Greetings from Boston...

I think you got misinformed about the schedule that was developed on Wednesday night. Morning sessions ran from 9:00 until noon or later. Afternoon sessions picked up by 3:00 at the latest (on Thursday) and earlier around 1:30 most days and ended around 5:00 or 5:30. You would have missed 9-10 AM (we usually started closer to 9:30) and the evening sessions. And of course the jamming on the 9th floor until the wee hours.

[I don't know if Isaac got your cc, our addresses were run together as
"\"isaac\" <kurtzer@brandeis.edu>nBruce Nevin"<bnevin@cisco.com>
in the header I received, but maybe mailers look only at what's in <>.]

         Bruce N

···

At 01:37 PM 07/31/2000, Bruce Gregory wrote:

Hi,

The sessions were scheduled at times that didn't work for me. Basically, when I
could be there (10a.m.-6:00p.m.), nothing was scheduled.

Hi,

The sessions were scheduled at times that didn't work for me. Basically, when I
could be there (10a.m.-6:00p.m.), nothing was scheduled.

Bruce

[From Rick Marken and Lloyd Klinedinst
(2000.07.29.2100)]

Chris Kitzke
Thanks for the good wishes, Chris.

The CSG 2000 meeting is over and it was great. The
conference schedule is now posted at:
http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/csg/csgschedule.htm

Here �s a quick review of the main events:

Wednesday evening - Ernst von Glasersfeld gave a brief
review of his perspective on the relationship between
PCT and constructivism. Larry Litwack asked CSG
presenters to submit articles for publication in the
International Journal of Reality Therapy

Thursday began with Hugh Gibbons� discussion on the
relationship between PCT and the human, rather than
legal, understanding of justice. Rick Marken and Bill
William discussed control theory approaches to
understanding the economy. In the afternoon Hugh
Gibbons gave a developer workshop on a multimedia
development tool that could be of use for training. In
the evening Wolfgang Zocher, Richard Kennaway and Bill
Powers showed what PCT can do in robotics. Incredible
computer demos! Isaac Kurtzer presented an overview of
some neuroscience research on neurons as control
systems.

On Friday Alex Genov started things off with a paper
on research on emotion and action which he explained
in terms of a control theory approach. Bill Powers and
Dick Robertson gave a brief workshop on and
demonstration of MOL. In the afternoon we took a spin
in Isaac�s motion control lab at Brandeis U. The
evening featured Peter Cariani and his pulse coded
sound waves. Then Gary Cziko, Bill Powers and Rick
Marken discussed evolution from an organism directed
perspective.

Saturday began with Dick Robertson�s discussion of a
possible new edition of Introduction to Modern
Psychology. Then Ken Kitzke talked about the possible
higher levels of human experience. Cziko explained and
demonstrated his foreign language learning interactive
web site. Marken demonstrated his latest web-based
demos. We reconvened at 5 for a clambake dinner by the
Charles River on the beautiful Boston U campus,
followed by a brief business meeting at which the
following decisions were made: CSG conference 2001
will be held in Saint Louis from July 25-28. Autumn
Winter is the new president of CSG; Bruce Nevin is
president-elect.

It was a great conference. We hope we will meet you
in St. Louis next year for an even better one!

Best Regards

Lloyd and Rick

···

__________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Kick off your party with Yahoo! Invites.
http://invites.yahoo.com/

[From Dick Robertson,000730.1908CDT]

Lloyd Klinedinst wrote:

[From Rick Marken and Lloyd Klinedinst
(2000.07.29.2100)]

Lloyd and Rick,

Congratulations on this prompt report on the conf. This is the kind of
"newsletter" that should go out to all the CSG members who couldn't make
it as well as the others we talked about that we would hope to interest.

Best, Dick R.

[From Kenny Kitzke (2000.07.31.0800)]

Thanks for all your work on arranging the conference. While I was originally
aghast at the high conference fee, having experienced the "environment" of
the BU Executive Management Conference Floor, I could understand. It was
world class and, though probably not necessary for a successful CSG
conference, at least provides some perspective on how the executive world
acts on its environment to get something it wants. Yet, there were many
annoying glitches in service. They are a type of quality management failures
which I assist clients in systematically avoiding. I am not imagining any
reference perception that they will retain me to help them. :sunglasses:

To Lloyd Klinedinst:
Thanks for serving as our president, moderating our sessions and promptly
putting out the summary on CSGNet. And, for the work that you and Barbara
have already done on the plans for CSG Conference 2001 in St. Louis. It
looks great am I am looking forward to it, especially since I am reasonably
sure my son Chris will be able to attend whether or not his employer is wise
enough to foot the bill.

