Giffen Questions

[From Bill Williams UMKC 19 November 2002 4:30 PM CST]

Rick,

Battalio et al 1991 "The Experimental Confirmation of the Existence of a
Giffen Good" American Economic Review September Vol 81 # 4 p. 961-70.
Might be the place to start in looking at the experimental work. I have my
doubts about the quality of the experimentation, but I don't have any
experience with animal subjects. I'd be interested in an assessment of what
B et al are doing.

Bill,

Even the better students, even those students who are very anti-orthodox,
are never-the-less the product of a long sequence of course work which is
largely dominated by orthodox conceptions. Many of them, despite being
criical of orthodox conceptions have taught orthodox courses. So their
"understanding" of the orthodox position has been "over learned." The
situtation isn't all that different than the one which prevailed when
behaviorism was dominant in psychology. Think of what a typical humanist
psychologist would have thought of being challenged to overturn behaviorism
( circa 1955 ). When I go through the basic Giffen model it seems that some
of the students "get it." But, then if I bring up the topic some months
later, it seems obvious that prior learning of the orthdox theory has to
some extent recovered and is obstructing their new "understanding" of the
Giffen effect as a control theory phenomena.

My German guest has a Ph.D. and is currently preparing for the higher
Habituation degree. He's here on a Fulbright fellowship, able and
hardworking. But, his reaction to effort required, is "But, that's
suicidal!" If I could find it, I could quote a passage from a paper given
a paper at a recent conference which said, in effect, "... we have to give
up on attempting to build an alternative to orthodox economic theory."
There has been for a long time an fairly wide spread attitude that the best
that can be done is to provide a supplement or something of a corrective to
orthodox theory. What seems to be required is the presentation of an
extensive demonstration that a _comprehensive_ alternative conception of
the economic process is possible. And, even then, when some of the people
are convinced by a presentation, the reaction is intense anger. THis anger
probably has multiple sources. One may be doubts about whether they will be
able to understand the new point of view and the techniques required to
make it work. Many people find the task of learning to program a formitable
task. Its not that the complexity of the task is all that prohibiitive, but
it is a barrier. Especially when learning to program has to be taken on as
a task in addition to the existing workload. Once the curiculum changes
this won't be such a problem. (A similiar problem existists in ecological
theory which requires the capacity to develop computer simulations.)
Unfortunately the trend in computer languages doesn't seem to me to helpful
in providing a platform for modeling. N. Wirth seems to me to have good
ideas about how a computer language ought to be constructed, but the
industry seems to have taken a very different direction.

More on this when I'm caught up here. I'm behind on returning a critique of
a dissertation.

It's good to see the graphic depictions of the Giffen Surface. A paper on
the Giffen surface might be a way to publish something very short in a
prestigious journal. It's obvious once its pointed out-- which might be an
advantage.

best

Bill Williams

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.19.2041 MST)]

Bill Williams UMKC 19 November
2002 4:30 PM CST–

There has been for a long time an fairly wide spread attitude that
the best

that can be done is to provide a
supplement or something of a corrective to

orthodox theory.

I’m puzzled by this – are you saying that there is agreement among some
economists that something is wrong with orthodox theory? If so, why not
try to fix it? I don’t get the problem here. Are people saying “It
needs fixing but that would be too hard,” or “It needs fixing,
but not much”?

What seems to be required is the
presentation of an

extensive demonstration that a comprehensive alternative conception
of

the economic process is possible. And, even then, when some of the
people

are convinced by a presentation, the reaction is intense
anger.

Yes, I’ve seen that sort of thing, too. It’s too bad, because rational
discussion goes out the window. I think of Hugh Gibbons, whose ideas I
have admired very much in the past, holding forth in Boston with great
vehemence that if there’s any rock-solid truth in economics, it’s that
raising prices will lower demand. I don’t think he was there for the
Giffen discussion, but I rather suspect he would have been incensed at
it. Why do people make such dogmatic statements with such emotional force
that they couldn’t possibly back down from them if proven wrong?
Everybody seems to have passionate convictions about economics, as if
that were enough to make them right.

THis anger

probably has multiple sources. One may be doubts about whether they will
be

able to understand the new point of view and the techniques required
to

make it work. Many people find the task of learning to program a
formitable

task.

Well then I suggest letting them design programs but you or I or
Rick do the actual programming for them until they catch on. And I hate
to imitate the broken record again (jeez, is there anyone left alive who
knows what that means?), but the Test Bed could be a nice neutral place
to start. Here’s a consumer. What does a consumer do? Works and spends
money to buy things. OK, let’s program just that part. You work X hours
for Y dollars per hour. Where do the Y dollars come from? (employer’s
bank account) Where do they go? (worker’s bank account, wallet). Good,
now we have a program that simulates a worker working and putting his
money into his bank account or wherever he keeps it overnight. Run the
program and admire it. Then ask some more questions.

What is done with the money? (trade some for goods). Who gets the money?
(producer, employer, keep it simple). Where do the goods come from
(inventory, production).What happens to the goods? (Consumed, used up, a
few kept for a while and used). Who made the goods? (worker). What if
there’s more than one worker and more than one employer? (expand the
program to multiple instances).

This is just an exercise in common sense, bookkeeping, and conservation
of mass. If you get a few basics into a program, questions will naturally
arise about how things work in more detail, and answering those will
expand the program and raise more questions. When you’ve answered all the
questions of this sort, you will have the Test Bed, without yet having
made a single conjecture about the psychology of the consumers or
producers. Maybe this will all seem too dull and elementary for advanced
students of economics, but it’s an easy way to learn some programming and
it sets the stage for trying out different theories about people’s
economic behavior.

I don’t think you even have to say you’re revolutionizing economics.
You’re just trying to make it a little more orderly. Then go ahead and
revolutionize it.

Unfortunately the trend in computer languages doesn’t seem to me to
helpful
in providing a platform for
modeling. N. Wirth seems to me to have good

ideas about how a computer language ought to be constructed, but
the

industry seems to have taken a very different
direction.

Oh, you are SO right. Fortunately, Turbo Pascal 7.0 is still available,
and failing that, Delphi is free the last I heard (version 6.0), fairly
cheap for academics if it has to be purchased, very easy to use, and
after you get past a few preliminaries you can program in Pascal in the
same way you and I have always done it. You don’t even have to use
object-oriented programming (I never use any, at least not on purpose).
The thing is, you can make one Object that is called by clicking on a
button into THE WHOLE PROGRAM. There are some little tricks for reading
keystrokes and drawing on the screen, but they’re simple and you only
have to do it one way. Then you can forget about all this advanced
Computer Science and just get the job done.

It’s good to see the graphic
depictions of the Giffen Surface. A paper on

the Giffen surface might be a way to publish something very short in
a

prestigious journal. It’s obvious once its pointed out-- which
might be an

advantage.

Right. Maybe we can think up a few more examples, and I’m still thinking
that there must be a comparable effect for a producer, to create a
downward sloping supply curve in some circumstances. Profits go down;
producer is forced to invest more in low-profit activities and cut back
on high-profit ones. Got any bright ideas?

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.19.2041 MST)]

Second transmission – something funny about the first one, I think a bad
address.

Bill Williams UMKC 19 November
2002 4:30 PM CST–

There has been for a long time an fairly wide spread attitude that
the best

that can be done is to provide a
supplement or something of a corrective to

orthodox theory.

I’m puzzled by this – are you saying that there is agreement among some
economists that something is wrong with orthodox theory? If so, why not
try to fix it? I don’t get the problem here. Are people saying “It
needs fixing but that would be too hard,” or “It needs fixing,
but not much”?

What seems to be required is the
presentation of an

extensive demonstration that a comprehensive alternative conception
of

the economic process is possible. And, even then, when some of the
people

are convinced by a presentation, the reaction is intense
anger.

