FW: FW: Lies (was On "variables" (was Re: Do we control "environmental variables"?))

[Rick Marken 2018-05-20_12:24:38]

[Martin Taylor 2018.05.18.20.24]

MT: RY is correct that there are situations in which a controlled perception does not correspond to any aspect of the external environment that can be perceived by an external observer.

RM: How do you know this?

RM (earlier) : Sleeping is a tough one but I think it is controlling done by the autonomic nervous system that has the aim of keeping some intrinsic physiological variables in genetically determined reference states.

HB : Can you tell us what in this situation (sleeping) “correpsond” to any “controlled aspect of environment” that external observer is perceiving. Maybe you can tell us what “controlled aspect of environment” can be observed by observing “the observer” ?

RM : Since the controlled perception (p) is a theoretical construct that explains the observation that an aspect of the environment (q.i) is controlled,

HB : Right. “Controlled perpcetion” or “Controlled Perceptual Variable” is theoretical construct in RCT (Ricks Control Theory)…

RM : ….how do you know that this construct does not always correspond to any aspect of the environment that can be perceived by an external observer?

HB : Simply bacause there isn’t any. See case with sleeping and observing.

RM : I’d like to see a demonstration or model showing how this works.

HB : PCT is general model about how this works. There is no aspect of environment that is controlled in his model. PCT is general theory that explains how organisms function and why and how they behave. It works with behaviors that have “cotrolled aspect of environment” and those behaviors that don’t have. For example : walking, sunshining,… Any general model should explain all behaviors. And your RCT model is explaining just some cases of behavior. So it’s your theory. It has nothing to do with PCT.

Here is a model that you asked for:

image002109.jpg

HB : Model explains every behavior including those that has “aspect of environment controlled”. But it can explain also how Amoeba, Bacteria, Plankton etc. Function.

Boris

MT: I suspect, however, that this is not the source of the dispute. I imagine that RY is thinking of whether or not a perceptual function has been developed by evolution or by lifetime reorganization and is stable within the hierarchy.

RM: The source of the dispute is whether PCT is approached from the scientific or mathematical-logical perspective. From the scientific perspective – the one that Bill and I take – the perceptual signal, p, is a theoretical construct that accounts for the observed fact that some variable aspect of the environment, q.i, is being controlled; the goal of PCT research from this perspective is to discover what aspects of the environment organisms control, how they control them and why. From the mathematical-logical perspective – the one that you and many others take – the perceptual signal is a fact – an axiom from which conclusions are derived by logical deduction; the goal of PCT research from that perspective is to derive new facts (theorems) from the axioms that are assumed to make up PCT. The dispute exists because I (like Bill, as described in his 1994 post to you, which I have copied again below for your enlightenment) think the mathematical -logical approach to PCT is a barrier to progress in the development of a science of living control systems.

RM: This is a theory-first way of looking at PCT; it assumes that the truth of the theory is prior to the truth of observation. But the truth of observation comes first in the scientific approach to PCT

MT: Actually, not according to Powers, for whom ones own perceptions were the only reliable truth.

RM: Bill knew that our observations are our perceptions. Your constant attempts to make it seem like what I say is not consistent with what Bill said are really deplorable. Compare Bill’s post below to his Foreword to " Mind Readings" and see whose approach to PCT was the one Bill preferred.

MT: Ones own perceptions are not admissible in science generally

RM: Please explain how observations differ from perceptions. No, on second though, don’t bother.

RM: and the truth is that we observe that some aspect of an organism’s environment, q.i, is being controlled or it is not.If we observe that it is being controlled, we assume that this is because the organism is controlling a perceptual signal, p, that is an analog of q.i; in theory, q.i = p.

MT: It’s not a “yes-no” proposition. Control comes in degrees between perfect (impossible for physically realizable systems) and no control.

RM: It’s true that control comes in degrees but the identity of the variable being controlled is, indeed, a yes-no proposition. For example, in the “What is size” demo (http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Size.html) the variable controlled is either area (“yes”, q.i = h * w) or it is something else (“no” it is not area, it is perimeter, h + w). The primary concern of PCT research is figuring out what variable is being controlled; that’s what the test for the controlled variable is all about. Only after that “yes-no” question is answered can you start trying to determine why the quality of control is good or poor.

RM: So it’s not true that the perceptual signal may correspond to q.i, the truth is that it does correspond to q.i, by proposal of the theorist

MT: No, it IS true that the perceptual signal MAY correspond to the observer’s notion of q.i, and not only because of the possible contribution of imagined components to the perceptual function’s input.

RM: Only in the non-scientific armchair of the mathematical-logical approach to PCT.

RM: Here again is Bill’s post. Enjoy.

···

From: Boris Hartman boris.hartman@masicom.net
Sent: Monday, May 21, 2018 9:29 PM
To: ‘rsmarken@gmail.com’ rsmarken@gmail.com
Subject: RE: FW: Lies (was On “variables” (was Re: Do we control “environmental variables”?))

Rick stop bugging…

From: Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Sunday, May 20, 2018 9:25 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: FW: Lies (was On “variables” (was Re: Do we control “environmental variables”?))

========================================

Date: Wed, 17 May 1995 05:24:50 -0600

Subject: Friction

Hello, Martin – (no CCs)

I have become increasingly frustrated with our communications and have been

trying to figure out what is wrong. In the middle of the night a possibility

occurred to me. A bit of browsing through the archives – not exhaustive –

has brought up a number of topics all of which have led me to the same

frustration with your approach that I am currently experiencing. The ones I

recall now, which are probably not all of them, are (in no particular order)


Information about the disturbance flowing through the perceptual signal to

enable control to take place.

The perceptual function composed of an S-shaped response followed by an

integrator.

A discussion on bandwidth in relation to maximum realizable gain in a control

system.

The “bomb” effect.

Flip-flops or cross-connections as explanations of category perceptions,

association, contrast.

Categories as existing parallel to the analogue hierarchy.

Control system organization as being a model of the environment.