To the Believers in PCT:

I do hope our elders/leaders will take to heart the question of why some
presenters don't even stay or never return. What did they experience at a
CSG Conference and what did they want? It may be similar regarding Net
participation.

Lastly, regarding the growth of PCT as a life science (a topic we have spent
hours on both this and last year), perhaps the old economic law of supply and
demand would inform us. Does supply generally follow demand or the other way
around?

I think that demand usually leads. When that demand can be met in a new way,
supply soars. And, for that new demand for PCT to be large (exceed the
market of psychology department students), it must come from usefulness in
life (applications) and not just from intellectual curiosity. And, that is
beginning to happen, but slowly.

Despite my own interest in people, I have failed miserably in getting
business leaders to give a hoot about psychology and how behavior works, even
though, by my perception, people issues consume a major amount of their
work-life time and a fairly high amount and degree of internal conflict which
they "feel" and must be dealt with to survive and be personally satisfied.

To wit, I recently competed for the opportunity to do an "intervention" on
teamwork among the top executives at one of Pittsburgh's major corporations.
Obviously, my proposal was uniquely based on PCT. The good news was I made
the initial cut to three consultants from the best, most prestigious HR
consulting firms in the world. I had hoped to share this process and the
reaction and results with the conference.

The bad news is that the commitment dragged on and on over the summer.
Finally, just before the conference, I was informed that the corporation had
decided to defer the entire "team building" intervention. I did not lose,
just no one won. Other things were perceived as being more important by the
executives. And, I believe their perception was exactly that in their minds.
There are "real" problems to work on that need "real" solutions. Teamwork
will have to wait based on the degree of problem it represents and the degree
of possibility that a solution will be found.

Despite this disturbance, I will persevere. It is my will. It is felt
somewhere deep inside my conscious mind as a purpose for me with the time I
have left in life (though other things might be less frustrating). Further,
should some major company ever declare in the business literature that
teamwork has soared since learning to see people as "controllers" of their
body, mind and human spirit perceptual needs, I think demand will soar for
PCT books, materials, courses, demos and teachers, whether we want that or
not. If that happens, I will be calling some of you for help. 8-))

Peace

···

To: Rick Marken

[From Bruce Gregory (2000,0731.1102)]

Kenny Kitzke (2000.07.31.0800)

I think that demand usually leads. When that demand can be met in a new way,
supply soars. And, for that new demand for PCT to be large (exceed the
market of psychology department students), it must come from usefulness in
life (applications) and not just from intellectual curiosity. And, that is
beginning to happen, but slowly.

Despite my own interest in people, I have failed miserably in getting
business leaders to give a hoot about psychology and how behavior works, even
though, by my perception, people issues consume a major amount of their
work-life time and a fairly high amount and degree of internal conflict which
they "feel" and must be dealt with to survive and be personally satisfied.

It seems to me that this is exactly what classical HPCT leads one to expect. The
hierarchy exists to exercise control, but control is only important because it
solves problems that would otherwise persist. Almost every house has a heating
system because that system solves an important problem for prospective
purchasers. Few prospective purchasers care how the thermostat/furnace system
works (they demonstrate this lack of interest by often treating the thermostat as
a faucet rather the switch which it is). PCT solves problems for those on CSGnet,
but not yet for the rest of the world. Once PCT is shown to solve problems for
business people, some of them will adopt it. It is not obvious to me, however,
that even those people will care about how it works, although they may well feel
it is worth their while to hire people who do understand the machinery.

BG

[From Kenny Kitzke (2000.07.31.1200)]

<Bruce Gregory (2000,0731.1102)>

<It seems to me that this is exactly what classical HPCT leads one to expect.
The
hierarchy exists to exercise control, but control is only important because it
solves problems that would otherwise persist.>

Perhaps my remarks would have a different flavor for you if you had heard my
presentation at the conference. I was hoping to see you there and was
disappointed to find you absent.

It was the president of this corporation whose perception of the teamwork he
observes between his business units did not match his perception of what it
should be. I think "teamwork" is a systems level perception high in the
hierarchy. The error was large enough that he asked/told his HR department
to find someone who could help with "teambuilding."

