improper actions

[BJORN_SIMONSEN]

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.11.08,10:20 EUST)]

From Kenny Kitzke (2005.11.07.940 EST)]

All your examples of how our world could be different if
we understood PCT as the preferred explanation of human
behavior are marvelous. Will you be able to come to the
China Conference?

Thank you. It would be nice to join the Conference, but it is too early to
answer today. It would be wonderful to meet you in CSG.

What a more HPCT wise reporter could do that would help us
understand the actions is to always try to determine "why" the
person took those actions.

Yes I agree.

I would love to get into some of your other issues like punishment,
or the injustice and ineffectiveness of our governmental and
constitutional "rules of law," but need to do some work today.

Yes, and I would love to read your texts.

Bjorn

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2005.11.08.0945)]

Bjorn Simonsen (2005.11.08,10:15 EUST)--

First, who is TI.

It's "I" with a "T" inserted by mistake.

Then, I understand you mean "...it makes no sense to say
that journalists should report only actions.", since this is
written 10 minutes after "I think journalists are there to
describe phenomena, not to explain them.".

Yes. Does this seem inconsistent to you? It seems right to me. It makes no
sense for journalists to report only what, in PCT, we call "actions" (the
means used to control particular perceived results) because virtually all
actions are controlled perceptual results as well. So the CIA leak is an
action (a means to control dissidents) and a controlled result (someone had
to control for leaking by getting near a reporter). But the leak was a
behavioral _phenomenon_; something that was done by someone. Whether it was
an action, a controlled result or accidental side effect (it was probably
all three) should not, I believe, be a consideration when a journalist is
deciding whether or not to report it.

The problem with this is that in a hierarchical system actions are at the
same time controlled results themselves.

If I should say what I think you would said, then I would say: "In a
hierarchical system actions are results of controlled perceptions (not
controlled results). Then there is no problem.

But that would be wrong. Actions are not a result of controlled perceptions.
They are a result of the difference between controlled perceptions and the
reference for those perceptions. And what you say here doesn't capture the
main point of my comment, which is that an action at one level of the
hierarchy is a controlled result at the next lower level.

What I will like to read is the purpose and, if possible, the disturbances
that made the exerciser perform what I called improper actions.

I think all these things are included (as speculation) in journalistic
reports. In the CIA leak case, for example, most of the reports I read did
contain speculation about the reasons for the leak -- that it may have been
a response to the disturbance of Wilson's exposure of the uranium lie, for
example. I think journalists are, by and large, doing a pretty good job of
describing the behavior they should describe -- the behavior of concern to
the pubic -- as long as they themselves are not busy trying to aid and abet
the government's efforts to deceive and suppress dissent (as in the case of
Judith Miller).

Best

Rick

···

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Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

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[BJORN_SIMONSEN]

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.11.09, 12:00 EUST)]
[From Rick Marken (2005.11.06.0920)]

How would a reporter know whether a particular
behavior, like leaking the name of a CIA agent, is an action (a means
to achieve a higher level goal, like punishing a critic of the
administration), an intended result in itself or an accidental side
effect? In fact, the leaking was probably both an action and an
intended result. Of course, the people who did it want us to believe
that it was an accidental side effect --a case where the leaker didn't
know the information was secret. In fact, we don't really know whether
the leak was an action, intended result or accident; we just have
opinions and some circumstantial evidence. I don't believe that the
role of a journalist is to determine whether some observed behavior,
like blowing a CIA agent's cover, is an action, intended result or
accidental side effect.

I have to stop here and re-examine our last mails. There are formulations
blocking my further understanding of what you say. If that's OK for you,
please tell me where I bear away.

You said "From Rick Marken (2005.11.06.092"

I don't believe that the
role of a journalist is to determine whether some observed behavior,
like blowing a CIA agent's cover, is an action, intended result or
accidental side effect.

I said "From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.11.07,13:15 EUST)"

They don't control their actions. Give me a reason for reading
something I don't know is an action, intended result or a side effect.

Here you talked about "some observed behavior" and it is the journalist's
perceptions.
I continued saying that the journalists don't control _their_ actions, the
journalists writing.
The journalists control their perceptions. Let us have a definition of
"control".
"Controlling means producing repeatable consequences by variable actions"
This definition say that the journalists produce perceptions equal their
references by variable actions, their writings.
I ended by asking "Why shall I read something the journalists wish to
perceive, because when the journalists' read their own writings, they stop
(for a while) writing because they perceive what they wish to perceive.
Again, why shall I read what the journalists wish to perceive. I wish to
read about the references in the "I. Lewis Libby Jr." system loops written
with great fonts and I wish to read about his actions (with small fonts)
which were elements in his system loops when he tried to perceive what he
wished to perceive (his reference).

Once again. I don't want to read about the journalists references. I wish to
read about "I. Lewis Libby Jr. references related to his actions.

You talk about actions, intended result or accidental side effect as if what
we read has something to do with " I. Lewis Libby Jr." . The enclosed gif is
a drawing about what I think happen.

In some time I wish to start a thread where I ask about actions, intended
result of what and accidental side effects.
Bjorn

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2005.11.09.0850)]

Bjorn Simonsen (2005.11.09, 12:00 EUST)

I have to stop here and re-examine our last mails. There are formulations
blocking my further understanding of what you say. If that's OK for you,
please tell me where I bear away.

Here you talked about "some observed behavior" and it is the journalist's
perceptions.
I continued saying that the journalists don't control _their_ actions, the
journalists writing.

Writing is the actions that are the means journalists use to control their
description of observed behaviors. But the writing is itself a perception
that is controlled by the journalist, is it not?

The journalists control their perceptions. Let us have a definition of
"control".
"Controlling means producing repeatable consequences by variable actions"
This definition say that the journalists produce perceptions equal their
references by variable actions, their writings.

Yes. But it's a hierarchical system. It's also true that the journalists
control their perceptions of what they write (their writing) by variable
actions, their hand movements. And they control their perceptions of their
hand movements by varying their muscle forces. And so on.

Once again. I don't want to read about the journalists references. I wish to
read about "I. Lewis Libby Jr. references related to his actions.

But you can't observe people's references. All you can see (and describe) is
their overt behavior, which we know consists of actions, controlled results
and accidental side effects. We can infer something about controlled
variables from descriptions of behavior; for example, it's pretty clear that
Libby intentionally identified a CIA agent to a reporter. But we have to
try to infer, from circumstances, whether he did this to punish a dissident
or to make small talk with a reporter or to prove that he's on the in or who
knows what. That's why we have courts. I don't think it's a journalists job
to establish whether a particular behavior (like leaking the agents name)
was an action done as the means of accomplishing a higher level goal or an
accidental side effect of doing something else (trying to appear to be a big
shot, for example). I think journalists should try to describe behavior and
the circumstances under which it occurred in as clear and as unbiased a way
as possible so that readers can come to their own conclusions about ultimate
motives.

