[Bruce Nevin (2016.03.07 07:55 ET)]
MK (2016.03.06.1300 CET) –
MK: An individual wants to perceive both A and B in his life. The
individual is asked whether A is more important than B. The individual
considers the question and realizes that whereas that used to be the
case, it no longer is so: B actually seems to be more important than
A. Upon considering it for a while, he concludes that B is now more
important for him than A.
What is the point of view from which the individual ‘considers’ this choice? A control system there decides which is more important. To do this, it controls both perception A and perception B at the same time. Its input also must include other perceptions that are relevant to the choice. These might include e.g. remembered consequences of controlling them, imagined consequences of not controlling them, and perhaps remembered experiences prior to controlling one or the other of them. And of course the consequences, controlling A and controlling B might be in conflict. The ‘aha!’ shift in MoL the resolution of conflict, pivots on this.
That point of view that takes in both A and B at once (with their ramifications) must be located in a perceptual input function that receives perceptions relating to A plus perceptions relating to B. Perhaps there are general-purpose problem-solving systems at the Program level. The evaluation that leads to a decision and choice I suppose is controlled at the Principle level by means of whatever system ‘hosts’ that unifying point of view on both A and B.
Setting aside detail…schematically, systems above both A and B adjust the relative gain for controlling perception A vs. perception B.
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On Sun, Mar 6, 2016 at 4:12 PM, Richard Marken rsmarken@gmail.com wrote:
[From Rick Marken (2016.03.06.1310)]
MK (2016.03.06.1300 CET)
MK: Consider the imagined placement of goals in an idealized control
hierarchy versus the gain with which one controls for a goal:
MK: An individual wants to perceive both A and B in his life. The
individual is asked whether A is more important than B. The individual
considers the question and realizes that whereas that used to be the
case, it no longer is so: B actually seems to be more important than
A. Upon considering it for a while, he concludes that B is now more
important for him than A.
MK: It is now very tempting to say that the individual has placed the goal
B “higher” in his control hierarchy than goal A; but is this the case?
RM: I wouldn’t be tempted to say this because, according to PCT anyway, the relative level of control systems in a hierarchy is not determined by the individual. It’s presumed to be determined by the inherited structure of the nervous system.
MK: To me it seems like he has merely adjusted the gain with which he
controls for the respective goals.
RM: Yes, that’s probably what “importance” is describing when we describe the relative importance of goals. More important goals are references for controlled variables that are controlled with higher gain than less important ones.
MK: That one controls for a goal B with a higher gain than goal A _does
not_ necessarily mean that goal B is “higher-level” than goal A.
RM: Right.
MK: Here is a difference between “higher-level” and “higher-gain”.
RM: Yes, although it’s possible that, in general, higher level goals can be controlled with higher gain than lower level ones since the time constant of higher level control systems must be slower than that of lower level systems.
Best
Rick
M
Richard S. Marken
Author, with Timothy A. Carey, of Controlling People: The Paradoxical Nature of Being Human.
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