Gene on free will & ethics

From Greg Williams (920518)

Gene Boggess (920518)

And, in reality, we all do have free will because it seems to us that we do
(it's a top-level system concept); our attempts (when we are conscious of
them) to control our perceptions seem to us to emanate from our self (another
top-level concept). It may be that in Reality our actions are
deterministically produced, but in the only reality we can know, they are
not.

I agree that it seems to me that I do have (traditional) free will. I disagree
that I necessarily have free will because it seems that I do. At the root of
our disagreement is your claim that "in the only reality we can know," our
actions are free. I think we can know more than one model of (portions of)
Reality, each model corresponding to a different reality. For example, one can
know a table naively (not a very good word -- an amazing amount of
sophistication goes into knowing something "naively"!) AND know it as physical
theory describes it. Similarly, one can know "experientially" (best word I
could think of) that one has "free will" (surely a model) AND know that it is
an illusion IF one accepts an unaugmented (that is, not including certain
types of "miracles") PCT model for nervous-system functioning. Modeling is the
Royal Road toward knowing Reality; if what one finds along that Road conflicts
with one's (or, especially, others') reality, well, that's what heretics are
(sometimes) punished for!

I think there ARE some absolute standards implied by PCT:

I claim, to the contrary, that any ethical absolutes ("ought" claims)
"implied" by PCT MUST be implied by PCT CONJOINED WITH at least one ethical
dictum. That is because PCT is not a normative theory, and normatives can only
be derived from normative postulates (suitably conjoined with non-normative
hypotheticals, of course). In other words, I claim that to derive a standard
from PCT, one must PRESUPPOSE a normative stance in addition to PCT. The
ultimate justification of the derived standard then is attributable to the
presupposed normative stance. The examples Gene gave illustrate this. (In the
following critique, I'll simply accept all of Gene's non-normative claims as
presumed to be the case.)

Given that: (1) you cannot control another person (except by force); (2)
you cannot, predictably and deterministically, change another person's
control systems; and (3) because it's all contextual and it's all
perception, we can't be sure that our standards and lower-level reference
signals will be appropriate for anyone else, THEREFORE no one should try
to impose his or her standards/reference signals on others.

Here the conclusion does NOT follow from the numbered postulates. For it to
follow, there would need to be a fourth postulate which is normative; "it is
not good to waste your time" is one such postulate which would serve. But note
that the absolutism is only for those who subscribe to the fourth postulate.

Given that: (1) control systems in good control exist in equilibrium with
their environment, and (2) the environment almost always includes other
control systems (other people), THEREFORE, to enable people to live
with one another with the least conflict, we should try to provide others
with the maximum opportunity to develop their own effective control systems.

Here there IS an (unnumbered) normative postulate (that it is good to enable
people to live with each other with the least conflict), and the conclusion
DOES follow. Again, note that the conclusion is NOT absolute for someone who
thinks it is good to promote conflict.

Given that: (1) control is impossible without feedback, and (2) feedback
is information, THEREFORE the more information made available to people,
the more effectively they will be able to control their perceptions.
(Notice I said "made available" - this doesn't mean we should flood
people with too much information for their processing systems to be able
to handle, but it does mean that they should have access to "relevant"
information [I know; it's ALL relevant, it least potentially, and in some
sense].)

Here there is no normative conclusion, so no normative postulate is needed.

I am sympathetic to the notion that PCT can be a useful tool when deciding how
to apply one's ethical presumptions. I simply want to make it clear(er) that
ethical presumptions are not part of PCT, but added on to it by human living
control systems.

Greg