guilt

Hello: I am a passive reader on CSGNET. I am a clinician and I'm studying
guilt as part of another therapy. Can you tell me how to get into the
archives on guilt?

Thank you,

Jason Gosnell
Bridgeway Center Inc.
Ft. Walton Beach, FL
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[From Rick Marken (2004.09.02.1940)]

Jason Gosnell wrote:

Hello: I am a passive reader on CSGNET. I am a clinician and I'm
studying
guilt as part of another therapy. Can you tell me how to get into the
archives on guilt?

You can go to

http://listserv.uiuc.edu/archives/csgnet.html

and select "Search the Archives". I don't think there is much on
"guilt" in the archives, though.

I think guilt is a feeling (emotion) associated with the error that
results from a particular kind of internal conflict, one in which one
system wants to experience a perception (X) that another system doesn't
  want others to know is wanted. A conflict exists because one system
wants X and the other essentially doesn't. The physiological
consequences of the error that results from this conflict combined with
the cognitive interpretation of the cause of these consequences (the
knowledge that I don't want others to know that I want X) is perceived
as "guilt". See a description of the PCT model of emotion in Powers'
_Living Control Systems II_ or, better, in the soon to be released,
second edition of Powers' _Behavior: The control of perception_.

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[From David Goldstein (2004.09.03.05:40 EDT)]
[Rick Marken (2004.09.02.1940)]

Rick,

Please elaborate on your answer.

I am not getting a clear picture of what you are saying.

Thanks,
David
David M. Goldstein, Ph.D.

···

----- Original Message -----
From: "Rick Marken" <marken@MINDREADINGS.COM>
To: <CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu>
Sent: Thursday, September 02, 2004 10:38 PM
Subject: Re: guilt

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.02.1940)]

Jason Gosnell wrote:

> Hello: I am a passive reader on CSGNET. I am a clinician and I'm
> studying
> guilt as part of another therapy. Can you tell me how to get into the
> archives on guilt?
>

You can go to

http://listserv.uiuc.edu/archives/csgnet.html

and select "Search the Archives". I don't think there is much on
"guilt" in the archives, though.

I think guilt is a feeling (emotion) associated with the error that
results from a particular kind of internal conflict, one in which one
system wants to experience a perception (X) that another system doesn't
  want others to know is wanted. A conflict exists because one system
wants X and the other essentially doesn't. The physiological
consequences of the error that results from this conflict combined with
the cognitive interpretation of the cause of these consequences (the
knowledge that I don't want others to know that I want X) is perceived
as "guilt". See a description of the PCT model of emotion in Powers'
_Living Control Systems II_ or, better, in the soon to be released,
second edition of Powers' _Behavior: The control of perception_.

Best

Rick
---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0903.0801)]

Rick Marken (2004.09.02.1940)

What you are calling guilt others might call shame. I believe that
guilt is normally associated with a situation in which one judges that,
in retrospect, one's actions conflicted with one's beliefs.

Bruce Gregory

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No
Doubt: no awakening."

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1250)]

David Goldstein (2004.09.03.05:40 EDT)

Please elaborate on your answer.

I am not getting a clear picture of what you are saying.

OK. I was trying to be succinct. Let me see if I can make the idea clearer.
I don't want to take the time now to make diagrams but I will if I can't get
this across verbally.

I think we feel guilt when we want to do something (or, possibly, have done
something) that we also don't want to do (or have done), either because it
violates our own ethics or because we think others would find our doing it
to be objectionable. For example, I feel guilty about wanting to eat (and,
possibly, about actually having eaten) an ice cream before dinner because I
know it's wrong to ruin my appetite for the good food -- and also because
Linda would be pissed;-). At the heart of this feeling of guilt, then, is
error -- a discrepancy between what I want and what I get. There is an error
if I eat (or ate) the ice cream (because I want to save my appetite) and
there is an error if I don't (because I want to eat the ice cream).

PCT explains a conflict like this in terms of control systems trying to
bring the same perceptual variable to two different reference states. In the
example, the perceptual variable in conflict is ice cream. One control
system wants the variable in the state "eaten" and the other wants it in the
state "not eaten". What actually happens to the ice cream depends on the
relative strength of each control system. If the systems are about equal in
strength, there will be some error in both systems: you keep going to the
freezer to get the ice cream but never get it because that would be wrong.
But regardless of what happens, there will always be a good size error
signal in one system or both. The error signal(s) leads to preparatory
physiological reactions -- fluttery stomach, dry mouth, and so on -- that we
experience (because the actions for which they are preparation never occur)
as emotion. These same physiological reactions are associated with many
different emotions: fear, sadness, anger, guilt, etc. We presumably
interpret them as guilt rather than anything else because we know that one
source of the conflict is a system that wants no ice cream because it's
wrong to eat it. That's the cognitive component of emotion, as I understand
the PCT model of emotion.