You talk about actions, intended result or accidental side effect as if what
we read has something to do with " I. Lewis Libby Jr." . The enclosed gif is
a drawing about what I think happen.

The only problem is that your figure shows only one system and only one
level of control for both the observed (Libby) and the observer
(journalist). In fact, the behavior of the person observed is generated
hierarchically and _perceived_ hierarchically by the observer. The overt
behavior that is observed -- the one little box you show -- is actually
perceived at many levels simultaneously and the observer must decide what
levels of his or her perception of the behavior to describe. So the
journalist sees that a reporter was told a CIA agent's name, that it was
done by talking, that is was done in the context of the agent's husband
having written a critical piece relevant to the leaker, etc, etc.

I think you may be looking for something from PCT that it doesn't provide.
PCT doesn't change the fact that people behave. It just changes the way we
look at that behavior. Where before PCT we saw behavior as something that
just popped out (or was poked out) of organisms, we can now look at behavior
and see that some of what we are looking at are controlled results of
actions, some are the actions that keep results under control, most are also
_both_ and some are unintended results of action.

I think that most people already look at behavior in basically this way. The
law, for example, certainly makes distinctions between results that are
intended, those that are the means to carry out legitimate intentions (self
defense) and those that are unintended side effects (that are worse if they
result from negligence rather than pure chance). Indeed, I think the PCT
view of behavior is really the prevalent lay view; most people seem to
understand the difference between intended and unintended results, for
example. It's mainly only scientific psychologists, trying to look at
behavior in cause effect terms, who have had difficulty understanding the
purposeful nature of behavior.

Best

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

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of the original message.

[BJORN_SIMONSEN]

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.11.09.21:45 EUST)]

From Rick Marken (2005.11.09.0850)

Writing is the actions that are the means journalists use to control their
description of observed behaviors. But the writing is itself a perception
that is controlled by the journalist, is it not?

I shouldn't write what I write below, because this is something all of us
know. Bu I do it.
In each human a great many systems are active when perception at logic
levels are controlled. The way I see it is that a journalist finds or gets a
job, eg I. Levis Libby Jr. At that moment she wishes to do the job in a
certain way (she with her System Concepts (I am a N.Y. Times Reporter) and
maybe other pronounced System Concepts, Principles, Categories (are Liberals
a Category?, in Norway most journalists are liberals)). She has a certain
matrix of references. She read, she talks with colleagues, prosecution
authority, I. Levis Libby Jr. (most journalists don't meet him), Libby's
wife, Libby's golf colleague. etc. All this is disturbances, what you called
observed behaviors. After Input Function, Comparison, Error and Output
Quantity. The journalist writes something, takes a new telephone (both
variables to Input Quantity). Perceptual signal, Comparison, Error, Output
Quantity, more writing.
At one moment the error is minimal. No more writing, no more phones. Just
the feedback signal. He perceives what he has written. A Perceptual Signal
almost like the Reference. No error.

I buy the Newspaper. I have my own wishes and my own control loops. Reading
the Libby article (Disturbance), I get a perceptual signal, Comparison,
error, Output signal, I will not mention my actions.

Did I get information about the key figure? I got a story that resulted in
zero error in the journalist's loop.
Maybe that's all I can get. I often call it Entertainment. I could often
better study mathematics.

Yes, the journalist's writing is a perception that is controlled. But
remember none of us knows his references.

Yes. But it's a hierarchical system. It's also true that the journalists
control their perceptions of what they write (their writing) by variable
actions, their hand movements. And they control their perceptions of their
hand movements by varying their muscle forces. And so on.

But in the great scale, these lower level controls are less interesting.

But you can't observe people's references.

Yes. Let us talk about the journalist. Let me repeat my cause for this
thread. We all control our perceptions. Our Perceptions tell us the current
status of whatever it is we're trying to control. Our _Perceptions are the
best Representation for the extern world we have_. Journalists belong to the
extern world. If we don't know their references, what do we know?

All you can see (and describe) is
their overt behavior, which we know consists of actions, controlled results
and accidental side effects.

Let me return to this sentence tomorrow.

We can infer something about controlled
variables from descriptions of behavior; for example, it's pretty clear

that

Libby intentionally identified a CIA agent to a reporter.

Yes we can infer. We can infer something about the disturbances the
journalist is influenced by. We all know that we never will learn to know
what those disturbances really was, but we can infer. I will not say it, but
do we talk about Entertainment.

But we have to
try to infer, from circumstances, whether he did this to punish a dissident
or to make small talk with a reporter or to prove that he's on the in or

who

knows what.

Yes we can have plenty of rules. But I will repeat. When I read the story
about Libby Jr., I think I read a story that the journalist perceived quite
near his own References.

This is written with great fonts. The subject has many answers. But I think
it is interesting to relate some of my thoughts to what I know about PCT.

The only problem is that your figure shows only one system and only one
level of control for both the observed (Libby) and the observer
(journalist).

You know that I know that there are great many loops each time we present
the model. Maybe I talk in too great fonts.

Bjorn

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2005.11.09.1530)]

Bjorn Simonsen (2005.11.09.21:45 EUST)

in Norway most journalists are liberals

I thought most everyone in Norway was a liberal

Yes. Let us talk about the journalist. Let me repeat my cause for this
thread. We all control our perceptions. Our Perceptions tell us the current
status of whatever it is we're trying to control. Our _Perceptions are the
best Representation for the extern world we have_. Journalists belong to the
extern world. If we don't know their references, what do we know?

You lost me there! But, in answer to the last question, I would say that
what we know is they are writing. Sometimes we can glean a little bit about
people's references from what they write (it's pretty clear, for example,
that Ibsen was a great liberal) but basically all we know are the writings
themselves and the imaginings elicited by those writings. And that's plenty
for me. I don't have to know what a reporter's goals are in order to know
what they are writing about. But I do think it is useful to know what a
reporter's goals are (or, at least, what we think those goals should be).
The way to find that out is, I think, to read a book on journalism (or, in
my case, ask my daughter, who will be teaching journalism at Stanford).

When I read the story about Libby Jr., I think I read a story that the
journalist perceived quite near his own References.

