[philip 2018.03.13]
I’m sure this has been discussed on csgnet before. How would a control system behave if it is given a chiral configuration and asked to arrange it into its mirror image?
Hi Philip, I was actually thinking of a different use of this understanding. If a control system is a loop, then the path of a control system signal over fractions of a second as it converges on its reference value, is a spiral. If the reference value has through reorganisation stumbled upon the opposite bias then it will be a mirror image. Is the most obvious version cultures that read left to right and top to bottom, versus cultures that read right to left and bottom to top?
Warren
···
On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 1:41 AM, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu wrote:
[philip 2018.03.13]
I’m sure this has been discussed on csgnet before. How would a control system behave if it is given a chiral configuration and asked to arrange it into its mirror image?
–
Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Clinical Psychology
School of Health Sciences
2nd Floor Zochonis Building
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk
Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589
Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406
Advanced notice of a new transdiagnostic therapy manual, authored by Carey, Mansell & Tai - Principles-Based Counselling and Psychotherapy: A Method of Levels Approach
Available Now
Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory
Well, that’s one way of looking at it. But the answer I was looking for is that muscular forces cannot help you…you have to look at the object through a mirror. And this is not a trick question.
···
On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 1:41 AM, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu wrote:
[philip 2018.03.13]
I’m sure this has been discussed on csgnet before. How would a control system behave if it is given a chiral configuration and asked to arrange it into its mirror image?
–
Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Clinical Psychology
School of Health Sciences
2nd Floor Zochonis Building
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.uk
Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589
Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406
Advanced notice of a new transdiagnostic therapy manual, authored by Carey, Mansell & Tai - Principles-Based Counselling and Psychotherapy: A Method of Levels Approach
Available Now
Check www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory
[philip 2018.03.14]
Letters are not generally chiral. Look at the attached figure. You
cannot go from the left symbol to right one and perceive the same
thing without both flipping the symbol along the z axis and looking at
each letter through a separate mirror.
···
On 3/14/18, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN <pyeranos@ucla.edu> wrote:
Well, that’s one way of looking at it. But the answer I was looking for is
that muscular forces cannot help you...you have to look at the object
through a mirror. And this is not a trick question.On Wednesday, March 14, 2018, Warren Mansell <wmansell@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi Philip, I was actually thinking of a different use of this
understanding. If a control system is a loop, then the path of a control
system signal over fractions of a second as it converges on its reference
value, is a spiral. If the reference value has through reorganisation
stumbled upon the opposite bias then it will be a mirror image. Is the
most
obvious version cultures that read left to right and top to bottom,
versus
cultures that read right to left and bottom to top?
WarrenOn Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 1:41 AM, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN < >> pyeranos@ucla.edu> wrote:
[philip 2018.03.13]
I’m sure this has been discussed on csgnet before. How would a control
system behave if it is given a chiral configuration and asked to arrange
it
into its mirror image?--
Dr Warren Mansell
Reader in Clinical Psychology
School of Health Sciences
2nd Floor Zochonis Building
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester M13 9PL
Email: warren.mansell@manchester.ac.ukTel: +44 (0) 161 275 8589
Website: http://www.psych-sci.manchester.ac.uk/staff/131406
Advanced notice of a new transdiagnostic therapy manual, authored by
Carey, Mansell & Tai - Principles-Based Counselling and Psychotherapy: A
Method of Levels Approach
<http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415738781/>
Available NowCheck www.pctweb.org for further information on Perceptual Control Theory
Content-Type: image/png; name="Screen Shot 2018-03-14 at 8.43.21 AM.png"
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="Screen Shot 2018-03-14 at 8.43.21 AM.png"
X-Attachment-Id: file0
[Bruce Nevin 2018-03-14_13:03:50 ET]
philip 2018.03.13 >
I’m sure this has been discussed on csgnet before. How would a control system behave if it is given a chiral configuration and asked to arrange it into its mirror image?
To answer this question for yourself, Philip, begin by asking what perceptions are involved when you recognize that two arrangements of objects (configurations) are chirally related (left-right mirror images). Bear in mind that an arrangement of configurations can be perceived in terms of the configurations and their spatial relationships and simultaneously it can be perceived as a whole as a single configuration. A configuration of configurations, like this letter T made up of letters T:
TTTTTT
TT
TT
TT
We can rotate things (or move around them) in imagination. This involves no muscle movements, only a change in perceptual inputs drawn from memory. Consider how it is that we perceive an arrangement as ‘the same’ arrangement while we move or as it rotates. What does chirality violate in this? In each arrangement, the R sphere partly occludes the COOH sphere, but when you rotate one the COOH sphere occludes the R sphere, making it different from the other, unrotated arrangement.
Having recognized the phenomena, the existence and ubiquity of control, we are surrounded by opportunities to ask “now, how do we living control systems do that?” The particular things to be explained are infinite in number. There is no end to such questions.