A bunch of proposals were received from "consultants," including some from
prestigious universities and national commercial firms. I was (somewhat
suprisingly) one of the three selected from that group for a personal
interview with the president and the HR trainer who was managing the
selection process.

But, the entire attempt (intervention, was their word) at teambuilding was
put on hold. IOW, it was not solved at all. Attention to it was postponed.
This seems different from your house thermostat example. Apparently,
according to them, other problems needed to take precedence. I would take it
that there were other system level perceptions like "profitability" or
"customer service" or "employee safety" that may have had higher error
signals screaming for attention (however one does that).

But, it could also be that in the conflict of which system level issue to
address (assuming that all could not be done at the same time) the president
moved up to a higher level and looked down upon these system conflicts, and
maybe moved up still higher to view his personal concept of what a newly
appointed good president would do, and somehow decided that other things
besides teamwork would come first in his personal actions.

What was going on within this President's body, mind and spirit that led him
to defer his initiated action to control a systems level error? Was it
reorganization? Was his life threatened by not pursuing other system goals
instead of teamwork?

Or, might it have been that none of the proposals convinced him that his
initiation of the intervention would significantly improve and lasting
perception of teamwork? So he selected another where he thought he could get
results for improvement in an equally important uncontrolled variable.

Or did he have even higher reference perception levels of himself as a
person, where he could look down and quite easily change his focus on which
systems error way done below needed action?

I have this knawing feeling, that at least for me, HPCT as currently
configured does not always or satisfactorily explain what people are doing
inside when we observe their external bodily behavior -- tells the HR person
to put the teambuilding intervention on hold.

I think we have perceptual levels or mechanisms higher than our active mind,
that can change references in our active minds, including principles and
systems perceptions, to get what these higher levels yearn for intrinsically
which we might call matters of the self (will), matters of the heart/spirit
(mutual respect) or matters of absolute right or wrong for ourselves, other
people or even societies (morality).

It is searching for such knowledge, understanding and even wisdom regarding
HPCT, human behavior, human nature and even the purpose of life itself that
has captured most of my PCT related attention at the moment. And, I can
perceive that just my flailing away has side effects that are a disturbance
to other CSG members. But, what can I do? I'm human. Quitting to try to
control probably equates to dying, and I am neither dead nor want to be. :sunglasses:
I shall persevere as best I can.

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.0731.1447)]

Kenny Kitzke (2000.07.31.1200)

I think we have perceptual levels or mechanisms higher than our active mind,
that can change references in our active minds, including principles and
systems perceptions, to get what these higher levels yearn for intrinsically
which we might call matters of the self (will), matters of the heart/spirit
(mutual respect) or matters of absolute right or wrong for ourselves, other
people or even societies (morality).

It is searching for such knowledge, understanding and even wisdom regarding
HPCT, human behavior, human nature and even the purpose of life itself that
has captured most of my PCT related attention at the moment. And, I can
perceive that just my flailing away has side effects that are a disturbance
to other CSG members. But, what can I do? I'm human. Quitting to try to
control probably equates to dying, and I am neither dead nor want to be. :sunglasses:

One problem may be the way you use "higher levels". In HPCT higher levels do not
yearn for anything intrinsically, They are mechanisms for reducing intrinsic
error. You appear to be postulating intrinsic error arising from a host of
"spiritual" rather than biological requirements. The principle of parsimony
suggests that we do not postulate intrinsic variables until we are forced to do
so. In other words, you must identify behavior which cannot be explained except
as part of an effort to reduce intrinsic "spiritual" error. That's a hard sell,
since many of us do not experience these error signals associated with spiritual
variables. Of course, this may simply be due to the fact that we are not among
the elect predetermined to be saved. If so, preaching to us is unlikely to have a
significant effect.