I should hope so. I don't think even journalists try to produce results that
they _don't_ want to produce;-)

Perhaps you just trying to say that journalistic reports are "subjective"
(ie. Influenced by the goals of the journalist)? If so, I agree. I think
journalistic (like any other) descriptions of phenomena can't help but be
influenced by personal preferences. But, like scientists, journalists are
supposed to have the goal of producing reports that are unbiased by their
preferences. But I think they know as well as everyone that this is really
impossible.

Best regards

Rick

···

--
Richard S. Marken
MindReadings.com
Home: 310 474 0313
Cell: 310 729 1400

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This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and
may contain privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use,
disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended
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of the original message.

[B_Thalhammer]

[From Bryan Thalhammer (2005.11.09.2145 CST)]

All we know is the writing. The writing is an artifact left over from journalists controlling their perceptions of their goals. If we want to make some guesses about a particular journalist, we can say something about how the writing reflects the environment the journalist is working in, the words that the journalist favors, and perhaps the counter-control the journalist is engaged in.

The reporter's stated goals, his/her actual goals, and the goals each and every observer ascribes are all different. Forget the goals, unless you want to do the Test. And remember that when you do the Test, you invariably alter the thing examined (Heisenberg). It's more authentic to just look at the words.

--B.

[Rick Marken (2005.11.09.1530)]

···

... But, in answer to the last question, I would say that
what we know is they are writing. Sometimes we can glean a little bit about
people's references from what they write (it's pretty clear, for example,
that Ibsen was a great liberal) but basically all we know are the writings
themselves and the imaginings elicited by those writings. And that's plenty
for me. I don't have to know what a reporter's goals are in order to know
what they are writing about. But I do think it is useful to know what a
reporter's goals are (or, at least, what we think those goals should be).
The way to find that out is, I think, to read a book on journalism (or, in
my case, ask my daughter, who will be teaching journalism at Stanford).

...

Best regards

Rick

[BJORN_SIMONSEN]

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.11.11,09:20 EUST)]

From Fred Nickols (2005.11.07.1355 EST)
And if you press them to acknowledge that they don't
really control what's out there, only their perceptions
of it, most of them (including me on many occasions)
will give you an odd look, shrug, and say, "Sure. So
what?" Why? Because unless our perceptions are
totally divorced from any kind of objective reality, me
thinking that I'm controlling my behavior so as to grasp
that coffee cup, raise it to my lips, take a sip and put it
back down, presents no practical problem and a PCT
view of that same action offers no practical advantage.

Aren't all our perceptions totally divorced from any kind of objective
realty? Is the world out there more objective real if 6 billion people say
(as Tim Carey) "The sun goes down in the evenings".

I have another problem you maybe can help me to explain Bill once said:
"Thus the physicist pounds on the solid table top and
says "This is an illusion, since the tabletop is REALLY mostly empty space
and waves and fields and flying particles." Of course it is not an
illusion; the experience is the reality, while the empty space, the fields
and particles, are imagined entities which, if they actually did exist,
would account for what we experience".

Is it really an illusion? Or is it an illusion when we see an illusionist
walking through a wall?

Bjorn

[Fred_Nickols1]

[From Fred Nickols (2005.11.11.0700 EST)] -

Bjorn Simonsen (2005.11.11,09:20 EUST)]

From Fred Nickols (2005.11.07.1355 EST)
>And if you press them to acknowledge that they don't
>really control what's out there, only their perceptions
>of it, most of them (including me on many occasions)
>will give you an odd look, shrug, and say, "Sure. So
>what?" Why? Because unless our perceptions are
>totally divorced from any kind of objective reality, me
>thinking that I'm controlling my behavior so as to grasp
>that coffee cup, raise it to my lips, take a sip and put it
>back down, presents no practical problem and a PCT
>view of that same action offers no practical advantage.

Aren't all our perceptions totally divorced from any kind of objective
realty? Is the world out there more objective real if 6 billion people say
(as Tim Carey) "The sun goes down in the evenings".

Hmm. Even if we adopt the position that all we know of the world, we know through our senses, we are left with the problem of sensing something, whatever that something might be. I think I know what I sense and you probably think you know what you sense. We are faced, then, with the task of verifying, validating, confirming, substantiating (pick a term you like) our perceptions. So I also believe, as I think most other people do, that there is an "out there" out there. The problem for us all is getting some agreement on its nature. We do that all the time in very practical ways; we confirm for each other what is out there. Usually, this requires less than scientific precision and sometimes scientific research and precision is the only way to proceed. And sometimes, I suspect, we are all at a loss.

I have another problem you maybe can help me to explain Bill once said:
"Thus the physicist pounds on the solid table top and
says "This is an illusion, since the tabletop is REALLY mostly empty space
and waves and fields and flying particles." Of course it is not an
illusion; the experience is the reality, while the empty space, the fields
and particles, are imagined entities which, if they actually did exist,
would account for what we experience".

Is it really an illusion? Or is it an illusion when we see an illusionist
walking through a wall?

I'm no physicist (or engineer or much of anything else for that matter) but the fist and the table anecdote seems to me to have relative densities at the heart of it, not illusions. As for an illusionist walking through a wall, well, were I to "see" (perceive) that, I'd say it was indeed an illusion.

···

--
Regards,

Fred Nickols, CPT
Senior Consultant
Distance Consulting
"Assistance at A Distance"
nickols@att.net
www.nickols.us

[BJORN_SIMONSEN]

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.11.11,15:25 EUST)]

[From Fred Nickols (2005.11.11.0700 EST)] -
It was a nice mail.

Even if we adopt the position that all we know of the
world, we know through our senses, we are left with the problem
of sensing something, whatever that something might be.

Agree. Should this sentence be basis for all social relationships?

I think I know what I sense and you probably think you know
what you sense. We are faced, then, with the task of verifying,
validating, confirming, substantiating (pick a term you like)
our perceptions.

I absolutely agree with your first sentence. The nearest I ever can come the
"out there" is my perceptions. And a basis for myself is that my perceptions
are not and will never be analog the "out there".
Should the last sentence be basis +1 for all social relationships?

So I also believe, as I think most other people
do, that there is an "out there" out there.

Yes, I absolutely think you believe so. I also think you are on home ground
when you talk for a lot of other people. You must have met many people in
the working life who had to develop better social relationships (I have
studied a lot of your writings on the web).

But I think it is interesting to listen to the argumentation when two
groups, employees and employer try to solve a mutual problem. Then they
often say that my Statement is Right and your Statement is Wrong. It is a
classical Conflict between People and we in CSG know how to solve it.