You may have noticed, Philip, that those who have not fully recognized the existence and ubiquity of the phenomenon of control instead ask “How does control theory account for this? Prove to me that this is a control phenomenon.”
These two ways of asking the question may sound the same, but operationally they are very different. In the latter case, PCT is a spectator sport with an expectation of failure, in the former, it is participatory, and there is often an initial failure to figure out what is going on. In both cases, we ask “how does PCT explain this”, but in the adverse spectator role the questioner believes that what is at stake in the question is the existence of control as a phenomenon and therefore the relevance and viability of control theory. Control theory does not prove the existence of control, it explains the empirically observable phenomenon of control.
It is this–the recognition of control as a ubiquitous phenomenon–that is mistakenly perceived as some kind of quasi-religious or cult-like creed by which we claim that control theory explains everything and everybody else is wrong and stupid. They’re not stupid. They’re very smart. They’re just not looking at the phenomenon of control which is all around them. Once people recognize the phenomenon of control, there are ramifications for their prior explanations of stimuli and cognitive processes and responses. These ramifications can be exceedingly uncomfortable. Many of us have experienced that distress. So it is easy to sympathize, and easy to understand why they demand extraordinary proofs for ideas that are so far outside of (extra-) their ordinary science.
But the first task is not to prove the validity of control theory. As in all science, theory is provisional. The first task is to recognize that there is a phenomenon to be explained–control. Then it follows that the ‘ordinary science’ of psychology cannot explain control. Fortunately, there is an elegant mathematical theory that explains it. It was first developed in Bell Labs when Bill was about 4 years old. He developed its explanatory power as a science of how living things work, retrieving it from (perhaps intellectually convenient?) trivialization by the cyberneticists. But the gold standard is not the theory, his formulation or any other; the gold standard is the phenomenon of control. That’s what is to be explained, by whatever means.
···
On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 9:41 PM, PHILIP JERAIR YERANOSIAN pyeranos@ucla.edu wrote:
[philip 2018.03.13]
I’m sure this has been discussed on csgnet before. How would a control system behave if it is given a chiral configuration and asked to arrange it into its mirror image?
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.14.13.10]
[Bruce Nevin 2018-03-14_13:03:50 ET]
Bruce, this is brilliant! Today's power of square circle control
(PI) to you!
I think it should be kept in Dag's special archive of memorable
messages.
philip2018.03.13 >
I’msure this has been discussed on csgnet before. How would a
control system behave if it is given a chiral
configuration and asked to arrange it into its mirror
image?
To answer this question for yourself, Philip, begin by askingwhat perceptions are involved when you recognize that two
arrangements of objects (configurations) are chirally related
(left-right mirror images). Bear in mind that an arrangement of
configurations can be perceived in terms of the configurations
and their spatial relationships and simultaneously it can be
perceived as a whole as a single configuration. A configuration
of configurations, like this letter T made up of letters T:
TTTTTT
TT
TT
TT
We can rotate things (or move around them) inimagination. This involves no muscle movements, only a
change in perceptual inputs drawn from memory. Consider how
it is that we perceive an arrangement as ‘the same’
arrangement while we move or as it rotates. What does
chirality violate in this? In each arrangement, the R sphere
partly occludes the COOH sphere, but when you rotate one the
COOH sphere occludes the R sphere, making it different from
the other, unrotated arrangement.
Having recognized the phenomena, the existence andubiquity of control, we are surrounded by opportunities to
ask “now, how do we living control systems do that ?”
The particular things to be explained are infinite in
number. There is no end to such questions.
You may have noticed, Philip, that those who have notfully recognized the existence and ubiquity of the
phenomenon of control instead ask “How does control theory
account for this? Prove to me that this is a control
phenomenon.”
These two ways of asking the question may sound the same,but operationally they are very different. In the latter
case, PCT is a spectator sport with an expectation of
failure, in the former, it is participatory, and there is
often an initial failure to figure out what is going on. In
both cases, we ask “how does PCT explain this”, but in the
adverse spectator role the questioner believes that what is
at stake in the question is the existence of control as a
phenomenon and therefore the relevance and viability of
control theory. Control theory does not prove the existence
of control, it explains the empirically observable
phenomenon of control.
It is this--the recognition of control as a ubiquitousphenomenon–that is mistakenly perceived as some kind of
quasi-religious or cult-like creed by which we claim that
control theory explains everything and everybody else is
wrong and stupid. They’re not stupid. They’re very smart.
They’re just not looking at the phenomenon of control which
is all around them. Once people recognize the phenomenon of
control, there are ramifications for their prior
explanations of stimuli and cognitive processes and
responses. These ramifications can be exceedingly
uncomfortable. Many of us have experienced that distress. So
it is easy to sympathize, and easy to understand why they
demand extraordinary proofs for ideas that are so
far outside of (extra-) their ordinary science.
