[From Rick Marken (2003.12.21.1700)]
Marc Abrams (2003.12.21.1543)--
I fully agree with you and I'm sorry that you misinterpreted my
intent. I
hope we straightened it out.
We have indeed. Sorry I misinterpreted you intent.
Best
Rick
---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400
[From Bill Powers (2003.12.21.1641 MST)]
Marc Abrams (2003.12.21.1252)-
[From Bill Powers
(2003.12.21.0-754 MST)]And reference signals for the endocrine system at least, and
possibly theimmune system, are set by neural signals from the brain via the
pituitaryand (I suppose) other paths.
Not necessarily.
In the pituitary, hormones are generated at variable rates, altering the
concentrations of circulating hormones in blood. These hormones enter all
the organ systems, where they appear to act as chemical reference signals
in the target organs. They cause the organs to release their products
such as glucose, adrenalin, and so forth into the bloodstream. Uniformly,
these substances or their breakdown products feed back to the organs to
inhibit their production. So the hormone from the pituitary stimulates
the output of the organ, and that output, fed back through the
bloodstream to the same organ, directly or indirectly inhibits the output
of the organ. Clearly there is an effective comparator in each organ,
with the difference between the reference input and the feedback from the
output determining the amount of output.
The pituitary itself is a collection of feedback loops, because each
emitted hormone also feeds back into the pituitary to inhibit the rate of
production of that hormone. What excites production of each hormome is a
signal from the neural half of the pituitary gland,where signals from the
hypothalamus are received. Those signals clearly act as reference
signals. Thus we have at least a two-level hierarchy of biochemical
control systems, with the reference signal entering the highest level
being adjusted by the lower levels of the midbrain. Within the organs, of
course, there are many subsidiary loops, which can be broken down into
cellular control systems and even DNA or RNA control systems.
I agree that this interpretation is “not necessarily” so. But
there seems to be a good bit of evidence for it.
The
significance of this depends entirely on what you mean by
“activity.”
I mean ‘command-and-control’.
But that is not supportable by the kinds of measurements available for
determining brain activity.
It seems that a large majority of
the‘communications’ that ultimately takes place betwen the brain and
spinalcolumn are chemical and not electrical in nature.
I doubt that very seriously, unless you literally mean
“electrical”, in which case I agree. Neural signals are not
electrical or chemical, but electrochemical. The neural impulses that
carry almost all information between the brain and spinal cord result
from a well-understood process of pumping ions in and out of nerve cells
to generate a voltage potential, which breaks down to initiate a wave of
similar breakdowns along the output axon, after which the ionic pumps
start to restore the ionic potentials again in the cell body and (through
the nodes of Renvier) all along the axon. One place where there is a
different mode of communication through axons is in the connection from
the hypothalamus to the pituitary. Apparently some of the connecting
lines are normal axons, while other “axons” are really pipes
through which neurotransmitters flow. I know of no details beyond
that.
Since neurons are living cells, of course they need nutrients and they
carry out metabolic processes that have nothing to do with signal
transmission. Perhaps these are the sorts of chemical flows you are
referring to.
The communication
throughthese pathways are bi-directional as well. Again, I don’t know what you
door don’t know and I’m addressing this to a larger audience than
yourself
Which pathways are you referring to? All neural fibers can carry impulses
either way – “normal” or “antidromic.” But normally
the signals go only one way, because receiving dendrites cannot initiate
impulses in an incoming axon from another nerve cell. Antidromic
propagation is often used to see where signals are coming from, but this
doesn’t mean that signals normally travel backward.
The brain uses a lot of
energy and requires metabolic support.yes, and for the longest time they thought glial cells were the
mainsupporting cast. They outnumber neurons 10 to 1. But again, recent
researchhas shown that glial cell are the equal of neurons in importance,
incommunication.
However, what their importance is is still not known.
Even the transmission of neural
impulses uses up energy, as does thegeneration of
impulses and the pumping up of ionic potentials in the cell body
after animpulse. So it is not at all surprising that PET scans and the like
shouldpick up biochemical activity in areas where there is unusual
neuralactivity.
