from [Marc Abrams (2003.12.21.1252)]
[From Bill Powers (2003.12.21.0-754 MST)]
And reference signals for the endocrine system at least, and possibly the
immune system, are set by neural signals from the brain via the pituitary
and (I suppose) other paths.
Not necessarily.
>It wasn't until very recently that they have discovered not only
receptors in
>the brain for over 200 peptides but also that various regions of the
brain
>actually produced them. It seems that peptides are our bodies chemical
>messengers and mode of communication. They are carried in the blood and
>visit every organ and part of our body.
Marc, I don't mean to be uncooperative, but is this supposed to be news to
me?
I don't know? I thought I might be addressing this to more than just you and
I really don't know what you do or don't know about our body's biochemistry
and specifically peptides, hormones, and steriods. As you know I am
beggining to explore it myself. What I mentioned in the above paragraph is
due to some fairly recent research. I really don't know how much you read
outside of _Science_ and _Nature_ and most of the 'ground work' for this has
not been reported through those two main journals. Not yet anyway.
>It has also been learned that 98% of the brains activity is through
>'long-distance' communications (i.e. through peptides), not synaptic
>transmission.
The significance of this depends entirely on what you mean by "activity."
I mean 'command-and-control'. It seems that a large majority of the
'communications' that ultimately takes place betwen the brain and spinal
column are chemical and not electrical in nature. The communication through
these pathways are bi-directional as well. Again, I don't know what you do
or don't know and I'm addressing this to a larger audience than yourself
The brain uses a lot of energy and requires metabolic support.
yes, and for the longest time they thought glial cells were the main
supporting cast. They outnumber neurons 10 to 1. But again, recent research
has shown that glial cell are the equal of neurons in importance, in
communication.
Even the transmission of neural impulses uses up energy, as does the
generation of
impulses and the pumping up of ionic potentials in the cell body after an
impulse. So it is not at all surprising that PET scans and the like should
pick up biochemical activity in areas where there is unusual neural
activity.
No Bill, _this_ stuff is not related to PET or fMRI's scans. The peptide
research I speak of is all about chemical assay's.
However, I don't mean to minimize the role of biochemistry in neural
computation and even short-haul signal transmission. Unfortunately, the
facts that are known about brain and body biochemistry are interpreted by
biochemists, who have a very limited understanding of system-level
analysis. You get the impression that it is very important just which
neurotransmitters are used in various parts of the brain, which is
equivalent to saying that it matters whether a radio uses transistors
which
rely on electrons for signal transmission rather than holes. At the level
of understanding systems, all that matters is how the variables are
related, not what physical form they take. So biochemistry, at the same
time it informs us about details of body function, tends to drag red
herrings across the trail. I think that means "tends to distract us with
irrelevant details."
I _HEARTILY_ agree with this assessment. That is one reason why a simulation
model that can synthesize this research and bring it up a level or two is so
important.
I don't believe that is true of all perceptions, or even most perceptions.
I think you are confusing what an input function does with what memory
does. Check this:
The reason I perceive glasses or watermelons is that I have acquired
perceptual input functions which receive visual sensations and respond to
a
certain combination of them by producing signals indicating that that a
specific configuration is present. That has nothing to do with memory.
Sorry, It has everything to do with memory. The fact that you can
distinguish one configuation from another is due to what you have stored
your memory. The visual sensations have no meaning in and of themselves.
_You_ need to give it meaning.
It's like a photocell with a narrow-band color filter producing a signal
indicating the presence of light at a certain wavelength. The recognition
is not done through comparison with memories, but through a neural network
operating in real time.
Yes, and a photocell cannot tell you what it is perceiving either. How would
you allow the photocell to 'tell' you what _color_ the wavelength is? What
does 780 - 622 nm mean. That is, how would your photocell, if possible be
able to perceive what 'color' the wavelength of 780nm - 622nm represents?
Can it perceice any signals below 390nm?
The fact that you were able to perceive some metal and plastic, with
possibly some glass as _both_ individual components of, and in a specific
configuration was, and is due, to what you have learned.
Memory would enter if my brain stored the perceptual signal coming out of
the glasses-recognizing input function, and later played it back into the
same axons. The result, for the local control system and all higher
systems, would be similar to the effect of experiencing the same
sensations
again.
I don't believe memory works this way.
This is how the PCT model is currently organized. If you're proposing a
different organization, you should say so and explain in similar detail
how
your version is supposed to work.
Although I don't believe memory works this way, I'm not currently prepared
to offer a counter-proposal for your memory model. But I will.
That is not a definition of emotion. It is an assertion that emotions have
something unspecified to do with bodily sensations. If you mean that
bodily
sensations are the whole of emotions, you are simply mistaken, because as
is well known, the bodily sensations can be the same for patterns we
identify as different emotions. Patterns of what? Of bodily sensations
plus
other, more cognitive, experiences. We can distinguish anger from fear not
because of how we feel, but because of what we want to do.
I don't believe I'm mistaken. You will just have to wait and see what I've
come up with. But I guess that may not matter.
I have define emotions as having two components: one is a set of bodily
sensations, and the other is a perception of what we intend to do, which
would be obtained through the imagination connection which enables us to
experience reference signals as if they were perceptions. So being angry
involves a certain set of feelings, together with the intention of taking
more or less violent action (depending on how angry we are). The feelings,
the bodily sensations, are the result of the error signals that would
produce action if that were possible. These error signals follow two paths
going downward: one to the systems that create motor action, and the other
to the biochemical control hierarchy. The error signals entering the
biochemical control hierarchy alter the biochemical state of the body, and
we perceive the results as the feeling part of the emotion. It is a state
of preparedness to act.