But the first task is not to prove the validity ofcontrol theory. As in all science, theory is provisional.
The first task is to recognize that there is a phenomenon to
be explained–control. Then it follows that the ‘ordinary
science’ of psychology cannot explain control. Fortunately,
there is an elegant mathematical theory that explains it. It
was first developed in Bell Labs when Bill was about 4 years
old. He developed its explanatory power as a science of how
living things work, retrieving it from (perhaps
intellectually convenient?) trivialization by the
cyberneticists. But the gold standard is not the theory, his
formulation or any other; the gold standard is the
phenomenon of control. That’s what is to be explained, by
whatever means.
/Bruce
Martin
[philip 2018.03.14]
Consider how it is that we perceive an arrangement as ‘the same’ arrangement while we move or as it rotates. What does chirality violate in this?
Is the point you are making, Bruce, that the perception of intermediate states is occluded during the transformation?
···
On Wednesday, March 14, 2018, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.14.13.10]
[Bruce Nevin 2018-03-14_13:03:50 ET]
Bruce, this is brilliant! Today's power of square circle control(PI) to you!
I think it should be kept in Dag's special archive of memorablemessages.
philip2018.03.13 >
I’msure this has been discussed on csgnet before. How would a
control system behave if it is given a chiral
configuration and asked to arrange it into its mirror
image?
To answer this question for yourself, Philip, begin by askingwhat perceptions are involved when you recognize that two
arrangements of objects (configurations) are chirally related
(left-right mirror images). Bear in mind that an arrangement of
configurations can be perceived in terms of the configurations
and their spatial relationships and simultaneously it can be
perceived as a whole as a single configuration. A configuration
of configurations, like this letter T made up of letters T:
TTTTTT
TT
TT
TT
We can rotate things (or move around them) inimagination. This involves no muscle movements, only a
change in perceptual inputs drawn from memory. Consider how
it is that we perceive an arrangement as ‘the same’
arrangement while we move or as it rotates. What does
chirality violate in this? In each arrangement, the R sphere
partly occludes the COOH sphere, but when you rotate one the
COOH sphere occludes the R sphere, making it different from
the other, unrotated arrangement.
Having recognized the phenomena, the existence andubiquity of control, we are surrounded by opportunities to
ask “now, how do we living control systems do that ?”
The particular things to be explained are infinite in
number. There is no end to such questions.
You may have noticed, Philip, that those who have notfully recognized the existence and ubiquity of the
phenomenon of control instead ask “How does control theory
account for this? Prove to me that this is a control
phenomenon.”
These two ways of asking the question may sound the same,but operationally they are very different. In the latter
case, PCT is a spectator sport with an expectation of
failure, in the former, it is participatory, and there is
often an initial failure to figure out what is going on. In
both cases, we ask “how does PCT explain this”, but in the
adverse spectator role the questioner believes that what is
at stake in the question is the existence of control as a
phenomenon and therefore the relevance and viability of
control theory. Control theory does not prove the existence
of control, it explains the empirically observable
phenomenon of control.
It is this--the recognition of control as a ubiquitousphenomenon–that is mistakenly perceived as some kind of
quasi-religious or cult-like creed by which we claim that
control theory explains everything and everybody else is
wrong and stupid. They’re not stupid. They’re very smart.
They’re just not looking at the phenomenon of control which
is all around them. Once people recognize the phenomenon of
control, there are ramifications for their prior
explanations of stimuli and cognitive processes and
responses. These ramifications can be exceedingly
uncomfortable. Many of us have experienced that distress. So
it is easy to sympathize, and easy to understand why they
demand extraordinary proofs for ideas that are so
far outside of (extra-) their ordinary science.
But the first task is not to prove the validity ofcontrol theory. As in all science, theory is provisional.
The first task is to recognize that there is a phenomenon to
be explained–control. Then it follows that the ‘ordinary
science’ of psychology cannot explain control. Fortunately,
there is an elegant mathematical theory that explains it. It
was first developed in Bell Labs when Bill was about 4 years
old. He developed its explanatory power as a science of how
living things work, retrieving it from (perhaps
intellectually convenient?) trivialization by the
cyberneticists. But the gold standard is not the theory, his
formulation or any other; the gold standard is the
phenomenon of control. That’s what is to be explained, by
whatever means.
/Bruce
Martin
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.14.13.52]
[philip2018.03.14]
Consider how
it is that we perceive an arrangement as ‘the same’
arrangement while we move or as it rotates. What does
chirality violate in this?
Is thepoint you are making, Bruce, that the perception of
intermediate states is occluded during the transformation?