BG

[From Dick Robertson,000801.1700CDT]

Bruce Gregory wrote:

[From Bruce Gregory (2000,0731.1102)]

Kenny Kitzke (2000.07.31.0800)
>
>
>I think that demand usually leads. When that demand can be met in a new way,
>supply soars. And, for that new demand for PCT to be large (exceed the
>market of psychology department students), it must come from usefulness in
>life (applications) and not just from intellectual curiosity. And, that is
>beginning to happen, but slowly.
>
It seems to me that this is exactly what classical HPCT leads one to expect. The
hierarchy exists to exercise control, but control is only important because it
solves problems that would otherwise persist. Almost every house has a heating
system because that system solves an important problem for prospective
purchasers. Few prospective purchasers care how the thermostat/furnace system
works (they demonstrate this lack of interest by often treating the thermostat as
a faucet rather the switch which it is). PCT solves problems for those on CSGnet,
but not yet for the rest of the world. Once PCT is shown to solve problems for
business people, some of them will adopt it. It is not obvious to me, however,
that even those people will care about how it works, although they may well feel
it is worth their while to hire people who do understand the machinery.

BG

This strikes me as a good insight. And I think some members of CSG might be close to
being able to present the applications without first having to convince the
"customer" of the truth of PCT.

Best, Dick R.

[From Rick Marken (2000.08.01.1900)]

Kenny Kitzke (2000.07.31.0800)--

I do hope our elders/leaders will take to heart the
question of why some presenters don't even stay or never
return.

After 20+ years of observing this phenomenon of drop outs
and no shows, which, I suppose, qualifies me as an "elder",
it has become pretty obvious to me why people don't stay
or never return to CSG meetings (or never show up in the
first place): it's because PCT eventually fails to meet
their non-scientific needs.

I define a "non-scientific need" as the need to justify an
existing belief. Many people have come to PCT because it
seemed to justify their existing beliefs in everything
from reality therapy to anarchy. As soon as something
about the PCT model conflicted with one of those existing
beliefs (and _something_ always did) it was goodby Charlie.

One great thing about the Y2K CSG meeting was that it was
largely scientific. Most of the presentations approached PCT
from a scientific perspective. That is, PCT was not used to
justify existing beliefs (and/or practices). Rather, PCT was
tested by skeptical researchers who wanted to know whether
PCT itself is a justifiable belief. For example, the tests
of PCT described by Wolfgang Zocher, Richard Kennaway
and myself suggest that PCT _is_ a justifiable belief (at
least, provisionally).

Wolfgang showed how a properly tuned input control system
can mimic existing eye movement data. Richard showed how
a six legged bug that is organized around control of various
input variables can do, with great computational elegance,
what one organized around control of output variables can
do only with intensive computational investment, if it can
do it at all. And I showed that an aggregate economic control
system can explain (as disturbance resistance) the puzzling
observed relationship between discount rate (leakage) and
inflation rate.

I have no doubt that Wolfgang, Richard and I will return
to CSG meetings, not because PCT confirms what we already
believe but, rather, because what we (provisionally) believe
(PCT) is continuously being confirmed by what we observe.

And, for that new demand for PCT to be large (exceed the
market of psychology department students), it must come
from usefulness in life (applications) and not just from
intellectual curiosity.

I don't think applications, per se, are the answer. I think
it's great when people base their successful applications on
PCT. But more often than not the applications come first and
PCT comes second, as a justification for the application. When
this happens, the application acts precisely as an existing
belief and PCT is used only to confirm it. As soon as something
about the PCT model conflicts with the existing belief (the
application) its goodby Charlie, as usual.

We have seen this abandonment of PCT by advocates of several
different "successful applications" (all, of course, "based on
PCT"). The developers of these applications may still be
convinced that their application is based on PCT. But the
fact is that the application comes first and PCT comes
second, in the sense that protecting the application from
disturbance is more important than protecting PCT from
disturbance. In other words, the application is, for these
application developers, a higher level goal than is PCT.

You can see that the application (rather than PCT) is the
higher level goal when the tenets of PCT are varied, as
necessary, to keep the application constant (protected
from disturbance). I would like to see people develop
applications with PCT itself as the higher level goal. In
that case, the content of the application would be varied,
as necessary, to protect the tenets of PCT from disturbance.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: marken@mindreadings.com
mindreadings.com

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.0801.2351 EDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2000.0731.1447)--

That's a hard sell,
since many of us do not experience these error signals associated with spiritual variables.

Do any of us experience (become aware of) any error signals at all?

We might be aware of feelings associated with uncorrected error. We might be aware of feelings associated with the success of controlling successfully. We might be aware of the former feelings of unsuccess being replaced by the latter feelings associated with success, or vice versa. But the feelings themselves are not error signals.