Is this any clearer?

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0903.1641)]

Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1250)

These same physiological reactions are associated with many
different emotions: fear, sadness, anger, guilt, etc. We presumably
interpret them as guilt rather than anything else because we know that
one
source of the conflict is a system that wants no ice cream because it's
wrong to eat it. That's the cognitive component of emotion, as I
understand
the PCT model of emotion.

Am I correct in concluding that the PCT model of emotions denies the
existence of emotions in animals that lack sufficient cognitive
apparatus to interpret their physiological responses? My dogs for
example, are Cartesian automatons, as it were, as they cower when they
hear loud thunder. They are experiencing no emotions, but presumably
some form of conflict. Any ideas what it might be?

Bruce Gregory

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No
Doubt: no awakening."

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1400)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.0903.1641)]

Am I correct in concluding that the PCT model of emotions denies the
existence of emotions in animals that lack sufficient cognitive
apparatus to interpret their physiological responses?

No. I think PCT would say that these animals probably experience the
physiological aspects of emotion just as we do. They just don't make the
cognitive distinctions that we make. So anger and fear, to the extent that
they involve the same physiological reactions, would be experienced as the
same emotion by a dog, but as different emotions by a human who was old
enough to be able to make the cognitive distinction.

RSM

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0903.1725)]

Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1400)

No. I think PCT would say that these animals probably experience the
physiological aspects of emotion just as we do. They just don't make
the
cognitive distinctions that we make. So anger and fear, to the extent
that
they involve the same physiological reactions, would be experienced as
the
same emotion by a dog, but as different emotions by a human who was old
enough to be able to make the cognitive distinction.

That seems reasonable. How about my own reaction to very loud thunder?
If I experience a physiological response, it must be due to conflict.
If I run away, presumably I experience no conflict and no emotion. Is
that correct?

Bruce Gregory

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No
Doubt: no awakening."

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1510)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.0903.1725)--

How about my own reaction to very loud thunder? If I experience a
physiological response, it must be due to conflict.

No. According to PCT, it must be due to error that causes preparatory
physiological reactions for actions that are not taken or that don't reduce
the error (so that the physiological consequences of error persist).

If I run away, presumably I experience no conflict and no emotion. Is
that correct?

I don't think there is any conflict involved in the thunderclap example. The
thunder is just an insuperable disturbance to a controlled variable:
perceived sound level.

RSM

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0903.1819)]

Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1510)

I don't think there is any conflict involved in the thunderclap
example. The
thunder is just an insuperable disturbance to a controlled variable:
perceived sound level.

O.K. No conflict, so I experience no emotion. What then do I experience
that feels like fear?

Bruce Gregory

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No
Doubt: no awakening."

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1620)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.0903.1819)]

O.K. No conflict, so I experience no emotion.

No. You do experience emotion. You just don't experience it (in the
thunderclap example) as a result of conflict.

The ultimate physiological source of emotion (according to PCT, I believe)
is failed control. When control fails there is error driving action
(including the physiological preparation for action) that is not effectively
reducing error. So there is continued physiological preparation (the feeling
component of emotion) sans error reduction. Anything that results in failed
control can, thus, be a cause of emotion. Among the things that can result
in failed control are conflict, lack of skill or insuperable disturbance.

What then do I experience that feels like fear?

I believe you experience the physiological response to error that results
from the insuperable disturbance (thunderclap) to the controlled variable
(sound level). Your cognitive interpretation of the cause of this
physiological reaction (your desire to get away from the thunderclap) is
presumably what leads you to call it "fear" (rather than "anger" or "joy").

RSM

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0903.1931)]

Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1620)

I believe you experience the physiological response to error that
results
from the insuperable disturbance (thunderclap) to the controlled
variable
(sound level). Your cognitive interpretation of the cause of this
physiological reaction (your desire to get away from the thunderclap)
is
presumably what leads you to call it "fear" (rather than "anger" or
"joy").

I'm with you up to the last sentence. I don't think my dog is afraid of
the sound of thunder (rather than experiencing joy at the sound of
thunder) as a result of a cognitive interpretation on her part. Of
course, I could be wrong.

Bruce Gregory

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No
Doubt: no awakening."

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1700)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.0903.1931)]

Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1620)

Your cognitive interpretation of the cause of this physiological
reaction (your desire to get away from the thunderclap) is
presumably what leads you to call it "fear" (rather than "anger" or
"joy").

