FW: Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters

David,

I perfectly agree with you. And I see you are a good tennis player. J. That’s probably the same in any sport. If we could »control behavior« of others we could probably always win. Or vica verse.

In tennis you can apply disturbances to your opponent’s control. And he com pensate for disturbances worse or better. Very good and instructing example.

Best,

Boris

···

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of David Goldstein (davidmg@verizon.net via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Thursday, November 20, 2014 1:52 AM
To: rsmarken@gmail.com
Cc: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu; Richard Marken
Subject: Re: Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters

David Goldstein (2014.11.19.2045)

I can control the behavior of the other tennis player so that they stay on the baseline on my right side. No matter where they hit the ball, I hit it on the right baseline.

Of course, if they are not interested, or can’t return my shot, I win the point. But then I lose the argument that I can control their behavior.

David

Sent from my iPad

On Nov 19, 2014, at 6:03 PM, Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.19.1500)]

On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 6:16 AM, “bara0361@gmail.comcsgnet@lists.illinois.edu (Barb Powers) wrote:

BP: Forgive me, but I’m struggling to see what is truly at issue.

Hi Barb

RM: I’m so glad you jumped in! I’ll try to explain what I think is at issue and also why understanding control of behavior is important. So I’ve changed the title of this thread because the discussion is no longer about just my demo.

BP: Some of the argument here sounds as if the theory itself is in question.

RM: No, I don’t think anyone is questioning the theory.

BP: Some of it sounds as if the specific words being used are in question.

RM: Actually I think the heart of the argument is about whether "control of behavior "is a fact or not. I am arguing that it is a fact; everyone but Martin is arguing that it is not. Those arguing that it is not a fact are basing their argument on the idea the PCT shows that “control of behavior” is impossible (this may be why you thought some of the argument questioned PCT itself; since I was saying that “control of behavior” is a fact and others were saying that PCT shows that it is impossible it could have looked like I was questioning PCT itself; don’t worry, I’m not. PCT certainly does show that “control of behavior” is possible; indeed, it explains how it works). They have made this argument mainly by questioning the words that are used to describe control of behavior (and this may be why you think that some of the argument sounded as if specific words being used were in question).

RM: I thought the argument would be finally settled by my “control of behavior” demo but, alas, like all things PCT, it wasn’t. I think this is because, at its root, this is a political issue. I think Erling described one aspect of it: just saying that “control of behavior” is possible, according to PCT, could give people the impression that PCT is like other theories in psychology which say that behavior is controlled by the environment. Another aspect of it is that many people are attracted to PCT because it seems to justify their belief that people are uncontrollable (free) and that the only thing that screws things up in the world is people trying to control other people. And they are close to being right; PCT shows that efforts to control the behavior of others – especially when this is done arbitrarily – is, indeed, the source of many (perhaps most) social problems.

RM: While I appreciate these political concerns, I think it’s more important to get the facts right than to be politically correct, especially if one wants to use PCT as a basis for improving human interaction. Which gets me to why it matters that we understand and not deny the existence of “control of behavior”. First, it matters because understanding control of behavior lets you see when you are doing it yourself. If one is convinced that PCT says there is no such thing as control of behavior then one will be unaware of when they are doing it. And since control of behavior can lead to rather ugly conflict, a person who doesn’t know when he or she is controlling behavior may have no idea why things are going so badly. Second, it matters because understanding control of behavior lets you see that you can be controlled and explains why and how. One who is convinced that PCT says there is no such thing as control of behavior will often be unable or unwilling to see when they are being controlled or how it’s beng done (or attempted). Finally, it matters because understanding control of behavior shows how it’s possible to control other people’s behavior (and allow them to control yours) with minimal or no conflict. This is particularly important when we want to produce results – such as a smart phone-- that require the coordinated efforts of many people working together who require certain behaviors from each other. Those who are convinced that PCT says there is no such thing as control of behavior will will end up controlling people arbitrarily thinking that they are not controlling anyone at all.

BP: Outside disturbances may influence behavior in another control system, but not actually control the behavior of that system.

RM: This is a crucial observation!! It’s important to know what control is in order to understand when control of behavior is happening. Controlling behavior is not the same as influencing or causing behavior. Controlling involves bringing a variable, such as the distance between the sheep and the herd in my demo, to a predetermined state, such as “sheep close to herd”, and keeping it there, protected from disturbances, which include the movements of the herd and of the sheep itself. Given this definition of control, the distance of the sheep from the herd can clearly be controlled in my demo. Since the distance between sheep and herd depends at least in part on the movements of the sheep this variable is a behavior of the sheep.

RM: So one thing that is clear from my demo is that the behavior of the sheep (just like the behavior of the cursor in a tracking task) is controlled. The data printed at the end of the demo shows how good this control was in terms of the average distance of sheep from herd (RMS error) and stability (ratio of expected to actual variance of the sheep’s position). So there is unquestionably control of behavior going on in this demo and we know why it’s happening: it’s because you (in the role of the dog) are a control system using movements of the mouse (and hence the dog) to keep the sheep near the herd. Only a control system (like you) can control. It turns out that you are exerting this control by disturbing a variable that is controlled by the sheep. But you know nothing of that (just as the dog knows nothing of that in real life). All you know is that when you move the mouse left the sheep moves right and vice versa. And when you move the mouse appropriately that you control the behavior of the sheep.

RM: But it turns out that in this demo the sheep is not an inanimate object (as is the cursor in your typical tracking task). The sheep is itself a control system, controlling for the distance between the visual location of the grass shoot and you (the dog). So when you (the dog) move you are disturbing a perception controlled by the sheep and the sheep acts (by moving left or right, as necessary) to compensate for that disturbance. So without your knowing it (and the dog certainly wouldn’t know it) you are controlling the position of the sheep by taking advantage of the fact that the sheep is controlling a perception to which your location is a disturbance that is corrected by varying the aspect of its behavior (it’s position) that you want to control. The data at the end also shows how well the sheep is controlling its perception (of the desired distance between you and the grass shoot); and it’s doing quite well at controlling by successfully moving to compensate for the disturbance created by *your *movements. You turn out to be using disturbances that influence a controlled variable as the means of controlling the variable (the behavior of the sheep that compensates for those disturbances) that you are controlling.

RM: All this is done with a PCT model of the sheep, of course. So to the extent that you are able to control the behavior of the sheep, the PCT model shows very clearly (and simply) how the behavior of a control system (the sheep) can be controlled by another control system (you, the dog).

RM: I think that’s enough for now. I’m imagine those who don’t like the idea of “control of behavior” will still not be convinced by the demo or my discussion. But there are some very interesting implications of this simple demo (and the model that shows how it works-- that is, PCT) that I’d like to talk about in this thread. But I’ll do that in another post. I got blisters on my fingers!!

Best

Rick

Goals and priorities constantly shift in order to maintain a certain level of accomplishment, satisfaction, etc., conscious or unconscious. When a conflict becomes apparent, something on one side or another of that conflict must change in order to move on. We can either reach our goal despite the disturbance or change our goal to accommodate that disturbance.

