guilt

[From Bill Powers (2004.09.04.1220 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2004.09.04.11:03--

What does Oliver's counter control depend on? It depends primarily on
whether Rachel is in fact controlling for a perception that Oliver is
well-disposed toward her.

I think "reciprocal control" some other terms should be used instead of
"countercontrol" which has a different meaning, at least if I have
understood your example correctly. Countercontrol is the phnenomenon of
using another person's attempt to control you as a means of controlling
that person's behavior -- B. F. Skinner defined it first, I think. Once you
know what that person wants of you, you can deliberately create
disturbances that the other person will counteract by producing just the
behavior you wanted to see. Tom Bourbon discussed this at some length, and
I think was the first to see Skinner's concept in PCT terms. A kid who is
amused when the teacher gets all upset can cause her to screech and rant by
disturbing her sense of classroom order. If she didn't want the class to be
orderly, she couldn't be countercontrolled in that way.

I don't think that's quite the same thing you were discussing. Was it?

Best,

Bill P.

···

If she wanted to make Oliver hostile, she
might say "Close it yourself", in response to his request. Oliver,
therefore, should be controlling a perception that Rachel feels well
disposed toward him. (I use "should be controlling" in a sense of
engineering efficiency, not moral correctness; an effectively
reorganized system would control what "should be controlled").

So, in this simple interaction, we find both parties needing to
control a perception that the other feels well disposed toward him or
her. Equivalently, Each has reorganized so as to act ordinarily in a
way that does not bring them into conflict by either acting in direct
opoosition to the other's control actions. If conflict is inevitable,
then some other component of the perception of each other's
disposition has also to be brought into play so that the perceptions
each has of the other's disposition remains under control in a
negative feedback loop (i.e. "The Bomb in the Machine" must not be
allowed to explode <http://www.mmtaylor.net/PCT/DFS93/DFS93_8.html&gt;\).
In the example of closing the door, Rachel might say "I'm sorry, I'm
stuck right now, and can't close it for you" rather than "No, I
won't".

Now we leave that example, and consider the perception of self. There
are at least two perceptions of self (probably many, but two kinds).
One is the perception one has of oneself "directly" through
perceiving one's own actions in the environment, the other is what
one perceives others to perceive of oneself. Both, presumably, are
controllable, though, as Rabbie Burns said "Wud some Guid the giftie
gie's, tae see ourselves as ithers see's" -- it's hard to be sure how
others perceive us.

Hard as it may be, if we want to perceive others as perceiving us in
a way that allows us to counter-control them effectively (as by
having them close the door when we want it closed and they can do it
easily), there are certain things that often work. One might allow
others to counter-control us, by obliging their requests when it is
convenient to do so, and one might try to act so as not to reduce
their ability to control their own actions. Those kinds of statements
correspond to reference levels for perceptions of "principles".

"Principles" also enter into one's own perception of self. One may
have a reference for perceiving oneself as following certain
principles, whether they be the ones above, or ones asserted by one's
religion (which may conflict with the ones given as examples).
Whatever they may be, those principles that enter into one's
perception of self must form controlled perceptions, and the actions
that control those perceptions become reference levels for all the
overt actions observable by others.

(Slowly we are coming toward "guilt").

Let's get back to Oliver and Rachel. Oliver wants to perceive himself
as a "good guy", meaning one who acts so as not to impede Rachel's
ability to control. But there comes a time when in order to control
some lower level perception (e.g. to have some ready cash), Oliver
has an available action (take some of Rachel's cash) that does impede
Rachel's control. Oliver might be able to get some of Rachel's cash
by saying "Could you lend me some money" (using counter-control), or
by stealing some, unknown to Rachel.

If Oliver uses counter-control to get cash from Rachel, he might
slightly reduce Rachel's feeling of goodwill toward him -- less so if
his request is customary and he has always repaid Rachel promptly,
meaning he perceives Rachel to perceive him as trustworthy. But if
Oliver steals the money and Rachel never finds out, then Rachel's
feeling of goodwill toward Oliver will not be disturbed, and Oliver
will not have induced error in his own perception of Rachel's feeling
of goodwill toward him. So Oliver steals.