I'm with you up to the last sentence. I don't think my dog is afraid of
the sound of thunder (rather than experiencing joy at the sound of
thunder) as a result of a cognitive interpretation on her part.

Right. I imagine that your dog just experiences a perception of the
physiological consequences of the error created by the huge disturbance to
its controlled variable. It's the same perception that _you_ would call
"fear" if you wanted to avoid hearing the thunderclap and "joy" if you were
hoping to hear it. Dogs, I believe, experience emotions only as pure
feelings. People experience emotions as cognitively interpreted feelings. So
when the thunder claps, the dog gets perception X. That's it's emotion. You
also get perception X but you also have a perception of what you want to do
about the thunderclap that resulted in X. If you wanted to avoid (a) the
thunderclap, then you perceive X + a as fear; if you wanted to hear (h) the
thunderclap, then you perceive X + h as joy. I believe that, for the dog,
the emotion is probably just X, regardless of what the dog wanted.

RSM

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

[From David Goldstein (2004.09.03.22:30 EDT)]
[From Rick Marken (2004.09.02.1940)]
David Goldstein (2004.09.03.05:40 EDT)

Rick,
I understand your statements better, but not quite completely.

I understand that guilt is the feeling that happens when I engage in an
action which I believe is wrong.

What I don't understand is why the conflict is necessary. Is it really
necessary?

David
David M. Goldstein, Ph.D.

···

----- Original Message -----
From: "Richard Marken" <marken@MINDREADINGS.COM>
To: <CSGNET@listserv.uiuc.edu>
Sent: Friday, September 03, 2004 4:01 PM
Subject: Re: guilt

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.03.1250)]

> David Goldstein (2004.09.03.05:40 EDT)

> Please elaborate on your answer.
>
> I am not getting a clear picture of what you are saying.

OK. I was trying to be succinct. Let me see if I can make the idea

clearer.

I don't want to take the time now to make diagrams but I will if I can't

get

this across verbally.

I think we feel guilt when we want to do something (or, possibly, have

done

something) that we also don't want to do (or have done), either because it
violates our own ethics or because we think others would find our doing it
to be objectionable. For example, I feel guilty about wanting to eat

(and,

possibly, about actually having eaten) an ice cream before dinner because

I

know it's wrong to ruin my appetite for the good food -- and also because
Linda would be pissed;-). At the heart of this feeling of guilt, then, is
error -- a discrepancy between what I want and what I get. There is an

error

if I eat (or ate) the ice cream (because I want to save my appetite) and
there is an error if I don't (because I want to eat the ice cream).

PCT explains a conflict like this in terms of control systems trying to
bring the same perceptual variable to two different reference states. In

the

example, the perceptual variable in conflict is ice cream. One control
system wants the variable in the state "eaten" and the other wants it in

the

state "not eaten". What actually happens to the ice cream depends on the
relative strength of each control system. If the systems are about equal

in

strength, there will be some error in both systems: you keep going to the
freezer to get the ice cream but never get it because that would be wrong.
But regardless of what happens, there will always be a good size error
signal in one system or both. The error signal(s) leads to preparatory
physiological reactions -- fluttery stomach, dry mouth, and so on -- that

we

experience (because the actions for which they are preparation never

occur)

as emotion. These same physiological reactions are associated with many
different emotions: fear, sadness, anger, guilt, etc. We presumably
interpret them as guilt rather than anything else because we know that one
source of the conflict is a system that wants no ice cream because it's
wrong to eat it. That's the cognitive component of emotion, as I

understand

the PCT model of emotion.

Is this any clearer?

Best

Rick
--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0904.0650)]

David Goldstein (2004.09.03.22:30 EDT)
[From Rick Marken (2004.09.02.1940)]
David Goldstein (2004.09.03.05:40 EDT)

Rick,
I understand your statements better, but not quite completely.

I understand that guilt is the feeling that happens when I engage in an
action which I believe is wrong.

What I don't understand is why the conflict is necessary. Is it really
necessary?

Far be it from me to speak for Rick, but one way to think of an action
that you believe to be wrong is to say that you do not want to perceive
anyone carrying out the action. When you perceive yourself as carrying
out the action there is a necessary error and because you are the
source of the action, a necessary conflict. Or so it seems to me.

Bruce Gregory

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No
Doubt: no awakening."

[From Rick Marken (2004.09.04.0830)]

David Goldstein (2004.09.03.22:30 EDT)

I understand your statements better, but not quite completely.

I understand that guilt is the feeling that happens when I engage in an
action which I believe is wrong.

What I don't understand is why the conflict is necessary. Is it really
necessary?