Bruce can speak for himself, but I read the
answer as saying that if a perception differs from its reference
value, “according to PCT” there are likely to be many means of
reducing or removing the error. In the case of your specific
example the reference configuration is the opposite chirality to
the perceived chirality, resulting in error. Output is sent to
lower level systems in the form of reference values, some of which
will differ from their current values and will create changes in
yet lower-level reference values. But without knowing what tools
and abilities are available to the controller, one cannot say what
these lower-level systems might be. For example, if the systems in
question are ball-and-stick models, as is suggested in your
diagram, one way of eliminating the error is to take it all apart
and put it together again in the reference configuration. But if
the diagrams are representative of chemical in the environment,
the lower-level procedures might involve taking courses in organic
chemistry and learning to use or invent methods of manipulating
the individual molecules.
I read "occlusion" as referring only to the perception that the
reference configuration differed from the actual configuration.
But that seemed to me to be irrelevant to the point, which was
questioning what variables you might be controlling at what
reference values. In particular, he asked whether you are
controlling for showing that PCT is a failed theory of whatever it
purports to explain, or for finding out how PCT might be applied
to various hypothetical situations.
In my opinion, both possibilities are scientifically useful, but
one disturbs perceptions controlled by most on CSGnet more than
does the other. The former is sometimes called applying a “stress
test”, whereas the latter is sometimes called “learning”.
Martin
···
On Wednesday, March 14, 2018, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net > > wrote:[Martin Taylor 2018.03.14.13.10]
[Bruce Nevin 2018-03-14_13:03:50 ET]
Bruce, this is brilliant! Today's power of square circlecontrol (PI) to you!
I think it should be kept in Dag's special archive ofmemorable messages.
philip2018.03.13 >
I’msure this has been discussed on csgnet before. How
would a control system behave if it is given a
chiral configuration and asked to arrange it into
its mirror image?
To answer this question for yourself, Philip, begin byasking what perceptions are involved when you recognize
that two arrangements of objects (configurations) are
chirally related (left-right mirror images). Bear in
mind that an arrangement of configurations can be
perceived in terms of the configurations and their
spatial relationships and simultaneously it can be
perceived as a whole as a single configuration. A
configuration of configurations, like this letter T made
up of letters T:
TTTTTT
TT
TT
TT
We can rotate things (or move around them) inimagination. This involves no muscle movements, only
a change in perceptual inputs drawn from memory.
Consider how it is that we perceive an arrangement
as ‘the same’ arrangement while we move or as it
rotates. What does chirality violate in this? In
each arrangement, the R sphere partly occludes the
COOH sphere, but when you rotate one the COOH sphere
occludes the R sphere, making it different from the
other, unrotated arrangement.
Having recognized the phenomena, the existenceand ubiquity of control, we are surrounded by
opportunities to ask “now, how do we living control
systems do that ?” The particular things to
be explained are infinite in number. There is no end
to such questions.
You may have noticed, Philip, that those who havenot fully recognized the existence and ubiquity of
the phenomenon of control instead ask “How does
control theory account for this? Prove to me that
this is a control phenomenon.”
These two ways of asking the question may soundthe same, but operationally they are very different.
In the latter case, PCT is a spectator sport with an
expectation of failure, in the former, it is
participatory, and there is often an initial failure
to figure out what is going on. In both cases, we
ask “how does PCT explain this”, but in the adverse
spectator role the questioner believes that what is
at stake in the question is the existence of control
as a phenomenon and therefore the relevance and
viability of control theory. Control theory does not
prove the existence of control, it explains the
empirically observable phenomenon of control.
It is this--the recognition of control as aubiquitous phenomenon–that is mistakenly perceived
as some kind of quasi-religious or cult-like creed
by which we claim that control theory explains
everything and everybody else is wrong and stupid.
They’re not stupid. They’re very smart. They’re just
not looking at the phenomenon of control which is
all around them. Once people recognize the
phenomenon of control, there are ramifications for
their prior explanations of stimuli and cognitive
processes and responses. These ramifications can be
exceedingly uncomfortable. Many of us have
experienced that distress. So it is easy to
sympathize, and easy to understand why they demand * extraordinary*proofs for ideas that are so far outside of (extra -)
their ordinary science.
But the first task is not to prove the validityof control theory. As in all science, theory is
provisional. The first task is to recognize that
there is a phenomenon to be explained–control. Then
it follows that the ‘ordinary science’ of psychology
cannot explain control. Fortunately, there is an
elegant mathematical theory that explains it. It was
first developed in Bell Labs when Bill was about 4
years old. He developed its explanatory power as a
science of how living things work, retrieving it
from (perhaps intellectually convenient?)
trivialization by the cyberneticists. But the gold
standard is not the theory, his formulation or any
other; the gold standard is the phenomenon of
control. That’s what is to be explained, by whatever
means.
/Bruce
Martin
[philip 2018.03.14]
“How does control theory account for this? Prove to me that this is a control phenomenon.”
I read Bruce’s answer to be the second question and I thought to myself, perhaps this is not a control phenomenon.