Oliver having stolen, however, introduces error in his perception of
himself as a "good guy". He perceives that he has in fact reduced
Rahel's ability to control (though he wouldn't put it that way unless
he had studied PCT). It introduces error in his controlled perception
of one of his principles. He has managed to create a difference
between the way he sees himself and the way he perceives others as
seeing him. Since the error is in his perception of his own
principles, but not in his perception of how others perceive him as
controlling his own principles, he feels "guilt". If, on the other
hand, he had been brought up in Fagin's troop of young pickpockets,
he might feel guilt if he failed to steal some of Rachel's cash, the
principle in question being to perceive himself as acting in
accordance with the Fagin-based social norms, which allow him to
counter-control the members of Fagin's gang.

It is important that in either case (normal or Fagin-based), the
feeling of guilt requires that the reference levels associated with
the stealing action include a reference that Rachel not perceive
Oliver as having acted against her own ability to control.

If it does not matter to Oliver whether Rachel knows, or if Oliver
actively wants Rachel to know, there would ordinarily be no feeling
of guilt associated with the theft. Only if Oliver had a principle
that excluded the action of theft, and yet stole because some other
controlled perception conflicted with the control of that "principle
perception" would Oliver feel guilt.

The end result of this pseudo-analysis is that guilt is a concomitant
of actions that increase error in a controlled perception of
principle that contributes to the perception of self. Actions that
increase error in any perception can occur, either in a poorly
reorganized structure, or in a situation in which the control of some
other perception leads to an internal conflict in which the control
of the "principle" perception loses out. So one can develop a feeling
of guilt either by not knowing how to act "properly" or through
internal conflict.

Sorry for the length. It's all a bit complicated. I know I wound up
agreeing with Rick that conflict is central to the question of guilt
-- Sorry, Rick :wink:
but I thought that to go through the interpersonal and social loops
according to LPT might help in other related analyses.

-------------------
I probably won't contribute much in the near future. There's another
meeting coming up next week, and I have a lot else that must be
attended to after the last month of pleasantly stressful activities.

Martin

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0904.1608)]

Bill Powers (2004.09.04.1218 MDT)

Couldn't it be that you're defending your reason for feeling guilty?

Could be. We can extend the test by concentrating the disturbance on the feeling of guilt itself and ignoring the reasons you might feel guilty. For example, "There's no point in feeling guilty, it is totally nonproductive." Does that input lessen the guilt? Or do you counter with, "I don't care whether it's productive, I still feel guilty."

Bruce Gregory

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No Doubt: no awakening."

[From Bill Powers (2004.09.04.1550 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.0904.1608)–

Couldn’t
it be that you’re defending your reason for feeling guilty?

Could be. We can extend the test by concentrating the disturbance on the
feeling of guilt itself and ignoring the reasons you might feel guilty.
For example, “There’s no point in feeling guilty, it is totally
nonproductive.” Does that input lessen the guilt? Or do you counter
with, “I don’t care whether it’s productive, I still feel
guilty.”

If you’ve stolen money from your best friend, telling you that feeling
guilty is unproductive isn’t likely to change your desire not to have
done what you did. So the reason for the guilty feeling hasn’t been
changed. In my theory, feeling guilty IS the desire not to have
done something, and the physiological states that arise from that
impossible wish and are experienced along with it.

Best,

Bill P.

[Martin Taylor 2004.09.04.15.18]

[From Bill Powers (2004.09.04.1220 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2004.09.04.11:03--

What does Oliver's counter control depend on? It depends primarily on
whether Rachel is in fact controlling for a perception that Oliver is
well-disposed toward her.

I think "reciprocal control" some other terms should be used instead of
"countercontrol" which has a different meaning, at least if I have
understood your example correctly. -- B. F. Skinner defined it
first, I think. Once you
know what that person wants of you, you can deliberately create
disturbances that the other person will counteract by producing just the
behavior you wanted to see. Tom Bourbon discussed this at some length, and
I think was the first to see Skinner's concept in PCT terms. A kid who is
amused when the teacher gets all upset can cause her to screech and rant by
disturbing her sense of classroom order. If she didn't want the class to be
orderly, she couldn't be countercontrolled in that way.