It just seemed to me that the phenomenon we call "guilt" is a conflict
phenomenon; I feel guilty when I want X (for whatever higher level
reason) and I don't want X (because I think it's wrong or because I
know that others think it's wrong). So the explanation of this
phenomenon was in terms of control systems providing conflicting
references for the state of a perception, X.

So I would say that conflict between control systems is necessary to
the explanation of guilt because guilt seems like a conflict phenomenon
(like an internal tug of war).

If there is a way to explain guilt in PCT terms that does not involve
conflict I'd sure like to hear it. I can't think of such a
conflict-free explanation myself.

Best regards

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0904.1238)]

Rick Marken (2004.09.04.0830)

If there is a way to explain guilt in PCT terms that does not involve
conflict I'd sure like to hear it. I can't think of such a
conflict-free explanation myself.

No problem. Guilt is a controlled perception. We perceive ourselves as
guilty because we have a reference level for the perception of guilt.
Something to do with original sin, I believe.

Bruce Gregory

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No
Doubt: no awakening."

[Martin Taylor 2004.09.04.11:03]

Back again for a week or so!

Reading through this thread on guilt, none of which I will quote,
reminds me of a lot of other things relating to the control of one's
perception of self, and to Layered Protocol Theory (LPT). Guilt is a
perception, and it is a perception inexcapably tied to a social
context.

According to LPT, the reason one communicates is that one can control
some perception by means of the actions of another person. That means
that O (the Originator, who we can call Oliver) counter-controls R
(the Recipient, who we call Rachel) so that Rachel's actions become
part of Oliver's external feedback loop for the control of his
perception.

Counter-control, as discussed earlier this year, does not involve
Rachel opposing a disturbance induced by Oliver. She does that, for
sure, but her actions in doing so are perceived by Oliver, and
Oliver's perceptions of Rachel's actions contribute to the perception
Oliver originally intended to control.

Consider a specific example. Oliver wants the door shut, and Rachel
is standing near the door. Oliver says "could you close the door,
please", Rachel does so, and Oliver says "Thanks". Where's the
counter-control in that sequence?

Here it is...

Oliver perceives Rachel as being, if not favourably disposed toward
him, at least not actively hostile. He perceives that Rachel has the
means to close the door (imagine if Rachel were holding a loaded tray
of dishes, or was confined to a wheel chair and out of reach of the
door; would Oliver, being well-disposed toward Rachel, make the same
request?). Oliver therefore can reasonably suppose that his request
would disturb a controlled perception held by Rachel, that Oliver is
well-disposed toward her.

If Rachel failed to shut the door, Oliver might think less well of
her, which would create error in her controlled perception of
Oliver's feeling toward her. Shutting the door might lead Oliver to
be well-disposed toward her, so she shuts the door. Oliver's
controlled perception of the door state, with its reference level for
seeing the door shut, is then brought to a state of no error.
Counter-control has happened, on the part of both Oliver and Rachel.
Oliver perceives the door shut, and Rachel perceives Oliver to
increase his positive feelings toward her, if minimally. He said
"Thanks".

What does Oliver's counter control depend on? It depends primarily on
whether Rachel is in fact controlling for a perception that Oliver is
well-disposed toward her. If she wanted to make Oliver hostile, she
might say "Close it yourself", in response to his request. Oliver,
therefore, should be controlling a perception that Rachel feels well
disposed toward him. (I use "should be controlling" in a sense of
engineering efficiency, not moral correctness; an effectively
reorganized system would control what "should be controlled").

So, in this simple interaction, we find both parties needing to
control a perception that the other feels well disposed toward him or
her. Equivalently, Each has reorganized so as to act ordinarily in a
way that does not bring them into conflict by either acting in direct
opoosition to the other's control actions. If conflict is inevitable,
then some other component of the perception of each other's
disposition has also to be brought into play so that the perceptions
each has of the other's disposition remains under control in a
negative feedback loop (i.e. "The Bomb in the Machine" must not be
allowed to explode <http://www.mmtaylor.net/PCT/DFS93/DFS93_8.html>).
In the example of closing the door, Rachel might say "I'm sorry, I'm
stuck right now, and can't close it for you" rather than "No, I
won't".

Now we leave that example, and consider the perception of self. There
are at least two perceptions of self (probably many, but two kinds).
One is the perception one has of oneself "directly" through
perceiving one's own actions in the environment, the other is what
one perceives others to perceive of oneself. Both, presumably, are
controllable, though, as Rabbie Burns said "Wud some Guid the giftie
gie's, tae see ourselves as ithers see's" -- it's hard to be sure how
others perceive us.