···
On Wednesday, March 14, 2018, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.14.13.52]
[philip2018.03.14]
Consider how
it is that we perceive an arrangement as ‘the same’
arrangement while we move or as it rotates. What does
chirality violate in this?
Is thepoint you are making, Bruce, that the perception of
intermediate states is occluded during the transformation?
Bruce can speak for himself, but I read theanswer as saying that if a perception differs from its reference
value, “according to PCT” there are likely to be many means of
reducing or removing the error. In the case of your specific
example the reference configuration is the opposite chirality to
the perceived chirality, resulting in error. Output is sent to
lower level systems in the form of reference values, some of which
will differ from their current values and will create changes in
yet lower-level reference values. But without knowing what tools
and abilities are available to the controller, one cannot say what
these lower-level systems might be. For example, if the systems in
question are ball-and-stick models, as is suggested in your
diagram, one way of eliminating the error is to take it all apart
and put it together again in the reference configuration. But if
the diagrams are representative of chemical in the environment,
the lower-level procedures might involve taking courses in organic
chemistry and learning to use or invent methods of manipulating
the individual molecules.I read "occlusion" as referring only to the perception that thereference configuration differed from the actual configuration.
But that seemed to me to be irrelevant to the point, which was
questioning what variables you might be controlling at what
reference values. In particular, he asked whether you are
controlling for showing that PCT is a failed theory of whatever it
purports to explain, or for finding out how PCT might be applied
to various hypothetical situations.In my opinion, both possibilities are scientifically useful, butone disturbs perceptions controlled by most on CSGnet more than
does the other. The former is sometimes called applying a “stress
test”, whereas the latter is sometimes called “learning”.MartinOn Wednesday, March 14, 2018, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net > > > wrote:[Martin Taylor 2018.03.14.13.10]
[Bruce Nevin 2018-03-14_13:03:50 ET]
Bruce, this is brilliant! Today's power of square circlecontrol (PI) to you!
I think it should be kept in Dag's special archive ofmemorable messages.
philip2018.03.13 >
I’msure this has been discussed on csgnet before. How
would a control system behave if it is given a
chiral configuration and asked to arrange it into
its mirror image?
To answer this question for yourself, Philip, begin byasking what perceptions are involved when you recognize
that two arrangements of objects (configurations) are
chirally related (left-right mirror images). Bear in
mind that an arrangement of configurations can be
perceived in terms of the configurations and their
spatial relationships and simultaneously it can be
perceived as a whole as a single configuration. A
configuration of configurations, like this letter T made
up of letters T:
TTTTTT
TT
TT
TT
We can rotate things (or move around them) inimagination. This involves no muscle movements, only
a change in perceptual inputs drawn from memory.
Consider how it is that we perceive an arrangement
as ‘the same’ arrangement while we move or as it
rotates. What does chirality violate in this? In
each arrangement, the R sphere partly occludes the
COOH sphere, but when you rotate one the COOH sphere
occludes the R sphere, making it different from the
other, unrotated arrangement.
Having recognized the phenomena, the existenceand ubiquity of control, we are surrounded by
opportunities to ask “now, how do we living control
systems do that ?” The particular things to
be explained are infinite in number. There is no end
to such questions.
You may have noticed, Philip, that those who havenot fully recognized the existence and ubiquity of
the phenomenon of control instead ask “How does
control theory account for this? Prove to me that
this is a control phenomenon.”
These two ways of asking the question may soundthe same, but operationally they are very different.
In the latter case, PCT is a spectator sport with an
expectation of failure, in the former, it is
participatory, and there is often an initial failure
to figure out what is going on. In both cases, we
ask “how does PCT explain this”, but in the adverse
spectator role the questioner believes that what is
at stake in the question is the existence of control
as a phenomenon and therefore the relevance and
viability of control theory. Control theory does not
prove the existence of control, it explains the
empirically observable phenomenon of control.
It is this--the recognition of control as aubiquitous phenomenon–that is mistakenly perceived
as some kind of quasi-religious or cult-like creed
by which we claim that control theory explains
everything and everybody else is wrong and stupid.
They’re not stupid. They’re very smart. They’re just
not looking at the phenomenon of control which is
all around them. Once people recognize the
phenomenon of control, there are ramifications for
their prior explanations of stimuli and cognitive
processes and responses. These ramifications can be
exceedingly uncomfortable. Many of us have
experienced that distress. So it is easy to
sympathize, and easy to understand why they demand * extraordinary*proofs for ideas that are so far outside of (extra -)
their ordinary science.
