is denied it is no longer possible to have a rational
discussion—in any subject (other than epistemology).

    Does that mean that our individual and

‘collective’ perceptions of the RR are not subject to change? Of
course not, they have been changing throughout recorded history.

Â

        What is important here, I

think, is the recognition that rigorous research produces
results that remain consistent. So irrespective of how the
RR reacts, you can rely upon the RR to react the same way
each time it is tested.

Â

        Yes,

if it is the same part of RR i.e. the same RREV which is
tested.

    But we don't know and can not know the

nature of that RREV beyond our perceptions.

bill

Â

Eetu

Fred Nickols (2019.05.03.0827 ET)

FWIW, I like “object of perception” too.

···

Regards,

Fred Nickols

Chief Toolmaker & Lead Solution Engineer

Distance Consulting LLC

“Assistance at A Distance”