I don't think that's quite the same thing you were discussing. Was it?

Isn't it? I think it is the same thing. By disturbing some perception
the other is controlling, one can get the other person to act. If one
has correctly judged the mechanism the other is using to control the
disturbed perception, one can get the other to act in a desired way.
It doesn't matter in the slightest what the other's controlled
perception might be that you choose to disturb. It doesn't have to
depend on the other wanting to perceive your goodwill.

"Countercontrol is the phnenomenon of
using another person's attempt to control you as a means of controlling
that person's behavior"

"Another person's attempt to control you" must mean either forcibly
constraining your ability to act, or disturbing your perceptions so
that you act in a way they want. In my example, Oliver is attempting
to control Rachel's actions (getting her to close the door). Rachel
can use this control to control Oliver's behaviour: (1) she could
close the door, thereby getting him to act pleased; (2) she could
refuse graciously, getting Oliver either to get up and close the
door, or ask someone else, without showing displeasure at Rachel, or
(3) she could do as your example kid is doing, gettingthe teacher to
rant -- she could say "Why should I", or put a wedge under the door
to make sure it will not close, or something like that.

If I understand you, Rachel is counter-controlling Oliver, but what
Oliver is doing is something different. He is relyng on Rachel's
counter-control, and on a perception that Rachel's counter-control
will involve controlling for him to be satisfied.

"Reciprocal control" carries quite different connotations, none of
which convey what I am getting at. I used the term "counter-control"
only because it was defined appropriately in a thread earlier this
year. I don't like the name "counter-control", either, because of its
wrong connotations, but it has been used to describe the effect in
question.

"Second-order control" could apply, but in engineering terms it has
other connotations, so that's no good. How about "cross-control"?

Martin

[From Bill Powers (2004.09.04.2335 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2004.09.04.15.18 --

I don't think that's quite the same thing you were discussing. Was it?

Isn't it? I think it is the same thing. By disturbing some perception
the other is controlling, one can get the other person to act. If one
has correctly judged the mechanism the other is using to control the
disturbed perception, one can get the other to act in a desired way.
It doesn't matter in the slightest what the other's controlled
perception might be that you choose to disturb. It doesn't have to
depend on the other wanting to perceive your goodwill.

OK, then it's the same thing and countercontrol is the right word, if not
an exact one. You're talking about a non-adversarial interaction, in which
each persons' reference condition is satisfied by the other's action,
without any conflict. The context of Tom Bourbon's analysis is one in which
one of the parties experiences conflict as a result of the interaction --
the teacher really doesn't want to screech and rant, or can get in trouble
for doing so. In your analysis, that case would be included but isn't the
only possibility.

How about "cooperation"?

Best,

Bill P.

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0905.0652)]

Bill Powers (2004.09.04.1550 MDT)

If you've stolen money from your best friend, telling you that feeling guilty is unproductive isn't likely to change your desire not to have done what you did. So the reason for the guilty feeling hasn't been changed. In my theory, feeling guilty IS the desire not to have done something, and the physiological states that arise from that impossible wish and are experienced along with it.

O.K. So you and Rick seem to have different views of guilt. At least I can't see any conflict in your picture. The impossible wish generates ongoing error because you cannot control this particular perception.

Bruce Gregory

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No Doubt: no awakening."

[From David Goldstein (2004.09.05.10:28 EDT)]

[Bruce Gregory (2004.0905.0652)] and Martin Taylor, Rick Marken, & Bill Powers

I agree that there seems to be no conflict in Bill’s concept of guilt, namely, “the desire not to have done something, and the physiological states that arise from that impossible wish and are experienced along with it.”

Robert Plutchik has provided some data on how people perceive guilt versus other feelings in his book “Emotions and Life” on page 78. There is a table entitle: Angular Placements on a Circumplex for a Population of Emotion Terms.

Guilty has an angular placement of 102.3. Nearby terms are Meek at 91.0 and Sad at 108.5 and Sorrowful at 112.7.

Opposite Guilty on the circle (102.3 plus 180 is about 282.3) are the terms Inquisitive 267.7, Planful 269.7, Adventurous 270.7, Ecstatic 286.0 and Social 296.7.