No Bill, this stuff is not related to PET or fMRI’s scans. The
peptideresearch I speak of is all about chemical assay’s.
Same differrence. The chemical assay, like PET scans and the others,
tells you only that there was activity in a certain region. It
doesn’t tell you what kind of activity it was.
I think you are confusing what
an input function does with what memorydoes. Check this:
The reason I perceive glasses
or watermelons is that I have acquiredperceptual input functions which receive visual sensations and
respond toa certain combination of them by producing signals indicating that that
aspecific configuration is present. That has nothing to do with
memory.
Sorry, It has everything to do with
memory. The fact that you candistinguish one configuation from another is due to what you have
storedyour memory. The visual sensations have no meaning in and of
themselves.You need to give it meaning.
No, I’m sorrier than you are, it has nothing to do with memory. What
you’re proposing is related to the “template” model of
perception, by which incoming patterns are compared with stored templates
in memory. When a match is found, the input is identified. But this model
has the flaw that an undefined mechanism is needed to receive a stream of
neural impulses, find the pattern in it, and perform comparisons with a
huge number of stored patterns in some undefined form. And this must be
done for every different perception that we can have.
The greatest problem with the template model of perception is that it is
useless for control. Merely classifying and naming patterns is not
sufficient to permit controlling them. We need continuously-variable
representations that can be in a range of states, so we can pick up the
watermelon, turn it to various angles to inspect it, and set it down on
one side preparatory to cutting it. What you see at various stages of
this process is not just “a watermelon”. It is an ovoid in
various orientations, looking circular from some angles, oval from
others, and with the long axis pointing in various directions in space.
Unless we want to believe that there is a template for every possible
orientation, size, color, and pattern of markings, we must look for a
completely different explanation of how perception of a continuously
variable configuration works.
That model is in the class that depends on “feature detection,”
though I am not sure that concept is adequate. Oliver Selfridge, I
believe, called it the “pandemonium” model. The idea is that
you have a large number of detectors that sense simple dimensions of the
array of input information, each one independently reporting how much is
present of the particular pattern it is tuned to. The one that yells the
loudest wins, according to the pandemonium model, thus explaining the
name. This is the approach that leads to a collection of perceptual input
functions each one specialized to detect just one dimension of perception
at the level in question. This leads in turn to a relatively simple model
of perception and control, but requires a large number of independent
control systems. That’s the principle behind HPCT.
It’s like a photocell with a
narrow-band color filter producing a signalindicating the presence of light at a certain wavelength. The
recognitionis not done through comparison with memories, but through a neural
networkoperating in real time.
Yes, and a photocell cannot tell you what it is perceiving
either.
It can tell you how much of its perception is present. Neural
signals can’t tell you what they represent, either. The brain learns to
identify them in terms of their relationships with other
signals.
How would you allow the photocell
to ‘tell’ you what color the wavelength is?
You would need an array of photocells with different filters in front of
them. Then you would need a way of combining signals from adjacent
photocells with weights corresponding to their filters. The resulting
signals would tell you that particular colors were present. We are
speaking, of course, of how color vision in the eye works.
Memory would enter if my brain
stored the perceptual signal coming out ofthe glasses-recognizing input function, and later played it back
into thesame axons. The result, for the local control system and all
highersystems, would be similar to the effect of experiencing the
samesensations
again.
I don’t believe memory works this way.
Then how do you explain hearing a tone on a pitch pipe, and a few seconds
later remembering the tone? I can’t see any other way for that to
work.
Terrific. Thank you. We really
don’t differ all that much but there aresubtle and important differences between our views. It’ll be a few more
daysbut I think it’ll be worth the wait. Again, your views are well stated
andclear.
Thank you.
