Imagination and control (was Re: Tickling and PCT)

Imagination and control (was Re: Tickling and
PCT)
[Martin Taylor 2006.03.10.10.34]

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2006.03.10,09:10
EUST)]
Martin Taylor 2006.03.09.21.02

I don’t understand that. In PCT, what is an
“episode”.
that do you perceive, if not perceptions? And if
the
prediction is not of a perception, how is its
accuracy
determined when the event does or does not
happen?
At some time, you have a perception, but at an
earlier
time you predicted an episode. What is the
relationship
between the two?

Here must be a misunderstanding.

Sorry about that. I guess I don’t read carefully enough.

But…

Said with other words. If we predict a perception
without one’s own actions, we are in the imagination mode. Am I
wrong?

An interesting question, at least as “Imagination Mode”
is usually treated.

Clearly, one is imagining a perception when one predicts – or in
other words, the perception one has is produced by imagination. So, in
one sense, what you say is tautologically true.

But, and here’s the problem, “Imagination Mode” is
ordinarily treated as a feedback path in a perceptual control loop. It
is generated by a simulation of what the consequence would be if one
performed a certain act. Now, you are asking “Assuming we are not
controlling a perception and perhaps have no means to do so, is the
perception of a future state of the perceived world generated in the
imagination mode”. Clearly, the imagination is NOT generated in
the feedback path of a perceptual control loop. Neither is it the
value of a reference variable. It is generated in some other pathway
within the larger control structure.

I am still looking at your World Model (now and then)
and soon I will send you a World Model mail. At the moment I also
spend some time trying to understand the connection between our
interior state and our brain hierarchy. Maybe you will hear from me
about that.

Having
just written what I said above, it seems clear to me that the World
Model in the feedback loop of a control system is not the only World
Model – or else it’s in the wrong place. The World Model that
predicts the effects of one’s control actions to produce an imagined
result must also include the predictable changes inthe world that are
not affected by one’s own actins. One’s actions are imposed on what
the world would do if we abstained from control, which is the
situation discussed above.

Given
that, the two imaginary situations (potential to control, and
“free-running” world) do seem to require a unified mechanism
for imagination.

It needs
more thought.

Martin