This was behind my comment to you, Kenny, at the conference. Your presentation was presented in a compelling way, and you testified as to some compelling feelings about how PCT had benefited you in your life. For some of us, compelling feelings certify as to the *truth* of some experience or practice. Others of us mistrust emotion as the bodyguard of bias, it cannot be a guide to finding truth. Setting these differences of personal temperament aside, this is institutionally true for science. In science, emotion is not a criterion of truth. Very much related to this is the importance of not knowing the answers in advance. Not that all scientists are by any means perfectly skillful at the management of either form of bias--indeed, those who deny emotion are often blind-sided by it--but that is the standard to which we are held if we claim to be involved in science. When we test for a subject's controlled variables we have to test for our own controlled variables (preferences, aversions, expectations, biases) and get them out of the way.

In workshops and training programs, there is often more than a little of salesmanship, which is to say, emotional suasion. This is not a bad thing if you can make sure that the pitch and the product are both grounded in sound science, as Tom Bourbon and Tim Carey are doing for RTP, to Ed Ford's lasting gratitude. (He confesses his limitations, bless him.) Most people are not committed to science, the essential uncertainty and open-endedness of it does not help them to control for warm fuzzy feelings. But if the pitchman doesn't understand the science, there's trouble in River City.

         Bruce Nevin

···

At 03:48 PM 07/31/2000, Bruce Gregory wrote:

i.kurtzer (2000.0802.0100)

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.0801.2351 EDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2000.0731.1447)--

>That's a hard sell,
>since many of us do not experience these error signals associated with
>spiritual variables.

Do any of us experience (become aware of) any error signals at all?

We might be aware of feelings associated with uncorrected error. We might
be aware of feelings associated with the success of controlling
successfully. We might be aware of the former feelings of unsuccess being
replaced by the latter feelings associated with success, or vice versa.

But

the feelings themselves are not error signals.

I think it would be premature to say outright what experiences are or are
not associated with particular signals within the PCT model. I see no
reason why emotions could not be one or the other, either identified with
perceptual signals or error signals. The only criteria is that the
hypothetical correlate has the same features--time course, magnitude, and
sign--as the candidate signal. Since each signal--error, reference, and
perceptual--each has its particular behavior within a control task it should
be possible to identify for a given task what are the corollary experiences.

i.

This was behind my comment to you, Kenny, at the conference. Your
presentation was presented in a compelling way, and you testified as to
some compelling feelings about how PCT had benefited you in your life. For
some of us, compelling feelings certify as to the *truth* of some
experience or practice. Others of us mistrust emotion as the bodyguard of
bias, it cannot be a guide to finding truth. Setting these differences of
personal temperament aside, this is institutionally true for science. In
science, emotion is not a criterion of truth. Very much related to this is
the importance of not knowing the answers in advance. Not that all
scientists are by any means perfectly skillful at the management of either
form of bias--indeed, those who deny emotion are often blind-sided by
it--but that is the standard to which we are held if we claim to be
involved in science. When we test for a subject's controlled variables we
have to test for our own controlled variables (preferences, aversions,
expectations, biases) and get them out of the way.

In workshops and training programs, there is often more than a little of
salesmanship, which is to say, emotional suasion. This is not a bad thing
if you can make sure that the pitch and the product are both grounded in
sound science, as Tom Bourbon and Tim Carey are doing for RTP, to Ed

Ford's

···

At 03:48 PM 07/31/2000, Bruce Gregory wrote:
lasting gratitude. (He confesses his limitations, bless him.) Most people
are not committed to science, the essential uncertainty and open-endedness
of it does not help them to control for warm fuzzy feelings. But if the
pitchman doesn't understand the science, there's trouble in River City.

         Bruce Nevin

[From Bruce Nevin (2000.0802.1048 EDT)]

i.kurtzer (2000.0802.0100)

I think it would be premature to say outright what experiences are or are
not associated with particular signals within the PCT model. I see no
reason why emotions could not be one or the other, either identified with
perceptual signals or error signals.

The point is well taken. We have talked about a guess (hypothesis?) that both reorganization and attention are somehow focussed on inputs that are hard to control, thus linked to error. This does not justify a claim that awareness is limited to perceptual input signals, or that awareness cannot extend to reference input signals or error output signals.

The only [criterion] is that the
hypothetical correlate has the same features--time course, magnitude, and
sign--as the candidate signal. Since each signal--error, reference, and
perceptual--each has its particular behavior within a control task it should
be possible to identify for a given task what are the corollary experiences.