I finally realized that there is a common element in your treatment of all

these subjects. It is very much like the way you took off on the basis of

assuming that my limitation of the disturbance magnitude in Hans’ set of

disturbances was due to insufficient output strength in my model, which in

turn was caused by too short a word length. Having assumed the truth of your

premise without particularly checking to see if it was true, you then built a

series of plausible deductions from the assumption, which happened to support

a general principle you were trying to get across. Unfortunately, the premise

was false. I would not be surprised, however, if you decided that even if the

premise happened to be false in that case, the deductions you made from it

were probably true.

In each of the above subjects, you began with a theoretical possibility and

developed it just far enough to see some possible implications of it. Then you

quickly built a plausible and ever-more-detailed series of deductions from

those implications, and arrived at what seemed to you an interesting new

phenomenon. You could see in your mind’s eye how the Bomb would sit there

ticking, ready to go off if the right combination of disturbances occurred.

You could imagine information flowing from the disturbance through the

perceptual system to the output, where it got used up in producing the effects

that would counteract the disturbance. You could see the s-shaped curves and

integrators acting like a perceptron for the input part of a control system.

You could see a whole hierarchy of discrete categories with hysteresis,

running in parallel to the analog hierarchy. And the fact that you could see

in principle how certain other phenomena might flow from the initial

conceptualizations was enough to convince you that the initial

conceptualizations must be correct.

So what happens is that the tail wags the dog: the attractiveness and richness

of the conclusions drawn from the initial assumptions convinces you that the

initial assumptions must have been right. And once that has happened, you

forget completely that the initial assumptions were never established as true,

and you speak of the conclusions as if they were now established facts; you

even start using them to prove other conclusions.

The name of this type of reasoning process, or one name, is of course

“mathematics.” In mathematics (including logic, or is it the other way

around), it doesn’t matter whether the initial assumptions are factually true

**or in some way supportable by evidence. **The assumptions are simply the initial

process of setting up the chessboard with a problem, so you can work out a

solution to it. Once the field of play is established, you can then start

working out the theorems and proofs, encountering beauty and entertainment at

many stages along the way. You begin to get a feel for the system you have

created, so its major conclusions become familiar parts of that conceptual

world. These major conclusions become theorems on which to build further; they

get names like “information about the disturbance” and “The Bomb” and

“crossconnections.” Since they have been derived by correct reasoning from the

premises, there is no reason to doubt them any more; they become real. The

premises drop out of sight; they were never very important anyway, except as a

way to get the game started. The real fun is in building the structure of

ideas on those premises.

Judging from various comments you have made about your interests and

preferences, I don’t think that this is a completely inappropriate assessment

of your modus operandi. Your approach is not the engineering approach to a

physical system, but the mathematical-logical approach to a hypothetico-deductive

system.

This hypothesis explains to me your disdain for “mere demonstrations.” If you

have worked out the logic correctly, what is the point in doing an actual

demonstration of it, and doing different demonstrations to bring out one point

or another? If you understand addition, what is the point of demonstrating

that 9 + 1 = 10, and 8 + 2 = 10, and so forth? If you understand the complete

structure of information theory from Shannon on up, what is the point in

demonstrating what you already know to be true: that the signals inside a

control system must contain or pass along information about the disturbance,

and that it is this information that makes control (and everything else)

possible? And most important,if you have shown that there are no logical

errors in reaching a conclusion about real behavior, what is the point in

going through the labor of showing by direct experiment that the conclusion

actually fits the data? If the data do not agree with the conclusion, there

must have been some error or something unaccounted for in the experiment.

That last if-then is the only way I can explain your reaction to difficulties

when we actually try out some of your proposals.In the long information

-in-perception debacle, we tried computing the reduction in the uncertainty in

The perception, then in its first derivative, then both again with temporal

shifts, and in every case the results disagreed with your deductions about

what we should find. By rights, this should have brought you up short and

caused you to question the very basis on which you built your deductions. But

that didn’t occur: you simply abandoned the attempt to make a correct

deduction that would fit the data and turned to other subjects.

If I had been in your shoes, I would have had to backtrack through the logic

trying to find the error, and eventually (if no logical mistake could be found

that would fix the problem) I would have gone all the way back to the simple

starting premises on which the whole logical structure is built: if there are

no mistakes in the logic, yet the conclusions do not fit observation, then the

only place left to find an error is in the premises. And for me, however

painful the decision, the only conclusion I could then reach is that the

entire system is built on false-to-reality premises.

When I went through the process of computing reduction in uncertainty about

the disturbance due to the perceptual signal, under your tutelage, I noticed a

fact, and mentioned it, that seemed significant to me. In the process of

computing the conditional probabilities, I noticed that I would get the same

conditional probabilities no matter in what order I did the sampling of the

disturbance waveform. So in principle there was an infinity of different

waveforms that would allow me to compute the same quantity of information in

the perception. This made it very hard for me to see how the outcome could be

an output waveform based on the “information” that was arranged in the same

sequence as the elements of the disturbance waveform, which of course is

necessary if the effect of the disturbance is to be canceled.

Your reply was brief and dismissive: you just compute the conditional

probabilities on pairs of successive values of the waveform, and get the

probabilities of the first derivatives. But after thinking that over, I

realized that the same problem still existed: one could rearrange the pairs

and get the same conditional probabilities. So how could the information

passed in the perceptual signal possibly be responsible for producing the

RIGHT output waveform?

When I mentioned this (I am pretty sure I mentioned it), there was no reply

that I recall. The failure to get the right results when we used the first

derivatives as elements, even time-shifted, reinforced my doubts about the

process, but not being an expert in information theory I did not feel

competent to ferret out the cause of the problem.

I now realize that you did not search for the cause of the problem by

backtracking through information theory. You just gave up on it. This did not

solve the problem, but it left the intellectual structure of information

theory in your head undisturbed. If PCT is correct, we can use this phenomenon

to guess at the nature of the variable you were – and are – controlling.

I remember getting a frantic phone call from Chris Love shortly after the

start of the Little Baby project. He had tried to set up a big complex

hierarchy of control systems in which, per the boss’s suggestion, the

perceptual function was an S-shaped curve followed by an integrator. The

reason he called was that he hadn’t been able to get even a single elementary

control system to work. I tried to explain to him that a control system

organized that way would be trying to control a variable that was the inverse

function of the proposed form, namely a nonlinear first derivative that went

to infinity at zero and maximum perceptual signal. He was not then

knowledgeable about control theory, so I just suggested that he move the

integrator to the output function, and preferably make the input function

linear. He tried that, and got a working control system for the first time,

several months into the project. I felt very sorry for Chris, because he had

to try to make the suggested model work, and it could not work.