In terms of physiological reactions, there is information on page 127 in a table entitled: Frequent Reactions associated with Different Emotions Based on 2,235 Respondents in 8 countries.

Guilt—Silence, hearbeat faster, lump in throuat, muscles tensing.

Shame–Silence, heartbeat faster, feeling hot, changed facial expression, withdrawing.

Joy–Feeling warm, heartbeat faster, muscles relaxing, laughing, smiling, moving toward , lenghty utterance, speech disturbances.

The concept of conflict has some terms which relate to it on page 78. There is indecisive (134.0), vacillating (137.3), ambivalent (144.7). So, I can see why Rick might associate it with the concept of guilty.

David

David M. Goldstein, Ph.D.

···

----- Original Message -----

From:
Bruce Gregory

To: CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu

Sent: Sunday, September 05, 2004 6:52 AM

Subject: Re: guilt

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0905.0652)]

Bill Powers (2004.09.04.1550 MDT)
If you’ve stolen money from your best friend, telling you that feeling guilty is unproductive isn’t likely to change your desire not to have done what you did. So the reason for the guilty feeling hasn’t been changed. In my theory, feeling guilty IS the desire not to have done something, and the physiological states that arise from that impossible wish and are experienced along with it.

O.K. So you and Rick seem to have different views of guilt. At least I can’t see any conflict in your picture. The impossible wish generates ongoing error because you cannot control this particular perception.

Bruce Gregory

“Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No Doubt: no awakening.”

Re: guilt
[Martin Taylor 2004.09.05.11.11]

[From Bruce Gregory
(2004.0905.0652)]

Bill Powers (2004.09.04.1550
MDT)

If you’ve stolen money from your
best friend, telling you that feeling guilty is unproductive isn’t
likely to change your desire not to have done what you did. So the
reason for the guilty feeling hasn’t been changed. In my theory,
feeling guilty IS the desire not to have done something, and
the physiological states that arise from that impossible wish and are
experienced along with it.

O.K. So you and Rick seem to have
different views of guilt. At least I can’t see any conflict in your
picture. The impossible wish generates ongoing error because you
cannot control this particular perception.

Here’s an interesting situation! We have a perception (of having
done a “bad” thing" that has a reference level (of not
having done it), but no means of action that can move the perception
toward or away from its reference level. The effect is much the same
as when a conflict exists that prevents a perception from being moved
toward its reference level.

Or do we?

There’s no means of acting in the external world so that the
event did not happen.

But isn’t it possible that there may be ways in the world of
imagination to move either the perception OR THE REFERENCE so that the
principles-level perception control system that experiences error has
its error reduced? Isn’t it at the principles level that the
experience of guilt arises? And might there not be other actions that
would reduce the error in that control system despite the fact that
the “bad” act can’t be changed? We assume that in most
situations, there are many means to the same end. Why not in
this?

Martin

[Martin Taylor 2004.09.05.11.20]

[From Bill Powers (2004.09.04.2335 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2004.09.04.15.18 --

I don't think that's quite the same thing you were discussing. Was it?

Isn't it? I think it is the same thing. By disturbing some perception
the other is controlling, one can get the other person to act. If one
has correctly judged the mechanism the other is using to control the
disturbed perception, one can get the other to act in a desired way.
It doesn't matter in the slightest what the other's controlled
perception might be that you choose to disturb. It doesn't have to
depend on the other wanting to perceive your goodwill.

OK, then it's the same thing and countercontrol is the right word, if not
an exact one. You're talking about a non-adversarial interaction, in which
each persons' reference condition is satisfied by the other's action,
without any conflict. The context of Tom Bourbon's analysis is one in which
one of the parties experiences conflict as a result of the interaction --
the teacher really doesn't want to screech and rant, or can get in trouble
for doing so. In your analysis, that case would be included but isn't the
only possibility.

How about "cooperation"?