Yes, I’ve seen that sort of thing, too. It’s too bad, because rational
discussion goes out the window. I think of Hugh Gibbons, whose ideas I
have admired very much in the past, holding forth in Boston with great
vehemence that if there’s any rock-solid truth in economics, it’s that
raising prices will lower demand. I don’t think he was there for the
Giffen discussion, but I rather suspect he would have been incensed at
it. Why do people make such dogmatic statements with such emotional force
that they couldn’t possibly back down from them if proven wrong?
Everybody seems to have passionate convictions about economics, as if
that were enough to make them right.

THis anger

probably has multiple sources. One may be doubts about whether they will
be

able to understand the new point of view and the techniques required
to

make it work. Many people find the task of learning to program a
formitable

task.

Well then I suggest letting them design programs but you or I or
Rick do the actual programming for them until they catch on. And I hate
to imitate the broken record again (jeez, is there anyone left alive who
knows what that means?), but the Test Bed could be a nice neutral place
to start. Here’s a consumer. What does a consumer do? Works and spends
money to buy things. OK, let’s program just that part. You work X hours
for Y dollars per hour. Where do the Y dollars come from? (employer’s
bank account) Where do they go? (worker’s bank account, wallet). Good,
now we have a program that simulates a worker working and putting his
money into his bank account or wherever he keeps it overnight. Run the
program and admire it. Then ask some more questions.

What is done with the money? (trade some for goods). Who gets the money?
(producer, employer, keep it simple). Where do the goods come from
(inventory, production).What happens to the goods? (Consumed, used up, a
few kept for a while and used). Who made the goods? (worker). What if
there’s more than one worker and more than one employer? (expand the
program to multiple instances).

This is just an exercise in common sense, bookkeeping, and conservation
of mass. If you get a few basics into a program, questions will naturally
arise about how things work in more detail, and answering those will
expand the program and raise more questions. When you’ve answered all the
questions of this sort, you will have the Test Bed, without yet having
made a single conjecture about the psychology of the consumers or
producers. Maybe this will all seem too dull and elementary for advanced
students of economics, but it’s an easy way to learn some programming and
it sets the stage for trying out different theories about people’s
economic behavior.

I don’t think you even have to say you’re revolutionizing economics.
You’re just trying to make it a little more orderly. Then go ahead and
revolutionize it.

Unfortunately the trend in computer languages doesn’t seem to me to
helpful
in providing a platform for
modeling. N. Wirth seems to me to have good

ideas about how a computer language ought to be constructed, but
the

industry seems to have taken a very different
direction.

Oh, you are SO right. Fortunately, Turbo Pascal 7.0 is still available,
and failing that, Delphi is free the last I heard (version 6.0), fairly
cheap for academics if it has to be purchased, very easy to use, and
after you get past a few preliminaries you can program in Pascal in the
same way you and I have always done it. You don’t even have to use
object-oriented programming (I never use any, at least not on purpose).
The thing is, you can make one Object that is called by clicking on a
button into THE WHOLE PROGRAM. There are some little tricks for reading
keystrokes and drawing on the screen, but they’re simple and you only
have to do it one way. Then you can forget about all this advanced
Computer Science and just get the job done.

It’s good to see the graphic
depictions of the Giffen Surface. A paper on

the Giffen surface might be a way to publish something very short in
a

prestigious journal. It’s obvious once its pointed out-- which
might be an

advantage.

Right. Maybe we can think up a few more examples, and I’m still thinking
that there must be a comparable effect for a producer, to create a
downward sloping supply curve in some circumstances. Profits go down;
producer is forced to invest more in low-profit activities and cut back
on high-profit ones. Got any bright ideas?

Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2002.11.20.0910)]

Bill Williams (UMKC 19 November 2002 4:30 PM CST) -

Battalio et al 1991 "The Experimental Confirmation of the Existence of a
Giffen Good" American Economic Review September Vol 81 # 4 p. 961-70.
Might be the place to start in looking at the experimental work. I have my
doubts about the quality of the experimentation, but I don't have any
experience with animal subjects. I'd be interested in an assessment of what
B et al are doing.

I haven't had much experience with animal subjects either (other than humans). But
it looks to me like Battalio et al definitely demonstrated the Giffen effect with
rats. They did the experiment with 6 rats, three of which showed the effect and
three of which didn't. The experiment ws very simple. Rats were placed in an
Skinner box for three hours a day. In the box were two levers, one of which
delivered root beer and the other quinine tainted water after a certain number of
presses. This was the rats' only source of liquid during the day. The "price" of
root beer and water was determined by the number of presses required to obtain
either. So the price of root beer and water is measured in presses per drop of
liquid. the rats also has a "budget" of presses -- eg. 110. So they could "spend"
their presses on root beer and water but once they had pressed the budgeted number
of times they could get no more liquid. The rats spent 10 days with water at one
price and then 10 days with the water at a higher price. The experimenters
measured total consumption of water during the final 5 days of each session. Three
rats showed _increased_ consumption of water with increased price of water, ie.
the Giffen effect. It is not clear why three rats did not show the effect; it
could be that those rats needed less liquid or really hated the quinine or just
didn't figure out how to get more liquid by switching to the now more pricey
water. I don't think you can tell from Battalio et al's results. But what Battalio
et all do show is that the Giffen effect can be observed in animal behavior. I
see the Battalio et al study as a demonstration more than an experiment. Three
rats show a pronounced increase in their consumption of water when the price of
water (in terms of presses per drop) increases. The effect is quite clear in Table
2.

The Battalio et al study is a nice demonstration of the Giffen phenomenon. But
what I would like to see is the economic data that led to the discovery of this
phenomenon in the first place. What was the data that led Mr. Giffen to say "Hey,
people are buying more X as the price of X goes up"?

One thing that seems to be true of economics (correct me if I'm wrong, Bill) is an
almost complete lack of interest in data. The problem with orthodox economics, it
seems to me, is not so much its theory as the fact that it is _only_ theory! How
else to explain economic dogmas, like "lowering Fed rates will stimulate the
economy" and "increasing Fed rates will lower inflation", which are clearly
contradicted by the data. This can be confirmed by anyone willing to look at the
data that is available (ironically) at the Fed's own data site
(Federal Reserve Economic Data | FRED | St. Louis Fed).

Anyway, does Giffen cite any data as the basis for his observation of increased
consumption with increased price?

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[From Bill Williams UMKC 21 November 2002 8:00 AM CST]

I'm now caught up on stuff I was supposed to do here. With finals
approaching there is actually less going on that I'm involved in.

I've been attempting to think about how one would approach defining an
economic agent in inclusive and unexceptional terms. ( "General" is a
perfectly good word, but its frequent misuse has had the effect of
reversing its meaning in ordinary usage. ) After becoming frustrated by my
not being able to conceive of what a "general theory" of an economic agent
would be when defined in control theory terms, I lapsed back into what has
been for me a reliable tactic-- taking up a phenomena that is an anomolie
in orthodox economic theory and thinking about how the aberation could be
considered in a control theory context.

Given the assumptions with which orthodox theory begins-- that consumer
preferences are the ultimate starting point for economic analysis, the
advertising industry is a massive anomoly. If the consumer's preferences
are, as a matter of fact, the ultimate datum then advertising isn't going
to change preferences and expenditures on advertising are irrational.
However, if advertising does change preferences then the assumption that
markets and all the rest of the assumptions which are ordinarily employed
will no longer necessarily generate through consumer maximizing an optimum
result. Orthodox theorists cope by ignoring advertising. I've never so
much as seen advertising mentioned in an orthdox text book. There's a
famous case from the 1920's when a guy got thrown out of a college for
including a treatment of advertising in a course he was teaching.

The common element in advertising is the premise that purchasing some
product is going to solve whatever problem you have. In the gap left by
economists choosing not to think about advertising, the explaination which
has been commonly adopted has been drawn from behaviorism. ANd,
conspiciously, Watson after his academic difficulties, worked on Madison
avenue. Since we reject a behaviorist explaination for the effectiveness of
advertising, we need an alternative control theory explaination. In a
context in which reorganization is going on, suppose we assume on the part
of human subjects a tendency to select as solutions the symbols which
appear around us. Reorganization may be fundamentally random in some sense,
but the solutions adopted it seems to me are often selected from an
environment which is decidedly not random. Its not that the "Marbough Man"
is a physical stimulus to takeup smoking. Instead, in the absence of what
appears to be a better alternative, an adolecent selects as a role model
for maturation the symbol and associated product which the "Marbourgh Man"
appears to supply.