If the task were the only thing going on for the subject, this might be possible. But at the very least the subject has the parallel task of observing and reporting on feelings. And that is the least of it.

Feelings seem to sum over multiple errors. The golfer has some feelings about the flubbed putt when alone, but might have much stronger feelings when playing with his braggart brother in law or with his boss or when trying to impress his son. And memory and imagination of unsuccess both add to the emotional brew. Perhaps indeed they contribute most to it.

Then there are the feelings associated with successful control. What is their hypothetical correlate in time course, magnitude, and sign? There is no signal in the model that is in inverse relation to the error signal.

There are other ways this might work. We have talked about the guess that feelings are perceptions of biochemical states in the body that are side effects of error. Pleasant feelings are associated with production of endorphins and perhaps other chemicals, and that seems to follow successful control. This pleasure seems to be why primates spend time grooming one another; if in the individual the controlled variable is an endorphin high, perhaps in the species the linkage of auto-intoxication to successful alliances is an outcome of evolution, since the offspring of individuals that have allies in a group survive better.

This seems to me a much more plausible direction to look for explanations of feelings. But you are right, we can't rule out the possibility that feelings are simply awarenesses of various signals in the model. (We already know we can be aware or unaware of perceptual input signals, and they are in general distinct from feelings.)

         Bruce Nevin

···

At 01:16 AM 08/02/2000, isaac wrote:

[From Bruce Gregory (2000.0801.0955)]

Rick Marken (2000.08.01.1900)

I define a "non-scientific need" as the need to justify an
existing belief. Many people have come to PCT because it
seemed to justify their existing beliefs in everything
from reality therapy to anarchy. As soon as something
about the PCT model conflicted with one of those existing
beliefs (and _something_ always did) it was goodby Charlie.

Freud relied on similar arguments to explain the defections of Adler, Jung, et al
from the true science of psychoanalysis. The approach allows one to make ad
hominem arguments while cloaking them in a rational package. If you don't agree
with me it is an example of "resistence".

The main weakness of the approach is that it convinces no one but the true
believer. Its main strength is that it comforts the true believer.

BG

[From Bruce Gregory (2000,0802.0957)]

Bruce Nevin (2000.0801.2351 EDT)

Do any of us experience (become aware of) any error signals at all?

I agree with Issac's analysis.

BG

[From Rick Marken (2000.08.02.0800)]

Me:

I define a "non-scientific need" as the need to justify an
existing belief.

Bruce Gregory (2000.0801.0955)

Freud relied on similar arguments to explain the defections
of Adler, Jung, et al from the true science of psychoanalysis.
The approach allows one to make ad hominem arguments while
cloaking them in a rational package. If you don't agree
with me it is an example of "resistence". The main weakness
of the approach is that it convinces no one but the true
believer. Its main strength is that it comforts the true
believer.

I'm sorry if my discussion seemed ad hominem. I have nothing
against people who are looking to justify their existing
beliefs. Nor do I have anything against people who leave CSG.
I was just suggesting why, based on my experience, people
leave CSG or distort PCT. I'm not trying to convince anyone
that there is anything wrong with these people (or anything
wrong with leaving CSG; I do have a bit of a problem with
people distorting PCT but it's really not that important to
me). Understanding why people leave CSG may, indeed, be a
comfort to those who want to understand it. It's not much
of a comfort to me because I would like to have more
scientific colleagues doing this work with me; science is
a social enterprise to some extent. So, while I think I
understand why many people leave CSG, I'm not happy about
it. But I certainly don't hold anything against those who
leave.

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
MindReadings.com mailto: marken@mindreadings.com
www.mindreadings.com

[From Bill Powers (2000.08.02.0848 MDT)]

i.kurtzer (2000.0802.0100)--

I think it would be premature to say outright what experiences are or are
not associated with particular signals within the PCT model. I see no
reason why emotions could not be one or the other, either identified with
perceptual signals or error signals. The only criteria is that the
hypothetical correlate has the same features--time course, magnitude, and
sign--as the candidate signal. Since each signal--error, reference, and
perceptual--each has its particular behavior within a control task it should
be possible to identify for a given task what are the corollary experiences.