The problem with "cooperation" is that it can apply in a
non-cooperative situation as readily as in a cooperative one. A
military commander may use the same kind of {counter|cross|mutual}
control to get the enemy to do what he wants, just as readily as
Oliver can ask a cooperative Rachel to close the door. In earlier
versions of LPT, I always thought that one of its strong points was
that it could handle non-cooperative communication and cooperative
communication in exactly the same way, the only difference being in
the intentions of the communicative partners with respect to each
other. The same applies here.

In the case of getting an enemy to do what you want, one of the
essential components of your action is that the enemy NOT perceive
your intent, whereas with a partner presumed cooperative, it's much
easier if the partner does perceive your intent. But the difference
is simply one of choosing your actions to disturb the partner's
perceptions appropriately. Cooperation: disturb their perception of
your disposition toward them; Hostilty: avoid disturbing their
perception of your disposition toward them (or at least avoid
allowing them to perceive that their actions are reducing the error
in your perceptions of something that concerns them).

How about "mutual control"?

Martin

[From Bill Powers (2004.09.05.0928 MDT)]

Martin Taylor 2004.09.05.11.11--

Here's an interesting situation! We have a perception (of having done a
"bad" thing" that has a reference level (of not having done it), but no
means of action that can move the perception toward or away from its
reference level. The effect is much the same as when a conflict exists
that prevents a perception from being moved toward its reference level.

Or do we?

There's no means of acting in the external world so that the event did not
happen.

But isn't it possible that there may be ways in the world of imagination
to move either the perception OR THE REFERENCE so that the
principles-level perception control system that experiences error has
_its_ error reduced? Isn't it at the principles level that the experience
of guilt arises? And might there not be other actions that would reduce
the error in that control system despite the fact that the "bad" act can't
be changed? We assume that in most situations, there are many means to the
same end. Why not in this?

Yes there is a way, and I alluded to it with the "up a level" reference in
my post to Bruce G. By consciously occupying the level that sets the
reference signals in question you put yourself (and perhaps the
reorganizing system?) in the proper position for altering the
now-lower-lever reference signals. You can remove the reference signal for
making something that did happen not have happened, and find some more
practical way to achieve the end of which you are now starting to be aware.

  Best,

Bill P.

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.05.0930)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.0905.0652)--

O.K. So you and Rick seem to have different views of guilt. At least I
can't see
any conflict in your picture. The impossible wish generates ongoing
error because
you cannot control this particular perception.

David Goldstein (2004.09.05.10:28 EDT)

I agree that there seems to be no conflict in Bill's concept of guilt,
namely, "the
desire not to have done something, and the physiological states that
arise from
that impossible wish and are experienced along with it."

Actually, Bill's account is exactly the same as mine. The conflict is
between the system that wanted to (and did) steal the money from the
friend and the system that didn't. The desire to have _not_ done
something (stealing from a friend) implies that you did something
(stealing from a friend), and we know that behaviors like stealing are
not simply emitted; stealing is a controlled result of action.

So the person who feels guilt about having stolen from a friend
controls for stealing and also controls for not stealing. A person who
has already stolen (reducing error in the stealing control system) now
finds that there is a large error in the system that does not want to
steal -- which results in physiological consequences that are perceived
as remorse or guilt. If there were no system that wanted to steal, the
person would not have stolen from his friend and there would be no
guilt. Same would be true if there were a system that wanted to steal
and no system that didn't want to steal.

Regards

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0905.1338)]

Rick Marken (2004.09.05.0930)

Actually, Bill's account is exactly the same as mine. The conflict is
between the system that wanted to (and did) steal the money from the
friend and the system that didn't. The desire to have _not_ done
something (stealing from a friend) implies that you did something
(stealing from a friend), and we know that behaviors like stealing are
not simply emitted; stealing is a controlled result of action.

I would have no trouble with your conflict model if I still wanted to
steal from my friend. Since that is not the case, there seems to be no
conflict. (Otherwise I would be in perpetual conflict. For example
about eating the main course, which I did, and eating the dessert,
which I am now doing.)

Bruce Gregory

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No
Doubt: no awakening."

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.05.1040)]

Bill Powers (2004.09.05.0928 MDT)

Martin Taylor 2004.09.05.11.11--

But isn't it possible that there may be ways in the world of
imagination
to move either the perception OR THE REFERENCE so that the
principles-level perception control system that experiences error has
_its_ error reduced?