But I wish to emphasize that the adjectives "Right" and "Wrong" don't
describe any events or relationships in the environment. The adjectives
"Right" and "Wrong" are more a way to describe the degree of Inner
Conflicts. We know what we are able to perceive our own experiences, we will
never be able to perceive what other people have perceived or perceives
(well we can use the Test up to a certain degree).

Therefore is my question to you as a Senior Consultant: "Should a consultant
who helps a group of employees and a group representing the employer help
each group to solve their own inner conflicts instead of helping them to
negotiate?

The problem for us
all is getting some agreement on its nature.

Yes, see above.

We do that all the time in very practical ways; we confirm
for each other what is out there.

I don't think we can confirm for each other what is out there. Nobody knows,
I guess. But I think it is possible to confirm for each other what is "in
here".

Usually, this requires less than scientific precision
and sometimes scientific research and precision is the only
way to proceed. And sometimes, I suspect, we are all at a loss.

Yes I absolutely agree.

Bjorn

[Fred_Nickols1]

[From Fred Nickols (2005.11.11.1142 EST)] -
  
Bjorn Simonsen (2005.11.11,15:25 EUST)]

[From Fred Nickols (2005.11.11.0700 EST)] -
It was a nice mail.

> Even if we adopt the position that all we know of the
>world, we know through our senses, we are left with the problem
>of sensing something, whatever that something might be.

Agree. Should this sentence be basis for all social relationships?

I'm not sure what you mean, Bjorn. How would such a sentence serve as the basis for social relationships. Its major significance, as far as I am concerned, is that much of the time we need to be tentative regarding what it is we think we perceive. Presumably, that would include the actions of others and most especially the motives we infer.

>I think I know what I sense and you probably think you know
>what you sense. We are faced, then, with the task of verifying,
>validating, confirming, substantiating (pick a term you like)
>our perceptions.

I absolutely agree with your first sentence. The nearest I ever can come the
"out there" is my perceptions. And a basis for myself is that my perceptions
are not and will never be analog the "out there".

Nor will mine but if we can agree on what we see - and subject our agreement to tests - then we can reach some concurrence regarding the nature of "out there."

More to the point, perhaps, I refuse to believe that I am not a part of something much larger than myself and I refuse to believe that all I know of the world out there is all there is. It is one thing to say that all I can ever know of the world out there is what I sense or perceive; it is an altogether different matter to say that all there is is what I perceive. I don't want to fall into that last trap.

Should the last sentence be basis +1 for all social relationships?

> So I also believe, as I think most other people
> do, that there is an "out there" out there.

Yes, I absolutely think you believe so. I also think you are on home ground
when you talk for a lot of other people. You must have met many people in
the working life who had to develop better social relationships (I have
studied a lot of your writings on the web).

Thanks for what I take to be a compliment but I'm not sure what you mean when you say that I "talk for a lot of othe people." Please say more about that.

But I think it is interesting to listen to the argumentation when two
groups, employees and employer try to solve a mutual problem. Then they
often say that my Statement is Right and your Statement is Wrong. It is a
classical Conflict between People and we in CSG know how to solve it.

You are more confident in PCT than I. I agree that people who are caught up in I'm right and you're wrong can be brought around so to speak but that doesn't require PCT and I've seen nothing on the CSGNet list that would lead me to believe PCT-savvy people are any better at it than others.

But I wish to emphasize that the adjectives "Right" and "Wrong" don't
describe any events or relationships in the environment. The adjectives
"Right" and "Wrong" are more a way to describe the degree of Inner
Conflicts. We know what we are able to perceive our own experiences, we will
never be able to perceive what other people have perceived or perceives
(well we can use the Test up to a certain degree).

Technically, you are probably correct; we can never perceive what others perceive. My response to that is, "So what?" I don't need to perceive what others perceive; I need to understand it and gauge it in light of my own perceptions and, on occasion, I and others need to spend a lot of time talking and testing to see if we are in agreement about things "out there" (and "in here" as well). But I don't need to literally perceive what they perceive with 100 percent fidelity or accuracy. Close enough will do.

Therefore is my question to you as a Senior Consultant: "Should a consultant
who helps a group of employees and a group representing the employer help
each group to solve their own inner conflicts instead of helping them to
negotiate?

The answer is Yes and the answer is No. My consulting practice is predicated on several basic propositions, one of which is that help is defined by the recipient. So, I tend not to try to help clients wrestle with matters they choose not to. On the other hand, I also try to adhere to some basic professional standards so I don't necessarily agree to help clients do whatever it is they want to do. The client-consultant relationship, at least as I see it, is about mutual influence, not unilateral control.

···

--
Regards,

Fred Nickols, CPT
Senior Consultant
Distance Consulting
"Assistance at A Distance"
nickols@att.net
www.nickols.us

[BJORN_SIMONSEN]

[From Bjorn Simonsen (2005.11.11,233:15 EUST)]

From Fred Nickols (2005.11.11.1142 EST)

>>Even if we adopt the position that all we know of the
>>world, we know through our senses, we are left with the problem
>>of sensing something, whatever that something might be.

Agree. Should this sentence be basis for all social relationships?

I'm not sure what you mean, Bjorn.

Well I talk for myself. Let me (over)simplify. We can be nice and we can be
bad to people in our environment. I don't wish to be bad to my own
perceptions.

And a basis for myself is that my perceptions
are not and will never be analog the "out there".

Nor will mine but if we can agree on what we see - and
subject our agreement to tests - then we can reach
some concurrence regarding the nature of "out there."

If we agree on an event, it is my perception. Even when you say and I hear:"
I agree, just as I should say it myself", it is my perception. If I Test for
the Controlled Quantity (you)(the Controlled Quantity is in me), I will see
if what I hypothesized the Controlled Quantity to be is correct.
All knowledge I get about agreements are my thoughts.

More to the point, perhaps, I refuse to believe that I am not a part
of something much larger than myself and I refuse to believe that
all I know of the world out there is all there is.

I shall not disturb you and I will not disturb you.

It is one thing to
say that all I can ever know of the world out there is what I sense
or perceive; it is an altogether different matter to say that all there
is what I perceive.

You explained this very well in an earlier mail saying: " I'm simply trying
to point out that a lot of folks aren't too terribly interested in the
distinction between controlling their behavior versus controlling their
perceptions of it".
I think I would have paraphrased what you wrote above: " It is one thing to
say that all _you_ can ever know of the world out there is what _you_ sense
or perceive; it is an altogether different matter to say that all there is
what _I_ perceive.