In principle, maybe, but putting that principle into practice could be
extremely difficult. Just consider the problem of measuring "the error
signal" in a one-joint motor control task. This signal is the sum of all
signals generating by motor cells innervating the same whole muscle, and
can consist of dozens or even hundreds of parallel signals. Add to that the
fact that each motor axon can excite more than one muscle cell, and we have
a huge technical problem. Probably the largest problem, however, is that
the resulting muscle tension produces multiple sensory signals at the same
time the error signal exists, so whatever experience results does not have
possible error signal effects neatly sorted out. So I think that your
proposal, while logical, will remain beyond our reach for some time to come.

Every case I have thought of in which an error signal seems to be
experienced can also be explained by assuming a perception of the
difference between two perceptual signals: one signal is the normal
perceptual signal and the other is an imagined reference signal, both from
a lower level of control. Since the basic model already allows for imagined
perception of past experiences, nothing new has to be added to explain
apparent perception of error signals in the hierarchy. Of course
"constructed error signals" like these may have nothing to do with the real
error signals in the system.

Error signals in the biochemical systems -- in the reorganizing system, for
instance -- are another matter since they are not in the neuro-motor
hierarchy. The reference signal for a somatic control system like a
temperature controller might not exist in the form of a signal: it might be
a built-in threshold in a temperature sensor, or a chemical substance that
directly affects firing thresholds. We sense whatever biochemical states
there are that can excite neural sensors. Some of these states might be
associated with biochemical error signals. I suspect that this is true with
respect to the temperature sense, since we seem to detect "hot" and "cold"
separately, and the definition can change depending on the recent history
of temperatures. A temperature sensed as neither hot nor cold is not
absolute zero! Adrenaline might one day be associated with biochemical
errors, and if so, then all the immediate sensed effects of adrenaline
would qualify as indicators of error signals.

These are all very iffy questions. Until some clear answer is found, I
think the safest bet is simply to assume that perceptions are what we
experience, and what we experience exists in the form of afferent neural
signals. If anyone wants to try a model in which error signals get into the
afferent channels, good luck: I've tried it, and have run into modeling
problems I couldn't solve. I remind us that in a hierarchical model, all
perceptual signals end up in the input side of higher-level systems; if
some of these signals represent lower-level perceptions while others
represents the difference between the same lower-level perceptions and
higher-level output signals (i.e., lower-level error signals), it's hard to
imagine what kind of higher-level input function could be applied to _both_
kinds of signal and still make sense of them. And the feedback paths get
pretty complicated, since an error signal contains a contribution from a
higher-level output function: what constitutes an error depends just as
much on the higher-level output as on the perceptual input from lower systems.

In a way, modeling is like all rule-driven games such as golf. The game of
golf is defined entirely by its rules; if you play by different rules or
ignore some of the rules, the game is changed entirely. In modeling, the
model consists of the formal definitions of the variables making it up, the
functions that convert one set of variables into another, and the structure
of connections. The behavior of the model depends entirely on these
factors. If you modify or add any factor, the behavior of the whole model
changes, and you must reason out what the changes will be before you can
say what the significance of the modification is. If you take the standard
PCT model and add any new connection, you can't just mention one or two
effects that this change will produce. You have to figure out how the
behavior of the whole system will be affected. What sounds like a simple
change can end up rendering the entire model inoperative, or changing it
into something so different as to be unrecognizable.

What would happen to chess if we arbitrarily decided to let knights move
two steps ahead or back and two (instead of one) to either side? A tiny
change in the rules would invalidate the whole history of chess. Would the
game become trivial? Entirely possible, and at the moment, unpredictable.

We have now a model of a system that can control variables at many levels,
and many variables at each level, simultaneously and in principle without
conflict.
If we allowed higher-level perceptions to contain information from
lower-level error signals, would this system be able to control anything at
all? Until we can answer that question and demonstrate the correctness of
the answer using methods like Marken's spreadsheet simulation, we had
better be careful about making arbitrary changes in the basic model.

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bill Powers (2000.08.02.1352 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2000.0801.0955)--

Rick Marken (2000.08.01.1900)

I define a "non-scientific need" as the need to justify an
existing belief. ...

Freud relied on similar arguments to explain the defections of Adler,

Jung, et al

from the true science of psychoanalysis. The approach allows one to make ad
hominem arguments while cloaking them in a rational package. If you don't

agree

with me it is an example of "resistence".

The main weakness of the approach is that it convinces no one but the true
believer. Its main strength is that it comforts the true believer.