Bill, I’m not sure I understand
this. Are you saying that emotions onlyreflect intrinsic error and not error associated with anything that
givesrise to them (i.e. error signals)
No, just the opposite. I am saying that the feeling component of emotion
arises from variables we have sensors for in the body. But I am saying
that these sensors probably do not detect the variables I call
“intrinsic,” but only indirect effects of changes in the
intrinsic variables. So an intrinsic variable might have to do with the
level of carbonic acid in the blood, but the sensation we might feel when
this variable gets too high is “shortness of breath,” or
“tightness in the chest.” I’m guessing that the reorganizing
system works with variables much closer to actual biochemistry than the
sensations we feel.
Yes, which brings up another set of
questions. In B:CP you do not addressthe hierarchy in this fashion.
If the emotion chapter had been retained, it would have.
What would your ‘biochemical’
hierarchy looklike?
Some guesses are described in the preceding. One would have to sit down
with a pile of books on biochemistry and physiology to work out more
details. Interested in taking on a project?
I love the concept. I was
thinking of something very similiar, with3 to 5 lower levels of abstraction for the physical and at the 4th or
6thlevel having a level of networked nodes representing ‘cognition’ and
thevarious interconnections that might be present.
Don’t forget that you’re trying to put together a system can can control
at all levels of abstraction. Also, the biochemical hierarchy I have in
mind has nothing to do with the levels of perception and control in the
brain’s hierarchy. The two systems interact but they are different
systems.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Rick Marken (2003.12.21.1730)]
Bruce Gregory (2003.12.21.1535)--
Martin Taylor (2003.12.21.1444) --
My personal experience has been exactly the opposite, on those
occasions when something similar has occurred. The emotion is absent
during the action, but appears some time later
I believe my experiences have been similar to yours.
I think we all may be right. I think we all agree that after a close
call we experience physiological symptoms like pounding heart and
increased arousal. I certainly have these perceptions after a near
miss but I don't experience them as fear or happiness once I have
successfully accomplished the control action. I believe that I only
very briefly experience fear in the pedestrian avoidance situation, and
that's when I first see the pedestrian and the pounding and adrenaline
start up. If I hit the pedestrian (which hasn't happen yet) I imagine
I would continue to experience these physiological symptoms as an
emotion, like fear. But unless I imagine the possible consequences of
not avoiding the pedestrian, I just experience the physiological
symptoms as physiological symptoms.
Stanley Schacter did an experiment that speaks to this. He injected
subjects with adrenaline and told one group of injectees to expect and
another not to expect physiological symptoms. The group that expected
physiological symptoms reported feeling no emotion. The group that
expected no symptoms reported experiencing an emotion that was like
that of a confederate who entered the room acting either angry or
happy. This led Schacter (and a fellow named Singer) to propose the
Schacter-Singer alternative to the James-Lange theory of emotion. The
Schacter-Singer theory turns out to be much like the PCT theory.
According to the Schacter-Singer theory, emotions have a physiological
and a cognitive component. Take away the cognitive component and all
you have is the experience of the physiological symptoms. I think
that's what I was remembering of my experiences with near misses. Once
it's over, if I don't start going through cognitive "what-if" scenarios
like Martin does, all I really perceive are the physiological symptoms
that have gone into preparing for avoiding the pedestrian.
Best
Rick
---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400
from [Marc Abrams (2003.12.21.2156)]
[From Bruce Gregory (2003.12.21.1700)]
I'll wait to comment on your proposals.
Why? I'd rather comment on yours. 
Marc
from [Marc Abrams (2003.12.21.2201)]
[From Rick Marken (2003.12.21.1730)]
I think we all may be right.
I agree.
Stanley Schacter did an experiment that speaks to this.
He injected
subjects with adrenaline and told one group of injectees to expect and
another not to expect physiological symptoms. The group that expected
physiological symptoms reported feeling no emotion. The group that
expected no symptoms reported experiencing an emotion that was like
that of a confederate who entered the room acting either angry or
happy. This led Schacter (and a fellow named Singer) to propose the
Schacter-Singer alternative to the James-Lange theory of emotion. The
Schacter-Singer theory turns out to be much like the PCT theory.