I liked Rick’s sheep demo, and admittedly played with it for awhile during a lull at work. The dog has been trained that the sheep should be kept together so it has learned on some level that it can bark and nip from certain angles and the sheep will move away from it. Sheep are wild animals, and generally will move away from what looks like a threat. If the dog is not in the way, it will try to get back to the herd. It looks as if the dog is “controlling” the sheep, and the farmer (me) and the dog appear satisfied that this is what is happening. The sheep didn’t return to the herd because the dog controlled it. To the sheep, the dog was behaving in a threatening manner, and the goal of the sheep was to return to the safety of the herd.

The sheep could have turned rogue and decided it wasn’t afraid of the dog, and kept running away, contrary to what the dog was trying to accomplish. Had the dog remained between the sheep and the herd, the sheep likely would have moved further off.

The dog perceives that it is causing the sheep to move. The sheep perceives a threat, and moves itself away from the threat and back to the herd. The farmer perceives his well-trained dog (whom he influences with food) keeping his herd together. Goals have been met in each of their minds, tiny though some of those may be, but in no case here are any of them controlling one another.

*barb

On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 3:37 AM, Warren Mansell csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

In B:CP where Bill explains arbitrary control, he states explicitly that other people’s behaviour can be controlled, and that this is a major source of conflict:

'… the attempt to make behaviour conform to one set of goals without regard to other goals…that may already be controlling that behaviour–that must already exist, since the bbehaviour exists…’

Warren

On 19 Nov 2014, at 09:39, Boris Hartman (boris.hartman@masicom.net via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

What a construct.

Where Bill divided environment into physical and social environment with different effects of disturbances and different perceptual signals for living and non-living environment. Show me in any of his diagrams ?

There are just physical variables (distal stimuli) outside which are turned into perceptual signals and which are than all compared in comparator (neurons) inside LCS. What LCS experience is just perception (disturbances), no mater what is causing disturbances in environment and later perception. I also didn’t see in any of his defintions or books divission on physical and social environment. The question is whether environment »controls behavior of LCS or not« ? As I see your writings you say once yes and once no. It’s total confussion.

If you are phylosophing in your name under Bill’s »flag« than you should find a citation that could support your statement in the name of PCT. If you don’t give that proof, I can just conclude that it’s your imagination.

LCS perceive disturbances (turned into perception), no matter who is producing them. And there is no protection against them. There is just conter-action.

Here are some Bill’s defitions just not to forget about which theroy we are talking about. And as far as I can see he is also not talking about »observable facts«. It’s subjective impression, so not something that is »definitelly or objectivelly outside« but something that is subject to human feelings and so on. See how we differently see the same »theme«. So what is here »obervable fact«.

Bill P (BC:P,2005):

DISTURBANCE : Any variable in the environment of a control system that (a) contributes to changes in the controlled quantty (b) is not controlled by the same control system.

ENVIRONMENT (of a control sytem) : All that directly affects the input function of a system and is affected by the output function of the system. See REALITY…

REALITY [Directly perceived] : The world as subjectively experienced, including mental activities, feelings, concepts, as wel as the subjective impression of three-dimensional outside universe. [External] : A directly-perceived set of hypotheses, beleifs, deducations, and organized models purporting to explain directly perceived reality in terms of underlying phenomena and laws. See PHYSICAL QUANTITY.

PHYSICAL QUANTTITY, PHENOMENON : A perception identifyed as part of a physical model of external reality.

I think it’s time that we see some real PCT wording, not just RCT wording. If you will talk what is PCT or what is not you should use PCT wording not self-regulation or behavioristic. As you can see Bill is not mentioning any different meaning for different »stimuli« or »observable facts« that is as it is because you said so…<

At least I see it this way. But I don’t see everything as »observable fact«

Best,

Boris

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2014 3:39 AM
To:
Subject: Re: Demonstration of control of behavior

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.17.1840)]

RM: One more thought regarding control of behavior. Perhaps part of the difficulty here comes from the fact hat PCT does show that the environment – the physical, non-living environment – does not control behavior. This is where PCT contradicts those, like Skinner, who believe that the environment does control behavior. Based on his experiments, for example. Skinner concluded that the behavior of organisms is controlled by “contingencies of reinforcement”. That is, behavior is controlled by the rewards and punishments (out there in the environment) that follow particular behaviors.

RM: PCT shows that this is not the case at all; the environment – in the form of stimuli, rewards and punishments – doesn’t control behavior.

HB :

According to upper Bill’s definitions this is all what we need to know.

How could rats knew what is »reward and punishment from Skinner«. Rats just perceive stimuli and control these perceived stimuli as any other stimuli from environment. There is no difference between stimuli from social and physical environment. They are all turned into perception which doesn’t distinguish between stimuli from social or physical environment. Perceptual signal is the same for all stimuli that affect input function. They just distinguish in intensity (frequency) and space code (.

But Skinner was able to control behavior with rewards and punishments – mainly rewards – so what’s going on here? Why would PCT deny that rewards and punishments control behavior? The answer is that PCT let’s us see the wizard that, in this case, isn’t even behind the curtain; the wizard who is doing the actual controlling is in full view but, somehow, never noticed . It’s Skinner who is controlling the behavior using rewards and punishments, not the rewards and punishments themselves.

Rewards and punishments are not control systems; they have no goals for what an organism should do. But Skinner did. Skinner wanted to see a rat press a lever to get food, for example, and he found that he could get the rat to do that using a process called “shaping”, which involves rewarding the animal for making successive approximations to the desired behavior (bar pressing). Skinner was clearly controlling the behavior of the rat, and he did it by varying his actions (giving or withholding rewards) with the aim of getting his perception of the rat’s behavior to be what he wanted it to be.

He could also build machines that could stand in for his controlling; so once the rat had been “shaped” into pressing the bar the machine could take over and give a reward only after a press (or several presses) were made. Of course, the machine is not really controlling the rat either since it would deliver a reward even if the bar were pressed by someone other than the rat. And if the pellet delivery system were jammed the rat would eventually stop pressing the bar and the machine would do nothing to get it back to the bar. The machine can’t perceive the rat’s behavior and act appropriately if it’s not doing what is “wanted”, becuase the machine also has no wants (references).

The point is that PCT shows that the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system. It’s not “the environment” consisting of stimuli ,rewards, or punishments that controls behavior; it is the other control systems in that environment – generally other people – that use stimuli, rewards or punishments to control behavior. And if the controlling is not consensual or if it requires the controllee to do things that conflict with other goals (including the goal of not being controlled) then the controllee might decide to resist the controlling; and then things get ugly.

HB : I never saw in PCT (Bill’s theory) to be pointing to anything you say and I didn’t see anything you wrote. Where did you see him saying »the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system«. It looks like your construct of PCT, which can be called RCT. If you are talking in the name of PCT I think you should prove it wilh some Bill’s defintion or Bill’s writings, as that is now only reference for what is true about PCT or not. You are using PCT as cover for your behavioristic and self-regulation theory. You are almost duplicate of Carver & Scheier. Why don’t you join them ?

