Hal to Bruce

Yes, it's always possible I have less to say than I think I do. Being
told so is one of the stories of my life :slight_smile:

Within the counterpart model I'm still hallucinating is worth talking
about, agreement occurs at the level of presuming that if we reach far
enough we want compatible things (e.g., you your coffee and I my
water), and ultimately want the same form of interaction between us.
The differences we discover between us are presumed to reflect
unacknowledged differences within ourselves. At any moment our
referent reflects but one part of ourselves--contrasting ones another.
This makes conflict a source of self-discovery rather than a threat to
oneself. The agreement presumed when we feel we can afford to live
within this model stands in distinction to our momentary choices of
referent, which are unique, tentative, idiosyncratic and hence always
different from one another. The more basic agreement amounts to
agreement to expect disagreement in any finite interaction.

I may try to say this a little more clearly later on. Basically, I'm
suggesting a world we also live in in which the referents described in
PCT are not the level at which evidence of agreement is sought.
Rather, agreement is demonstrated empirically to us by evidence that
our motives are orbiting around one another as I have tried here (and
at greater length elsewhere) to describe.

My disagreement with Bill and others, I think, is over whether PCT
explains all of what we do. I think it depicts one of two drummers we
harken to. l&p hal

Yes, it's always possible I have less to say than I think I do. Being
told so is one of the stories of my life :slight_smile:

Within the counterpart model I'm still hallucinating is worth talking
about, agreement occurs at the level of presuming that if we reach far
enough we want compatible things (e.g., you your coffee and I my
water), and ultimately want the same form of interaction between us.
The differences we discover between us are presumed to reflect
unacknowledged differences within ourselves. At any moment our
referent reflects but one part of ourselves--contrasting ones another.
This makes conflict a source of self-discovery rather than a threat to
oneself. The agreement presumed when we feel we can afford to live
within this model stands in distinction to our momentary choices of
referent, which are unique, tentative, idiosyncratic and hence always
different from one another. The more basic agreement amounts to
agreement to expect disagreement in any finite interaction.

I may try to say this a little more clearly later on. Basically, I'm
suggesting a world we also live in in which the referents described in
PCT are not the level at which evidence of agreement is sought.
Rather, agreement is demonstrated empirically to us by evidence that
our motives are orbiting around one another as I have tried here (and
at greater length elsewhere) to describe.

My disagreement with Bill and others, I think, is over whether PCT
explains all of what we do. I think it depicts one of two drummers we
harken to. l&p hal