According to the Schacter-Singer theory, emotions have a physiological
and a cognitive component. Take away the cognitive component and all
you have is the experience of the physiological symptoms. I think
that's what I was remembering of my experiences with near misses. Once
it's over, if I don't start going through cognitive "what-if" scenarios
like Martin does, all I really perceive are the physiological symptoms
that have gone into preparing for avoiding the pedestrian.
I know it as the Arnold-Schachter resolution. But as you will see in short
order, even this theory is incomplete.
Marc
[From Bill Powers (2003.12.21.2007 MST)]
Bruce Gregory (2003.12.21.1209)--
What is your view of emotions we experience after we have successfully
exercised control? One example is encountering a pedestrian on an
unlighted street and swerving just in time to miss her. Or perhaps
noticing her just as you pass and realizing that, had you been driving
three feet closer to the shoulder you would have hit her.
How about giving this one a try yourself? The basic principle is that a
large error produces a large preparation for action. Was there a large
error at any time during this episode?
Best,
Bill P.
[From Bruce Gregory (2003.12.21.2212)]
Marc Abrams (2003.12.21.2156)
[From Bruce Gregory (2003.12.21.1700)]
I'll wait to comment on your proposals.
Why? I'd rather comment on yours.
I don't have any. You're the one who thinks these mechanisms are
important. I think it will be a long long time before we can model
them, and I am not convinced that we need to in order to model
behavior.
Bruce Gregory
"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no
one was listening, everything must be said again."
Andre Gide
[From Bruce Gregory (12.21.2218)]
Marc Abrams (2003.12.21.2201)
I know it as the Arnold-Schachter resolution. But as you will see in
short
order, even this theory is incomplete.
I'm sure you know the story of the beautiful young woman who had been
married three times, but was still a virgin. She explained that her
first husband was very old and unable to perform. Her second husband
was gay and was unwilling to perform. The third husband? He just sat by
the bed stroking her hand and telling her how wonderful it was going to
be...
Bruce Gregory
"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no
one was listening, everything must be said again."
Andre Gide
[From Bill Williams 22 December 2003 1:22 AM CST]
Rick,
If you re-read your post,
[From Rick Marken (2003.12.21.0955)]
Marc Abrams (2003.12.20.155) to Bill Powers--
Your 'sense-based' perceptions are filled with
imaginations, or memory if you prefer. Ask Rick
about imagining perceptions.
Is this an example of how you think cordial conversation should be
conducted on CSGNet? I suppose you could actually be referring Bill to
me as the technical expert on imagined perceptions. But that was not my
first impression. I think you can imagine what the comment above
sounded like to me by imagining what it would sound like to you if, in
a post to Bill, I had said "Ask Marc about imagining perceptions".
I think those of us who want conversations on CSGNet to be more cordial
can accomplish this goal more effectively by spending less time trying
to improve the behavior of others and more time trying to make the only
behavior we can reliably control -- our own -- a model of how we would
like to see others behave.
Best regards
Rick
does it seem to you that there is an internal contradiction?
Bill Williams
[From Bruce Gregory (2003.12.22.0848)]
From Bill Powers (2003.12.21.2007 MST)
How about giving this one a try yourself? The basic principle is that a
large error produces a large preparation for action. Was there a large
error at any time during this episode?
Only in my imagination, as far as I can tell. The car is under control
at all times and the avoidance maneuver is completely successful.
Failing to avoid the pedestrian would have generated a large error, but
that did not happen. In daylight the maneuver would have been less
abrupt, but no more successful.
Bruce Gregory
"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no
one was listening, everything must be said again."
Andre Gide
[From Bill Powers (2003.12.22.0841 MST)]
Bruce Gregory (2003.12.22.0848)--
Was there a large error at any time during this episode?
Only in my imagination, as far as I can tell. The car is under control
at all times and the avoidance maneuver is completely successful.
Failing to avoid the pedestrian would have generated a large error, but
that did not happen. In daylight the maneuver would have been less
abrupt, but no more successful.