I don't want to fall into that last trap.

I don't think our thoughts are any trap. They explain what we perceive.

Thanks for what I take to be a compliment but I'm not sure what you
mean when you say that I "talk for a lot of other people." Please say
more about that.

You are right.
I explained myself in a wrong way. I meant to say that you as a Consultant
(your home ground) must have met many people who believed that there is an
"out there" out there. I mean many employees saying there is an employer out
there and many employers saying there are many employees out there.
That's what they think, I think. Have a good night.
Bjorn

[Tracy_Harms1]

Fred Nickols wrote:

...

Hmm. Even if we adopt the position that all we know
of the world, we know through our senses, we are
left with the problem of sensing something, whatever
that something might be. I think I know what I
sense and you probably think you know what you
sense. We are faced, then, with the task of
verifying, validating, confirming, substantiating
(pick a term you like) our perceptions.

When we're concerned about accuracy and adequacy of
perceptions, as the topic appears to be here, none of
these terms point us in the right direction.

If we hope to learn something about the wider world,
beyond what is perceptually apparent at any given
time, the task we are faced with is challenging our
perceptions, not validating them. We should strive to
compare, contrast, criticize, and otherwise reconsider
in order that the truth of the matter may be tested.
Efforts at positive assurance are either misguided, or
they are misidentified (i.e. the actual value occurs
through testing, contrary to what is said.)

Tracy B. Harms

···

__________________________________
Yahoo! FareChase: Search multiple travel sites in one click.
http://farechase.yahoo.com

[Bozo_the_Clown]

From [Marc Abrams (2005.11.11.1929)]

In a message dated 11/11/2005 5:24:15 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, t_b_harms@YAHOO.COM writes:

···

Tracy Harms

Fred Nickols wrote:

Hmm. Even if we adopt the position that all we know
of the world, we know through our senses, we are
left with the problem of sensing something, whatever
that something might be. I think I know what I
sense and you probably think you know what you
sense. We are faced, then, with the task of
verifying, validating, confirming, substantiating
(pick a term you like) our perceptions.

When we’re concerned about accuracy and adequacy of
perceptions, as the topic appears to be here, none of
these terms point us in the right direction.

If we hope to learn something about the wider world,
beyond what is perceptually apparent at any given
time, the task we are faced with is challenging our
perceptions, not validating them. We should strive to
compare, contrast, criticize, and otherwise reconsider
in order that the truth of the matter may be tested.
Efforts at positive assurance are either misguided, or
they are misidentified (i.e. the actual value occurs
through testing, contrary to what is said.)

Very well said Tracy, except we have one tiny problem here. In order to do what you suggest we do, would require each of us to expose ourselves and our beliefs to others. As controllers this is a very risky business and most folks simply don’t have the trust in others to do this kind of thing.

Remember, nothing, and I mean nothing, comes before our attempts at correcting error, or maintaining stability. When we perceive threat or embarrassment we react quickly, tacitly, and often blindly to the consequences that our attempts at control have on others.

Let’s not also forget that the ultimate purpose of control is to maintain system stability and as controllers we usually do an excellent job of it, even if it means creating huge problems with others while doing so.

Regards,

Marc

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2005.11.12.0820)]

Tracy B. Harms

If we hope to learn something about the wider world,
beyond what is perceptually apparent at any given
time, the task we are faced with is challenging our
perceptions, not validating them.

I agree that the notion of "validating" perceptions makes no sense from a PCT perspective. Perceptions are the ultimate (and only) reality of a control system. When I control a perception, like the perception of being a good host, say, I'm never concerned about what I am "really" controlling -- what is really behind the perception of being a host. The reality I am controlling is the perception: of myself as the host.

What we should be willing to validate is not our perceptions but our beliefs _about_ these perceptions. And we do this, not by challenging our perceptions (I don't even know what that would that would mean, actually; how does one challenge a perception?) but by challenging our beliefs. We challenge a belief, not by challenging perceptions, but by _testing_ to see whether the perceptual consequences of the belief obtains. That is, we look for evidence that will either confirm or disconfirm the belief. This is what we (well, some of us) do all the time with out beliefs about the PCT explanation of behavior. We create circumstances (experimental situations) where the behavior we observe (perceive) will either confirm or disconfirm the model (belief). So far, we've only seen confirmation.

So I would say that the task we are (or should) all be faced with is challenging our _beliefs_ using perceptual evidence. Perception should be the ultimate arbiter of what we believe because it is the only thing of which we can be certain: I perceive therefore I believe (tentatively).

Best

Rick

···

---
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[Fred_Nickols1]

[From Fred Nickols (2005.11.12.1228 EST)] -

Rick Marken (2005.11.12.0820)]
So I would say that the task we are (or should) all be faced with is
challenging our _beliefs_ using perceptual evidence. Perception should
be the ultimate arbiter of what we believe because it is the only thing
of which we can be certain: I perceive therefore I believe
(tentatively).

Hmm. What about optical illusions? Why should I be so certain of my
perceptions? Why shouldn't I check/confirm/verify what I think I perceive
against what others are perceiving? How else do we come to agreement that
brown is brown and red is red and that my car is red and my dog is brown?
And don't agreements such as that signal the existence of something "out
there"?

Regards,

Fred Nickols
"Assistance at a Distance"
nickols@att.net
www.nickols.us

[Bozo_the_Clown]

From [Marc Abrams (2005.11.11.2043)]

In a message dated 11/12/2005 11:21:40 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, marken@MINDREADINGS.COM writes:

···

[From Rick Marken (2005.11.12.0820)]

Tracy B. Harms

If we hope to learn something about the wider world,
beyond what is perceptually apparent at any given
time, the task we are faced with is challenging our
perceptions, not validating them.

I agree that the notion of “validating” perceptions makes no sense from
a PCT perspective.

I don’t think ‘validation’ is what Tracy had in mind. I think with his mention of ‘challenging’ our perceptions he might have been talking about ‘critical discussion’ or a ‘critical attitude’ as possibly outlined by Karl Popper the 2oth century scientific philosopher.

For those who have never had the pleasure of reading Popper I provide what I believe to be the point Tracy was alluding to when he said ‘challenge’. (highlighting is mine)

"…it passes on its theories; but it also passes on a critical attitude towards them. The theories are passed on, not as dogmas, but rather with the challenge to discuss them and improve upon them. This tradition is Hellenic: it may be traced back to Thales, founder of the first school (I do not mean ‘of the first philosophical school’, but simply ‘of the 1st school’) which was not mainly concerned with the preservation of a dogma.