I don't see the parallel with Rick's comment. Freud, according to your
post, used one of his own theoretical concepts ("resistance") to explain
the defections of the others. Rick said only that some people come to PCT
to justify existing beliefs, and leave when they find no support (or
something like that). You don't need any PCT concepts to understand what he
means, do you?

Best,

Bill P.

[From Dick Robertson,000802.1515CDT]

Rick Marken wrote:

After 20+ years of observing this phenomenon of drop outs
and no shows, which, I suppose, qualifies me as an "elder",
it has become pretty obvious to me why people don't stay
or never return to CSG meetings (or never show up in the
first place): it's because PCT eventually fails to meet
their non-scientific needs.

I think you have a point there, as you spelled out in your various
permutations in the following. However, don't forget the
"non-scientific" needs of people who aren't necessarily espoused to a
different basic paradigm, but none in particular. These are the people
who are looking to the latest developments in science for _usefull_
applications in their lives. So far, PCT is in too early its scientific
development to have many such, as I believe Bruce Gregory was pointing
out in his post on thia subject. I don't think that means we should
inappropriately push "applications" beyond those that come naturally,
like the MOL (itself more a research technique than a true application
as yet IMO).

I define a "non-scientific need" as the need to justify an
existing belief.

One among several.

Many people have come to PCT because it
seemed to justify their existing beliefs in everything
from reality therapy to anarchy.

Agreed

PCT was
tested by skeptical researchers who wanted to know whether
PCT itself is a justifiable belief. For example, the tests
of PCT described by Wolfgang Zocher, Richard Kennaway
and myself suggest that PCT _is_ a justifiable belief (at
least, provisionally).

In all human history I think true scientists have _always_ been a very
tiny portion of the population.

I have no doubt that Wolfgang, Richard and I will return
to CSG meetings, not because PCT confirms what we already
believe but, rather, because what we (provisionally) believe
(PCT) is continuously being confirmed by what we observe.

Of course. And likewise for the rest of us who come regularly to see
the latest of what you have done.

I don't think applications, per se, are the answer. I think
it's great when people base their successful applications on
PCT. But more often than not the applications come first and
PCT comes second, as a justification for the application. When
this happens, the application acts precisely as an existing
belief and PCT is used only to confirm it.

You said that already and you're right.

Best, Dick R.

[From Rick Marken (2000.08.02.2000)]

Dick Robertson (000802.1515CDT) --

don't forget the "non-scientific" needs of people who aren't
necessarily espoused to a different basic paradigm, but none
in particular.

Yes. I agree. People who are not wedded to a particular paradigm
must be among those who return to CSG. Still, precious few do
return so some of the non-wedded might have been in some kind of
committed relationship with a conflicting paradigm and not known it.
Of course, it's also possible that some of the "paradigm virgins"
really are virgins but don't return to CSG because PCT just doesn't
pluck their magic twanger.

These are the people who are looking to the latest developments
in science for _usefull_ applications in their lives. So far,
PCT is in too early its scientific development to have many
such, as I believe Bruce Gregory was pointing out in his post
on thia subject.

I agree that people (like you, for example) who are looking to PCT
for useful applications are, indeed, the people who return to CSG.
But my experience is that such people are rare birds. Most people
come to CSG with an application (a particular process) that they
want to have validated by PCT. I certainly don't object to people
looking to PCT for validation of their applications. All I'm
saying is that my experience is that people who approach PCT this
way (Glasser, for example) are the one's who tend not to return
to CSG meetings (Glasser came before CSG meetings so he didn't stop
attending meetings; but he did stop meeting with Bill P.). And I
kind of like my HPCT-based explanation of why this happens. It's
because the application is the high level reference and PCT is the
_means_ by which the perception of the applicatoin is kept under
control. Given this relationhship between application and PCT, it
would not be surprising to see the tenets of PCT varied as necessary
to protect the application from disturbance (a disturbance to an
application, of course, is any suggestion that the application could
be changed or improved).

The people who stick with CSG are also willing to vary the tenets of
PCT, if necessary. But I think you will agree (because I know you
are one who shares this attitude with me ) that, for those of us who
stick with CSG, the only thing that can necessitate a change in PCT
tenets is observations that differ from prediction, not protection of
a particular application of PCT.

Best

Rick

···

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Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: marken@mindreadings.com
mindreadings.com