Let's think about this more in detail. Say your car is traveling at 60
miles per hour, or 88 feet per second. Suppose you first see the pedestrian
stepping onto the road two blocks, 1320 feet, ahead of you. And then
suppose you first see the pedestrian stepping onto the road 50 feet ahead
of you. In both cases, you would probably take some sort of action.
Remember that in PCT all action is driven by error signals. No exceptions.
The amount of action indicates the size of the error signal, with the most
energetic actions being the result of the largest error signals.
So does this lead you to assess the error signals in our scenario any
differently?
Best,
Bill P.
[From Rick Marken (2003.12.22.0820)]
Bill Williams (22 December 2003 1:22 AM CST) --
Rick,
If you re-read your post,
Rick Marken (2003.12.21.0955)--
Marc Abrams (2003.12.20.155) to Bill Powers--
Your 'sense-based' perceptions are filled with
imaginations, or memory if you prefer. Ask Rick
about imagining perceptions.Is this an example of how you think cordial conversation should be
conducted on CSGNet?...I think those of us who want conversations on CSGNet to be more cordial
can accomplish this goal more effectively by spending less time trying
to improve the behavior of others and more time trying to make the only
behavior we can reliably control -- our own -- a model of how we would
like to see others behave.
does it seem to you that there is an internal contradiction?
Sure. Bad logic. But very good principle. Thank goodness for different
levels of perception.
Best
Rick
--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400
[From Bruce Gregory (2003.12.22.1202)]
Rick Marken (2003.12.22.0820)
Sure. Bad logic. But very good principle. Thank goodness for different
levels of perception.
Good moto for Bush in 2004.
Bruce Gregory
"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no
one was listening, everything must be said again."
Andre Gide
[From Bill Powers (2003.12.22.0851 MST)]
From Rick Marken (2003.12.21.1015) --
after one has successfully achieved the goal (to avoid the pedestrian)
the cognitive component of the emotion -- the goal -- is no longer in
effect. And the model says that emotion depends on perceptions of
biochemical preparedness _and_ of the goal one is prepared to achieve.
Only one of these components is present _after_ the pedestrian has
been avoided.
I think we can carry this a little farther. The state of preparedness
entails elevation of blood glucose (released from the liver), an increase
in oxygen saturation of the blood (due to faster breathing and increased
heart throughput), an increase in circulating adrenaline, and a number of
other changes. When you go into action, both the muscular exertions and the
speeded-up metabolic processes deplete the extra glucose and oxygen, and
break down the adrenaline and other circulating chemical signals. So if the
adjustment of somatic state is about right for the action that actually
takes place, the action itself will restore the state of the body
approximately to the way it was before the emotional arousal happened. You
may feel energized during the action, but by its end you will be
approximately in a normal condition, perhaps resting and breathing hard if
the demands due to action have overshot the increase in energy resources
that was supplied. I agree with you that in such circumstances we probably
would not call the experience "emotional." It would just be energetic
action, like running a race or chopping a log in two.
However, when something prevents the action from taking place, or when the
original deviation of a perception from its reference level was exaggerated
(say by a too-large rate-of-change component in the input function), the
state of preparedness will either remain for a long time, when no action
takes place, or will not be entirely reduced to zero by muscle exertions
during the action -- if, for example, correcting the error took much less
effort than usual. This will leave the body in a continued state of
heightened preparedness, which will remain until metabolism and ordinary
efforts dissipate this state. One can interpret this continued state as an
emotional state even if the original error has been corrected and the goal
has been achieved. Whether one does percieve this as an emotional state
depends much on how one's perceptions have become organized, and as Martin
has shown, on which perceptual functions one has chosen or been encouraged
to choose.
Martin brings up the case in which action does take place and no particular
emotion is perceived at the time, but an emotional state does appear later
as one reviews the situation and imagines what might have happened under
slightly different conditions. Here the error is produced by an imagined
perception, but it is still an error signal, and it can lead to a state of
heightened preparedness just as before, and maybe even more so (depending
on how much worse the possibilities are than what actually occurred). The
difference, of course, is that no action can change what is imagined, or
what happened in the past. The error remains unreduced, at least for some time.