Economic orthodoxy is absurdly unable to generate anything plausible to say
about advertising. In contrast behaviorism does have a plausible story in
explaination of why advertising works. After failing to persuade people
that Billboards can't compell people to do anything using a basic control
theory argument, I had to rethink things. I don't think People believe
orthodox economics or behaviorism because they are stupid. And, negative
arguments are often not persuasive-- not in the absence of a better
alternative. It seems to me that an explaination of why it is adolecents
who take up smoking can be explained by that period being one in which a
lot of reorganization is going on. And, the primiary issue is how one can
successfully become an adult.

I'm assuming in the above thatI'm somewhere close to the mark on how
advertising works in control theory terms.

It's not that I'm opposed to a "general theory" based upon control theory
of economic behavior. Instead its that economic orthodoxy generates so
many anomolies that for the time being there isn't any shortage of stuff to
work on. I think for the time being, my "general theory" will be-- if you
don't understand why they're doing it there's probably a control theory
explaination that explains it.

This posting isn't responsive to recent posts, but I haven't yet read the
recent posts with full attention. I did sort through notes I have on the
Giffen effect. The thing to understand about the origin of the controversy
is the peculiar character of Alfred Marshall. He had what it took to be
one of the chief figures in the development of neo-classical orthodoxy.
And, in addition he was perceptive enough to realize that what he had
created was defective. But, he wasn't, late in life, prepared to start
from bare ground and contruct something entirely new. He based his comments
on the Giffen effect, on what he described as a "hint" by Robert Giffen who
was a journalist who worked for the British magazine The Economist.
Stigler's complaint about the Giffen effect or rather paradox was that
there wasn't any data to support such a wild idea. All that Marshall or
Giffen had was causual empiricism. There was before Marshall, as early I
think as the 18th century ( Gray and Beeke goods ) an idea floating about
concerning a perverse consumer behavior, but before Marshall it was
regarded as a crankish absurdity. What Marshall did was make it semi-
respectable to think about the issue. And, the increasing percision with
which economists were attempting to formualate a theory of demand gave the
issue prominance. The theory of demand in the 20th century was largely
devoted to how to handle the possiblity that a Giffen good might exist and
call into question the whole of the orthodox theory. I say the whole of
the theory because there has been a recognition of the possiblity that
Giffen like effects might intrude into the theory of production,
international trade, capital theory and elsewhere too. So, it looks as if
its possible that if one pushes hard enough on the Giffen anomolie the
whole orthodox structure might come apart.

If attached some giffen notes, but maybe the logical point at which to
start is Stigler's 1947? article on the paradox ( # 1 in the list of giffen
papers ). When I started the Giffen.lst I began by including on papers in
which the paradox was listed in the title-- the full literature is much
larger.

I just realized that using the CSGnet posting feature doesn't include the
possiblity of attaching a file. I send the attachment from my email
server. Maybe it has now recovered and you'll receive in a semi-reasonable
time.

best

Bill Williams

[From Rick Marken (2002.11.21.2040)]

Bill Williams (UMKC 21 November 2002 8:00 AM CST) --

It's not that I'm opposed to a "general theory" based upon control theory
of economic behavior. Instead its that economic orthodoxy generates so
many anomolies that for the time being there isn't any shortage of stuff to
work on.

What are these anomalies that orthodox theory generates? Are they failures to
fit data? If so, where in the world is the data. I now have two papers on
"Insurance as a Giffen good" and neither on of them has any data in it. Both
are filled with equations that, as best as I can tell, purport to describe the
conditions under which insurance becomes a Giffen good. But there is not even
one little teensy, weensy piece of data in either article. It's starting to
look to me like "orthodox economics" is a lot like orthodox religion; all
model and no observation. Unless the "reform" version of economics" adopts
the scientific method (testing models against observation) I don't think there
is anything of interest in that for me either. It suspect that the best way to
deal with "orthodox economists" is to just ignore them. I think we should
start using Bill Powers' test bed to see how well the behavior of various
models of H. economicus fit the relevant data.

If attached some giffen notes, but maybe the logical point at which to
start is Stigler's 1947?

Thanks for the article. But for me the only logical point to start is with
observation. Where are the papers that show how a model of the Giffen effect
fits the data?

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313

[Bill Williams UMKC 22 November 2002 4:30 AM CST]

Rick,

I share many, or maybe all, of the complaints you make concerning the way
economists typically go about doing and reporting their work. My only
excuse is that the orthodox folks didn't ask me about such matters.

Where is the data you ask? Well, I assume it is mouldering in some faculty
office or some basement. You could write to the authors and request the
data upon which the study they published was based. But, it is unlikely
that they would go to the trouble of sending it to you, if that is they
remember where it is. And, why should they after all? You might find
fault with what they did, and what would that do for them? You probably
wouldn't even get a post-card back from an inquiry.

About a quarter century ago some economists made an issue of this state of
things and complained about it for a few years. See Wassily Leontief 1958
"THe State of Economic Science." THe Review of Economics and Statistics
Vol 40 # 2 May pp 103-06.

or

Leontief 1971 "Theoretical Assmptions and Non-Observed Facts." American
Economic Review Vol 61 # 1 March p. 1-7. Note that this was the lead
article for that issue, there was for a time an editor who allowed some
critical papers into the AER. Galbraith was president of the Association
about this time. There was a more or less extended discussion about such
issues-- requiring as a matter of journal policy that authors retain their
worksheets and such and make them availible. But, this era is now long gone
and the move to reform publication practices so that assertions can be
independently checked died out.

As to more data on the Giffen effect see Silberberg et al 1987 "Inferior-
good and Giffen Good effects in Monkey Choice" Journal of Experimental
Pschology ( Animal Behavior Processes ) 13 July p. 292-301. The Monkey
study, if I remember it correctly, was similiar to the Texas A&M groups rat
study. Some of the monkeys exhibited a Giffen effect, but some of them
refused to eat the inferior good and the Animal welfare officer removed
them from the study. Monkey's being very expensive they didn't have very
many subjects. There have been indirect reports of a Giffen study at Cal
Tech by Plott. But, I don't think the work was ever published.

As to the question you raise about how to best apply control theory in
economics, as far as I'm concerned "Nothing suceeds like success." I am
not all that confident that the path I have taken will neccesarily be
successful. I have, however, spent 30 years studying the development of
economic thought, and the emergence of critical traditions within
economics. I've also looked at the history of psychology and biology for
the past 15 years or so. I'm not saying that the conclusions I've reached
about how to introduce control theory into economics I've reached are
neccesarily compelling. But, I have given the issue some thought. Currently
I'm in a situation in which I will have a significant "influence" upon the
way in which at least four dissertations will be written. When I came into
the office tonight the Jagacinski and Flach book was on a student's desk.
He'd ordered a copy when the notice came out. So, people here are beginning
to pay attention to Control theory. Some time ago a student compared the
predictions of the Veblen/Duessenberry model of consumer response to
changes in income to the Bureau of Labor Statistics data for consumer
expenditure. Using the data 1950 2000 ( quarterly ) gives 200
observations, but only 5 or 6 really significant transitions. All the
numbers came out with the correct sign (That is the predicted sign ) and
somewhat reassuringly plausible magnitudes. But, the data is aggregated and
not in my opinion a good basis for statistical work.