But the first task is not to prove the validityof control theory. As in all science, theory is
provisional. The first task is to recognize that
there is a phenomenon to be explained–control. Then
it follows that the ‘ordinary science’ of psychology
cannot explain control. Fortunately, there is an
elegant mathematical theory that explains it. It was
first developed in Bell Labs when Bill was about 4
years old. He developed its explanatory power as a
science of how living things work, retrieving it
from (perhaps intellectually convenient?)
trivialization by the cyberneticists. But the gold
standard is not the theory, his formulation or any
other; the gold standard is the phenomenon of
control. That’s what is to be explained, by whatever
means.
/Bruce
Martin
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.14.16.19]
[philip2018.03.14]
"How does controltheory account for this? Prove to me that this is a control
phenomenon."
I readBruce’s answer to be the second question and I thought to
myself, perhaps this is not a control phenomenon.
I presume you are referring to your first
question (two questions, really): " …how it is that we
perceive an arrangement as ‘the same’ arrangement while we move or
as it rotates. What does chirality violate in this?".
You are right, these are not control phenomena. They are questions
about the construction of fairly complex perceptual functions.
Control does come into play, however, in their construction. One
would not survive very long in a world in which objects, and more
particularly dangerous or edible animals, turned into something
quite different when you saw them from a different angle. So
whatever turns out to be the method by which a perceptual function
decides “this is what I’m looking for”, survival directs that
evolution has found a method. Artificial Intelligence people have
been trying for a long time to figure out how to do the same.
Your second question comes down to "what do you mean by two
perceptions being of the same thing". The answer depends on what
matters at the moment. If you control a perception involving the
chiral object and it doesn’t matter whether it is left-handed or
right-handed because you act the same way whichever it is and get
the same result in controlling that perception, then the two
chiralities are “the same”. If you must act differently depending
on which it is, then they are not “the same”. This isn’t
particular to chirality. If you want someone to help you move a
sofa, all strong enough people are “the same”. For other purposes,
they are not.
One way of looking at the concept of a perceptual function is that
it discriminates (or filters) incoming data to produce more output
as a perceptual signal for things that are “the same” or “nearly
the same” than for things that are not. Whether things are or are
not “the same” depends on what you want to do with them in
controlling some other perception(s).
Martin
···
On Wednesday, March 14, 2018, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net > > wrote:[Martin Taylor 2018.03.14.13.52]
[philip 2018.03.14]
Consider
how it is that we perceive an arrangement as ‘the
same’ arrangement while we move or as it rotates. What
does chirality violate in this?
Isthe point you are making, Bruce, that the perception
of intermediate states is occluded during the
transformation?
Bruce can speak for himself, but Iread the answer as saying that if a perception differs
from its reference value, “according to PCT” there are
likely to be many means of reducing or removing the error.
In the case of your specific example the reference
configuration is the opposite chirality to the perceived
chirality, resulting in error. Output is sent to lower
level systems in the form of reference values, some of
which will differ from their current values and will
create changes in yet lower-level reference values. But
without knowing what tools and abilities are available to
the controller, one cannot say what these lower-level
systems might be. For example, if the systems in question
are ball-and-stick models, as is suggested in your
diagram, one way of eliminating the error is to take it
all apart and put it together again in the reference
configuration. But if the diagrams are representative of
chemical in the environment, the lower-level procedures
might involve taking courses in organic chemistry and
learning to use or invent methods of manipulating the
individual molecules.I read "occlusion" as referring only to the perceptionthat the reference configuration differed from the actual
configuration. But that seemed to me to be irrelevant to
the point, which was questioning what variables you might
be controlling at what reference values. In particular, he
asked whether you are controlling for showing that PCT is
a failed theory of whatever it purports to explain, or for
finding out how PCT might be applied to various
hypothetical situations.In my opinion, both possibilities are scientificallyuseful, but one disturbs perceptions controlled by most on
CSGnet more than does the other. The former is sometimes
called applying a “stress test”, whereas the latter is
sometimes called “learning”.MartinOn Wednesday, March 14, 2018, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net > > > > wrote:[Martin Taylor 2018.03.14.13.10]
[Bruce Nevin 2018-03-14_13:03:50 ET]
Bruce, this is brilliant! Today's power of squarecircle control (PI) to you!
I think it should be kept in Dag's special archiveof memorable messages.
philip2018.03.13 >
I’msure this has been discussed on csgnet
before. How would a control system behave
if it is given a chiral configuration and
asked to arrange it into its mirror image?
To answer this question for yourself, Philip,begin by asking what perceptions are involved
when you recognize that two arrangements of
objects (configurations) are chirally related
(left-right mirror images). Bear in mind that an
arrangement of configurations can be perceived
in terms of the configurations and their spatial
relationships and simultaneously it can be
perceived as a whole as a single configuration.
A configuration of configurations, like this
letter T made up of letters T:
TTTTTT
TT
TT
TT
We can rotate things (or move aroundthem) in imagination. This involves no
muscle movements, only a change in
perceptual inputs drawn from memory.