Hard as it may be, if we want to perceive others as perceiving us in
a way that allows us to counter-control them effectively (as by
having them close the door when we want it closed and they can do it
easily), there are certain things that often work. One might allow
others to counter-control us, by obliging their requests when it is
convenient to do so, and one might try to act so as not to reduce
their ability to control their own actions. Those kinds of statements
correspond to reference levels for perceptions of "principles".

"Principles" also enter into one's own perception of self. One may
have a reference for perceiving oneself as following certain
principles, whether they be the ones above, or ones asserted by one's
religion (which may conflict with the ones given as examples).
Whatever they may be, those principles that enter into one's
perception of self must form controlled perceptions, and the actions
that control those perceptions become reference levels for all the
overt actions observable by others.

(Slowly we are coming toward "guilt").

Let's get back to Oliver and Rachel. Oliver wants to perceive himself
as a "good guy", meaning one who acts so as not to impede Rachel's
ability to control. But there comes a time when in order to control
some lower level perception (e.g. to have some ready cash), Oliver
has an available action (take some of Rachel's cash) that does impede
Rachel's control. Oliver might be able to get some of Rachel's cash
by saying "Could you lend me some money" (using counter-control), or
by stealing some, unknown to Rachel.

If Oliver uses counter-control to get cash from Rachel, he might
slightly reduce Rachel's feeling of goodwill toward him -- less so if
his request is customary and he has always repaid Rachel promptly,
meaning he perceives Rachel to perceive him as trustworthy. But if
Oliver steals the money and Rachel never finds out, then Rachel's
feeling of goodwill toward Oliver will not be disturbed, and Oliver
will not have induced error in his own perception of Rachel's feeling
of goodwill toward him. So Oliver steals.

Oliver having stolen, however, introduces error in his perception of
himself as a "good guy". He perceives that he has in fact reduced
Rahel's ability to control (though he wouldn't put it that way unless
he had studied PCT). It introduces error in his controlled perception
of one of his principles. He has managed to create a difference
between the way he sees himself and the way he perceives others as
seeing him. Since the error is in his perception of his own
principles, but not in his perception of how others perceive him as
controlling his own principles, he feels "guilt". If, on the other
hand, he had been brought up in Fagin's troop of young pickpockets,
he might feel guilt if he failed to steal some of Rachel's cash, the
principle in question being to perceive himself as acting in
accordance with the Fagin-based social norms, which allow him to
counter-control the members of Fagin's gang.

It is important that in either case (normal or Fagin-based), the
feeling of guilt requires that the reference levels associated with
the stealing action include a reference that Rachel not perceive
Oliver as having acted against her own ability to control.

If it does not matter to Oliver whether Rachel knows, or if Oliver
actively wants Rachel to know, there would ordinarily be no feeling
of guilt associated with the theft. Only if Oliver had a principle
that excluded the action of theft, and yet stole because some other
controlled perception conflicted with the control of that "principle
perception" would Oliver feel guilt.

The end result of this pseudo-analysis is that guilt is a concomitant
of actions that increase error in a controlled perception of
principle that contributes to the perception of self. Actions that
increase error in any perception can occur, either in a poorly
reorganized structure, or in a situation in which the control of some
other perception leads to an internal conflict in which the control
of the "principle" perception loses out. So one can develop a feeling
of guilt either by not knowing how to act "properly" or through
internal conflict.

Sorry for the length. It's all a bit complicated. I know I wound up
agreeing with Rick that conflict is central to the question of guilt
-- Sorry, Rick :wink:
but I thought that to go through the interpersonal and social loops
according to LPT might help in other related analyses.

···

-------------------
I probably won't contribute much in the near future. There's another
meeting coming up next week, and I have a lot else that must be
attended to after the last month of pleasantly stressful activities.

Martin

[From Bruce Gregory (2004.0904.1304)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.0904.1238)

No problem. Guilt is a controlled perception. We perceive ourselves as
guilty because we have a reference level for the perception of guilt.
Something to do with original sin, I believe.

Perform the test. Notice that if you feel guilty about something, you
often resist the efforts of another to persuade you that you should not
feel guilty. In other words, you defend the perception of guilt against
disturbances.

Bruce

"Great Doubt: great awakening. Little Doubt: little awakening. No
Doubt: no awakening."

[From Bill Powers (2004.09.04.1218 MDT)]

Bruce Gregory (2004.0904.1304)]

Perform the test. Notice that if
you feel guilty about something, you

often resist the efforts of another to persuade you that you should
not

feel guilty. In other words, you defend the perception of guilt
against

disturbances.

Couldn’t it be that you’re defending your reason for feeling
guilty?

Best,

Bill P.