On other occasions, I have pointed out to you a shortcoming of the perceptron

approach, in that it doesn’t yield perceptual signals which are continuous

representations of controlled variables. The nonlinearities and other

properties limit the output to a yes-no signal, which is good only for

discrete control. However, in the fairly recent past, I noticed that you were

still referring to the S-shaped input function with an integrator as part of

the model. Chris’ problems do not seem to have shaken your faith one bit. Or

perhaps they have simply led you to abandon that problem, and go to modeling

discrete systems. Obviously it has not led you to re-examine the premises

behind the perceptron approach.


I think that in deciding to be an abstract theoretician, you have simply cut

off your higher level systems from lower-level perceptions, operating the

higher-level systems in the imagination mode. And I think that this is a

mistake. If you don’t continually check your higher-level models against

experiences by interacting with the outside world at the lowest levels, you

run the risk of creating a systematic delusion about the nature of the world;

one that is internally consistent, but which is not consistent with what your

senses could tell you if you consulted them. Abstract thought alone is simply

not a reliable way to learn about nature.

This is why I am so adamant about demonstrations and experiments. You have to

close the loop through the external environment if you’re to achieve real

control. No matter how self-evident or obvious or logically necessary a

conclusion may seem, it is still necessary to find a way to test it by

interacting with the world. And when you do such tests, it is necessary to pay

attention to the outcome, because if the outcomes don’t agree with the logic,

it says that something is wrong with the logic or with the premises on which

it’s founded. No matter how convinced you are that you have the right idea,

nature is perfectly capable of contradicting you.

And this says something else, too. It says that there is really very little

point in building up big deductive structures on premises that have not been

experimentally demonstrated. Your cross-connection ideas about category

perception may prove to be quite right, but you have no way to verify that

such cross connections exist or work in the ways you assume they work.

Technology has simply not reached the stage where we can do this in a living

working brain. Perhaps it would be possible to do experiments to check, at

least, the conclusions, to see if people actually work in the way that your

hypothetical model works. But unless you can also check the premises, you are

on very uncertain ground. For any circuit that accomplishes a given result,

there are a dozen different ones that would do the same thing. There will

always be uncertainties in our models, but why deliberately make them as large

as possible?


I have no illusions about changing your style to correct what I see as

mistakes. What you make of what I say is in your hands alone. But if you want

to understand where our frictions come from, you have to know how I perceive

the way you work, and how limited it looks to me. You have to understand that

even where you think you see agreement, you may be considering only a narrow

range of meanings of what I or others say, meanings that fit your world-view

but that may only represent one point of intersection of trajectories that are

headed in different directions. And you have to realize that you often read

hastily, making assumptions that a more careful reading would quickly set

straight and then leaping ahead to draw unwarranted conclusions – largely,

seeing agreement where there is actually no agreement, or only a very partial

**agreement. **This is another penalty for working in the imagination mode. You

are far from the only person to work this way, of course.

Obviously, I have considered only YOUR problems, not my own. I am sure that

all of this looks quite different to you. If you want to turn the tables, you

have every right.

Bill

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.”
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Rick,

before you reveal any more of your fantasy constructs prove to me that you can “control behavior”. All your talkings are uselles if you don’t prove how you can “control aspect of environment”, and how you get “Controlled Perceptual Variable” ???

So your post is nonsense again. It’s empty. You told exactly nothing. Maybe it’s representing what is really in your head as PCT is concerned.

If you don’t know how to read Bills’ literature I can help you. But stop confussing people on CSGnet with your nonsense imaginational constructs. We are here to keep the memory on PCT alive. Memory on Bills’ work not on your imagination.

BN earlier : We are here to investigate, test, demonstrate, and promulgate perceptual control theory.

HB : You should listen to your friends.

RM: ….I tend to evaluate ideas about PCT on their intellectual merits and not on whether they come from people I like or don’t like. (So if you ever had an idea about PCT that had some merit I would acknowledge it).

HB : Ha,ha,ha…. You would acknowledge what PCT is ? This must be the joke of century. When did you last time write about PCT ? You are all the time writing about RCT (Ricks’ Control Theory).

HB : You are becoming very brave for somebody that don’t understand what PCT is and it’s not offering any proofs for what he is talking aboout. You are the one who never showed any evidence about “Control of behavior – what is mantra in RCT (Ricks’ Control Theory)”. And you are talking about PCT merrits ??? You are joking. Arent’ you ? You are a top joker Rick. But that doesn’t mean that you can make Bill and PCT look like a clown

I proved to you for at least 50 x that you are PCT top ignorant.

HB : PCT explanations (not RCT) about excitations in nervous system goes also for experiments with “electrical current” if you don’t of course exaggerate. You can burn if you play with fire. If you’ll do some experiments with electrical currents watch if anywhere you’ll notice smoke coming from your organism. It’s better to contact some experts before you start or ask Martin to help you or find somebody that will know what to do. Don’t try it with your childish explanations.

It doesn’t matter what the source of excitation is. Neuron fires by the Law “All or nothing”. Let us see some real PCT :

Bill P : Any one first-order perceptual signal can vary only along one dimension frequency… This means that however the associated input function is stimulated, only one dimension of that stimulation can affect the perceptual signal : the intensity of stimulation, without distinction as to the cause or kind of stimulation. The perceptual signal from a touch receptor does not reflect whether the cause is an electrical current, a touch, or a chemical poisoning, or whether a touch occurs to the left or right of the exact receptor location.

Bill P : ………first order perceptual signal reflects only what happens at the sensory ending : the source of the stimulation is cpmpletely undefined and unsensed.

HB : I don’t understand Rick whether you are delibrately avoiding PCT explanation of how organisms function or you are doing it because you are perfectly ignorant. One thing is sure. There is something very wrong in transformation of “q.i.” to “p” in your nervous system when your are reading Bills’ literature. There is no “analog” transformation of “q.i.” into perceptual signal. There is no tranformation at all. You must be medicine phenomenon.