Consider how it is that we perceive an
arrangement as ‘the same’ arrangement while
we move or as it rotates. What does
chirality violate in this? In each
arrangement, the R sphere partly occludes
the COOH sphere, but when you rotate one the
COOH sphere occludes the R sphere, making it
different from the other, unrotated
arrangement.
Having recognized the phenomena, theexistence and ubiquity of control, we are
surrounded by opportunities to ask “now, how
do we living control systems do that ?”
The particular things to be explained are
infinite in number. There is no end to such
questions.
You may have noticed, Philip, that thosewho have not fully recognized the existence
and ubiquity of the phenomenon of control
instead ask “How does control theory account
for this? Prove to me that this is a control
phenomenon.”
These two ways of asking the question maysound the same, but operationally they are
very different. In the latter case, PCT is a
spectator sport with an expectation of
failure, in the former, it is participatory,
and there is often an initial failure to
figure out what is going on. In both cases,
we ask “how does PCT explain this”, but in
the adverse spectator role the questioner
believes that what is at stake in the
question is the existence of control as a
phenomenon and therefore the relevance and
viability of control theory. Control theory
does not prove the existence of control, it
explains the empirically observable
phenomenon of control.
It is this--the recognition of control asa ubiquitous phenomenon–that is mistakenly
perceived as some kind of quasi-religious or
cult-like creed by which we claim that
control theory explains everything and
everybody else is wrong and stupid. They’re
not stupid. They’re very smart. They’re just
not looking at the phenomenon of control
which is all around them. Once people
recognize the phenomenon of control, there
are ramifications for their prior
explanations of stimuli and cognitive
processes and responses. These ramifications
can be exceedingly uncomfortable. Many of us
have experienced that distress. So it is
easy to sympathize, and easy to understand
why they demand extraordinary proofs
for ideas that are so far outside of (extra -)
their ordinary science.
But the first task is not to prove thevalidity of control theory. As in all
science, theory is provisional. The first
task is to recognize that there is a
phenomenon to be explained–control. Then it
follows that the ‘ordinary science’ of
psychology cannot explain control.
Fortunately, there is an elegant
mathematical theory that explains it. It was
first developed in Bell Labs when Bill was
about 4 years old. He developed its
explanatory power as a science of how living
things work, retrieving it from (perhaps
intellectually convenient?) trivialization
by the cyberneticists. But the gold standard
is not the theory, his formulation or any
other; the gold standard is the phenomenon
of control. That’s what is to be explained,
by whatever means.
/Bruce
Martin
Those two questions are Bruce’s questions. I said to you that I determined the second to be more relevant because your initial response gave me the impression that you were talking about something more relevant to the first question.
···
On Wednesday, March 14, 2018, Martin Taylor mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net wrote:
[Martin Taylor 2018.03.14.16.19]
[philip2018.03.14]
"How does controltheory account for this? Prove to me that this is a control
phenomenon."
I readBruce’s answer to be the second question and I thought to
myself, perhaps this is not a control phenomenon.
I presume you are referring to your firstquestion (two questions, really): " …how it is that we
perceive an arrangement as ‘the same’ arrangement while we move or
as it rotates. What does chirality violate in this?".You are right, these are not control phenomena. They are questionsabout the construction of fairly complex perceptual functions.
Control does come into play, however, in their construction. One
would not survive very long in a world in which objects, and more
particularly dangerous or edible animals, turned into something
quite different when you saw them from a different angle. So
whatever turns out to be the method by which a perceptual function
decides “this is what I’m looking for”, survival directs that
evolution has found a method. Artificial Intelligence people have
been trying for a long time to figure out how to do the same.Your second question comes down to "what do you mean by twoperceptions being of the same thing". The answer depends on what
matters at the moment. If you control a perception involving the
chiral object and it doesn’t matter whether it is left-handed or
right-handed because you act the same way whichever it is and get
the same result in controlling that perception, then the two
chiralities are “the same”. If you must act differently depending
on which it is, then they are not “the same”. This isn’t
particular to chirality. If you want someone to help you move a
sofa, all strong enough people are “the same”. For other purposes,
they are not.One way of looking at the concept of a perceptual function is thatit discriminates (or filters) incoming data to produce more output
as a perceptual signal for things that are “the same” or “nearly
the same” than for things that are not. Whether things are or are
not “the same” depends on what you want to do with them in
controlling some other perception(s).MartinOn Wednesday, March 14, 2018, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net > > > wrote:[Martin Taylor 2018.03.14.13.52]
[philip 2018.03.14]
Consider
how it is that we perceive an arrangement as ‘the
same’ arrangement while we move or as it rotates. What
does chirality violate in this?
Isthe point you are making, Bruce, that the perception
of intermediate states is occluded during the
transformation?
Bruce can speak for himself, but Iread the answer as saying that if a perception differs
from its reference value, “according to PCT” there are
likely to be many means of reducing or removing the error.