In my perception what is required is a sufficiently elaborated
demonstration that control theory can do everything that maximization was
believed to be able to do and do it better. Since it takes me about 18
months to come up with and work out demos such as the Veblen/Duessenberry
effect, or the backward bending labor offer curve when I publish I don't
expect to have anything approaching a complete system. But, the repetition
with variations of a control theory explaination to a collection of
important economic problems ought to attract attention. The capacity of a
control theory explaination to include time, value and causation in a model
provides a solution to a problem in economic theory the recognition of
which is widespread-- there really is a great deal of dis-satisfaction with
the orthodox model of econmic man. And, behaviorism also seems now to be
recognized as a fundamentally defective approach to human behavior. IN
neither case have the criticisms been taken as far as they might in regard
to fundamental issues, But, I don't remember their being a widespread
assumption that behaviorism was faulty a decade ago. Of course, Most of the
people in economics then had gotten their training, or at least their
exposure to psychology, ten or twenty years or more earlier.

One of the things that has changed since I got a degree 1972 is the amount
of communication both by increased travel and by internet. People here are
in frequent contact with people located in many of the heterodox centers
world wide. The volume of gossip is enourmous. Which means that a semiar
here on monday is being discussed in France, Britian, and North Africa that
afternoon. But, the stuff that gets noticed is the work that solves the
problems which are already percieved as problems. Good numbers in empirical
work doesn't count for much by itself. It's implicitly assume that people
will do data mining, and somehow fudge numbers. And, given the frequent
inaccessibltiy of data often work isn't replicated. In the confusion what
happens is that people choose up teams as a way of providing some order in
a situation which is fairly chaotic. Currently, there is one very big
team-- orthdox theory which has control of maybe 97 percent of the bodies
and more than 99 percent of the resources. The 3 percent of rebelious
heterodox fractions have maybe a half a percent of the resources-- if that.

So, my question would be, suppose you do some control theory economics.
Suppose you get some really good numbers. Who are you going to get to
listen to what you have to say? Consider for a moment what happened when
Bill got outstanding numbers and presented them to psychologists. So, I
don't see economists are going to be impressed with numbers either. But,
think about what's likely to happen. First thing, you'll almost surely say
what you have to say in a way that is going to sound like some foreign
language to economists. What this tells people is that you are not likely
to be a long term player in the economic theory market. Plus They can't
send their graduates to teach at your place, because you don't have a
place. And, you won't be telling an editor whether or not to publish their
stuff. Suppose you get a spot on the program, the first question is one the
audience is going to ask each other, when you stand up will be "Who are
these people?" And, the answer will be, from the audience-- "nobody knows."
It's just the way the academic world works. Not all that fair, or not fair
at all, but is it any different than your experience in psychology?

So, I'll repeat myself, My question is, suppose you come up with the
ultimate solution to economic problems-- who's going to listen? How are you
going to get you message out?

best

Bill Williams

[From Rick Marken (2002.11.22.0910)]

Bill Williams (UMKC 22 November 2002 4:30 AM CST) --

Where is the data you ask? Well, I assume it is mouldering in some faculty
office or some basement.

I'm not really expecting to find any data. I was just ranting a bit because I was
frustrated when I got the second article on "Insurance as a Giffen good". I
thought for sure that that article would show data on insurance purchasing as a
function of premium rate and coverage. So I set me up for some negative emotions.
In fact, both articles on insurance purchasing are simply exercises in
mathematics. They assume certain functions for relationships between variables
like consumption, risk aversion and coverage and then show what happens when you
try to maximize this or that variables within the constraints of these equations.
The exercise is similar to Euclidean geometry, being based on axioms rather than
data. And the authors make no claims about the ability of their "model" to
account for any data. These papers are like proofs in geometry rather than
scientific tracts.

Currently
I'm in a situation in which I will have a significant "influence" upon the
way in which at least four dissertations will be written. When I came into
the office tonight the Jagacinski and Flach book was on a student's desk.
He'd ordered a copy when the notice came out. So, people here are beginning
to pay attention to Control theory.

Too bad a copy of MR and MMR weren't on their desk. I hope to have a review of the
Jagacinski/Flach book completed by next week. I'll put it up at my web site when
it's completed.

I don't remember their being a widespread
assumption that behaviorism was faulty a decade ago.

Criticism of behaviorism started in earnest in the 1960s, when "cognitive
psychology" was born. Today I think it would be hard to find any psychologists who
call themselves behaviorists. It's not really behaviorism that's a problem but the
whole causal model of behavior. There is still no widespread (or even narrowly
spread) assumption among psychologists that there is any problem with the causal
model. There has been no progress at all toward a control theory view of behavior,
psychologists like Jagacinski and Flach notwithstanding.

My question is, suppose you come up with the
ultimate solution to economic problems-- who's going to listen?

After this long (going on 25 years now) doing relatively good work (not solving
the ultimate solutions to psychological problems, perhaps, but, I think, doing a
reasonably good job of pointing to where those solutions might lie) and having
almost no one listen (or having many of those who do listen hear something
completely different than what was said) I would have to answer this question by
saying "Almost no one". I no longer (if I ever did) do my work on PCT in the
hopes of being rewarded by people listening to or being convinced by me (any more
than I exercise in the hopes of being rewarded with long life or act decently in
the hopes of being rewarded with an eternity in heaven). I think you (like me)
study PCT because doing so is rewarding in itself (just as exercise and being a
decent person are rewards unto themselves). If your goal is to get people to
listen to you or think that you have some really profound things to say about
economics, my advice would be to look into "chaos theory" or "string theory" or
whatever is trendy these days. PCT will not only _not_ get you listened to, it
might actually get you actively ignored and despised (if you're doing it right,
that is ;-).

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken, Ph.D.
The RAND Corporation
PO Box 2138
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
Tel: 310-393-0411 x7971
Fax: 310-451-7018
E-mail: rmarken@rand.org

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.22.0933 MST)]

Bill Williams UMKC 21 November 2002 8:00 AM CST

···

I’ve been attempting to think about how one would approach defining
an

economic agent in inclusive and
unexceptional terms. ( “General” is a

perfectly good word, but its frequent misuse has had the effect of

reversing its meaning in ordinary usage. )

Right: a fact that’s “generally true” has come to mean
“sometimes true in some cases,” as opposed to the original
meaning which is “always true, in all cases.”

Given the assumptions with which orthodox theory begins-- that
consumer
preferences are the ultimate
starting point for economic analysis, the

advertising industry is a massive anomaly.

I think it might be worthwhile to back up a step from even that
apparently basic idea. What is a consumer preference, and how can it
affect how people behave? I know, one answer would be that a preference
is merely an observed tendency to buy one good rather than another, but
we can do better than that. What is it that can lead to such a tendency?

By that question, I don’t mean to ask what circumstances can lead to a
preference (for example, what sort of advertising), but what it is inside
a person that gives rise to an observable preference. Of course the
answer I would propose is that an observed preference is determined by
reference signals and control systems. This doesn’t answer the question
of what sets reference signals, a question to which the subject of
advertising may well be pertinent. It simply assumes that reference
signals are set in certain ways, and maybe that different control systems
have different loop gains, and asks what can be predicted about economic
behavior given those system parameters.

For example, suppose a person has a reference level for eating 2000
calories of food energy per day. What will happen to the vigor or amount
of the person’s efforts to obtain food as the amount obtained increases
toward the reference level? The amount obtained can be manipulated by
changing the amount of effort needed to get each calorie. As the
“price” in units of effort decreases, what do we predict will
happen?

We predict, on the basis of the simplest possible control model, that the
amount of food obtained (and consumed) will increase, and that the amount
of effort produced to obtain it will decrease. This would be true of a
control system with constant parameters; no parameters in the control
system need to change to produce this effect.

We also predict that for each person there is some particular amount of
obtained food at which all efforts to consume more of it would cease;
that would be the observable reference level, which reflects the internal
setting of the reference signal and the calibration of the perceptual
system directly or indirectly detecting food intake. In other words, we
predict that some level of food intake will be “enough.” We can
also predict that if food were donated in that amount (and of the right
kind), the amount of effort expended would drop to zero.

It seems to me that if data do not exist against which to check these
predictions, it should be easy enough to devise experiments for obtaining
data, from humans and from animals. I quite agree with Rick that
experimental data are essential for doing PCT economics, but of course if
no data exist this doesn’t mean we have to give up. It just means we have
to do the experiments, or persuade someone to do them.

