[From Rick Marken (990107.1520)]
Bruce Gregory (990107.1710 EST)]
But if you believed that all Jews were stingy and you encountered
a generous Jew, would you simply go looking for a stingy Jew to
match your desired perception?
I really have no idea what I'd do. Depends on the circumstances.
Maybe I'd make him pull down his pants. Maybe I'd just take his
money and run. Maybe I'd change my belief.
It seems to me you are telling me that if I believe the Earth
goes around the Sun I will perceive the Earth going around the
Sun.
I'm not telling you that.
Beliefs seem to me to be statements that I affirm, while
purposeful behavior seems to involve intended outcomes I achieve.
Isn't "affirming a statement" a purposeful behavior? Or are
affirmations just caused by certain statements and denials
caused by others? Or do people just emit affirmations?
I am having trouble seeing that they [beliefs and purposeful
behavior] are "really" the same thing.
So beliefs are statements that you affirm; and affirming a
statement is not a purposeful behavior.
OK. Is a belief (affirming a statement) a behavior (something
people do)? If so, how do you explain it? If not, what is it?
Best
Rick
···
---
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken
[From Bruce Gregory (990107.2013 EST)]
Rick Marken (990107.1520)
OK. Is a belief (affirming a statement) a behavior (something
people do)? If so, how do you explain it? If not, what is it?
Affirming a statement is a purposeful behavior. But the perception being
controlled may be unrelated to the content of the statement. If you ask me,
"Do you believe 2 + 2 = 4?" I will respond, "Yes I do believe 2 + 2 = 4".
The perception that I am controlling is that I speak truthfully; I am not
controlling a perception that 2 + 2 = 4. "2 + 2 = 4" does not seem to me to
be a reference level for any perception I am experiencing.
And I'm feeling better, thank you. (I knew you intended to ask me how I was
feeling after the extraction.)
Bruce Gregory
[From Rick Marken (990107.1830)]
Bruce Gregory (990107.2013 EST) --
Affirming a statement is a purposeful behavior. But the
perception being controlled may be unrelated to the content
of the statement. If you ask me, "Do you believe 2 + 2 = 4?"
I will respond, "Yes I do believe 2 + 2 = 4". The perception
that I am controlling is that I speak truthfully; I am not
controlling a perception that 2 + 2 = 4.
The perception being controlled ("speaking truthfully") is most
definitely related to the statement "Do you believe 2 + 2 = 4?".
It's a disturbance to the perceptual variable "speaking truthfully".
You control that perception (keeping it at "truthful") by saying
"yes". If the statement had been "Do you believe 2 + 2 = 5?" then,
in order to keep your perception of "speaking truthfully" at
"truthful", you would have said "no" (I presume).
If the perception being controlled were unrelated to the content
of a statement like "Do you believe 2 + 2 = 4?", then that
statement would not be a disturbance to that perception and there
would be no systematic relationship between how you act (say "yes"
or "no" in this case) and the content of the statement.
But all this has nothing to do with what belief _is_. I think
believing is something people do (even if they do it covertly,
in imagination). What do you think believing _is_?
Oh, and I'm sorry about the extraction. There is a procedure
called root canal, by the way, that they've had out here on the
west coast for over 30 years. It may not have spared you much
pain but it might have spared the tooth.
Best
Rick
···
--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken/
[From Bruce Gregory (990108.1047 EST)]
Rick Marken (990107.1830)
But all this has nothing to do with what belief _is_. I think
believing is something people do (even if they do it covertly,
in imagination). What do you think believing _is_?
I agree that believing is something people do. I think believing x is
thinking "x is true".
Oh, and I'm sorry about the extraction. There is a procedure
called root canal, by the way, that they've had out here on the
west coast for over 30 years. It may not have spared you much
pain but it might have spared the tooth.
I'll keep that in mind. Perhaps I should have visited a dentist rather
than extracting the tooth myself.
Bruce Gregory
[From Bruce Abbott (990108.1140 EST)]
Bruce Gregory (990108.1047 EST) --
Rick Marken (990107.1830)
But all this has nothing to do with what belief _is_. I think
believing is something people do (even if they do it covertly,
in imagination). What do you think believing _is_?
I agree that believing is something people do. I think believing x is
thinking "x is true".
Beware of the semantic pitfall: one could just as well assert that
perceiving is something people "do." That doesn't make it a behavior. I
perceive my beliefs; I don't "do" them. How about you?
Oh, and I'm sorry about the extraction. There is a procedure
called root canal, by the way, that they've had out here on the
west coast for over 30 years. It may not have spared you much
pain but it might have spared the tooth.
I'll keep that in mind. Perhaps I should have visited a dentist rather
than extracting the tooth myself.
Or a psychotherapist, who might have helped you to perceive that the tooth
was fine and didn't need extracting.
Bruce
[From Rick Marken (990108.1000)]
Does anyone have any ideas about how we might actually _test_
the notion that beliefs can be reference perceptions?
Best
Rick
···
--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken
[From Bruce Gregory (990108.1210 EST)]
Bruce Abbott (990108.1140 EST)
>Bruce Gregory (990108.1047 EST) --
>>Rick Marken (990107.1830)
>> But all this has nothing to do with what belief _is_. I think
>> believing is something people do (even if they do it covertly,
>> in imagination). What do you think believing _is_?
>I agree that believing is something people do. I think believing x is
>thinking "x is true".
Beware of the semantic pitfall: one could just as well assert that
perceiving is something people "do." That doesn't make it a
behavior.
Even if you add "even if they do it covertly in imagination"? Thinking
does seem to be more active than perceiving, but that may simply be a
belief of mine.