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

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Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

BP: Outside disturbances may influence behavior in another control system, but not actually control the behavior of that system.

RM: This is a crucial observation!! It’s important to know what control is in order to understand when control of behavior is happening. Controlling behavior is not the same as influencing or causing behavior.

HB :

As I see it, he wrote that CONTROL SYSTEM CAN »INFLUENCE« OTHER CONTROL SYSTEM, BUT CAN NOT ACTUALLY CONTROL BEHAVIOR OF THAT SYSTEM. Dog can not control sheep behavior, but can influence that behavior via »disturbances«.

RM : Controlling involves bringing a variable, such as the distance between the sheep and the herd in my demo, to a predetermined state, such as “sheep close to herd”, and keeping it there, protected from disturbances, which include the movements of the herd and of the sheep itself.

HB :

Where did Bill wrote this one ? I can’t find it in his literature ? Or it’s your imagination again ? If I compare your defition with Bill’s text, you made at least 3 mistakes. Again.

HB :

Given this definition of control, the distance of the sheep from the herd can clearly be controlled in my demo. Since the distance between sheep and herd depends at least in part on the movements of the sheep this variable is a behavior of the sheep.

HB :

Read once again Bill’s writings. It says : other control system can influence behavior in another control system, but not actually control the behavior of that system.

Best,

Boris

···

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Thursday, November 20, 2014 12:04 AM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Cc: Richard Marken
Subject: Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.19.1500)]

On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 6:16 AM, “bara0361@gmail.comcsgnet@lists.illinois.edu (Barb Powers) wrote:

BP: Forgive me, but I’m struggling to see what is truly at issue.

Hi Barb

RM: I’m so glad you jumped in! I’ll try to explain what I think is at issue and also why understanding control of behavior is important. So I’ve changed the title of this thread because the discussion is no longer about just my demo.

BP: Some of the argument here sounds as if the theory itself is in question.

RM: No, I don’t think anyone is questioning the theory.

BP: Some of it sounds as if the specific words being used are in question.

RM: Actually I think the heart of the argument is about whether "control of behavior "is a fact or not. I am arguing that it is a fact; everyone but Martin is arguing that it is not. Those arguing that it is not a fact are basing their argument on the idea the PCT shows that “control of behavior” is impossible (this may be why you thought some of the argument questioned PCT itself; since I was saying that “control of behavior” is a fact and others were saying that PCT shows that it is impossible it could have looked like I was questioning PCT itself; don’t worry, I’m not. PCT certainly does show that “control of behavior” is possible; indeed, it explains how it works). They have made this argument mainly by questioning the words that are used to describe control of behavior (and this may be why you think that some of the argument sounded as if specific words being used were in question).

RM: I thought the argument would be finally settled by my “control of behavior” demo but, alas, like all things PCT, it wasn’t. I think this is because, at its root, this is a political issue. I think Erling described one aspect of it: just saying that “control of behavior” is possible, according to PCT, could give people the impression that PCT is like other theories in psychology which say that behavior is controlled by the environment. Another aspect of it is that many people are attracted to PCT because it seems to justify their belief that people are uncontrollable (free) and that the only thing that screws things up in the world is people trying to control other people. And they are close to being right; PCT shows that efforts to control the behavior of others – especially when this is done arbitrarily – is, indeed, the source of many (perhaps most) social problems.

RM: While I appreciate these political concerns, I think it’s more important to get the facts right than to be politically correct, especially if one wants to use PCT as a basis for improving human interaction. Which gets me to why it matters that we understand and not deny the existence of “control of behavior”. First, it matters because understanding control of behavior lets you see when you are doing it yourself. If one is convinced that PCT says there is no such thing as control of behavior then one will be unaware of when they are doing it. And since control of behavior can lead to rather ugly conflict, a person who doesn’t know when he or she is controlling behavior may have no idea why things are going so badly. Second, it matters because understanding control of behavior lets you see that you can be controlled and explains why and how. One who is convinced that PCT says there is no such thing as control of behavior will often be unable or unwilling to see when they are being controlled or how it’s beng done (or attempted). Finally, it matters because understanding control of behavior shows how it’s possible to control other people’s behavior (and allow them to control yours) with minimal or no conflict. This is particularly important when we want to produce results – such as a smart phone-- that require the coordinated efforts of many people working together who require certain behaviors from each other. Those who are convinced that PCT says there is no such thing as control of behavior will will end up controlling people arbitrarily thinking that they are not controlling anyone at all.

BP: Outside disturbances may influence behavior in another control system, but not actually control the behavior of that system.

RM: This is a crucial observation!! It’s important to know what control is in order to understand when control of behavior is happening. Controlling behavior is not the same as influencing or causing behavior. Controlling involves bringing a variable, such as the distance between the sheep and the herd in my demo, to a predetermined state, such as “sheep close to herd”, and keeping it there, protected from disturbances, which include the movements of the herd and of the sheep itself. Given this definition of control, the distance of the sheep from the herd can clearly be controlled in my demo. Since the distance between sheep and herd depends at least in part on the movements of the sheep this variable is a behavior of the sheep.

RM: So one thing that is clear from my demo is that the behavior of the sheep (just like the behavior of the cursor in a tracking task) is controlled. The data printed at the end of the demo shows how good this control was in terms of the average distance of sheep from herd (RMS error) and stability (ratio of expected to actual variance of the sheep’s position). So there is unquestionably control of behavior going on in this demo and we know why it’s happening: it’s because you (in the role of the dog) are a control system using movements of the mouse (and hence the dog) to keep the sheep near the herd. Only a control system (like you) can control. It turns out that you are exerting this control by disturbing a variable that is controlled by the sheep. But you know nothing of that (just as the dog knows nothing of that in real life). All you know is that when you move the mouse left the sheep moves right and vice versa. And when you move the mouse appropriately that you control the behavior of the sheep.

RM: But it turns out that in this demo the sheep is not an inanimate object (as is the cursor in your typical tracking task). The sheep is itself a control system, controlling for the distance between the visual location of the grass shoot and you (the dog). So when you (the dog) move you are disturbing a perception controlled by the sheep and the sheep acts (by moving left or right, as necessary) to compensate for that disturbance. So without your knowing it (and the dog certainly wouldn’t know it) you are controlling the position of the sheep by taking advantage of the fact that the sheep is controlling a perception to which your location is a disturbance that is corrected by varying the aspect of its behavior (it’s position) that you want to control. The data at the end also shows how well the sheep is controlling its perception (of the desired distance between you and the grass shoot); and it’s doing quite well at controlling by successfully moving to compensate for the disturbance created by *your *movements. You turn out to be using disturbances that influence a controlled variable as the means of controlling the variable (the behavior of the sheep that compensates for those disturbances) that you are controlling.

RM: All this is done with a PCT model of the sheep, of course. So to the extent that you are able to control the behavior of the sheep, the PCT model shows very clearly (and simply) how the behavior of a control system (the sheep) can be controlled by another control system (you, the dog).