In any case it would be good that you stop writing about things that you don’t understand and in this way you stop damaging PCT.

Your ignorant discourse about electrical currents works the same as any other stimulation of nerv endings. PCT explanation is more than sufficient source of information. But you don’t apply it. Instead you are offering some fantasy constructs which has not contact with reality. I’m wondering why don’t you start using Bills explanations about what PCT is.

So by my oppinion (because I beleive Bill was right) electrical current will affect organism in accordance to what Bill proposed.

His diagram and definition of control loop are enough to explain what will happen. It’s general explanation of how organisms control. There is no “control of behavior”, no “controlled aspect of environment” and no “Controlled Perceptual Variable” or PCV. See it for yourself. If you need any instructions how to read and understand PCT I’m here.

image002109.jpg

PCT Definitions of control loop :

Bill P (B:CP):

  1. CONTROL : Achievement and maintenance of a preselected state in the controlling system, through actions on the environment that also cancel the effects of disturbances.

Bill P (B:CP):

  1. OUTPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into a corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system

Bill P (LCS III):…the output function shown in it’s own box represents the means this system has for causing changes in it’s environment.

Bill P (LCS III):

  1. FEED-BACK FUNCTION : The box represents the set of physical laws, properties, arrangements, linkages, by which the action of this system feeds-back to affect its own input, the controlled variable. That’s what feed-back means : it’s an effect of a system’s output on it’s own input.

Bill P (B:CP) :

  1. INPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that receives signals or stimuli from outside the system, and generates a perceptual signal that is some function of the received signals or stimuli.

Bill P (B:CP) :

  1. COMPARATOR : The portion of control system that computes the magnitude and direction of mismatch between perceptual and reference signal.

Bill P (B:CP)

  1. ERROR : The discrepancy between a perceptual signal and a reference signal, which drives a control system’s output function. The discrepancy between a controlled quantity and it’s present reference level, which causes observable behavior.

Bill P (B:CP) :

  1. ERROR SIGNAL : A signal indicating the magnitude and direction of error.

Boris

···

From: Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Saturday, May 19, 2018 12:02 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: FW: Lies (was On “variables” (was Re: Do we control “environmental variables”?))

[Rick Marken 2018-05-18_15:01:24]

On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 7:41 AM, “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

RY earlier : Sure, a perceptual signal (q.i*g) may correspond to, or be a function of, variable aspects of the environment (q.i) but it is the perceptual signal that is controlled not the variable aspects of the environment

HB : It’s a perfect statement. When I saw it first time I wasn’t sure who wrote it. Bill or Rupert. I now know it was Rupert. It’s a PCT flower. Rupert has some really great statements on CSGnet.

HB: I can support this statement with any means that is possible. With PCT means, biological, physiological, name it. But I can’t think of any scientific mean that could support Bruce’s way of proving how “environmental variable and it’s analog perceptual signal” are both controlled. Maybe there is one “vague” way, but it got some other name, not control.

HB: But I’m interested Rick, why don’t you listen to Rupert, and stop being behaviorist. He is your friend afterall. Isn’t he ?

RM: I like Rupert a lot but I tend to evaluate ideas about PCT on their intellectual merits

HB : What kind of intelectuall merits. Based on RCT (Ricks Control Theory) ?

RM : and not on whether they come from people I like or don’t like. (So if you ever had an idea about PCT that had some merit I would acknowledge it).

HB : Do I have to prove you again that you don’t understand PCT ???

RM : But I’m afraid I have to say that Rupert’s statement above is wrong.

HB : Prove it with scientific means. Bill did it.

RM : But it is wrong in a way that illustrates the problem of approaching PCT from the mathematical-logical perspective.

HB : As I said before. It doesn’t matter from which poitn you are coming from. It matters only if you understand how organisms function or you don’t. And you don’t. So cut the bullshitting.

RM : So I’ll use his statement to illustrate the problem with this approach and show why it’s more useful to approach PCT from the scientific perspective.

HB : We don’t need

RM: First , Rupert says: “Sure, a perceptual signal (q.i*g) may correspond to, or be a function of, variable aspects of the environment (q.i) …” The problem here is the little word “may”, suggesting that, while the perceptual signal usually corresponds to the aspect of the environment that is controlled,

HB : We want proofs that environment is controlled. With what you are controlling environment. With Telekinesis ? But if you “control environment” with “ontrol of behavior” than it’s wrong. No such thing exist in PCT

HB : And remember. We are talking about general theory not just about some cases. So you have to explain with your "controlling aspect of environment all behaviors. But you already failed

RM : …there are situations where it does not. This is a theory-first way of looking at PCT;

HB : Your view is perfectly "theory-first. Did you ever anything tryed to “test” your test and demos in nature – the final arbiter. Do you remember how Bill was dissapointed when he found out that “baseball ball catch” demo is just your fiction.

RM : it assumes that the truth of the theory is prior to the truth of observation.

HB : Where are your observations ?

RM : But the truth of observation comes first in the scientific approach to PCT and the truth is that we observe that some aspect of an organism’s environment, q.i, is being controlled or it is not.

HB : In PCT that is not a wuestion any more because Bill proved that “behavior is not control” and that there is no “controlled variable” in environment.

Bill P (feedback)

HB : All his work is about this new approach. Why he would wrote so much literature if you can capture in one santence : “Environmental variables are controlled”. You must be genious Rick. Supermen. But in the fact you are a little bahaviorist who would like to be “intelectuall giant”. You are not.

RM : If we observe that it is being controlled, we assume that this is because the organism is controlling a perceptual signal, p, that is an analog of q.i; in theory, q.i = p.

HB : I told you many times that you are a lousy reader and that

So it’s not true that the perceptual signal may correspond to q.i, the truth is that it does correspond to q.i, by proposal of the theorist

HB : In your case how you read Bills book it look like q.i. does not correspond to anything. Just some “Đ%@žć”…

RM : That is how the theory accounts for the observation that q.i is controlled.

HB : Did you read what did you wrote.

RM : The theory accounts for the observation.

HB : And what practice accounts for ? What you said till now is “empty talking”. You told exctly nothing about the problem how “environmental variables are controlled”. So I ask you again to prove how “environmetal variables are controlled” (you can use Bills’ literature or better you read everything again" and than enlighten us with your findings.