I
perceive my beliefs; I don't "do" them. How about you?
This is a very interesting question. Most of the time I am unaware of my
beliefs. (I believe the plate tectonic model is the best model we have
of the earth's surface, but I am not aware of this most of the time.)
Suppose you ask me, "What do you think of the plate tectonic model?" I
am not aware that I "look" anywhere to find the answer to this question.
Rather, I say something such as, "I believe the plate tectonic model is
the best model we have of the earth's surface." In this sense, I don't
know what I believe until I hear what I say.
>I'll keep that in mind. Perhaps I should have visited a
dentist rather
>than extracting the tooth myself.
Or a psychotherapist, who might have helped you to perceive
that the tooth
was fine and didn't need extracting.
Good point. I clearly believed my tooth needed extracting. If I believed
otherwise, I'd still have the tooth.
Bruce Gregory
[From Bruce Abbott (990108.1255 EST)]
Bruce Gregory (990108.1210 EST) --
Bruce Abbott (990108.1140 EST)
Beware of the semantic pitfall: one could just as well assert that
perceiving is something people "do." That doesn't make it a
behavior.
Even if you add "even if they do it covertly in imagination"? Thinking
does seem to be more active than perceiving, but that may simply be a
belief of mine.
Yes, I agree: thinking does seem to be an active process. However, in my
view thinking is one way in which one arrives at a belief. Consider the
logical deduction: All swans are white; this animal is a swan; therefore,
this animal is white. The first two statements are assertions of belief,
the last is a logical deduction leading to or supporting the belief that the
animal is white. I may have been controlling for arriving at a true
conclusion; if so I must have some means of perceiving its truth. (By this
I do not mean that I perceive its absolute truth, but that it seems true to me.)
I
perceive my beliefs; I don't "do" them. How about you?
This is a very interesting question. Most of the time I am unaware of my
beliefs. (I believe the plate tectonic model is the best model we have
of the earth's surface, but I am not aware of this most of the time.)
Suppose you ask me, "What do you think of the plate tectonic model?" I
am not aware that I "look" anywhere to find the answer to this question.
Rather, I say something such as, "I believe the plate tectonic model is
the best model we have of the earth's surface." In this sense, I don't
know what I believe until I hear what I say.
Perhaps for the same reason that you don't know what you know (or do not
know) until you try to remember it.
Bruce
[From Richard Kennaway (990109.1900 GMT)]
Rick Marken (990108.1000):
Does anyone have any ideas about how we might actually _test_
the notion that beliefs can be reference perceptions?
Apply disturbances, in the form of data that conflicts with some observed
belief, and see whether the person acts so as to remove the conflict
between the data and the belief without changing the belief.
Armchair observation: some beliefs do appear to behave in this way
(especially abstract principles), and some don't (my belief about where my
car is when I go there and see an empty space).
It's not necessarily a bad thing for a belief to be a reference. When a
scientist sees some piece of data that seems to conflict with a theory he
believes, his first response is likely to be to give the observation a
thorough shake to see if it rattles. Sometimes it's the observation that's
at fault. A hitherto successful belief is worth a strong defence before
changing it.
-- Richard Kennaway, jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk, http://www.sys.uea.ac.uk/~jrk/
School of Information Systems, Univ. of East Anglia, Norwich, U.K.
[From Bruce Gregory (990108.1605 EST)]
Richard Kennaway (990109.1900 GMT)
Rick Marken (990108.1000):
>Does anyone have any ideas about how we might actually _test_
>the notion that beliefs can be reference perceptions?
Apply disturbances, in the form of data that conflicts with some observed
belief, and see whether the person acts so as to remove the conflict
between the data and the belief without changing the belief.
Is it clear to you how to distinguish a belief from any other reference
signal? Or is the difference not important? How does your proposal differ,
if at all, from the Test in general?
Bruce Gregory
[From Rick Marken (990108.1510)]
Me:
Does anyone have any ideas about how we might actually _test_
the notion that beliefs can be reference perceptions?
Richard Kennaway (990109.1900 GMT) --
Apply disturbances, in the form of data that conflicts with some
observed belief, and see whether the person acts so as to remove
the conflict between the data and the belief without changing the
belief.
Yes. And your answer reminds me of a lovely old Piaget demo
which could be the basis for such research. The subject is
given two solid cylinders of equal size but one cylinder is
much heavier than the other. The subject is asked which will
displace the most water? Most subjects (of all ages) say they
believe that the heavier cylinder will displace the most water.
When the experiment is done and they see that both cylinders
displace the _same_ amount of water there is obvious surprise
(error). What the subjects perceive clearly does not match what
the subjects believed they would perceive; the perception
(equal displacement) does not match a reference (greater
displacement for heavier cylinder); there is _error_.
I think there is clearly _error_ in the PCT sense because
subjects typically start acting to "correct" this error; they
start examining the apparatus more closely; they knit their
brow; they move the cylinders up and down to see if something
is keeping the water from being displaced properly, etc.
Obviously, the subject's can't make what they are perceiving
match what they believed they would perceive; but they are
clearly experiencing an error and they are doing things (like
laughing or knitting their brow) that suggest that they are
_reorganizing_; trying to get rid of the error _somehow_.
Anyway, I think this kind of demo can be extended and developed
into methods for studying how beliefs (or expectations or
predictions or whatever one wants to call them) can function
as references for the states of perceptual variables.
Best
Rick
···
--
Richard S. Marken Phone or Fax: 310 474-0313
Life Learning Associates e-mail: rmarken@earthlink.net
http://home.earthlink.net/~rmarken