What would be the position of conventional economics on this prediction?
Would it be possible to derive a prediction from the assumptions that are
made about how much of a good a person obtains, and how much effort the
person puts out to obtain it? If conventional economics does make a
prediction, it will either be the same as the PCT prediction or different
from it; furthermore, the actual behavior of people will either be like
what PCT predicts or not like it. Whatever the truth may prove to be, it
seems to me that this is an issue that can be settled one way or the
other.

The common element in advertising
is the premise that purchasing some

product is going to solve whatever problem you have.

Premise, or promise? It seems to me that advertising fulfils two quite
different functions. One is to notify people of the availability of goods
and services at certain prices. That is the “information”
function. It could indeed be that buying a widget would solve your
problem. The other is to distort the description of goods and services to
make it seem that they will satisfy more needs than they actually do
satisfy, or satisfy the same needs but with less effort, in order to
convince people that they should buy the advertised good, or buy it
rather than a competitor’s functionally identical good. That is the
“deception” function. In that case, buying the widget will NOT
actually solve your problem, Both functions work on the perceptions
of the consumer, one to provide an accurate picture of the product, the
other to provide a carefully-designed inaccurate picture.

So there is a PCT way of dealing with advertising that might well lead to
experiments. But suppose that we find that advertising does indeed have
effects on people’s preferences. What then? Will more advertising then
cause them to buy even more? Not necessarily. If I buy a potato-peeler
because I have seen that a good one is available at a price I consider
reasonable, does this mean that a stepped-up advertising campaign will
cause me to buy a second potato-peeler? Not likely. The concept of
“enough” ought to exist in economics if it doesn’t exist
now.

Reorganization may be fundamentally random in some sense,
but the solutions adopted it seems
to me are often selected from an

environment which is decidedly not random.

Of course. We reorganize randomly when there is no a priori basis
for guessing that one action would be more effective than another in
correcting an intrinsic error. One of the things we acquire from this
process is the ability to reason systematically about the world and take
actions based on understanding the world and making wise predictions
about it. If that ability proves reliable, we no longer need to
reorganize: the systematic system corrects the pertinent errors before
reorganization can come into play, removing the reason for
reorganization.

One of the aspects of this ability is the ability to translate
communications from others into perceptions even if we have not had those
perceptions ourselves. Descriptions become vicarious perceptions. We can
act to control those vicarious perceptions in good faith, taking what we
are told as true (within reason), just as we control the speed of a car
by controlling what the speedometer cdommunicates to us rather than
trying to estimate the speed from direct experience. Eventually, we will
come to distrust a faulty speedometer. We also come to distrust faulty
communications, those that deceive rather than inform. So ultimately,
advertising is self-defeating; this is probably why it is aimed to catch
the innocent and ignorant before they wise up.

Its not that the “Marbough
Man”

is a physical stimulus to takeup smoking. Instead, in the absence
of what

appears to be a better alternative, an adolecent selects as a role
model

for maturation the symbol and associated product which the
“Marbourgh Man”

appears to supply.

I’d add that the Marlboro Man implies that if you indulge in the same
behaviors he demonstrates, you will become like him in other respects:
strength, looks, sexiness, success, independence. That is deception, of
course, but if you are inexperienced and do not know better, you will
take this perception as the truth, and since it is true, you will do what
you are shown that it takes to be like that. The heart of the Marlboro
Man image is deception. It is not true that smoking Marlboros will endow
you with the Marlboro Man’s admirable attributes. But if you can be
persuaded it is true, and if you would like very much to have those
attributes, you will smoke the smoke and choke the choke. If it
were true, it would be quite rational to consider choosing present
glory over preventing possible future diabilities. The truth, of course,
is that you are subject to the future disabilities and you don’t end up
strong, sexy and so forth, either: you lose both ways.

Economic orthodoxy is absurdly
unable to generate anything plausible to say

about advertising. In contrast behaviorism does have a plausible
story in

explaination of why advertising works. After failing to persuade
people

that Billboards can’t compell people to do anything using a basic
control

theory argument, I had to rethink things. I don’t think People
believe

orthodox economics or behaviorism because they are
stupid.

Sometimes I agree with that. Sometimes I don’t. Anyway, a billboard that
tells the truth can persuade people (if not compel them) to do
things: 'FREE BEER THIS FRIDAY" would probably bring a lot of beer
drinkers in, at least until the word got out that the cover charge is
$50. It wouldn’t bring in many people who dislike beer.

It’s not that I’m opposed to a “general theory” based upon
control theory
of economic behavior. Instead
its that economic orthodoxy generates so

many anomolies that for the time being there isn’t any shortage of stuff
to

work on. I think for the time being, my “general theory” will
be-- if you

don’t understand why they’re doing it there’s probably a control
theory

explaination that explains it.

I really think we can do better than that. Uncovering anomalies isn’t
enough to persuade people they were wrong. They just assume there’s a
mistake somewhere that will fix it. The trick, I think, lies in catching
yourself taking things for granted, You’re used to the arguments that
economists use, but you’re also used to leaving out the concepts they
habitually leave out, like “enough.” I think your approach to
advertising in going the right way, but you have to watch the premises
you’re letting slip past.

One premise is that advertising is “effective.” I think the
most effective advertising ever done is the job the agencies have done in
convincing producers to spend enormous amounts of money on advertising.
Look, your competitor is spending ten million dollars on advertising –
obviously, you need to spend eleven million dollars to win back sales (we
reassure you, of course, that the shoddiness and high price of your
product couldn’t possibly explain why you sell less of it). Just watch
television for a couple of hours and ask yourself about the net effect of
commercials on your buying habits. Of course market analysis will show a
definite possible trend toward decreasing the disadvantageous position of
your product relative to saddle soap, but in fact you have to improve
your product or lower its net cost if you want to sell more of it for
long – which you already knew.

I think you will find that essentially all data about the effectiveness
of advertising has been produced by people whose fortunes depend on
convincing other people that it is effective. At least take that premise
with a grain of salt.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Williams UMKC 22 November 2002 1:30 PM CST]

Rick and Bill,

At one time the connection between economic theory and euclid was taken
quite seriously-- this was before the non-euclidian conceptions emerged.
When I was talking about what I percieve of as change in the reaction to
behaviorism, what I had in mind was the state of mind of heterodox
economists. When there seemingly wasn't anything better availible with
which to replace maximization, heterodox economists thought behaviorism
might be _the_ ultimate in scientific economics. And, it did seem to
account for some important things that orthodox theory ignored-- like the
fact that people learn things from each other. Its taken economists a
decade or two longer to catch on to what happened in the 50's through the
70's in psychology. Unfortunately there is now something of belief that
cognative psychology promises to work wonders. But, it looks to me as if
at least a big part of cognative psychology ( the information processing
input-output type anyway ) is a third version of behaviorism. When
economists think about psychology they do so from such a distance that they
often end up thinking that Skinner's psychology is a stimulus-response
theory-- I can almost quote you chapter and verse to this effect.

More about the Jagacinski and Flach text and other resources. I think there
is now sufficient interest in the possiblities of a control theory approach
to economic behavior that its time to stock the department library with
whats availible. (BTW I recently looked at the most recent edition of
Carver and Schier's sp? control theory psychology-- it looked to me as if
they've made some very considerable improvements.

I would agree that many of the claims of the ad agencies for the
effectiveness of advertising are doubtful, but somebody is getting scammed.
Who ever it is, is demonstrating that the neo-classical description of
economic man as completely rational and fully informed is mistaken.