RM: Rupert goes on to say: “… but it is the perceptual signal that is controlled not the variable aspects of the environment”. I think this idea is based on the fact that it is the perceptual signal, p, and not q.i, that the control system acts to bring into a match with its reference signal r.

HB : Vauu. What a discovery. Are you aware that Bill discovered this in 1960…

RM : And it’s true, in theory, that if one were to directly disturb p (by injecting an electrical pulse stream into the neuron carrying p) so that p = p + d,

HB : How this can be theory if you inject electrical pulse into neuron). Did you try it. If you didn’t then you are not inposition to talk about it. And it’s not p=p+d. What is d. Whatever you did with electrical puise was that you forced neuron to exceed “trashold”. There is no p=p+d.

RM : ….the system would act to counter that disturbance and bring p back to the value r, showing that p is under control.

HB : How did you get on idea that system will “counter the disturbance”. You will punch on the nose the person that “injected” pulse ???

The problem is what person will perceive as the result of electrical pulse ? Probably nothing that can be presented as “q.i.” I would gues some blackout. So I’ll gues there wouldn’t be any “counter-action” to “electrical pulse” or stimulus (we mustn’t forget that you are behaviorist) because person wouldn’t have any “real perceptions” of what happened unless you count in that whole system will “counteract” on electrical pulse with his purposes. But that is again the problem which we have before. How will people “counter-act” disturbances with their different purposes.

RM : The system would do this controlling of p by acting on q.i so that q.i becomes proportional to q.i - d, bringing p + d to the value p.

HB : What a fantasy. So much bullshitting. If the system will control perception (electrifyed) it’s question how will the person. Counter-act. If she will feel the pain than you can expect quite wild counteraction.

Experiment’s with electrical impulses show that results of stimulation can be totaly unpredictable, so are "conteractions. If you’ll do the experiment be carefull if experimental person jump. The counteraction are unpredictable. There is no p+d or q.i -d. What an imagination.

RM : So q.i would still be controlled but it would be brought to a different reference state than the one specified by the reference signal.

HB : Q.i. is never controlled. It’s just “input function”. And it can happen that person will stay still or it can remove that electrical source. I bet that person who injected “ellectrical pulse” is sure that he’ll never triy again to do the same thing because of possible agressive counteraction. What a mess maker are you Rick. World champion.

RM : That is, if q.i were the area of a rectangle (q.i = h * w) that were being kept in a reference state of 100 sq cm., directly disturbing the neural signal, p, that corresponds to q.i would result in a change in the reference state at which the area of the rectangle (h * w) was being controlled, from 100 to 100 - d. But it wouldn’t change the fact that the aspect of the environment that is controlled is the area of the rectangle. That is, it wouldn’t change the fact that what is controlled is q.i = h * w.

HB : What a bullshitting. There is no “aspect of environment that is being controlled”. You didn’t prove with electrical pulses how you “controlled behavior” if there was any “counteraction” ??? You forgot that you think that “controlled aspect of enviroment” is controlled in your case by behavior or you think is Telekinesis ? Go read Bills books again

RM: This can be easily demonstrated using modeling.

HB : Your modeling ??? Tests and demos ? Ha, haaaa. It’s Just some more bullshitting again.

RM: If I have a chance I’ll develop such a model over the weekend but it would be best if someone else would do it – especially someone who believes that it is only the perceptual signal that is controlled and not the variable aspects of the environment that can be observed to be controlled and of which the perceptual signal is a theoretical analog.

HB : O.K. We are waiting for your RCT model.

Boris

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken

"Perfection is achieved not when you have nothing more to add, but when you
have nothing left to take away.”
–Antoine de Saint-Exupery

Rupert

RY : Well, it depends what is meant by “variable aspects of the environment”. I’m still not sure what you mean by it, so I think we are talking about different things. We were discussing it in, “Re: Watching your p’s and q.i’s (was Re: Kenneth J. W. Craik on levels of perception and control)” but I didn’t see a response after (Rupert Young (2017.12.29 17.15)). There I did suggest, “Therefore, there is no contradiction is saying that only perception is controlled and “aspects of the environment” are controlled.”

HB : Is this a joke ? You were all the time jokiing with all the members on CSGnet and with me ?

RY earlier : Sure, a perceptual signal (q.i*g) may correspond to, or be a function of, variable aspects of the environment (q.i) but it is the perceptual signal that is controlled not the variable aspects of the environment

So this not what you wanted to write. You are saying that you wanted to write this :

RY earlier : Sure, a perceptual signal (q.i*g) may correspond to, or be a function of, variable aspects of the environment (q.i) but it is the perceptual signal that is controlled and the variable aspects of the environment

HB : So now you are denying what you said ??? This is a mess. It seems that I praised you to soon. I thought you are supporting PCT, but it seems that you support RCT (Ricks Control Theory). This is not a forum for what Bruce Nevin thought it was :

BN earlier : We are here to investigate, test, demonstrate, and promulgate perceptual control theory.

Boris

···

From: Rupert Young (rupert@perceptualrobots.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Tuesday, May 22, 2018 10:51 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: FW: Lies (was On “variables” (was Re: Do we control “environmental variables”?))

[From Rupert Young (2018.05.22 9.50)]

(Rick Marken 2018-05-18_15:01:24]

On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 7:41 AM, “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

RY earlier : Sure, a perceptual signal (q.i*g) may correspond to, or be a function of, variable aspects of the environment (q.i) but it is the perceptual signal that is controlled not the variable aspects of the environment

HB : It’s a perfect statement. When I saw it first time I wasn’t sure who wrote it. Bill or Rupert. I now know it was Rupert. It’s a PCT flower. Rupert has some really great statements on CSGnet.

HB: I can support this statement with any means that is possible. With PCT means, biological, physiological, name it. But I can’t think of any scientific mean that could support Bruce’s way of proving how “environmental variable and it’s analog perceptual signal” are both controlled. Maybe there is one “vague” way, but it got some other name, not control.

HB: But I’m interested Rick, why don’t you listen to Rupert, and stop being behaviorist. He is your friend afterall. Isn’t he ?