I have exactly such an experience in my memory. In my high-school days I
acquired by mail-order a "6-foot telescope," consisting of a three-inch
simple lens with a focal length of 72 inches, which I mounted in a
cardboard tube with the eyepiece lens glued into a wooden spool at the
other end. I could just see Saturn's rings, beautified by the red and blue
aberrations of the lens.
I used to take this telescope, at night, up a fire escape to the roof of
the five-story Madison School, next to the high school, and rest the
telescope across the peak of the roof to look at the skyscrapers of
Chicago, 20 miles
away. I once dropped the eyepiece, and it slithered down the slope of the
metal roof but was fortunately caught by the gutter. I had tennis shoes on,
so I carefully made my way down to the gutter, retrieved the eyepiece,
crawled up the slope again (my hands flattened to increase friction with
the roof), and went on observing.
Even now, as I describe what I did, the bottom falls out of my stomach.
There was absolutely nothing to keep me from sliding down the roof and
shooting into space over the gutter, 60 feet to the asphalt playground,
except the friction in my tennis shoes and the palms of my hands. As I
think of this, my mind is saying "No, no, I couldn't have done that, I
can't bear this." But of course this is imagination and memory, so there is
no action I can take to correct the error. And I feel my body getting ready
to act, and only very, very, slowly calming down again. About sixty-two
years ago, that was. You see what I go through to find examples for you.
With regard to the traditional views on emotion, I heard of them in the
form of an example of seeing a lion (loose, presumably), and running away
from it. The question was put, "Do you run away from the lion because you
are afraid, or are you afraid because you run away from the lion?" By the
time I heard this I had had not only the Madison School experience, but a
number of others that still have poignancy. I was a very foolish teenager.
And I thought, "But why does anyone think those are the only choices?" I
knew that I could create an emotion any time I wanted to just by thinking
the right things.
I wondered why people thought that their adrenal glands could see lions.
That would seem to be the only way in which the emotion could come before
acting and consciously perceiving danger. But the other choice didn't seem
any better -- why would I be running from the lion if I weren't afraid or
didn't strongly desire to get away from it? At the time, as an
undergraduate in college, I had no alternatives to offer, but I knew that
the choices being presented to me were bogus, and rejected both of them.
Now I think we have a much fuller explanation to propose and test,
especially now that we can think in terms of levels of organization. We
know that conscious awareness may not be in contact with the whole
hierarchy all of the time, so lower-order control processes can take place
without our paying any conscious attention to them. It is possible, from a
higher-order standpoint, to experience feelings that seem to arise
spontaneously, not recognizing that a lower-order control system has had
its perceptions disturbed and is taking action (including preparing the
somatic systems) to correct the error. In fact, considering the Behavioral
Illusion, we may actually perceive the source of a disturbance and feel the
somatic arousal that results when a lower-order system gets ready to oppose
the disturbance, and think that the disturbance is directly causing the
"emotional response", just as an external S-R psychologist, observing the
same disturbance and subsequent signs of emotional response, might draw the
same erroneous conclusion.
When we consider carefully just what is involved in perceiving,
recognizing, and drawing conclusions from the sight of a lion, it becomes
clear that nobody else has proposed a theory of emotion that takes into
account all that is going on at all levels of organization.
Best,
Bill P.
[From Bruce Gregory (2003.12.22.1251)]
Bill Powers (2003.12.22.0841)
Remember that in PCT all action is driven by error signals. No
exceptions.
The amount of action indicates the size of the error signal, with the
most
energetic actions being the result of the largest error signals.
I failed to understand this. I thought that changing reference levels
could lead to action and if the reference levels changed slowly enough,
error would never have to grow large. Since this is incorrect, I must
have experienced large error levels to avoid the pedestrian. However,
since my actions were successful, I still don't see why I experienced
strong emotions, which I thought were the result of blocked actions.
"Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But since no
one was listening, everything must be said again."
Andre Gide