RM: I think that’s enough for now. I’m imagine those who don’t like the idea of “control of behavior” will still not be convinced by the demo or my discussion. But there are some very interesting implications of this simple demo (and the model that shows how it works-- that is, PCT) that I’d like to talk about in this thread. But I’ll do that in another post. I got blisters on my fingers!!

Best

Rick

Goals and priorities constantly shift in order to maintain a certain level of accomplishment, satisfaction, etc., conscious or unconscious. When a conflict becomes apparent, something on one side or another of that conflict must change in order to move on. We can either reach our goal despite the disturbance or change our goal to accommodate that disturbance.

I liked Rick’s sheep demo, and admittedly played with it for awhile during a lull at work. The dog has been trained that the sheep should be kept together so it has learned on some level that it can bark and nip from certain angles and the sheep will move away from it. Sheep are wild animals, and generally will move away from what looks like a threat. If the dog is not in the way, it will try to get back to the herd. It looks as if the dog is “controlling” the sheep, and the farmer (me) and the dog appear satisfied that this is what is happening. The sheep didn’t return to the herd because the dog controlled it. To the sheep, the dog was behaving in a threatening manner, and the goal of the sheep was to return to the safety of the herd.

The sheep could have turned rogue and decided it wasn’t afraid of the dog, and kept running away, contrary to what the dog was trying to accomplish. Had the dog remained between the sheep and the herd, the sheep likely would have moved further off.

The dog perceives that it is causing the sheep to move. The sheep perceives a threat, and moves itself away from the threat and back to the herd. The farmer perceives his well-trained dog (whom he influences with food) keeping his herd together. Goals have been met in each of their minds, tiny though some of those may be, but in no case here are any of them controlling one another.

*barb

On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 3:37 AM, Warren Mansell csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

In B:CP where Bill explains arbitrary control, he states explicitly that other people’s behaviour can be controlled, and that this is a major source of conflict:

'… the attempt to make behaviour conform to one set of goals without regard to other goals…that may already be controlling that behaviour–that&nnbsp;must already exist, since the behaviour exists…’

Warren

On 19 Nov 2014, at 09:39, Boris Hartman (boris.hartman@masicom.net via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

What a construct.

Where Bill divided environment into physical and social environment with different effects of disturbances and different perceptual signals for living and non-living environment. Show me in any of his diagrams ?

There are just physical variables (distal stimuli) outside which are turned into perceptual signals and which are than all compared in comparator (neurons) inside LCS. What LCS experience is just perception (disturbances), no mater what is causing disturbances in environment and later perception. I also didn’t see in any of his defintions or books divission on physical and social environment. The question is whether environment »controls behavior of LCS or not« ? As I see your writings you say once yes and once no. It’s total confussion.

If you are phylosophing in your name under Bill’s »flag« than you should find a citation that could support your statement in the name of PCT. If you don’t give that proof, I can just conclude that it’s your imagination.

LCS perceive disturbances (turned into perception), no matter who is producing them. And there is no protection against them. There is just conter-action.

Here are some Bill’s defitions just not to forget about which theroy we are talking about. And as far as I can see he is also not talking about »observable facts«. It’s subjective impression, so not something that is »definitelly or objectivelly outside« but something that is subject to human feelings and so on. See how we differently see the same »theme«. So what is here »obervable fact«.

Bill P (BC:P,2005):

DISTURBANCE : Any variable in the environment of a control system that (a) contributes to changes in the controlled quantty (b) is not controlled by the same control system.

ENVIRONMENT (of a control sytem) : All that directly affects the input function of a system and is affected by the output function of the system. See REALITY…

REALITY [Directly perceived] : The world as subjectively experienced, including mental activities, feelings, concepts, as wel as the subjective impression of three-dimensional outside universe. [External] : A directly-perceived set of hypotheses, beleifs, deducations, and organized models purporting to explain directly perceived reality in terms of underlying phenomena and laws. See PHYSICAL QUANTITY.

PHYSICAL QUANTTITY, PHENOMENON : A perception identifyed as part of a physical model of external reality.

I think it’s time that we see some real PCT wording, not just RCT wording. If you will talk what is PCT or what is not you should use PCT wording not self-regulation or behavioristic. As you can see Bill is not mentioning any different meaning for different »stimuli« or »observable facts« that is as it is because you said so…

At least I see it this way. But I don’t see everything as »observable fact«

Best,

Boris

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2014 3:39 AM
To:
Subject: Re: Demonstration of control of behavior

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.17.1840)]

RM: One more thought regarding control of behavior. Perhaps part of the difficulty here comes from the fact hat PCT does show that the environment – the physical, non-living environment – does not control behavior. This is where PCT contradicts those, like Skinner, who believe that the environment does control behavior. Based on his experiments, for example. Skinner concluded that the behavior of organisms is controlled by “contingencies of reinforcement”. That is, behavior is controlled by the rewards and punishments (out there in the environment) that follow particular behaviors.

RM: PCT shows that this is not the case at all; the environment – in the form of stimuli, rewards and punishments – doesn’t control behavior.

HB :

According to upper Bill’s definitions this is all what we need to know.

How could rats knew what is »reward and punishment from Skinner«. Rats just perceive stimuli and control these perceived stimuli as any other stimuli from environment. There is no difference between stimuli from social and physical environment. They are all turned into perception which doesn’t distinguish between stimuli from social or physical environment. Perceptual signal is the same for all stimuli that affect input function. They just distinguish in intensity (frequency) and space code (.

But Skinner was able to control behavior with rewards and punishments – mainly rewards – so what’s going on here? Why would PCT deny that rewards and punishments control behavior? The answer is that PCT let’s us see the wizard that, in this case, isn’t even behind the curtain; the wizard who is doing the actual controlling is in full view but, somehow, never noticed . It’s Skinner who is controlling the behavior using rewards and punishments, not the rewards and punishments themselves.

Rewards and punishments are not control systems; they have no goals for what an organism should do. But Skinner did. Skinner wanted to see a rat press a lever to get food, for example, and he found that he could get the rat to do that using a process called “shaping”, which involves rewarding the animal for making successive approximations to the desired behavior (bar pressing). Skinner was clearly controlling the behavior of the rat, and he did it by varying his actions (giving or withholding rewards) with the aim of getting his perception of the rat’s behavior to be what he wanted it to be.

He could also build machines that could stand in for his controlling; so once the rat had been “shaped” into pressing the bar the machine could take over and give a reward only after a press (or several presses) were made. Of course, the machine is not really controlling the rat either since it would deliver a reward even if the bar were pressed by someone other than the rat. And if the pellet delivery system were jammed the rat would eventually stop pressing the bar and the machine would do nothing to get it back to the bar. The machine can’t perceive the rat’s behavior and act appropriately if it’s not doing what is “wanted”, becuase the machine also has no wants (references).