RM: I like Rupert a lot but I tend to evaluate ideas about PCT on their intellectual merits and not on whether they come from people I like or don’t like. (So if you ever had an idea about PCT that had some merit I would acknowledge it). But I’m afraid I have to say that Rupert’s statement above is wrong. But it is wrong in a way that illustrates the problem of approaching PCT from the mathematical-logical perspective. So I’ll use his statement to illustrate the problem with this approach and show why it’s more useful to approach PCT from the scientific perspective.

RM: First , Rupert says: “Sure, a perceptual signal (q.i*g) may correspond to, or be a function of, variable aspects of the environment (q.i) …” The problem here is the little word “may”, suggesting that, while the perceptual signal usually corresponds to the aspect of the environment that is controlled, there are situations where it does not. This is a theory-first way of looking at PCT; it assumes that the truth of the theory is prior to the truth of observation. But the truth of observation comes first in the scientific approach to PCT and the truth is that we observe that some aspect of an organism’s environment, q.i, is being controlled or it is not. If we observe that it is being controlled, we assume that this is because the organism is controlling a perceptual signal, p, that is an analog of q.i; in theory, q.i = p. So it’s not true that the perceptual signal may correspond to q.i, the truth is that it does correspond to q.i, by proposal of the theorist That is how the theory accounts for the observation that q.i is controlled. The theory accounts for the observation.

I still have in mind the example of RDSs (random dot sterograms), where, it seems to me, no aspects of the environment vary while the perception is being controlled, so how can it be that “aspects of the environment” are being controlled?

Regards,
Rupert

I’m deeply sorry Rupert.

I see made a fatal mistake. I didn’t read to the end of your message. So I missed your last thought.

RY : I still have in mind the example of RDSs (random dot sterograms), where, it seems to me, no aspects of the e
nvironment vary while the perception is being controlled, so how can it be that “aspects of the environment” are being controlled?

HB : This is the right answer I expected from you. It’s your Royal style. I know you are not talking to me. But At least you could give a warning that I made a mistake. Well I’m little temperament guy. I admitt. Sometimes too much in rush.

So your statement still holds :

RY earlier : Sure, a perceptual signal (q.i*g) may correspond to, or be a function of, variable a
spects of the environment (q.i) but it is the perceptual signal that is controlled not the variable aspects of the environment

HB : Last statement in your post is fully supporting this statement and by my oppinion is also appropriate answer to wrong statement : when “P” is controlled also “q.i.” is controlled". Its simply wrong statement.

Hope you’ll forgive me. Sorry again,

Boris

···

From: Rupert Young (rupert@perceptualrobots.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Tuesday, May 22, 2018 10:51 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: FW: Lies (was On “variables” (was Re: Do we control “environmental variables”?))

[From Rupert Young (2018.05.22 9.50)]

(Rick Marken 2018-05-18_15:01:24]

On Fri, May 18, 2018 > at 7:41 AM, “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

RY earlier : Sure, a perceptual signal (q.i*g) may correspond to, or be a function of, variable aspects of the environment (q.i) but it is the perceptual signal that is controlled not the variable aspects of the environment

HB : It’s a perfect statement. When I saw it first time I wasn’t sure who wrote it. Bill or Rupert. I now know it was Rupert. It’s a PCT flower. Rupert has some really great statements on CSGnet.

HB: I can support this statement with any means that is possible. With PCT means, biological, physiological, name it. But I can’t think of any scientific mean that could support Bruce’s way of proving how “environmental variable and it’s analog perceptual signal” are both controlled. Maybe there is one “vague” way, but it got some other name, not control.

HB: But I’m interested Rick, why don’t you listen to Rupert, and stop being behaviorist. He is your friend afterall. Isn’t he ?

RM: I like Rupert a lot but I tend to evaluate ideas about PCT on their intellectual merits and not on whether they come from people I like or don’t like. (So if you ever had an idea about PCT that had some merit I would acknowledge it). But I’m afraid I have to say that Rupert’s statement above is wrong. But it is wrong in a way that illustrates the problem of approaching PCT from the mathematical-logical perspective. So I’ll use his statement to illustrate the problem with this approach and show why it’s more useful to approach PCT from the scientific perspective.

RM: First , Rupert says: “Sure, a perceptual signal (q.i*g) may correspond to, or be a function of, variable aspects of the environment (q.i) …” The problem here is the little word “may”, suggesting that, while the perceptual signal usually corresponds to the aspect of the environment that is controlled, there are situations where it does not. This is a theory-first way of looking at PCT; it assumes that the truth of the theory is prior to the truth of observation. But the truth of observation comes first in the scientific approach to PCT and the truth is that we observe that some aspect of an organism’s environment, q.i, is being controlled or it is not. If we observe that it is being controlled, we assume that this is because the organism is controlling a perceptual signal, p, that is an analog of q.i; in theory, q.i = p. So it’s not true that the perceptual signal may correspond to q.i, the truth is that it does correspond to q.i, by proposal of the theorist That is how the theory accounts for the observation that q.i is controlled. The theory accounts for the observation.

Well, it depends what is meant by “variable aspects of the environment”. I’m still not sure what you mean by it, so I think we are talking about different things. We were discussing it in, “Re: Watching your p’s and q.i’s (was Re: Kenneth J. W. Craik on levels of perception and control)” but I didn’t see a response after (Rupert Young (2017.12.29 17.15)). There I did suggest, “Therefore, there is no contradiction is saying that only perception is controlled and “aspects of the environment” are controlled.”

I still have in mind the example of RDSs (random dot sterograms), where, it seems to me, no aspects of the environment vary while the perception is being controlled, so how can it be t
hat “aspects of the environment” are being controlled?

Regards,
Rupert

“RY: I still have in mind the example of RDSs (random dot sterograms), where, it seems to me, no aspects of the environment vary while the perception is being controlled, so how can it be that “aspects of the environment” are being controlled?”

Hi Rupert, so that means that you can control perception without controlling the variable aspect of the environment, but doesn’t logically mean that perception is being controlled every time that a variable aspect of the environment is being controlled. It seems that the phenomenon is control of a variable in the environment, and the explanation is the control of the perceived aspects of the environment (PCT). But in the RDS, isn’t that a different phenomenon to explain? Through a more sophisticated component of PCT (e.g. the imaginal connection?)