The critical attitude, the tradition of free discussion of theories with
the aim of discovering their weak spots so that they may be improved upon, is the attitude of reasonableness, of rationality. It makes far-reaching use of both verbal argument and observation-of observation in the interest of argument, however. The Greeks’ discovery of the critical method gave rise at first to the mistaken hope that it would lead to the solution of all the great old problems; that it would establish certainty; that it would help to prove our theories, to justify them. But this hope was a residue of the dogmatic way of thinking; in fact nothing can be justified or proved (outside of mathematics and logic). The demand for rational proofs in science indicates a failure to keep distinct the broad realm of rationality and the narrow realm of rational certainty: it is an untenable, an unreasonable demand.

Nevertheless, the role of logical argument, of deductive logical reasoning, remains all-important for the critical approach; not because it allows us to prove our theories, or to infer them from observation statements, but because only by purely deductive reasoning is it possible for us to discover what our theories imply, and thus to criticize them effectively. Criticism, I said, is an attempt to find the weak spots in a theory, and these, as a rule, can be found only in the more remote logical consequences which can be derived from it. It is here that purely logical reasoning plays an important part in science.

Hume was right in stressing that our theories cannot be validly
inferred from what we can know to be true-neither from observations nor from anything else. He concluded from this that our belief in them was irrational. If ‘belief’ means here our inability to doubt our natural laws, and the constancy of natural regularities, then Hume is again right: this kind of dogmatic belief has, one might say, a physiological rather than a rational basis. If, however, the term ‘belief’ is taken to cover our critical acceptance of scientific theories-a tentative acceptance combined with an eagerness to revise the theory if we succeed in designing a test which it cannot pass-then Hume was wrong. In such an acceptance of theories there is nothing irrational. There is not even anything irrational in relying for practical purposes upon well-tested theories, for no more rational course of action is open to us.

Assume that we have deliberately made it our task to live in this
unknown world of ours; to adjust ourselves to it as well as we can; to take advantage of the opportunities we can find in it; and to explain it, if possible (we need not assume that it is), and as far as possible, with the help of laws and explanatory theories. If we have made this our task, then there is no more rational procedure than the method of trial and error-of conjecture and refutation: of boldly proposing theories; of trying our best to show that these are erroneous; and of accepting them tentatively if our critical
efforts are unsuccessful. From the point of view here developed all laws, all theories, remain essentially tentative, or conjectural, or hypothetical, even when we feel unable to doubt them any longer.

Before a theory has been refuted we can never know in what way it may have to be modified. That the sun will always rise and set within twenty-four hours is still proverbial as a law ‘established by induction beyond reasonable doubt’. It is odd that this example is still in use, though it may have served well enough in the days of Aristotle and Pytheas of Massalia-the great traveler who for centuries was called a liar because of his tales of Thule, the land of
the frozen sea and the midnight sun.

The method of trial and error is not, of course, simply identical with
the scientific or critical approach-with the method of conjecture and
refutation. The method of trial and error is applied not only by Einstein but, in a more dogmatic fashion, by the amoeba also. The difference lies not so much in the trials as in a critical and constructive attitude towards errors; errors which the scientist consciously and cautiously tries to uncover in order to refute his theories with searching arguments, including appeals to the most severe experimental tests which his theories and his ingenuity permit him to design. The critical attitude might be described as the result of a conscious attempt to make our theories, our conjectures, suffer in our stead in the struggle for the survival of the fittest. It gives us a chance to survive the elimination of an inadequate hypothesis-when a more dogmatic attitude would eliminate it by eliminating us. (There is a touching story of
an Indian community which disappeared because of its belief in the
holiness of life, including that of tigers.) We thus obtain the fittest
theory within our reach by the elimination of those which are less fit. (By ‘fitness’ I do not mean merely ‘usefulness’ but truth; see chapters 3 and 10, below.) I do not think that this procedure is irrational or in need of any further rational justification."

–Karl Popper Conjectures and Refutations pg’s 67-69

What we should be willing to validate is not our perceptions but our
beliefs about these perceptions.

No, it’s never about ‘validation’. Validation is, as Popper points out, a futile game. Any belief or theory we hold we should hold tentatively and with caution, always striving to find the weak points so we may strengthen the theory, not destroy it.

And we do this, not by challenging our perceptions (I don’t even know what that >would that would mean, actually; how does one challenge a perception?)

Are you still in doubt as to what ‘challenge’ means?

but by challenging our beliefs. We challenge a belief, not by challenging >perceptions, but by testing to see whether the perceptual consequences of the >belief obtains.

Beliefs are the perceptions we have and hold about the world Everything we know, we know as a perception. It’s all
perception.

That is, we look for evidence that will either confirm or disconfirm the belief.

No, the focus needs to be on disconfirming since we learn nothing new from confirmation., and since we can never ever know with certainty that our theories are true we need to spend our time trying to poke as many holes and find as many gaps in our theories as we can. It is the only way to advance any theory, including PCT.

This is what we (well, some of us) do all the time with out beliefs about the PCT >explanation of behavior.

Yes, that is exactly what you do all the time. You keep on running the same tests which provide you with no new clues as to where and how your theory might need help and where the gaps are. Except others have indeed found gaps and holes. But these are undiscussable on CSGnet. In fact you avoid it like the plague because you feel people will not be interested in a theory that has holes in it. So instead you are stuck in a double-bind that becomes undiscussable and unresolvable.

If you can’t have critical discussions about the weak points and gaps, how do you intend on resolving them? And if you can’t resolve them why do you think people would be interested in a theory with a bunch of holes and gaps in it? Yet none of this can be discussed here because you might hurt someone’s feelings. So instead a theory languishes.

Kenny, in a private conversation we had, this was a dilemma I spoke of, do you still think I’m off-base?

We create circumstances (experimental situations) where the behavior we >observe (perceive) will either confirm or disconfirm the model (belief). So far, >we’ve only seen confirmation.

Yes, this is precisely the problem of setting up ‘tests’ to ‘confirm’ and not setting up tests to disconfirm. They are not the same thing.

For instance Rick, what evidence would I need to produce to show you that ‘levels’ do not exist as outlined in PCT/HPCT theory? What tests could I do to disconfirm this belief? Is there any test I could perform or provide any evidence that would show you that any part of the current theory might be false.

If your answer is no, than you are not dealing in a science, you are dealing in a religion, and then of course all this does not matter.

It is this kind of talk that leads to ‘enemies’ list on CSGnet and a total lack of scientific integrity.