One of the things I've been thinking about is the contrast between
something Bill P said several posts back which gave too much credit to the
orthdox position. Bill was describing utility as increasing up to some
level of consumption and decreasing when consumption exceeded some level.
But, orthodox theorists almost assume that however large consumption may
be, increasing the consumption of a good still further will add to total
utility. Off hand this may appear absurd. But economists find it useful
to make this assumption on their way to the conclusion that an idealized
free market demand curves will always slope downward so that a reduction in
price will result in an increase in the quantity demand and thus will
always generate outcomes that are stable, efficient and fair. So goods are
goods and more is always better-- they seem to think. Infamously one very
prominent Chicago economists seemed to actually believe something like this
and died at a quite early age from the effects of rather extreme obesity
and absurd consumption of alcohol. So, orthodox theorists write, when they
infrequently specify explicit functions, relationships such as U = 1/x
squared, or U = square root x /constant. This it seems to me ought to be
very easily refutable. I'm confident that if in an experiment the price of
a hamburger were reduced-- eventually reduced to zero the subject wouldn't
eat an unlimited number of hamburgers. And, that fairly quickly one would
reach a point where it would be neccesary to pay someone to consume an
extra burger. Maybe this isn't acceptable given contemporary rules
governing experimentation with human subjects, but how about mice or
insects?

With Sturgeon scheduled to become department chair, there may be more
possiblities that will open up here for presenting control theory. One
possiblity is the introduction of a course on the history of concepts of
human nature. Things don't happen quickly here. Often they don't seem to
happen at all. I spend a good portion of my time being a "good citizen" in
a department that attempts to present a variety of heterodox viewpoints.
So, I do stuff like review and comment on a paper a student is going to
give at the University of Lyon. She's a French Marxist and I don't find
the combination especially plausible. But, I pointed out a number of
places where as a matter of internal consistency and presentation the paper
might be modified. All of my suggestions were accepted-- which isn't
usually the case. But, I was pleased that it worked out well. She knew I
didn't really approve of the whole argument, but expected that I would
never-the-less have useful suggestions. This in one sense is a long, long
way from the test for the controlled variable. But, it does make something
of a contribution to an academic environment in which students become to
some extent accustomed to developing their own thinking rather than some
party line.

In the current issue of Physics Today there is an article by Hopfeld ( the
Hopfeld of Hopfeld and Tank of neuro-net fame. He has a two page statement
on what he'd like the elementary physics course to present to biology
majors. Real biology majors that is, not people taking biology to get into
med school. One of the things he said he wanted was a better introduction
to the concept of modeling.

best

Bill Williams

[From Bill Curry (2002.11.22.1500 EST)]

[Bill Powers (2002.11.22.0933 MST)]

I think you will find that essentially all data about the effectiveness of

advertising has been produced by people whose fortunes depend on convincing
other people that it is effective. At least take that premise with a grain
of salt.

One exception is direct response advertising such as magazine placements to
drive direct mail or phone order campaigns. In these instances the marketer
can precisely test and measure the cost effectiveness of advertising
expenditures.

My best,

Bill

···

--
Bill Curry
Powerseed Systems
www.powerseed.com

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.22.1931 MST)]

Bill Williams UMKC 22 November 2002 1:30 PM CST --

>One of the things I've been thinking about is the contrast between

something Bill P said several posts back which gave too much credit to the
orthdox position. Bill was describing utility as increasing up to some
level of consumption and decreasing when consumption exceeded some level.
But, orthodox theorists almost assume that however large consumption may
be, increasing the consumption of a good still further will add to total
utility.

That's really too bad. Your examples are hilarious -- but haven't orthodox
economists thought of such examples, too? It's awfully hard to believe they
haven't, and in fact if they haven't I would have to take exception to the
idea that they are of normal intelligence. Or maybe they just don't know
how others use the term maximizing.

In other fields, the idea of maximizing means just that: finding the
maximum point in a curve which is lower at all other points. A function
that increases without limit is said to have no maximum.

Keynes had some strange ideas along these lines, too, perhaps related to
the idea of maximizing utility. As I read him, he thinks, thought, that the
propensity to consume is driven by income. Of course I agree that if one's
income increases, it becomes possible to buy more, or at least to buy more
expensive versions of goods one has been buying. But this seemed at the
time I read it, and still seems, to ignore the problem of why people
consume anything. Consuming has to be something more than a way to get rid
of money. Why such reluctance to admit that consumption is a means to an
end, or a set of ends?

  Off hand this may appear absurd. But economists find it useful
to make this assumption on their way to the conclusion that an idealized
free market demand curves will always slope downward so that a reduction in
price will result in an increase in the quantity demand and thus will
always generate outcomes that are stable, efficient and fair.

Of course this absolves them from any attempt to say what is stable,
efficient, and fair. The free market will take care of all that, and
regulators and moralists can only do harm by interfering with it. My
economic theory is this: buzz off and leave me alone so I can do anything I
want in any way I want to anybody I please.

>With Sturgeon scheduled to become department chair, there may be more

possiblities that will open up here for presenting control theory. One
possiblity is the introduction of a course on the history of concepts of
human nature.

Good. And in line with this, the concept of modeling you refer to should be
part of it -- it's an important tool in some very successful fields of
investigation. I wouldn't get too insistent about things like the Test for
the Controlled Variable; if introduced like that it sounds doctrinaire,
whereas I think it can be brought in as a common-sense approach to testing
any proposed model. I would start by teaching responsible skepticism,
meaning a recognition that all ideas need to pass some sort of serious test
designed to weed out those that don't work.Nothing is true just because
someone says it's true or because someone finds it plausible. I think of
the Test as simply a way of kicking the tires that the salesman has assured
you are brand new. That can be done in numerous ways. They don't have to
have catchy names.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (2002.12.22.2027 MST)]

Bill Curry (2002.11.22.1500 EST) –

One exception is direct response advertising such as magazine
placements to

drive direct mail or phone order
campaigns. In these instances the marketer

can precisely test and measure the cost effectiveness of
advertising

expenditures.

In terms of providing information, I’m sure it’s effective. But my reason
for thinking so is rather vague, and I would be very dubious about
accepting the marketer’s own evaluation of his cost-effectiveness. After
all, that’s what the professional marketer is selling, isn’t it? He has
every reason to put a favorable interpretation on his test results, and
for that matter to devise tests that will yield the most positive-looking
results, and to conceal or minimize anything that would detract from the
rosy picture that helps him sell his services. And I doubt very much that
a professional marketer would ever tell a client that he shouldn’t be
advertising what he is advertising, or selling what he is
selling.
I have found technical advertizing to be a useful source of information
about what is available. But it’s getting to look just like any other
kind of advertising now. Even in Science and Nature, tits
and ass sell enzymes.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2002.1123.0857]

Rick Marken (2002.11.21.2040)

Thanks for the article. But for me the only logical point to start
is with observation. Where are the papers that show how a model of
the Giffen effect fits the data?

I could not help but notice the contrast between this statement and
your response to my question (about the link between positive
emotions and failure to control) which contained no reference to any
data.

[From Rick Marken (2002.11.23.0810)]

Bruce Gregory (2002.1123.0857)--

Rick Marken (2002.11.21.2040)

>Thanks for the article. But for me the only logical point to start
>is with observation. Where are the papers that show how a model of
>the Giffen effect fits the data?

I could not help but notice the contrast between this statement and
your response to my question (about the link between positive
emotions and failure to control) which contained no reference to any
data.

Maybe I wasn't clear about it in my post but when I referred to the
"...periodic pangs of love we feel for the one who said "yes" long ago"
I was alluding my own personal experience (which I presume is similar to
that of other people), which I count as data. The PCT model of emotion
(such as it is) is largely about personal experience. So much of the
pertinent data, it seems to me, will be our own observations of how we
feel in various circumstances.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
marken@mindreadings.com
310 474-0313

Re: Giffen Questions
[From Bill Curry (2002.11.22.2340 EST)]

Bill Powers (2002.11.22.0933 MST)]

I think you will find that essentially all data about the effectiveness of advertising has been produced by people whose fortunes depend on convincing other people that it is effective.

Bill Curry (2002.11.22.1500 EST) –

One exception is direct response advertising such as magazine placements to

drive direct mail or phone order campaigns. In these instances the marketer

can precisely test and measure the cost effectiveness of advertising

expenditures.