Warren

···

On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 11:48 AM, “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

I’m deeply sorry Rupert.

I see made a fatal mistake. I didn’t read to the end of your message. So I missed your last thought.

RY : I still have in mind the example of RDSs (random dot sterograms), where, it seems to me, no aspects of the e
nvironment vary while the perception is being controlled, so how can it be that “aspects of the environment” are being controlled?

HB : This is the right answer I expected from you. It’s your Royal style. I know you are not talking to me. But At least you could give a warning that I made a mistake. Well I’m little temperament guy. I admitt. Sometimes too much in rush.

So your statement still holds :

RY earlier : Sure, a perceptual signal (q.i*g) may correspond to, or be a function of, variable a
spects of the environment (q.i) but it is the perceptual signal that is controlled not the variable aspects of the environment

HB : Last statement in your post is fully supporting this statement and by my oppinion is also appropriate answer to wrong statement : when “P” is controlled also “q.i.” is controlled". Its simply wrong statement.

Hope you’ll forgive me. Sorry again,

Boris

From: Rupert Young (rupert@perceptualrobots.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Tuesday, May 22, 2018 10:51 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: FW: Lies (was On “variables” (was Re: Do we control “environmental variables”?))

[From Rupert Young (2018.05.22 9.50)]

(Rick Marken 2018-05-18_15:01:24]

On Fri, May 18, 2018
at 7:41 AM, “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

RY earlier : Sure, a perceptual signal (q.i*g) may correspond to, or be a function of, variable aspects of the environment (q.i) but it is the perceptual signal that is controlled not the variable aspects of the environment

HB : It’s a perfect statement. When I saw it first time I wasn’t sure who wrote it. Bill or Rupert. I now know it was Rupert. It’s a PCT flower. Rupert has some really great statements on CSGnet.

HB: I can support this statement with any means that is possible. With PCT means, biological, physiological, name it. But I can’t think of any scientific mean that could support Bruce’s way of proving how “environmental variable and it’s analog perceptual signal” are both controlled. Maybe there is one “vague” way, but it got some other name, not control.

HB: But I’m interested Rick, why don’t you listen to Rupert, and stop being behaviorist. He is your friend afterall. Isn’t he ?

RM: I like Rupert a lot but I tend to evaluate ideas about PCT on their intellectual merits and not on whether they come from people I like or don’t like. (So if you ever had an idea about PCT that had some merit I would acknowledge it). But I’m afraid I have to say that Rupert’s statement above is wrong. But it is wrong in a way that illustrates the problem of approaching PCT from the mathematical-logical perspective. So I’ll use his statement to illustrate the problem with this approach and show why it’s more useful to approach PCT from the scientific perspective.

RM: First , Rupert says: “Sure, a perceptual signal (q.i*g) may correspond to, or be a function of, variable aspects of the environment (q.i) …” The problem here is the little word “may”, suggesting that, while the perceptual signal usually corresponds to the aspect of the environment that is controlled, there are situations where it does not. This is a theory-first way of looking at PCT; it assumes that the truth of the theory is prior to the truth of observation. But the truth of observation comes first in the scientific approach to PCT and the truth is that we observe that some aspect of an organism’s environment, q.i, is being controlled or it is not. If we observe that it is being controlled, we assume that this is because the organism is controlling a perceptual signal, p, that is an analog of q.i; in theory, q.i = p. So it’s not true that the perceptual signal may correspond to q.i, the truth is that it does correspond to q.i, by proposal of the theorist That is how the theory accounts for the observation that q.i is controlled. The theory accounts for the observation.

Well, it depends what is meant by “variable aspects of the environment”. I’m still not sure what you mean by it, so I think we are talking about different things. We were discussing it in, “Re: Watching your p’s and q.i’s (was Re: Kenneth J. W. Craik on levels of perception and control)” but I didn’t see a response after (Rupert Young (2017.12.29 17.15)). There I did suggest, “Therefore, there is no contradiction is saying that only perception is controlled and “aspects of the environment” are controlled.”

I still have in mind the example of RDSs (random dot sterograms), where, it seems to me, no aspects of the environment vary while the perception is being controlled, so how can it be t
hat “aspects of the environment” are being controlled?

Regards,
Rupert

Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Clinical Psychology

School of Health Sciences
2nd Floor Zochonis Building
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk

Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589

Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

Advanced notice of a new transdiagnostic therapy manual, authored by Carey, Mansell & Tai - Principles-Based Counselling and Psychotherapy: A Method of Levels Approach

Available Now

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

Warren

···

From: Warren Mansell (wmansell@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Wednesday, May 23, 2018 1:45 PM
To: Rupert Young rupert@perceptualrobots.com
Cc: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: FW: FW: Lies (was On “variables” (was Re: Do we control “environmental variables”?))

“RY: I still have in mind the example of RDSs (random dot sterograms), where, it seems to me, no aspects of the environment vary while the perception is being controlled, so how can it be that “aspects of the environment” are being controlled?”

WM : Hi Rupert, so that means that you can control perception without controlling the variable aspect of the environment,

HB : Of course Warren. Perception is controlled in comparator. Only nervous system can control. Perception is matched to references.

Bill P (B:CP)

  1. COMPARATOR : The portion of control system that computes the magnitude and direction of mismatch between perceptual and reference signal.

  2. OUTPUT FUNCTION : The portion of a system that converts the magnitude or state of a signal inside the system into a corresponding set of effects on the immediate environment of the system

HB : Variable aspect of environment is not controlled. You don’t produce “controlled effects”. Just effects to environment. You wrote that you read Bills’ books. How can I see that ? Your explanations shows that you read only Ricks’ writings.

WM : ….but doesn’t logically mean that perception is being controlled eevery time that a variable aspect of the environment is being controlled.

HB : Perception is not controlled, when variable aspect is “controlled”. Variable aspect is not controlled and thus perceptual signal is “control empty”. it will be controlled in comparator. Read it in Bills literature.

WM : It seems that the phenomenon is control of a variable in the environment,

HB : The phenomenon of control is “Control of perception” not “variable aspect of environment”. Did you or didn’t you read Bills’ literature.