Yes there is a way, and I alluded to it with the "up a level"
reference in
my post to Bruce G. By consciously occupying the level that sets the
reference signals in question you put yourself (and perhaps the
reorganizing system?) in the proper position for altering the
now-lower-level
reference signals. You can remove the reference signal for making
something that did happen not have happened, and find some more
practical way to achieve the end of which you are now starting to be
aware.

Here Bill explains how one might solve the guilt/ remorse producing
conflict (over stealing from a friend) by going up a level. For
example, Bill suggests that one could remove the reference signal for
making something that did happen (stealing) not happen. Of course, one
could also take the route of the sociopath and remove the reference
signal for wanting something not to have happened (stealing) that did
happen.

Regards

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0905.1403)]

Rick Marken (2004.09.05.1040)

Here Bill explains how one might solve the guilt/ remorse producing
conflict (over stealing from a friend) by going up a level. For
example, Bill suggests that one could remove the reference signal for
making something that did happen (stealing) not happen. Of course, one
could also take the route of the sociopath and remove the reference
signal for wanting something not to have happened (stealing) that did
happen.

Bill's solution may work reasonably well when it comes to preventing
future transgressions. I am less sanguine about its effectiveness for
eliminating guilt with regard to past transgressions. I thought
conflict involved bringing the same perception to different reference
levels _at the same time_. What am I missing here?

Bruce Gregory

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No
Doubt: no awakening."

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.05.1110)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.0905.1338)--

I would have no trouble with your conflict model if I still wanted to
steal from my friend. Since that is not the case, there seems to be no
conflict.

This assumes that control systems, like the one that controls for
stealing, are dismantled once they have achieved their goals. Even if
one accepts this possibility (which seems very unparsimonious to me,
from a modeling perspective) I would still say that the guilt/remorse
producing error is ultimately the result of conflict since one control
system, in achieving it's goal (stealing) has made it impossible for
another control system to achieve its goal (not stealing).

RSM

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.05.1115)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.0905.1403)--

Bill's solution may work reasonably well when it comes to preventing
future transgressions. I am less sanguine about its effectiveness for
eliminating guilt with regard to past transgressions. I thought
conflict involved bringing the same perception to different reference
levels _at the same time_. What am I missing here?

Nothing. If you've already stolen the money, I think the only way to
eliminate the guilt (without changing how you feel about stealing from
a friend) is to give it back and apologize. I would imagine that doing
that takes some serious "going up a level".

RSM

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0905.1437)]

Rick Marken (2004.09.05.1110)

This assumes that control systems, like the one that controls for
stealing, are dismantled once they have achieved their goals. Even if
one accepts this possibility (which seems very unparsimonious to me,
from a modeling perspective) I would still say that the guilt/remorse
producing error is ultimately the result of conflict since one control
system, in achieving it's goal (stealing) has made it impossible for
another control system to achieve its goal (not stealing).

So conflict is _not_ only the result of two control systems trying to
put the same perceptual variable into two different states at the same
time. Conflict is also the result of one control system making it
impossible for for another control system to achieve its goal even at
some later time. Sounds like two very different processes with the same
name. Perhaps different labels would be helpful.

Bruce Gregory

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No
Doubt: no awakening."

[Martin Taylor 2004.09.05.14.50]

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.05.1040)]

Bill Powers (2004.09.05.0928 MDT)

Martin Taylor 2004.09.05.11.11--

But isn't it possible that there may be ways in the world of
imagination
to move either the perception OR THE REFERENCE so that the
principles-level perception control system that experiences error has
_its_ error reduced?

Yes there is a way, and I alluded to it with the "up a level"
reference in
my post to Bruce G. By consciously occupying the level that sets the
reference signals in question you put yourself (and perhaps the
reorganizing system?) in the proper position for altering the
now-lower-level
reference signals. You can remove the reference signal for making
something that did happen not have happened, and find some more
practical way to achieve the end of which you are now starting to be
aware.