Bill Powers (2002.12.22.2027 MST)

In terms of providing information, I’m sure it’s effective. But my reason for thinking so is rather vague, and I would be very dubious about accepting the marketer’s own evaluation of his cost-effectiveness. After all, that’s what the professional marketer is selling, isn’t it? He has every reason to put a favorable interpretation on his test results, and for that matter to devise tests that will yield the most positive-looking results, and to conceal or minimize anything that would detract from the rosy picture that helps him sell his services. And I doubt very much that a professional marketer would ever tell a client that he shouldn’t be advertising what he is advertising, or selling what he is selling.

I think you missed the distinction I was drawing between general brand awareness advertising and advertising for direct marketing purposes. You were rightfully questioning the premise that advertising is cost effective for the advertiser. “Effectiveness” requires measurement of outcomes. With general advertising metrics like cost/million “impressions” you might be better off using a Ouija board to make cost-effective decisions. Given our daily ration of 600 to several thousand “impressions” per day it is of course impossible to tease out the impact of any one impression. The primary functions of general advertising is to create brand awareness or to create demand for a new product. It’s a one-way information flow from the advertiser to the market, and the sale is consummated through a third party seller at a later date. Of course general advertising works to some extent but it is only vaguely measurable. You sense this immediately when the first question out of an agent’s mouth is “What is your budget”! Agencies frequently use “Market share” as a metric of their cost effectiveness even though the advertising is only one element of many contributing to market position. Basically, the advertising sell boils down to smoke, mirrors, arm waving and over-extrapolation of anecdotal focus group sentiments.

Direct marketing, as in ordering by mail or phone from catalogs, direct mail pieces, direct response magazine ads, etc. is quite different than general advertising in several respects. It is a direct, interactive, targeted information flow between the advertiser and customer producing current sales that allow precise measurement of return on investment. Even though we wouldn’t guess it from all the flotsam that hits our mailboxes, direct mail is very expensive, particularly when you factor in escalating mail costs and the average response rate of 1-2%. The advertiser is often the cost-minimizing manufacturer and advertising placements that don’t pay out in terms of budgeted cost/order are summarily dropped. The whole process is rigorously tested for cost efficacy: Since list brokers get around $100/thousand names, lists are carefully targeted and tested before a full rollout. So too, the offer or selling proposition, the copy and the format of the package are often tested and tuned by small test mailings.

Of course both forms of advertising share the information and persuasion characteristics that you described. The interesting thing about direct marketing in terms of the current economics discussion is the potential availability of objective data that could show the impact of advertising on consumer preferences. I have even heard anecdotal reports of a Giffen-sounding scenario where a product’s sales languished at a low price point because it was perceived as too cheap but sold well when the price point was raised. Bill W – if there’s interest, I could guide you to several degree programs that specialize in direct marketing as well as other experts in this field.

My Best,

Bill

···

Bill Curry

Powerseed Systems

www.powerseed.com

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.25.0849 MST)]

Bill Curry (2002.11.22.2340 EST)--

The primary functions of general advertising is to create brand awareness
or to create demand for a new product. It's a one-way information flow
from the advertiser to the market, and the sale is consummated through a
third party seller at a later date.

Creating demand for a new product is, it seems to me, a socially legitimate
and useful role for advertising -- how else would we consumers know what is
available? As a buyer of technical equipment in my working days, I
carefully read almost every ad in the technical journals I saw, although of
course I never based my purchases only on what an ad said about the
product's virtues.

>Direct marketing, as in ordering by mail or phone from catalogs, direct
mail >pieces, direct response magazine ads, etc. ... is a direct,
interactive, >targeted information flow between the advertiser and customer
producing ?current sales that allow precise measurement of return on
investment.

What is measured is the sum of two effects: the hair-tearing indignation
aroused by stuffing of mailboxes with repeated demands for attention (and
the subsequent need for recycling of paper), and the residual interest in a
product that has not been totally snuffed out by the means of selling it. I
don't care what kind of advertising you're talking about: somebody makes a
living by selling it, and greatly exaggerates its effectiveness in order to
continue making that living.

>Even though we wouldn't guess it from all the flotsam that hits
our >mailboxes, direct mail is very expensive, particularly when you factor
in >escalating mail costs and the average response rate of 1-2%. The
advertiser >is often the cost-minimizing manufacturer and advertising
placements that >don't pay out in terms of budgeted cost/order are
summarily dropped.

That's the theory -- the practice doesn't seem to work that way much of the
time, for me. Just one example of many: I have bought perhaps $100 worth of
materials from Orion Instruments over the past 10 years, and have received
at least 60 catalogues having around 50 pages and printed on glossy paper
with some color. I doubt that they've made a penny from me. Most of our
junk mail repeats frequently and is totally ignored, or else it leads to
small sales spaced far apart, the profit from which can't possibly cover
the cost of the mailings.

>The whole process is rigorously tested for cost efficacy: Since list
brokers >get around $100/thousand names, lists are carefully targeted and
tested >before a full rollout. So too, the offer or selling proposition,
the copy and >the format of the package are often tested and tuned by small
test mailings.

Well, that makes sense but it doesn't fit my experience on the receiving
end of mailings. A broker can say that a list has been carefully targeted
and tested, but couldn't that be simply the broker's pitch? It doesn't have
to be true, does it? The thing about advertising of all kinds that I see is
that it always lies. Always, The whole point seems to be to give a little
extra kick to the pitch to make the product seem just a little, or a whole
lot, better than it will actually prove to be when in my hands. This can
boost sales temporarily, but what happens after the hundredth time you cry
wolf? After J. C. Penny's eleventh Big Sale this month?

I still think that a better job is being done on those who pay for
advertising than on those who receive it. Sorry if this is undiplomatic,
but I am truly fed up with living on the Gravy Planet.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Williams UMKC 25 November 2002 1:00 PM CST]

Bill Currey,

  I'm, of course, most interested in evidence that increasing the price of
a product can have the effect of increasing the demand for the product.
Actually a distinction is made between the Giffen effect where two goods--
say sweet and bitter gruel supply calories and there is an interaction
between their rates of purchase and their prices and the sort of thing you
are describing where the price of a good is thought to be a signal of what
the good is worth. THis has usually been considered under the caption of a
"Veblen effect." THere's a converse effect that may also occur where
decreasing the price of a good creates doubts on the part of the consumer
concerning the quality of the product. Off hand, would you be inclined to
purchase lobster priced at twenty-five cents a pound?

Mostly I suspect the orthodox theorists are right in thinking that a price
increase will result in less demand for a product. However, by using
control theory I'm convinced a better explaination can be provided for this
tendency-- AND the exceptions can also be explained such as the Giffen
effect, and the exception where price either is, or may be a signal about
the quality of the good. Ordinarily we can be pretty sure that when
someone is trying to sell us a Rollex watch on a street corner for $25 that
something isn't quite right.

So, do tell.

best

Bill Williams

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.25.1344 MST)]

Bill Williams UMKC 25 November 2002 1:00 PM
CST–

Mostly I suspect the orthodox theorists are right in thinking that a
price

increase will result in less demand
for a product. However, by using

control theory I’m convinced a better explanation can be provided for
this

tendency-- AND the exceptions can also be explained such as the
Giffen

effect, and the exception where price either is, or may be a signal
about

the quality of the good.

One way toward this goal might be to do away with the idea of price as an
indicator of absolute value. People don’t really care how much they pay
for anything as long as they can still buy the other things they want
just as much. Lobster at 25 cents per pound would be expensive if Filet
Mignon cost 3 cents per pound. The Giffen effect is a phenomenon having
to do with relative price: price of one good compared with the price of
another, and the price of both compared with the money available. And
even the money available has a value determined by how hard one has to
work – how much of the day must be spent, and how exhausting the labor
– to get it.All of this argues for descriptions in terms of system of
equations
rather than piecemeal relationships between isolated
variables.And of course that takes us to modeling, or simulations, in
which all the variables are set free to change at the same time,
constrained only by each other, the rules of the game, and the laws of
nature.