WM : ….and the explanattion is the control of the perceived aspects of the environment (PCT).

HB : Right. There is control of percived aspect of environment not of “controlled environment”. Only environment.

Bill P (LCS I) :

The sensor function creates an ongoing relationship between some set of environmental physical variables (v’s) and a Sensor signal inside the system, an internal analog of some external state of affairs.

HB : Bills’ description does not talk about “controlled aspect” of environment. It’s just about “environmental physical variables” (v’s) or some external state of affairs.

Best,

Boris

RM : Â But in the RDS, isn’t that a different phenomenon to explain? Through a more sophisticated component of PCT (e.g. the imaginal connection?)

Warren

On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 11:48 AM, “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

I’m deeply sorry Rupert.

I see made a fatal mistake. I didn’t read to the end of your message. So I missed your last thought.

RY : I still have in mind the example of RDSs (random dot sterograms), where, it seems to me, no aspects of the e nvironment vary while the perception is being controlled, so how can it be that “aspects of the environment” are being controlled?

HB : This is the right answer I expected from you. It’s your Royal style. I know you are not talking to me. But At least you could give a warning that I made a mistake. Well I’m little temperament guy. I admitt. Sometimes too much in rush.

So your statement still holds :

RY earlier : Sure, a perceptual signal (q.i*g) may correspond to, or be a function of, variable a spects of the environment (q.i) but it is the perceptual signal that is controlled not the variable aspects of the environment

HB : Last statement in your post is fully supporting this statement and by my oppinion is also appropriate answer to wrong statement : when “P” is controlled also “q.i.” is controlled". Its simply wrong statement.

Hope you’ll forgive me. Sorry again,

Boris

From: Rupert Young (rupert@perceptualrobots.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Sent: Tuesday, May 22, 2018 10:51 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: FW: Lies (was On “variables” (was Re: Do we control “environmental variables”?))

[From Rupert Young (2018.05.22 9.50)]

(Rick Marken 2018-05-18_15:01:24]

On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 7:41 AM, “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

RY earlier : Sure, a perceptual signal (q.i*g) may correspond to, or be a function of, variable aspects of the environment (q.i) but it is the perceptual signal that is controlled not the variable aspects of the environment

HB : It’s a perfect statement. When I saw it first time I wasn’t sure who wrote it. Bill or Rupert. I now know it was Rupert. It’s a PCT flower. Rupert has some really great statements on CSGnet.

HB: I can support this statement with any means that is possible. With PCT means, biological, physiological, name it. But I can’t think of any scientific mean that could support Bruce’s way of proving how “environmental variable and it’s analog perceptual signal” are both controlled. Maybe there is one “vague” way, but it got some other name, not control.

HB: But I’m interested Rick, why don’t you listen to Rupert, and stop being behaviorist. He is your friend afterall. Isn’t he ?

RM: I like Rupert a lot but I tend to evaluate ideas about PCT on their intellectual merits and not on whether they come from people I like or don’t like. (So if you ever had an idea about PCT that had some merit I would acknowledge it). But I’m afraid I have to say that Rupert’s statement above is wrong. But it is wrong in a way that illustrates the problem of approaching PCT from the mathematical-logical perspective. So I’ll use his statement to illustrate the problem with this approach and show why it’s more useful to approach PCT from the scientific perspective.

RM: First , Rupert says: “Sure, a perceptual signal (q.i*g) may correspond to, or be a function of, variable aspects of the environment (q.i) …” The problem here is the little word “may”, suggesting that, while the perceptual signal usually corresponds to the aspect of the environment that is controlled, there are situations where it does not. This is a theory-first way of looking at PCT; it assumes that the truth of the theory is prior to the truth of observation. But the truth of observation comes first in the scientific approach to PCT and the truth is that we observe that some aspect of an organism’s environment, q.i, is being controlled or it is not. If we observe that it is being controlled, we assume that this is because the organism is controlling a perceptual signal, p, that is an analog of q.i; in theory, q.i = p. So it’s not true that the perceptual signal may correspond to q.i, the truth is that it does correspond to q.i, by proposal of the theorist That is how the theory accounts for the observation that q.i is controlled. The theory accounts for the observation.

Well, it depends what is meant by “variable aspects of the environment”. I’m still not sure what you mean by it, so I think we are talking about different things. We were discussing it in, “Re: Watching your p’s and q.i’s (was Re: Kenneth J. W. Craik on levels of perception and control)” but I didn’t see a response after (Rupert Young (2017.12.29 17.15)). There I did suggest, “Therefore, there is no contradiction is saying that only perception is controlled and “aspects of the environment” are controlled.”

I still have in mind the example of RDSs (random dot sterograms), where, it seems to me, no aspects of the environment vary while the perception is being controlled, so how can it be t hat “aspects of the environment” are being controlled?

Regards,
Rupert

Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Clinical Psychology

School of Health Sciences
2nd Floor Zochonis Building
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk

Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589

Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406

Advanced notice of a new transdiagnostic therapy manual, authored by Carey, Mansell & Tai - Principles-Based Counselling and Psychotherapy: A Method of Levels Approach

Available Now

Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory

[From Rupert Young (2018.05.28 11.25)]

I don't think it is necessary to invoke imagination here. The

“information” to perceive an image is being presented to the
perceptual system to create the perception just as (almost) as with
other situations, such as the Ames room or watching TV, or with
normal real life. It’s just that you have to change your focus from
normal to conjure the perception.
Rupert

···

On 23/05/2018 12:45, Warren Mansell
( via csgnet Mailing List) wrote:

      "RY: I still have in mind the example of RDSs (random dot

sterograms), where, it seems to me, no aspects of the
environment vary while the perception is being controlled, so
how can it be that “aspects of the environment” are being
controlled?"

      Hi Rupert, so that means that you can control perception

without controlling the variable aspect of the environment,
but doesn’t logically mean that perception is being controlled
every time that a variable aspect of the environment is being
controlled. It seems that the phenomenon is control of a
variable in the environment, and the explanation is the
control of the perceived aspects of the environment (PCT). But
in the RDS, isn’t that a different phenomenon to explain?
Through a more sophisticated component of PCT (e.g. the
imaginal connection?)

Warren

wmansell@gmail.com