The point is that PCT shows that the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system. It’s not “the environment” consisting of stimuli ,rewards, or punishments that controls behavior; it is the other control systems in that environment – generally other people – that use stimuli, rewards or punishments to control behavior. And if the controlling is not consensual or if it requires the controllee to do things that conflict with other goals (including the goal of not being controlled) then the controllee might decide to resist the controlling; and then things get ugly.

HB : I never saw in PCT (Bill’s theory) to be pointing to anything you say and I didn’t see anything you wrote. Where did you see him saying »the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system«. It looks like your construct of PCT, which can be called RCT. If you are talking in the name of PCT I think you should prove it wilh some Bill’s defintion or Bill’s writings, as that is now only reference for what is true about PCT or not. You are using PCT as cover for your behavioristic and self-regulation theory. You are almost duplicate of Carver & Scheier. Why don’t you join them ?

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

David,

I perfectly agree with you. And I see you are a good tennis player. J. That’s probably the same in any sport. If we could »control behavior« of others we could probably always win. Or vica verse.

In tennis you can apply disturbances to your opponent’s control. And he com pensate for disturbances worse or better. Very good and instructing example.

Best,

Boris

···

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of David Goldstein (davidmg@verizon.net via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Thursday, November 20, 2014 1:52 AM
To: rsmarken@gmail.com
Cc: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu; Richard Marken
Subject: Re: Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters

David Goldstein (2014.11.19.2045)

I can control the behavior of the other tennis player so that they stay on the baseline on my right side. No matter where they hit the ball, I hit it on the right baseline.

Of course, if they are not interested, or can’t return my shot, I win the point. But then I lose the argument that I can control their behavior.

David

Sent from my iPad

On Nov 19, 2014, at 6:03 PM, Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.19.1500)]

On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 6:16 AM, “bara0361@gmail.comcsgnet@lists.illinois.edu (Barb Powers) wrote:

BP: Forgive me, but I’m struggling to see what is truly at issue.

Hi Barb

RM: I’m so glad you jumped in! I’ll try to explain what I think is at issue and also why understanding control of behavior is important. So I’ve changed the title of this thread because the discussion is no longer about just my demo.

BP: Some of the argument here sounds as if the theory itself is in question.

RM: No, I don’t think anyone is questioning the theory.

BP: Some of it sounds as if the specific words being used are in question.

RM: Actually I think the heart of the argument is about whether "control of behavior "is a fact or not. I am arguing that it is a fact; everyone but Martin is arguing that it is not. Those arguing that it is not a fact are basing their argument on the idea the PCT shows that “control of behavior” is impossible (this may be why you thought some of the argument questioned PCT itself; since I was saying that “control of behavior” is a fact and others were saying that PCT shows that it is impossible it could have looked like I was questioning PCT itself; don’t worry, I’m not. PCT certainly does show that “control of behavior” is possible; indeed, it explains how it works). They have made this argument mainly by questioning the words that are used to describe control of behavior (and this may be why you think that some of the argument sounded as if specific words being used were in question).

RM: I thought the argument would be finally settled by my “control of behavior” demo but, alas, like all things PCT, it wasn’t. I think this is because, at its root, this is a political issue. I think Erling described one aspect of it: just saying that “control of behavior” is possible, according to PCT, could give people the impression that PCT is like other theories in psychology which say that behavior is controlled by the environment. Another aspect of it is that many people are attracted to PCT because it seems to justify their belief that people are uncontrollable (free) and that the only thing that screws things up in the world is people trying to control other people. And they are close to being right; PCT shows that efforts to control the behavior of others – especially when this is done arbitrarily – is, indeed, the source of many (perhaps most) social problems.

RM: While I appreciate these political concerns, I think it’s more important to get the facts right than to be politically correct, especially if one wants to use PCT as a basis for improving human interaction. Which gets me to why it matters that we understand and not deny the existence of “control of behavior”. First, it matters because understanding control of behavior lets you see when you are doing it yourself. If one is convinced that PCT says there is no such thing as control of behavior then one will be unaware of when they are doing it. And since control of behavior can lead to rather ugly conflict, a person who doesn’t know when he or she is controlling behavior may have no idea why things are going so badly. Second, it matters because understanding control of behavior lets you see that you can be controlled and explains why and how. One who is convinced that PCT says there is no such thing as control of behavior will often be unable or unwilling to see when they are being controlled or how it’s beng done (or attempted). Finally, it matters because understanding control of behavior shows how it’s possible to control other people’s behavior (and allow them to control yours) with minimal or no conflict. This is particularly important when we want to produce results – such as a smart phone-- that require the coordinated efforts of many people working together who require certain behaviors from each other. Those who are convinced that PCT says there is no such thing as control of behavior will will end up controlling people arbitrarily thinking that they are not controlling anyone at all.

BP: Outside disturbances may influence behavior in another control system, but not actually control the behavior of that system.

RM: This is a crucial observation!! It’s important to know what control is in order to understand when control of behavior is happening. Controlling behavior is not the same as influencing or causing behavior. Controlling involves bringing a variable, such as the distance between the sheep and the herd in my demo, to a predetermined state, such as “sheep close to herd”, and keeping it there, protected from disturbances, which include the movements of the herd and of the sheep itself. Given this definition of control, the distance of the sheep from the herd can clearly be controlled in my demo. Since the distance between sheep and herd depends at least in part on the movements of the sheep this variable is a behavior of the sheep.

RM: So one thing that is clear from my demo is that the behavior of the sheep (just like the behavior of the cursor in a tracking task) is controlled. The data printed at the end of the demo shows how good this control was in terms of the average distance of sheep from herd (RMS error) and stability (ratio of expected to actual variance of the sheep’s position). So there is unquestionably control of behavior going on in this demo and we know why it’s happening: it’s because you (in the role of the dog) are a control system using movements of the mouse (and hence the dog) to keep the sheep near the herd. Only a control system (like you) can control. It turns out that you are exerting this control by disturbing a variable that is controlled by the sheep. But you know nothing of that (just as the dog knows nothing of that in real life). All you know is that when you move the mouse left the sheep moves right and vice versa. And when you move the mouse appropriately that you control the behavior of the sheep.

RM: But it turns out that in this demo the sheep is not an inanimate object (as is the cursor in your typical tracking task). The sheep is itself a control system, controlling for the distance between the visual location of the grass shoot and you (the dog). So when you (the dog) move you are disturbing a perception controlled by the sheep and the sheep acts (by moving left or right, as necessary) to compensate for that disturbance. So without your knowing it (and the dog certainly wouldn’t know it) you are controlling the position of the sheep by taking advantage of the fact that the sheep is controlling a perception to which your location is a disturbance that is corrected by varying the aspect of its behavior (it’s position) that you want to control. The data at the end also shows how well the sheep is controlling its perception (of the desired distance between you and the grass shoot); and it’s doing quite well at controlling by successfully moving to compensate for the disturbance created by *your *movements. You turn out to be using disturbances that influence a controlled variable as the means of controlling the variable (the behavior of the sheep that compensates for those disturbances) that you are controlling.