When I was reading Keynes, I had the feeling that he had a sort of
working model in his head; when he imagined the effects of changes like
increases of interest rate, he looked inward at his model and saw what it
would do, more or less, then described the result to us. But he really
couldn’t keep in all in mind at the same time; nobody could. While he
focused on one aspect of the economy he lost track of another. That’s why
we need simulations: the computer will not lose track, and the simulation
will continue to behave according to the rules we have put into it even
when we have forgotten that we did so.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Williams UMKC 25 November 2002 3:00 PM CST]

[From Bill Powers (2002.11.22.1931 MST)]

Bill Williams UMKC 22 November 2002 1:30 PM CST --

>One of the things I've been thinking about is the contrast between
>something Bill P said several posts back which gave too much credit to the
>orthdox position. Bill was describing utility as increasing up to some
>level of consumption and decreasing when consumption exceeded some level.
>But, orthodox theorists almost [always] assume that however large

consumption may be, increasing the consumption of a good still further will

add to total utility.

That's really too bad. Your examples are hilarious -- but haven't orthodox
economists thought of such examples, too? It's awfully hard to believe they
haven't, and in fact if they haven't I would have to take exception to the
idea that they are of normal intelligence. Or maybe they just don't know
how others use the term maximizing.

In other fields, the idea of maximizing means just that: finding the
maximum point in a curve which is lower at all other points. A function
that increases without limit is said to have no maximum.

What the orthodox economists have done is relegated maximization to the total
situation which the consumer faces. Maximization doesn't apply to any
particular good, it only applies to the consumer's attempt to obtain the most
utility from the budget. To get the answers to come out right, in the sense of
supporting the conclusion that free markets are best, it is assumed that the
consumer maximizes the distribution of expenditure among goods all of which
have utility functions. The utility functions are specified such that the
marginal utility of consuming additional units of the good is declining but
declining such that at no point does the marginal utility ever become zero.
Considered from outside the system of thought it is easy enough to see that
this is an absurd model of human behavior. There is such a thing as _too many_
green apples, and even too many credit cards.

From_your point of view it may look as if the economists aren't familiar with
how maximization is used in other fields. And, as a result you raise the
question about possible deficiencies regarding intellectual capacity. The last
time that I know of when a study was published on the matter in regard to IQ
economists and physicists had on average higher scores than other fields. THis
wouldn't however neccesary say anything about the comparative scores of people
in physics and economics doing the work in theory. Within economics there have
sometimes, more like frequently, been accusations that the criticism of the
orthodox position has its source in the frustration of minds incapable of
understanding genuine merits of the orthodox theoretical position. There may in
fact be some truth to the charge that people who are inclined to be skeptical
of the orthodox position may not on average be as analytically capable as the
orthodox theorists. And, the absence of analytical ability or training on the
part of heterodox economists may have hindered the development of an
alternative to the orthodox position. But, it seems to me that a more
persuasive argument can be made that very powerful social forces have been
involved which have discouraged the development of an alternative to the
orthdox position. No one would I think believe that Russian biologists sudden
became stupid when Lysenko became the dictator of Russian biology. In the West
the methods used to insure the dominance of orthodox economic theory have been
far less brutal, but they have never-the-less been quite effective. Now, the
alternative, critical, heterodox traditions that have developed despite
measures intended to hinder their development may not have generated what can
be considered an "economic science."But, there has developed a critical
literature which provides a starting point in terms of anomolous phenomena
which provides a starting point at which to
apply control theory.

But, to return to the main point of why contemporary orthodox economics looks
so peculiar, it ought to be understood that contemporary orthodoxy in economics
is the result of a failure of an earlier version of orthodoxy, and the
historical situation that developed in the transition from feudalism to
capitalism. Orginally the tradition which became orthodox economics was a
progressive intellectual tradition which was critical of a land owning class
which extracted rent from the rest of the community without neccesarily making
any productive contribution. So, Adam Smith defined value in terms of the
productive labor neccesary to create a product. Value was measured in terms of
the amount of labor contained. Marx wasn't the first to realize that this was
a potentially very radical proposition. If it was labor that geneated the
value contained in a product, "Why shouldn't labor recieved what a buyer paid
for a product?" The contemporary version of orthodox economics represents a
system which was developed to dispose of Marx's question. What the orthdox
theorists did was to develop as system in which the claims to income could be
based on something other than simply the work involved in creating a product.
The system they created was one based upon maximization defined in a peculiar,
and non-obvious way. Instead of claims to income being based upon the direct
contribution to output, claims would be based upon the _marginal_ contribution.
Now, rather than output being attributed to just the work required to create a
product, output was defined in terms of decisions to produce effectively by
_maximizing_ the ratio of the productivity of inputs in ratio to their price as
they contributed to output. Now, it was the marginal contributions to an output,
the marginal contributions of land, labor, capital and management to output to
which output was attributed. This was in a real sense a reversal of the
original intent of Smith to create a system of theory and a society based upon
simple and obvious principles that those who don't contribute to a society's
well being ought not to receive income for free based upon some mythical status
as ownership or heriditary right. As SMith complained, the landlords, "...were
fond of reaping where they had not sown." Under the system which the orthodox
theorists created from the 1870's to the 1890 the rights of land, and capital
to a share of income were restored. Whatever you may think of this, I regard
it as an intellectual achievement of considerable significance. That it is a
reactionary achievement doesn't, in my view, change the fact that its critics
have been unable to construct what I would consider a viable comprehensive
theoretical alternative in more than a century. In the absence of a single
comprhensive alternative there has developed a number of partial alternatives
each of which makes a fair amount of sense in various limited contexts. Each of
these partial systems develops according to perceptions concerning internal
problems of consistency and changing external circumstance. Sometimes these
research programs die out, but whatever their actual merits they are typically
quite durable-- I think party because they express, however clumsily, efforts
to provide solutions for continuing intractable problems which have been
characteristic of industrial capitalist societies. Within these various
research programs most of the on-going work is organized as a sort exercise in
reading the tea leaves to try and make sense of the texts generated by the
great figures of the past. And, perhaps make some modest improvements upon such
texts. The result is a scholasticism in which the efforts of most of those who
are critics of the orthodox position are very nearly, in not perhaps more,
inhibited by tradition than the orthodox themselves. And, the scholasticism
creates a situation in which many heterodox economists never genuinely master
either the orthdox system nor attain more than a superficial understanding of
the basis of the various critical traditions. In this situation people
frequently develop commitments to research programs which contain internal
inconsistencies which go unrecognized because even the people attempting to
develop heterodox theory don't fully understand the logical structure of their
own theory. Of course if they did adaquately understand their own theory, they
would often be complelled to face the fact that the efforts they have made in
the past have been laregely if not entirely futile. On rare occasions people
have come to this conclusion and abandoned their previous efforts as being so
self-contradictory to not being worth continuing. Or, some programs reach a
point at which they stagnate and are more or less abandoned when it becomes
impossible to find new recruits to replace an older generation.

In this context the problem of how to communicate a new conception of human
behavior such as control theory, and Perceptual control theory, consists of how
to explain the new point of view such that it appears to provide solutions to
the intellectual problems which potential recruits are experiencing. ONe of the
reactions to a presentation I recently gave on applying control theory to
economics was, "The stuff you described was facinating, but I don't know what
to do with it." Another reaction was, "Now I see how, using simulations there
is a way to get around the problem of mathamatical intractiblity." Following
the seminar there may be sufficient interest to make it possible to offer a
course in programing and simulation. This might be interesting, last summer I
wrote a spring-mass control program that seemed to work, but when I tried to
see how it worked last week it took me three days to understand it-- or rather
perhaps I understand it. So, From where I look at things, your concern about
the adaquacy of the I.Q. of orthodox theorists seems to me to a case of
worrying about the wrong problem. The character of my concerns has more to do
right now with, now that I can, to a limited extent, write indexed programs,
will I be able to write indexed programs that call indexed sub-routines.

best

Bill Williams

···

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