If we actually go into action, the state of biochemical preparedness is
"used up" and we probably would not say we are angry. The anger is felt
mainly when the action is blocked, externally or by internal conflict.
Then
we are left in a state of heightened preparedness, wanting to go into
action but not being able to do so, and the feelings persist.
Exactly the same thing happens if the intention is to flee. The error
signals change the state of the body in the same way as for anger, but the
intention component is different, so we give the combination a different
name: fear. If we are able to flee, the action "uses up" the state of
preparedness and we would probably not say we are afraid. But if we find
it
impossible to flee, because of external obstacles or inner conflict, we
experience the heightened state of preparedness to act, and the desire to
flee, but cannot act, so the feelings persist.
Other similar analyses can be applied to other negative emotions, and with
a few changes, to positive emotions as well (many positive emotions have a
cognitive element of an error decreasing).
Terrific. Thank you. We really don't differ all that much but there are
subtle and important differences between our views. It'll be a few more days
but I think it'll be worth the wait. Again, your views are well stated and
clear.
What has changed is that I think that the feeling component of emotion is
only indirectly dependent on intrinsic errors. And it is not necessary for
an intrinsic error to exist for the body's sensed state to change.
Agreed.
"Psyching up" for action definitely involves the brain raising the
reference levels for many biochemical systems, but these changes do not
amount to intrinsic error states. They are perfectly normal, and in fact
the organism would be worse off if it could not produce these changes of
biochemical state.
The true intrinsic variables that are associated with reorganization are,
I
think, ones that must be maintained in certain states for the body to
survive. Many of them are involved in one-way control (like CO2
concentration in the bloodstream which must not increase beyond a certain
level), and many are two-way (blood pressure should be neither very high
nor very low). I don't think we sense these variables directly. Mainly we
sense their effects on other systems which do have neural sensors for
reporting bodily states. Those other systems can have their states changed
by the brain, too, so those changes are independent of intrinsic error.
This in no way changes my model of emotions. It just says that the feeling
component of emotion is not, as originally proposed, identical with
intrinsic error signals (though it might be disturbed by intrinsic error
states). Intrinsic error states might give rise to changes in bodily
states
that we can consciously experience, but those bodily states can also
change
because of other influences, and they are not directly representative of
intrinsic error, as I think of them now.
Wonderful. Again, you make your case clearly and succintly
I suggest that your understanding of what I said was also based on
imagined
perceptions.
You bet. _No_ question. There is _always_ a bit of 'interpreting' that must
be done when communicating with some one. It becomes harder when you are not
within visual contact. When 'reading' other posts, if I have happened to
have either met the person or spoke with them on the phone, I can 'hear'
their voices as I 'read' the post. My past experiences (memory/imagination)
are also brought into play. I can 'hear' when Bruce Gregory is being
sarcastic. At least sometimes, and that is the problem. My experience with
Bruce is such that I _think_ I know when he might or might not be in a
biting humor. Unfortuantely I am not right all the time, and you tend to
remember only the times you were wrong and made embarrassing accusations.
This is why it's always a good policy to reflect on important matters.
'Important' being relative to the situation at hand. I will neve again type
and immediately send out a post. I type it now, walk away from it for at
least 5 minutes and come back to it. I re-read it and if I'm happy with it
out it goes.
As I look at the model now, it seems quite the same to me as
when I originally proposed it. The only difference is in the assertion
that
the feeling states reflect intrinsic error alone. That has nothing to do
with the effects of error signals from the brain on altering bodily
states,
or with sensing those changes, or with the intentions or disturbances that
gave rise to the error signals.
Bill, I'm not sure I understand this. Are you saying that emotions _only_
reflect intrinsic error and not error associated with anything that gives
rise to them (i.e. error signals)
The emotion chapter will be in the paperback edition.
Wonderful.
I think the preceding pretty much answers your questions 1 through 4. If
not, enquire further and I will do my best to explain.
Yes, you've done a yeomans job. Thanks.
>5) Why did you abandon your view of the split hierarchy stated in this
>chapter, for the one you currently hold. That is, what didn't you like
about
>the spilt hierarchy?
Of course I didn't abandon it, as you can now see
Yes, which brings up another set of questions. In B:CP you do not address
the hierarchy in this fashion. What would your 'biochemical' hierarchy look
like? I _love_ the concept. I was thinking of something very similiar, with
3 to 5 lower levels of abstraction for the physical and at the 4th or 6th
level having a level of networked nodes representing 'cognition' and the
various interconnections that might be present. This of course would be the
'highest' level. Again this will all come out when I lay it out on the table
in a couple of days. Remember, it was at your insistence that I keep this
public. I was willing to share details with you privately, but you insisted
otherwise. So you'll just have to wait a bit more. 
btw, I have no
problem with working this way
Oh, gosh, I should have remembered to strive for clarity. Thanks for
reminding me. Also, I will humbly attempt to be patient, even though once
in a while it gets difficult.
You were wonderful in this post. This goes into my 'Best of Bill Powers'
folder. I holler and scream when I think your being unreasonable, so I want
to tell you how much I admire this side of you. Thanks again for your
effort.
Marc
that emotions are tied to our ‘error’ signals, but I think it’s a good deal more than that. All of which I will b glad to get into a few more days when I finish putting all my stuff together.