Here Bill explains how one might solve the guilt/ remorse producing
conflict (over stealing from a friend) by going up a level. For
example, Bill suggests that one could remove the reference signal for
making something that did happen (stealing) not happen. Of course, one
could also take the route of the sociopath and remove the reference
signal for wanting something not to have happened (stealing) that did
happen.

Bill put into plain statements what I put in the form of rhetorical
questions. We said the same thing. Now Rick also says the same thing.
Perhaps there might be something to it?

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0905.1403)]

Bill's solution may work reasonably well when it comes to preventing
future transgressions. I am less sanguine about its effectiveness for
eliminating guilt with regard to past transgressions. I thought
conflict involved bringing the same perception to different reference
levels _at the same time_. What am I missing here?

Nothing much. Your definition of conflict is too restrictive, but
that doesn't matter here. Somewhere in your principle-level controls
there is one that generates an output that generates a lower
reference level for "not perceiving yourself as one who steals", and
that in turn would create a reference level for not perceiving
oneself as actually stealing on a specific occasion. Somewhere else
was a control system that generated a reference level that allowed
you to perceive yourself as stealing on some occasion. There was a
direct conflict at that time, which was resolved by the action of
stealing, leaving error in the perception of the degree to which you
perceive yourself as one who steals. That error is persistent until
it can be reduced by altering some OTHER lower level reference and
committing some action that reduces the principles-level perceptual
error.

The conflicted perception of seeing/not-seeing yourself as stealing
on the specific occasion has long been resolved, but that resolution
left residual error, and that's what matters in a conflict. Now, as
Bill, Rick, and I separately said, the question is whether the
feeling-guilty person can reduce the principles-level error by some
other action. Depending on what other principles-level perceptions
might be under control, the person might, for instance, go to
confession and be absolved (apologising to God, in effect); he might
apologise to the victim and promise restitution (whether that promise
would be fulfilled is another question); he might perform some
compensating act of charity; or, as Rick/Bill said, he might alter
the reference level for his principles-level perception of not
stealing so that the error vanished that way.

Conflict need not persist for its effects to persist, especially when
one gets into event perceptions and perceptions that depend on event
perceptions. If one is conflicted about whether to take the bike or
the car to work, the conflict is resolved whichever one wins, but the
guilt of choosing the polluting car over the healthy exercise of the
bike can persist for a long time. Events happen, and their effects
persist. It's a bit different than the persistent conflict that could
occur over the state of a variable that continues over time.

Martin

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.05.1220)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.0905.1437)--

So conflict is _not_ only the result of two control systems trying to
put the same perceptual variable into two different states at the same
time. Conflict is also the result of one control system making it
impossible for for another control system to achieve its goal even at
some later time. Sounds like two very different processes with the same
name. Perhaps different labels would be helpful.

Perhaps. But I don't think you are describing two different things. In
the stealing example, two control systems are trying to put the same
perceptual variable (stealing) in two different states (stealing, not
stealing). In Bill's example, guilt exists because one of these control
systems (the one that wants to steal) has "won" the tug of war; the
money was stolen. This creates an uncorrectable error for the system
that wants no stealing. The error that is present in this system is the
result of a conflict.

It's also possible to think of cases were guilt exists even when there
is no "winner" in the conflict. For example, consider a fellow like
Proust, who was a homosexual but despised homosexuality. So he wanted
to sleep with men and didn't want to sleep with men. The evidence is
that Proust felt very guilty about his homosexuality, even when he was
not sleeping with men. So here we have a case where guilt exists even
when the guilty action does not take place (neither side of the
conflict wins).

I think the general lesson about guilt, from a PCT perspective, is that
it is a feeling that results from error produced by a conflict between
systems that want to produce (and may successfully produce) some result
(stealing, sleeping with people of the same sex) and other systems that
don't want to produce (and may successfully prevent production of) that
same result. I think the only way to overcome such guilt is to resolve
the conflict that is it's ultimate cause, and this is done by going up
a level and reorganizing the conflict producing goals.

RSM

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.05.1225)]

Martin Taylor (2004.09.05.14.50) --

Bill put into plain statements what I put in the form of rhetorical
questions. We said the same thing. Now Rick also says the same thing.
Perhaps there might be something to it?

I agree, Martin. We're all on the same page on this one.

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400