Of course since all this is undiscussable I don’t think I’ll be hearing from anyone on this

So I would say that the task we are (or should) all be faced with is
challenging our beliefs using perceptual evidence.

If you mean by ‘challenging’, the confirmation of what you already believe than you don’t need to ‘test’ anything. The reason you walk around believing whatever it is you believe is because it has already ‘passed’ certain tests you privately hold.

Perception should be the ultimate arbiter of what we believe because it is the >only thing of which we can be certain: I perceive therefore I believe
(tentatively).

No, perceptions are not ‘pure’. Your perceptions of the world are a mixture of what you imagine things to be, what you want things to be and how you learned to frame and experience the world.

Your cog class should be a lot of fun. I wish I could attend. I really would love to hear you talk about epistemology.

Regards,

Marc

[Richard_Marken2]

[From RIck Marken (2005.11.12.2140)]

Marc Abrams (2005.11.11.2043)--

Rick Marken (2005.11.12.0820)

We challenge a belief, not by challenging perceptions, but by _testing_ to see whether the perceptual consequences of the belief obtains.

�
Beliefs are the perceptions we have and hold about the world Everything we know, we know as a perception. It's all perception.

Yes. They are all perceptions, in the sense that they are afferent neural signals. But I think of beliefs as non- sensory based perceptions: imaginations. I usually use the term "perception" to refer to refer to sensory based perceptions.

This is what we (well, some of us) do all the time with out beliefs about the PCT explanation of behavior.

�
Yes, that is exactly what you do all the time. You keep on running the same tests which provide you with no new clues as to where and how your theory might need help and where the gaps are. Except others have indeed found gaps and holes. But these are undiscussable on CSGnet.

Instead of always saying this, why not just discuss these things? I think you'll find quite a lot of interest in it. But I don't think you'll find much interest in it if what you mean by "discuss" is posting a reference to some article and then saying "there, that proves that PCT is wrong about X".

For instance Rick, what evidence would I need to produce to show you that 'levels' do not exist as outlined in PCT/HPCT theory? What tests could I do to disconfirm this belief? Is there any test I could�perform or provide any evidence that would show you that�any part of the current theory might be false.

Yes. For example, you could develop a non-hierarchical model of the behavior observed in my "levels of behavior" experiment at:

http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Levels.html

Then use that model to make a prediction about how a person would behave in different circumstances. Then test to see if people behave as predicted by your non-hierarchical model.

That's one way of showing that a non-hierarchical model is an improvement over (or, at least, a reasonable alternative to) a hierarchical model. I can think of several others but that might be a nice, easy way to start.

If your answer is no, than you are not dealing in a science, you are dealing in a religion, and then of course all this�does not matter.

My answer was yes. So how about putting a cork in it until you can come back with some actual evidence (like the kind I mentioned above) that a non-hierarchical model can handle the kind of phenomena that seem to require (and have been successfully modeled using) a hierarchical model of control.

Rick

···

----
Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
Home 310 474-0313
Cell 310 729-1400

[Bozo_the_Clown]

From [Marc Abrams (2005.11.12.0045)]

In a message dated 11/13/2005 12:39:22 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, marken@MINDREADINGS.COM writes:

worker_burnout.pdf (1.74 MB)

···

[From RIck Marken (2005.11.12.2140)]

Marc Abrams (2005.11.11.2043)–

Rick Marken (2005.11.12.0820)

We challenge a belief, not by challenging perceptions, but by
testing to see whether the perceptual consequences of the belief
obtains.

Beliefs are the perceptions we have and hold about the world
Everything we know, we know as a perception. It’s all perception.

Yes. They are all perceptions, in the sense that they are afferent
neural signals. But I think of beliefs as non- sensory based
perceptions: imaginations. I usually use the term “perception” to
refer to refer to sensory based perceptions.

How can you tell the difference between the two, and why would you need to?

This is what we (well, some of us) do all the time with out beliefs
about the PCT explanation of behavior.

Yes, that is exactly what you do all the time. You keep on running the
same tests which provide you with no new clues as to where and how
your theory might need help and where the gaps are. Except others have
indeed found gaps and holes. But these are undiscussable on CSGnet.

Instead of always saying this, why not just discuss these things?

But I am, right now. I asked you to provide me with a test or evidence that I could present to you that would falsify some aspect of the current PCT theory.

I also talked about how the holes and gaps in PCT are not discussable on CSGnet. As ‘proof’ of this I’d like to hear what you and Bill have to say about what you both feel PCT lacks, and how we might go about strengthening the theory.

I think you’ll find quite a lot of interest in it. But I don’t think
you’ll find much interest in it if what you mean by “discuss” is
posting a reference to some article and then saying “there, that proves
that PCT is wrong about X”.

Apparently your reading glasses are a bit foggy. You cannot prove anything one way or the other except in logic and with some simple mathematics. But that does not stop you from tossing that word around.

What both you and Bill have done though is ask anyone who wants to talk about something different, is to ‘prove’ PCT wrong first, and that can’t be done. So in effect you have cut off all inquiry into the theory, and remain firmly in control. Of what, I’m not sure, but you are in control.

In good faith why don’t you open a discussion on something you feel PCT lacks since you are so willing to discuss it?

Everything is a ‘challenge’ to you and your manhood, what a shame.

For instance Rick, what evidence would I need to produce to show you
that ‘levels’ do not exist as outlined in PCT/HPCT theory? What tests
could I do to disconfirm this belief? Is there any test I
could perform or provide any evidence that would show you that any
part of the current theory might be false.

Yes. For example, you could develop a non-hierarchical model of the
behavior observed in my “levels of behavior” experiment at:

http://www.mindreadings.com/ControlDemo/Levels.html

Do you mean to explain this behavior?