RM: All this is done with a PCT model of the sheep, of course. So to the extent that you are able to control the behavior of the sheep, the PCT model shows very clearly (and simply) how the behavior of a control system (the sheep) can be controlled by another control system (you, the dog).

RM: I think that’s enough for now. I’m imagine those who don’t like the idea of “control of behavior” will still not be convinced by the demo or my discussion. But there are some very interesting implications of this simple demo (and the model that shows how it works-- that is, PCT) that I’d like to talk about in this thread. But I’ll do that in another post. I got blisters on my fingers!!

Best

Rick

Goals and priorities constantly shift in order to maintain a certain level of accomplishment, satisfaction, etc., conscious or unconscious. When a conflict becomes apparent, something on one side or another of that conflict must change in order to move on. We can either reach our goal despite the disturbance or change our goal to accommodate that disturbance.

I liked Rick’s sheep demo, and admittedly played with it for awhile during a lull at work. The dog has been trained that the sheep should be kept together so it has learned on some level that it can bark and nip from certain angles and the sheep will move away from it. Sheep are wild animals, and generally will move away from what looks like a threat. If the dog is not in the way, it will try to get back to the herd. It looks as if the dog is “controlling” the sheep, and the farmer (me) and the dog appear satisfied that this is what is happening. The sheep didn’t return to the herd because the dog controlled it. To the sheep, the dog was behaving in a threatening manner, and the goal of the sheep was to return to the safety of the herd.

The sheep could have turned rogue and decided it wasn’t afraid of the dog, and kept running away, contrary to what the dog was trying to accomplish. Had the dog remained between the sheep and the herd, the sheep likely would have moved further off.

The dog perceives that it is causing the sheep to move. The sheep perceives a threat, and moves itself away from the threat and back to the herd. The farmer perceives his well-trained dog (whom he influences with food) keeping his herd together. Goals have been met in each of their minds, tiny though some of those may be, but in no case here are any of them controlling one another.

*barb

On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 3:37 AM, Warren Mansell csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

In B:CP where Bill explains arbitrary control, he states explicitly that other people’s behaviour can be controlled, and that this is a major source of conflict:

'… the attempt to make behaviour conform to one set of goals without regard to other goals…that may already be controlling that behaviour–that must already exist, since the bbehaviour exists…’

Warren

On 19 Nov 2014, at 09:39, Boris Hartman (boris.hartman@masicom.net via csgnet Mailing List) csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

What a construct.

Where Bill divided environment into physical and social environment with different effects of disturbances and different perceptual signals for living and non-living environment. Show me in any of his diagrams ?

There are just physical variables (distal stimuli) outside which are turned into perceptual signals and which are than all compared in comparator (neurons) inside LCS. What LCS experience is just perception (disturbances), no mater what is causing disturbances in environment and later perception. I also didn’t see in any of his defintions or books divission on physical and social environment. The question is whether environment »controls behavior of LCS or not« ? As I see your writings you say once yes and once no. It’s total confussion.

If you are phylosophing in your name under Bill’s »flag« than you should find a citation that could support your statement in the name of PCT. If you don’t give that proof, I can just conclude that it’s your imagination.

LCS perceive disturbances (turned into perception), no matter who is producing them. And there is no protection against them. There is just conter-action.

Here are some Bill’s defitions just not to forget about which theroy we are talking about. And as far as I can see he is also not talking about »observable facts«. It’s subjective impression, so not something that is »definitelly or objectivelly outside« but something that is subject to human feelings and so on. See how we differently see the same »theme«. So what is here »obervable fact«.

Bill P (BC:P,2005):

DISTURBANCE : Any variable in the environment of a control system that (a) contributes to changes in the controlled quantty (b) is not controlled by the same control system.

ENVIRONMENT (of a control sytem) : All that directly affects the input function of a system and is affected by the output function of the system. See REALITY…

REALITY [Directly perceived] : The world as subjectively experienced, including mental activities, feelings, concepts, as wel as the subjective impression of three-dimensional outside universe. [External] : A directly-perceived set of hypotheses, beleifs, deducations, and organized models purporting to explain directly perceived reality in terms of underlying phenomena and laws. See PHYSICAL QUANTITY.

PHYSICAL QUANTTITY, PHENOMENON : A perception identifyed as part of a physical model of external reality.

I think it’s time that we see some real PCT wording, not just RCT wording. If you will talk what is PCT or what is not you should use PCT wording not self-regulation or behavioristic. As you can see Bill is not mentioning any different meaning for different »stimuli« or »observable facts« that is as it is because you said so…<

At least I see it this way. But I don’t see everything as »observable fact«

Best,

Boris

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2014 3:39 AM
To:
Subject: Re: Demonstration of control of behavior

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.17.1840)]

RM: One more thought regarding control of behavior. Perhaps part of the difficulty here comes from the fact hat PCT does show that the environment – the physical, non-living environment – does not control behavior. This is where PCT contradicts those, like Skinner, who believe that the environment does control behavior. Based on his experiments, for example. Skinner concluded that the behavior of organisms is controlled by “contingencies of reinforcement”. That is, behavior is controlled by the rewards and punishments (out there in the environment) that follow particular behaviors.

RM: PCT shows that this is not the case at all; the environment – in the form of stimuli, rewards and punishments – doesn’t control behavior.

HB :

According to upper Bill’s definitions this is all what we need to know.

How could rats knew what is »reward and punishment from Skinner«. Rats just perceive stimuli and control these perceived stimuli as any other stimuli from environment. There is no difference between stimuli from social and physical environment. They are all turned into perception which doesn’t distinguish between stimuli from social or physical environment. Perceptual signal is the same for all stimuli that affect input function. They just distinguish in intensity (frequency) and space code (.

But Skinner was able to control behavior with rewards and punishments – mainly rewards – so what’s going on here? Why would PCT deny that rewards and punishments control behavior? The answer is that PCT let’s us see the wizard that, in this case, isn’t even behind the curtain; the wizard who is doing the actual controlling is in full view but, somehow, never noticed . It’s Skinner who is controlling the behavior using rewards and punishments, not the rewards and punishments themselves.

Rewards and punishments are not control systems; they have no goals for what an organism should do. But Skinner did. Skinner wanted to see a rat press a lever to get food, for example, and he found that he could get the rat to do that using a process called “shaping”, which involves rewarding the animal for making successive approximations to the desired behavior (bar pressing). Skinner was clearly controlling the behavior of the rat, and he did it by varying his actions (giving or withholding rewards) with the aim of getting his perception of the rat’s behavior to be what he wanted it to be.

He could also build machines that could stand in for his controlling; so once the rat had been “shaped” into pressing the bar the machine could take over and give a reward only after a press (or several presses) were made. Of course, the machine is not really controlling the rat either since it would deliver a reward even if the bar were pressed by someone other than the rat. And if the pellet delivery system were jammed the rat would eventually stop pressing the bar and the machine would do nothing to get it back to the bar. The machine can’t perceive the rat’s behavior and act appropriately if it’s not doing what is “wanted”, becuase the machine also has no wants (references).