In the case of your specific example the reference
configuration is the opposite chirality to the perceived
chirality, resulting in error. Output is sent to lower
level systems in the form of reference values, some of
which will differ from their current values and will
create changes in yet lower-level reference values. But
without knowing what tools and abilities are available to
the controller, one cannot say what these lower-level
systems might be. For example, if the systems in question
are ball-and-stick models, as is suggested in your
diagram, one way of eliminating the error is to take it
all apart and put it together again in the reference
configuration. But if the diagrams are representative of
chemical in the environment, the lower-level procedures
might involve taking courses in organic chemistry and
learning to use or invent methods of manipulating the
individual molecules.I read "occlusion" as referring only to the perceptionthat the reference configuration differed from the actual
configuration. But that seemed to me to be irrelevant to
the point, which was questioning what variables you might
be controlling at what reference values. In particular, he
asked whether you are controlling for showing that PCT is
a failed theory of whatever it purports to explain, or for
finding out how PCT might be applied to various
hypothetical situations.In my opinion, both possibilities are scientificallyuseful, but one disturbs perceptions controlled by most on
CSGnet more than does the other. The former is sometimes
called applying a “stress test”, whereas the latter is
sometimes called “learning”.MartinOn Wednesday, March 14, 2018, Martin Taylor <mmt-csg@mmtaylor.net > > > > > wrote:[Martin Taylor 2018.03.14.13.10]
[Bruce Nevin 2018-03-14_13:03:50 ET]
Bruce, this is brilliant! Today's power of squarecircle control (PI) to you!
I think it should be kept in Dag's special archiveof memorable messages.
philip2018.03.13 >
I’msure this has been discussed on csgnet
before. How would a control system behave
if it is given a chiral configuration and
asked to arrange it into its mirror image?
To answer this question for yourself, Philip,begin by asking what perceptions are involved
when you recognize that two arrangements of
objects (configurations) are chirally related
(left-right mirror images). Bear in mind that an
arrangement of configurations can be perceived
in terms of the configurations and their spatial
relationships and simultaneously it can be
perceived as a whole as a single configuration.
A configuration of configurations, like this
letter T made up of letters T:
TTTTTT
TT
TT
TT
We can rotate things (or move aroundthem) in imagination. This involves no
muscle movements, only a change in
perceptual inputs drawn from memory.
Consider how it is that we perceive an
arrangement as ‘the same’ arrangement while
we move or as it rotates. What does
chirality violate in this? In each
arrangement, the R sphere partly occludes
the COOH sphere, but when you rotate one the
COOH sphere occludes the R sphere, making it
different from the other, unrotated
arrangement.
Having recognized the phenomena, theexistence and ubiquity of control, we are
surrounded by opportunities to ask “now, how
do we living control systems do that ?”
The particular things to be explained are
infinite in number. There is no end to such
questions.
You may have noticed, Philip, that thosewho have not fully recognized the existence
and ubiquity of the phenomenon of control
instead ask “How does control theory account
for this? Prove to me that this is a control
phenomenon.”
These two ways of asking the question maysound the same, but operationally they are
very different. In the latter case, PCT is a
spectator sport with an expectation of
failure, in the former, it is participatory,
and there is often an initial failure to
figure out what is going on. In both cases,
we ask “how does PCT explain this”, but in
the adverse spectator role the questioner
believes that what is at stake in the
question is the existence of control as a
phenomenon and therefore the relevance and
viability of control theory. Control theory
does not prove the existence of control, it
explains the empirically observable
phenomenon of control.
It is this--the recognition of control asa ubiquitous phenomenon–that is mistakenly
perceived as some kind of quasi-religious or
cult-like creed by which we claim that
control theory explains everything and
everybody else is wrong and stupid. They’re
not stupid. They’re very smart. They’re just
not looking at the phenomenon of control
which is all around them. Once people
recognize the phenomenon of control, there
are ramifications for their prior
explanations of stimuli and cognitive
processes and responses. These ramifications
can be exceedingly uncomfortable. Many of us
have experienced that distress. So it is
easy to sympathize, and easy to understand
why they demand extraordinary proofs
for ideas that are so far outside of (extra -)
their ordinary science.
But the first task is not to prove thevalidity of control theory. As in all
science, theory is provisional. The first
task is to recognize that there is a
phenomenon to be explained–control. Then it
follows that the ‘ordinary science’ of
psychology cannot explain control.
Fortunately, there is an elegant
mathematical theory that explains it. It was
first developed in Bell Labs when Bill was
about 4 years old. He developed its
explanatory power as a science of how living
things work, retrieving it from (perhaps
intellectually convenient?) trivialization
by the cyberneticists. But the gold standard
is not the theory, his formulation or any
other; the gold standard is the phenomenon
of control. That’s what is to be explained,
by whatever means.
/Bruce
Martin