First, notice that it is virtually impossible to avoid the brief “runaway” period that occurs when the polarity of the connection between mouse and cursor changes. During this runaway period you are actually pushing the cursor away from the target in an exponentially accelerated manner. This happens because the change in polarity makes the sign of the cursor control loop ** positive. The runaway is positive feedback in action.**

** You can’t avoid the runaway because the quality control loop cannot act quickly enough to prevent it. It takes about 1/2 second for the quality control loop to change the way the cursor control system deals with error. During this 1/2 second, the cursor control loop is in a positive feedback relationship with respect to the variable it is controlling (cursor position). This can be seen in the graph of your behavior. The horizontal line in this graph is the location of the target; the vertical line indicates the point at which the polarity reversal occurs. The open squares are a trace of your cursor movements just before and for a period after the polarity reversal. The filled squares are a trace of the cursor movements made by a simple control model during the same period.**

** Back to Levels**

** Notice that both you and the model accelerate the cursor away from the target as soon as the polarity reversal occurs. Your cursor control system works just like a simple control system for about 1/2 second, at which point the model’s cursor continues off the graph while your cursor return to the target position (usually after a brief overshoot in a direction opposite to the initial runaway). Your cursor returns to the target due to the operation of another control system – the quality control system – that operates on the cursor control system. The quality control system must have been monitoring the performance of the cursor control system all along; in this sense, the quality control system is at a higher-level that the cursor control system. When the quality control system sees that the cursor control system is in trouble, it “fixes” the problem.**

If so, where did the positive feedback come from and where do you account for that in your theory? And if I produce a model that has no levels, will you will discard your notion of levels in PCT? Are you sure? Are you really sure this behavior cannot be accounted for by a network rather than a hierarchical structure?

BTW, how come you only need two ‘levels’ to account for this behavior, maybe 10 or 11 is overkill then? Maybe all the robotic experiments I have heard about can generally be done with 3 ‘levels’ or less?

How many ‘levels’ does Kenneway’s bug have? Is it 11? If not, why not? I have never seen his project discussed here on CSGnet in detail nor have I seen any of the other ‘projects’ that Bill was involved in that didn’t quite work out the way he wanted. Aren’t those worthy of critical analysis and discussion?

Or are these ‘failures’ just things to try and sweep away and make believe they never happened? Isn’t there something to be learned from them?

The experiments Bill was working on with Bruce Abbott were never discussed. I once started a conversation with Bruce, and I asked Abbott a few questions and he ran for the hills. Apparently his little rats had a hard time controlling the cursor.

Maybe the real reason no discussions are had is because Bill thinks the only one who can truly analyze and be critical of his work is one Bill Powers.

Then use that model to make a prediction about how a person would
behave in different circumstances. Then test to see if people behave as
predicted by your non-hierarchical model.

And what ‘prediction’ does your model make? That is, based on this model how would you predict someone might act in confronting a lion? What can I say about the behavior of an individual from that model? What will it help me ‘predict’ in the future about that individual?

That’s one way of showing that a non-hierarchical model is an
improvement over (or, at least, a reasonable alternative to) a
hierarchical model. I can think of several others but that might be a
nice, easy way to start.

OK, you have your model, I’d like to hear of some others you may have in mind. I have attached an SD model that was used to understand burnout in individuals, enjoy.

And there are many other models I could produce that have no ‘levels’ and do quite a nice job of describing human behavior.

But that is not the point here. Why don’t we discuss the burnout model?

If your answer is no, than you are not dealing in a science, you are
dealing in a religion, and then of course all this does not matter.

My answer was yes. So how about putting a cork in it until you can come
back with some actual evidence (like the kind I mentioned above) that a
non-hierarchical model can handle the kind of phenomena that seem to
require (and have been successfully modeled using) a hierarchical model
of control.

I just did, now what?

But that still does not address my post. I called for open critical discussion, and what I get from you and always get from you is a challenge to ‘prove’ that PCT is wrong, and that is not my freakin’ purpose, nor has it ever been.

Get your glasses cleaned.

Regards,

Marc

[Richard_Marken2]

[From Rick Marken (2005.11.13.0920)]

Marc Abrams (2005.11.12.0045)--
�

Rick Marken (2005.11.12.2140)

Marc Abrams (2005.11.11.2043)

Is there any test I could�perform or provide any evidence that would show you that�any part of the current theory might be false.

Yes. For example, you could develop a non-hierarchical model of the behavior observed in my "levels of behavior" experiment at:

Levels of Control

�
Do you mean to explain this behavior?

Yes. Using a non-hierarchical (network) model.

If so, where did the positive feedback come from and where do you account for that in your theory?

The feedback becomes positive when the polarity of the connection between handle and target -- the feedback connection -- reverses.

And if I produce a model that has no levels, will you will discard your notion of levels in PCT?

It would certainly help me understand what a non-hierarchical model is and how it applies to this "recovered runaway" situation. If it accounts for the data as well as the hierarchical model then I'd have to reconsider the idea that the "recovered runaway" situation reveals a hierarchical control organization. I would certainly reconsider the idea that levels applies to the "recovered runaway" situation if other predictions of the non-hierarchical model pan put.

Are you sure? Are you really sure this behavior cannot be accounted for by a network rather than a hierarchical structure?

No, I'm not sure at all. I think it would be great if you would produce a network model (either as a computer program, a set of simultaneous equations of as a flow diagram) so that I could see how it applies to this "recovered runaway" situation and we could compare it's predictions to those of a hierarchical model.

BTW, how come you only need two 'levels' to account for this behavior, maybe 10 or 11 is overkill then? ...

Now you're getting off on a tangent again. You asked if there was any test you could�perform that would show me that�any part of the current theory might be false. I gave you one example: develop and test a network model of the "recovered runaway" experiment. So now it's time for you to stop asking your ridiculous questions and start actually doing something worthwhile. If you think there is something wrong with the hierarchical assumptions of PCT then please show me what they are, using models and data.

And what 'prediction' does your model make? That is, based on this model how would you predict someone might act in confronting a lion?

Again, just show me what you think is the right way to model it. My model of the "recovered runaway" situation makes no predictions about what a person would do in confronting a lion. What does your model predict? What _is_ you model.

OK, you have your model, I'd like to hear of some others you may have in mind. I have attached an SD model that was used to understand burnout in individuals, enjoy.

There you go again, posting papers as your "discussion" of issues. If you can't describe the model that is in this paper to me, explain how it works, what it predicts and how it differs from a PCT model, then I'm just not interested. I've read the papers you've posted and in every case I was unable to see what the point of posting them was. If you can't think for yourself, Marc, then you're really not PCT material.

But that is not the point here. Why don't we discuss the burnout model?

Fine. Why don't you describe it in a post and say what you like about it. That would be the way to start a useful discussion.

My answer was yes. So how about putting a cork in it until you can come back with some actual evidence (like the kind I mentioned above) that a non-hierarchical model can handle the kind of phenomena that seem to require (and have been successfully modeled using) a hierarchical model of control.

�
I just did, now what?

Marc, you just posted a PDF file. Evidence is what I described: a non-hierarchical model of the "recovered runaway" situation. If you want to describe the model that you say is described in the PDF file and explain how it relates to a PCT model that would be acceptable as well. Now get to work.

Rick

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Richard S. Marken
marken@mindreadings.com
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