The point is that PCT shows that the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system. It’s not “the environment” consisting of stimuli ,rewards, or punishments that controls behavior; it is the other control systems in that environment – generally other people – that use stimuli, rewards or punishments to control behavior. And if the controlling is not consensual or if it requires the controllee to do things that conflict with other goals (including the goal of not being controlled) then the controllee might decide to resist the controlling; and then things get ugly.

HB : I never saw in PCT (Bill’s theory) to be pointing to anything you say and I didn’t see anything you wrote. Where did you see him saying »the only thing that can control the behavior of a control system is another control system«. It looks like your construct of PCT, which can be called RCT. If you are talking in the name of PCT I think you should prove it wilh some Bill’s defintion or Bill’s writings, as that is now only reference for what is true about PCT or not. You are using PCT as cover for your behavioristic and self-regulation theory. You are almost duplicate of Carver & Scheier. Why don’t you join them ?

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.20.1125)]

···

On Thu, Nov 20, 2014 at 9:03 AM, “Boris Hartman” csgnet@lists.illinois.edu wrote:

RM: This is a crucial observation!! It’s important to know what control is in order to understand when control of behavior is happening. Controlling behavior is not the same as influencing or causing behavior.

HB :

As I see it, he wrote that CONTROL SYSTEM CAN »INFLUENCE« OTHER CONTROL SYSTEM, BUT CAN NOT ACTUALLY CONTROL BEHAVIOR OF THAT SYSTEM. Dog can not control sheep behavior, but can influence that behavior via »disturbances«.

RM: If the “he” you are referring to is Bill Powers, I doubt very much that he wrote this. Where did you find this? Please give me the reference (book or article and page number) so I can see for myself.

RM: I find it difficult to believe that Bill would write this because a control system doesn’t just influence variables (behavioral or otherwise). It controls variables (brings them to reference states) by influencing those variables in just the right way so that they are brought to the reference states and maintained there, protected from disturbance (as best as possible).

RM : Controlling involves bringing a variable, such as the distance between the sheep and the herd in my demo, to a predetermined state, such as “sheep close to herd”, and keeping it there, protected from disturbances, which include the movements of the herd and of the sheep itself.

HB : Where did Bill wrote this one ?

RM: I understand control theory in terms of models – working computer models -not in terms of quotations. What I say here is based on my understanding of how the control model works. Bill wrote very similar descriptions of controlling (based on his understanding of control theory which also came from understanding the workings of computer models – and actual control systems) but I don’t remember where I read each one. But I don’t have to go search for them because I don’t gauge my understanding of control theory in terms of whether I generate sentences that match Bill’s. I gauge it in terms of whether what I say corresponds to how the model actually works.

RM :Given this definition of control, the distance of the sheep from the herd can clearly be controlled in my demo. Since the distance between sheep and herd depends at least in part on the movements of the sheep this variable is a behavior of the sheep.

HB :Read once again Bill’s writings. It says : other control system can influence behavior in another control system, but not actually control the behavior of that system.

RM: Again, I would really like to see where he wrote that. Please send me the reference. If Bill wrote that then he would have been wrong and Bill was almost never wrong, certainly never about something as obvious as the fact that a control system controls, it doesn’t just influence.

Best

Rick


Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.
Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

For the beggining to clarify some terms.

RM :

And they are also standing where David wants them to stand. They are controlling and being controlled.

BP :

Outside distrrbances may influence behavior in another control system, but not actually control the behavior of that system.

HB :

Outside disturbances are affecting control, but not »overtaking control«. You have to prove that HPCT can be set references through 11. Level to say that one LCS can »control behavior« of another LCS. You can’t control LCS with perceptual input. You need also references. In which language can we talk to you, that you will understand it. Isn’t it your language enough. You are just confusing Barb with contradicting statements :

RM earlier :

What we often notice about behavior are responses to disturbances to controlled perceptions and fail to notice that the responses only occur because people are controlling those perception.

I think that *barb is absolutelly right. I haven’t seen such a good thinking seen I talked to Bill. I hope she will alove me sometimes talking to her.

···

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Thursday, November 20, 2014 6:09 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters

[From Rick Marken (2014.11.20.0910)]

David Goldstein (2014.11.19.2045)

DG:I can control the behavior of the other tennis player so that they stay on the baseline on my right side. No matter where they hit the ball, I hit it on the right baseline.

BP …which is your perception.

RM: Right. David is controlling his perception of the opponent’s position on the court, keeping that player behind the baseline. And he’s able to do that to the extent that the opponent is able to control his or her perception of getting behind the ball to hit it.

HB : David is not keeping the player behind the baseline. The opponet is keeping himself behind the baseline if he wnats to win. As barb said it’s the goal of opponent that which will »keep« his position not David. It depends from the opponent waht he will do (which perception will he control, which goal he will persue). It’s just David’s perception (iluusion) that he is »keeping« the opponent behind the baseline. I think that’s what barbwnated to say.

BP: The other player is in control of their own actions,

RM: Actually the other player (like everyone else) is controlling their own perceptions, not their actions.

HB : Bingo. I’m telling you all the time that pepole, players are »controlling perception«, not »controlling behavior« (actions).

But Barb wrote »in control of their own actions«, what could mean »that perception is being controlled and consequently actions as means of control«.

RM :

In this case, in order to control the perception of being behind the ball the other player must vary his or her actions (in this case, the action of moving to the appropriate position on the court) in order to keep that perception under control. So David can control the other player’s actions, keeping him or her behind the baseline, by hitting the ball to the baseline.

HB :

David is »influencing behavior of opponent« (distrubing), but what opponent will actually do is up to him.

RM :

Both David and the other player are controlling their perceptions.

HB : Very good…

/p>

RM :

David is in control of is a perception of an aspect of the behavior of the other player: their location on the court.

HB :

Ups sorry. I prized you too soon.

BP: because they are positioning themselves in the best place to keep returning the ball. They perceive the ball being hit in the same general area over and over, so in order to meet their own goal of being able to keep returning it, they do appear to stand where you want them.

RM: Why say “appear”? The other player is, in fact, standing where David wants him or her to stand.

HB : No. The player is in fact standing there where he wants too (as Barb said), for example If he sees that he will not catch the ball, he will just look at it. It depends as *barb said : They still are measuring, adjusting, calculating, even if only slightly, according to their perception of how to best play the game.

Great observing Barb…. Do you play tennis ?

David’s actions are not implying that opponets behavior will actually happen. Maybe David can expect some behavior of the opponent to occur, but the opponent can also surprise David with some other action. But David said it for himself…

DG earlier :

Of course, if they are not interested, or can’t return my shot, I win the point. But then I lose the argument that I can control their behavior.

It depends from the »predefined state« in the controlling system which perception will control and how player will »control peception«. And there is no way that David could know that about opponent. Although we can expect, predict, etc. some opponets actions. But what really happens in actual moment depends from control of »inside variables« and reorganization, not outside.

If the player is not »motivated« any more for the game, he will not even look at the ball. In different parts of the game players are differently »motivated« to play the game. Or maybe it’s better to say that the gain is varying. So their actions will be adjusted to their »predefined inner state« not to Davids actions (disturbances, percpetions, whatever)…

Player’s controlling in the play are fluctuating with their »concentration«, »tiredness«, »motivation«, etc. So that action can be hardly predicted (although sometimes succesfull) from opponents actions. … See the match Tommy Robredo : Andy Murrey. What happend at the end of the game…and how »varying control« of both players duriing the match took place. It’s nice example how actions are consequence of reroganization and inner state »intrinsic varaibles« not from opponets actions (disturbances).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kZ_Y-yraBXw&spfreload=10

RM :

He is controlling the field position of the other player…

HB :

Good players of tennis are always »controlling the field position« of the other player, for the purposes of anticipating next »move«… But if you think that David is »contrrolling the field position of other player« than no. Position of other player is controlled perception of other player with the intention of realizing his goals in hierarchy.

RM

…¦just as surely as the sheepdog is controlling the sheep.

HB :

No sheepdog is not controlling the sheep, but is influencing it’s control with disturbances not necesary to »controlled variable« in environment. It can be any »important controlled variable« inside sheep, which you don’t see, which sheepdog is disturbing, so sheep can also attack… How we could call in that case »behaviors« of both LCS ? It depends from the sheep what will do, in accordance to disturbances to her control.

RM :

And the other player is controlling his or her perception of her location relative to the ball just as surely as the sheep is controlling its perception of the distance between the dog and grass shoot.

BP: Actually, they are standing where THEY want to, if they want to enjoy a long volley.

RM: True. And they are also standing where David wants them to stand. They are controlling and being controlled.

HB : No. It’s only they are standing where THEY want to stand. They are not being controlled. They are being disturbed or influenced as *barb said.

RM :

As is David. the other player is surely controlling for keeping David in a place on the court where he can’t hit back those baseline shots. A tennis game is actually an example of people trying to control each other’s behavior;

HB : No they are disturbing each other »perception«. Not controlling each other behavior. Remember that you tried to correct *barb in the beggining. You are again contradicting yourself.

RM earlier :

Actually the other player (like everyone else) is controlling their own perceptions, not their actions.

HB : Bravo…all you have to do is to remember your words.
<

RM :

it’s a conflict situation, which is why neither player really controls the other’s behavior as well as they would like; the better player (the more skillful controller) will end up controlling the other best. If David were playing Federer his control of Federer’s position on the court would be very poor while Federer’s control of David’s position would, I would wager, be excellent (no offense David;-)

HB : If David would be motivated to play. But who knows how Federer would play against David, Maybe he would adjust the level of playing to David, not »disabeling his control«. Maybe he would help David to play his game with propriate disturbances. It’s true what said Martin : I think it is this insistence that only successful control is control that causes much of the confusion.

Opponets actions (distrubances) to other opponets control can probably really as Martin says »influnece« or disturb »succesfull or unsuccesfull« control. But not succesful or unsuccesfull »control of behavior« in any sense. Succseful or unseccsfull »Control of perception«.

Whatever is happening in the game is that both players are controlling their own perceptions and disturb (influence) each other control of perception so making it more or less succesfull as I suppose Martin meant. (it sounds good). They don’t »control behavior« of each other. People are living their lives, playing their games, all the time controlling their predefined state of organism around »equilibrium« (as Ashby would probably say) or reference »intrinsic« state (as Bill would probably say) more or less succesfully otherwise they wouldn’t be alive. And people can help each other or »disable« each other control with disturbances. Also physical anvironment can be source of disturbances that can »enable« or »disabkle« better or worse control inside organisms to »equilibrium«. in the world (physical and social environment) full of disturbances, with actions as means to compensate those disturbances or counter-act them. But most important we mustn’t forget is succesfull control of nonbehavioral means inside organisms as Bruce pointed out, which can »switch« and »turn« off behavior.

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble

Some parts of the post I sent to Rick is not actual any more, as I and Rick made a compromise about offending each other. so I delete them. I hope Rick will agree.

···

From: csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu [mailto:csgnet-request@lists.illinois.edu] On Behalf Of Richard Marken (rsmarken@gmail.com via csgnet Mailing List)
Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2014 9:33 PM
To: csgnet@lists.illinois.edu
Subject: Re: Understanding control of behavior: Why it matters

RM: But there is a lesson here. And that is that, because we are control systems, we can’t help trying to be in control and among the most important things that we try to control is the behavior of other people.

HB :

I can agree. Emphases is on »try« to control«, but you can’t control behavior of other people. But you can variously disturb »control of perception« so to maybe get »control of perception« that you wished. I think it’s your »perceptual illusion« that you »control behavior« of other people.

»Control of behavior« is old-fashioned term still used by behaviorists and sefl-regulationists. PCT uses »control of perception« and counter-action of disturbances.

RM :

I think we are unaware of how often we are involved in controlling other people’s behavior because the behavior of the people we want to control is usually what we would like it to be.

HB:

I really don’t understand how can we be involved often in »controlling other people’s behavior« if most constantly people »control their perception« which can be disturbed in different ways. Remember you corrected *barb :

RM earlier : Actually the other player (like everyone else) is controlling their own perceptions, not their actions.

HB :

Your ambiguity is really confusing …

RM:

That is, we usually need to take no action to get people’s behavior to our reference specification for it.For example, when I teach class I rarely think of myself as controlling the behavior of the students because they are rarely behaving in a way that is a disturbance to the way I would want to see them behaving. But I do occasionally have students who are engaged in disruptive behavior – such as fairly loud conversations while I am lecturing – and then my controlling is revealed in the fact that I take action (usually by just stopping my lecture and looking at the offending students) aimed at stopping the behavior – controlling that is virtually always successful.

HB :

You didn’t control their behavior. You disturbed their »control of perception«. Students control perceptions which you can’t even think off, during your lectures. You don’t know what they are controlling. Maybe one is thinking how to eliminate you, or do something to your car. Even if you think that you »controlled their behavior«, you don’t really know what »perceptions they are really controling« during your hours. But you have »perceptual illusion« that you »controlled« their behavior, which you are mixing with the way they stopped »disturbing« some of your important perceptions. Students control on many levels, and it’s hard to say which perception did you disturb with »just stopping my lecture and looking at the offending students«.But I hope that you don’t think that you were the »cause« of stopping them »control some perception« that disturbed yours. There is whole array of levels and references and I really wonder why they really stopped. Maybe affraid of punishment, or that Institution will inform parents after you »complaint« or maybe that you will give them bad marks. Who knows which important perceptions did you disturbed. But one thing is sure. You didn’t for a moment »controlled their behavior«. Because even they can’t do that. It’s just your perceptual illusion. Everything is in »control of perception«.

Best,

Boris

Best

Rick

Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
Author of Doing Research on Purpose.

Now available from Amazon or Barnes & Noble